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HANDBOOK ON AGGRESSOR MILITARY FORCES

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No. 3

**DEPARTMENTS OF THE ARMY
AND THE NAVY**

WASHINGTON 25, D. C., 23 September 1955

HANDBOOK ON AGGRESSOR MILITARY FORCES (U)

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INTRODUCTION

1. Purpose

This manual is designed—

a. As a guide for the Maneuver Director and Chief Umpire and their staffs in the organization and tactics to be employed by Aggressor in tactical exercises.

b. To provide the Aggressor Force commander and his troops with the information necessary to convert United States units to Aggressor units and to acquaint them with the tactical principles to be employed by Aggressor in field exercises.

c. To serve as reference material for United States troops preparing for participation in tactical exercises in which they will be opposed by Aggressor.

2. Scope

The information contained herein includes Aggressor history, military system, organization of units, doctrine and tactics of offensive, defensive, and special operations. It also includes a brief description of the weapons and logistic principles employed by Aggressor.

3. Departures From Aggressor History, Organization, and Tactical Doctrine

a. The location of Aggressor-held or Aggressor-invaded territory may be changed at will in the preparation of tactical exercises. Departures from Aggressor history, as contained in paragraphs 368 and 369, may be brief and radical in order to attain this change. It is emphasized, however, that in order to insure a high degree of realism in all assumed tactical situations, the organization, tactical doctrine, and general nature of Aggressor troops should be as set forth in this manual.

b. The information relative to the Aggressor Air Forces, as contained in paragraphs 152 through 162 and 316 through 330 is not intended to set forth hard and fast rules governing the employment of tactical units as Aggressor Forces. In field exercises the Aggressor Air Force staffs theoretically will be organized as depicted. However, the actual command and operational control of United States Air Force units will remain with the designated air commander.

c. The information relative to the Aggressor Naval Forces, as contained in paragraphs 163 through 170 and 331 through 334 is not in-

tended to set forth hard and fast rules governing the employment of elements of the Fleet, Naval Aviation, or Marine Units as Aggressor Forces. In joint exercises the Aggressor Naval and Marine staffs will be theoretically organized as herein presented. However, the actual command and operational control of United States Naval and United States Marine Corps elements will remain with the designated naval commander.

PART ONE
ORGANIZATION
CHAPTER 1
THE AGGRESSOR ARMED FORCES

Section I. GENERAL

4. General

Immediately upon the formation of the Aggressor Republic, disbanded troops of many nations hastened to join its Armed Forces and were utilized as a well-balanced, professional cadre. Conscription was inaugurated to build up a large trained reserve. Experienced military leaders, including members of the armed forces of former great powers, were available and eager to accept employment; many were utilized. The Armed Forces have been rapidly expanded along sound lines. The training of all components is extremely thorough and rigorous. A high standard of discipline is maintained, morale and esprit de corps are excellent, and the prestige of the Armed Forces is high. All troops are given extensive indoctrination of the principles of the Circle Trigon Party.

5. Composition of the Armed Forces

The Armed Forces of the Aggressor Nation consist of four different services—the Ground Forces, the Air Forces, the Naval Forces, and the Security Forces.

6. Administration of the Armed Forces

a. The Ground Forces, Air Forces, and Naval Forces are all administered by the Ministry of the Armed Forces; the Security Forces are under the control of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

b. From the viewpoint of administration, the Ministry of the Armed Forces controls by far the most important part of the Armed Forces. More than 90 percent of the Armed Forces' personnel are under its jurisdiction. Through its General Staff, its various directorates, and service headquarters in the field, the Ministry of the Armed Forces bears the principal responsibility for carrying out the nation's military policy. This policy includes the induction of conscripts for all the

Armed Forces in time of peace and the mobilization of reservists in time of war.

7. Predominance of the Army

Although each of the services exists as a separate entity, they are by no means coequal members of the overall military organization. The Aggressor Army, as the senior service, predominates. In the past the Navy and the Air Forces operated solely in support of the Army. The General Staff was responsible for planning and supervising the execution of war plans involving all three services. Despite a tendency in recent years to divide power and responsibility more equitably among the services, the predominance of the Army has not been appreciably lessened.

8. Interrelation of Armed Forces

The interrelation between the Aggressor Armed Forces has resulted in the administration of these services by the same Ministry except during the period that a separate Ministry of Navy was in existence. No less than two-thirds of all aircraft in the Aggressor Air Forces belong to the tactical air arm, which is aptly named the Air Force of the Aggressor Army. Long-range aviation is a much smaller, semi-autonomous organization under Armed Forces General Staff control. Defense of the Aggressor Homeland against air attack is the responsibility of a separate command under the Armed Forces General Staff known as Home Air Defense. The Home Air Defense Command possesses its own early warning radar systems and communication channels, but the sizable antiaircraft artillery elements and fighter aviation under its control are provided by the Army and the Air Forces. Similarly, the Airborne Command, which is also directly subordinate to the Armed Forces General Staff, is a joint headquarters which appears to control both airborne combat elements and troop carrier units. A single logistical command known as Rear Services coordinates supply, storage, and movements for the Armed Forces. Thus, the Armed Forces are closely interrelated; they all furnish resources for certain mixed commands such as Military and Naval Districts, and they all draw logistical support from a common agency.

9. Navy

Administration and control of the navy, which was carried out by a separate ministry until recently, is also conducted by the Ministry of Defense. However, at sea the navy would have the relatively independent mission of attacking enemy naval and merchant shipping with a large submarine force.

10. Security Forces

The Security Forces are the military element of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. These elite forces, composed of border troops, internal security troops, and certain signal units, are not used for normal military tasks. As the ultimate bulwark and defenders of the regime, their primary mission is to provide the force necessary to insure the internal stability of the Aggressor Homeland.

Section II. THE ARMED FORCES HIGH COMMAND

11. General

a. Top-level planning and policy making for the overall military organization are vested in a single agency—the Trinity. The members of the Trinity also occupy key Government posts.

b. The Circle Trigon Party shapes policy, and the Aggressor Government puts the policy into practice. No sharp lines, however, can be drawn between the Party and the Government.

c. Constitutionally, the elected legislature has ultimate power, but in actual fact it has no influence.

12. Ministry of the Armed Forces

a. The Ministry of the Armed Forces is headed by the Minister of Armed Forces. Before the Armed Forces were placed under a single Ministry, professional officers headed the Ministry of War and the Ministry of Navy. The two First Deputy Ministers are soldiers. The Minister and his First Deputies deal for the most part with the Chief of the General Staff, the Chief of the Political Staff, and the Chief of the Inspection Staff. Although the Minister transmits his decisions and orders to the military establishment principally through the Chief of the General Staff, the channel of command goes directly from the Minister's headquarters to a number of staff headquarters and field commands in the Homeland and abroad.

b. Most of the remaining business of the Ministry of Defense is administered by six officers—the Commander in Chief of the Ground Forces, the Commander in Chief of the Air Forces, the Commander in Chief of the Naval Forces, the Commander of the Home Air Defense, the Commander of the Airborne Troops, and the Commander in Chief of Rear Services. Each of these officers has a headquarters and a sizable staff. Although all are designated as commanders, the nature of their responsibilities makes them in fact chiefs (that is, staff officers) rather than commanders. The position of the Commander in Chief of the Ground Forces, for example, closely parallels that of the Com-




Figure 1. The Aggressor Armed Forces.

manding General, Continental Army Command, in the United States Army.

c. The Ministry of the Armed Forces also includes agencies charged with the application of military justice, the carrying out of personnel administration, the supervision of military training other than that in the Armed Forces, and the publishing of military manuals.

13. Political Staff

The Chief of the Political Staff, who is the principal representative of the Circle Trigon Party, controls and administers a large political apparatus which blankets the entire Armed Forces. His representatives in headquarters and field units are designated as assistant commanders for political matters. While these assistants are subordinate to the commander or the chief of the element to which they are assigned, their actual relationship with the commander varies. During combat the commander unquestionably bears the full authority and responsibility of command. During peacetime the influence of the political officer grows, but the influence still does not infringe upon the principle of single command. Nevertheless, if the political officer is relatively sure of the merit of his position in a controversy with his commander, he can utilize confidential channels and often can secure a decision favorable to himself.

14. Inspection Staff

The Inspection Staff of the Ministry of the Armed Forces is responsible for checking combat readiness and for insuring that training is properly planned and efficiently executed. In this respect its function is somewhat similar to that of the Office of the United States Army Inspector General. Its activities, however, do not include inspection of morale, grievances, fiscal affairs, and administrative activities. The political apparatus and special agencies, sometimes referred to as the "conscience of the army," watch over such matters.

15. Armed Forces General Staff

a. Organization.

- (1) The General Staff is the principal military planning, coordinating, and executive body of the military establishment. Its chief is also a Deputy Minister of the Armed Forces. The great bulk of the Minister of the Armed Forces' business with his Ministry and with the Armed Forces is transacted through the General Staff. The Main Operations Directorate of the General Staff deals with operations. The General Staff also contains a Main Intelligence Directorate, an Organization and Mobilization Directorate, and various directorates con-

cerned with topographical, historical, high-level signal personnel, and other activities, but lacks logistical elements. A part of the General Staff's work consists of organizing and coordinating committees and teams of General Staff and other agency representatives. This liaison and committee system provides for G4 representation on the General Staff from the Office of the Chief of the Rear Services Staff.

- (2) G3 functions are divided between the Main Operations Directorate and the Organization and Mobilization Directorate. In the Aggressor organization the Main Intelligence Directorate is charged with G2 responsibility.

b. Detailed Planning in Time of War. The General Staff jointly serves the Army, the Navy, and the Air Forces. In time of war the General Staff probably will become again the planning agency charged with developing of joint (Army-Navy-Air) plans for the Trinity. In this case the General Staff would be transferred directly under the control of the Trinity and would no longer be an element of the Ministry of the Armed Forces. The Ministry would become principally a logistical and support agency. The operational chain of command would pass from the Trinity through the General Staff to the troops in the Regional Commands. The line between operational and logistical (rear services) matters would be drawn even more strongly than it is in peacetime.

c. Staff Personnel.

- (1) The Armed Forces General Staff is manned for the most part by Army officers. This fact reflects the continued predominance of the Army in military planning. Thus the Army outlook would tend to prevail in the preparation of concrete plans to meet a specific wartime situation.
- (2) Service on the General Staff is a career in the Aggressor Army, just as it once was in the German Army. The Aggressor General Staff officer is likely to be a professional soldier in his thirties or early forties who has made outstanding grades at the General Staff Institute and who can look forward to a relatively uninterrupted series of staff assignments. There appears to be a formally designated General Staff Corps, but there are no special insignia. Just as in the former German Army, an Aggressor General Staff officer assigned, for example, as chief of staff in a field command often exercises as much authority as the field commander under whom he is serving. Frequently during war members of the General Staff are sent to a Regional or Army

Group Headquarters so that they can monitor the conduct and influence the course of an operation which they themselves have planned.

16. Ground Forces High Command

a. The Ground Forces High Command develops basic doctrine and prescribes its application in training. It coordinates the Army's school system. It insures that the arms and services subordinate to it (rifle, cavalry, tank and mechanized, engineer, signal, and chemical troops) develop their specialized doctrine and conduct their specialized training in consonance with a unified policy. It exercises a predominant influence in the development of tactical air-ground co-operation.

b. The headquarters of the arms and services subordinate to the Ground Forces High Command have similar responsibilities in their own fields. In addition, these headquarters conduct research and development programs. They supervise the procurement, storage, issue, and maintenance of specialized equipment and supplies. The artillery arm, for example, includes an ordnance element called the Artillery Engineer Service. This service administers the Artillery Institute as a research and development agency. Artillery representatives—usually artillery engineers—are present in munitions factories to prescribe specifications in the manufacture of artillery pieces and ammunition and to inspect the materiel produced.

17. Air Forces High Command

a. The Air Forces High Command administers five separate air elements—the Air Force of the Aggressor Army (the tactical air force, which includes over 60% of all aircraft assigned to active units), Long-range Aviation, Aviation of the Home Defense Command, Troop Carrier Command, and the Civil Air Fleet.

b. The degree of control varies in each case. For example, in peacetime the Civil Air Fleet is under only nominal control of the Air Forces High Command. This limited control makes possible the planning of the Civil Air Fleet's peacetime activities so that the immediate potential can be increased in the event of war. Long-range Aviation is a semiautonomous command; its principal link with the Air Force Headquarters is for logistical support. On the other hand, the Air Force of the Aggressor Army is closely supervised in all of its affairs by the Air Force High Command. The Fighter Aviation of Antiair Defense Command and the Troop Carrier Command are administered and supported by the Air Forces, but their mission and some of their training are prescribed by other agencies.

18. Home Air Defense Command

The Home Air Defense Command is concerned with the security of Aggressor territory against air attack. Besides having its own radar systems, control centers, and communications net, the headquarters has at its disposal large forces of antiaircraft artillery, furnished by the Ground Troops, and of Fighter Aviation, supplied by the Air Forces.

19. Airborne Command

The Airborne Command apparently exists as a separate entity, but like the Antiair Defense Command, it must draw heavily on the training and materiel resources of the Ground Troops High Command and the Air Forces High Command.

20. Rear Services Staff

a. The Rear Services Staff has operating, staff, and coordinating responsibilities. It is responsible for the designing, procurement, storage, issue, and maintenance of general supplies (quartermaster items such as clothing, canvas, and housekeeping equipment) and non-combat vehicles. Its supply responsibilities also include procurement of fuel and lubricants, rations, and fodder.

b. The Rear Services Headquarters brings together and coordinates the specialized supply functions of the Armed Forces, and apparently maintains over them an overall statistical control.

c. The Rear Services Staff carries out all overland movement of supplies and materiel. Its agencies construct and operate military roads and railroads and do all military and naval construction work except the building of field fortifications and naval yards and docks. In time of war the Ministry of Transport is brought under military control and administered by the Rear Services Staff.

d. The Rear Services controls the Medical and Veterinary Services and the Fiscal and the Finance Departments.

e. In addition to these operating and coordinating responsibilities, the Rear Services Staff prepares the supply and logistical elements of all plans and programs developed by the General Staff. The Rear Services Staff details officers to the General Staff for this purpose. Finally, the Rear Services Staff and the principal elements subordinate to it are responsible for the development of supply and logistical doctrine and for the application of this doctrine in their own schools and throughout the Armed Forces establishment.

Section III. THE ARMY

21. Origins

A study and an evaluation of the present Aggressor Army require a preliminary review of the great strides made by the Aggressor Army since its organization in 1945. The stages by which the Aggressor Army has developed from the makeshift defender of a new regime into the formidable offensive force of today are largely reflections of the political fortunes of the nation itself. The internal struggles which took place in the Aggressor Nation, and the force and violence which characterized international relations in the period since World War II, profoundly influenced the developing Aggressor Army.

22. The Army Since Birth

a. Aggressor has made significant changes in the makeup of his Army since its founding. For the most part these changes have been in favor of increased mechanization. Almost 40 percent of the Aggressor line divisions of the present establishment are tank divisions and mechanized divisions. Moreover, the rifle divisions themselves have been given motor transportation in place of animal-drawn carts; they now have organic tanks; and much additional light artillery has been given to the line divisions. These organizational changes have put the Aggressor Army on the road toward mechanization. The changes also indicate that the extreme centralization of control is being relaxed. A more conventional distribution of command responsibility and of opportunity for tactical decision is being provided. Joint training exercises and maneuvers on a sizable scale are held annually; the maneuvers involve closely integrated actions by infantry, armor, artillery, and air elements. Specialized training in amphibious, airborne, and mountain operations—fields in which previous Aggressor techniques were often unsuccessful—indicates that considerable stress is being laid on these important operations.

b. The Aggressor Army knows a great deal about current United States Army doctrine and tactics. The top Aggressor military planners are resourceful men willing to give time and thought to originality. Yet they apparently have not succeeded in overcoming a tendency to indulge in self-congratulations on their methods and accomplishments in previous campaigns.

23. Political Weakness

a. A source of potential weakness in the Aggressor military organization is the relationship between the Army and the Circle Trigon Party. When the fate of the regime rested squarely on military

success, the Party formed a close relationship with the Army; prominent Party members became generals. With an ease in international tensions, national patriotism, so emphasized during the dark days of war, yielded first place to the Circle Trigon Party as the moral force which was said to have saved the nation. Recently the Army has been shorn of some of its glory and prestige. Several of the most popular and influential Army leaders were shabbily treated by the Circle Trigon Party, and one is known to have been court-martialed and dismissed. Consequently, all Aggressor professional soldiers interested in their careers feel constrained to maintain a close relationship with the Party; in fact, nearly all officers are Circle Trigon Party members.

b. A fair percentage of Aggressor Army officers probably believe generally in the Party. Certainly few of them escape entirely from its influence. It is easy but dangerous to underestimate the effectiveness of Aggressor propaganda, particularly on the captive audience within the Homeland. Nevertheless, a substantial number of career soldiers are perfunctory Circle Trigonists, badgered by the numerous Party tasks that leave them no time for private life and even use up much of the time and energy they should be devoting to their profession. These officers cannot help resenting the spiritual prison that a jealous and untrusting regime has built around them. Yet these officers must inflict on their men the same daily, dull political lectures and propaganda which they themselves detest. This they must do for there hangs over all soldiers and officers, as indeed there does over every other person in the Aggressor Nation, the constant dread of the secret police, who can arrest, try, and condemn a person without due process of law.

c. There is weakness in such a system. The system is brittle; it weakens the moral fiber of those who live under it. But the weakness is latent. Its principal ill effects on the Army arise out of the indifference, the lack of enthusiasm, and the desire to play safe that it engenders.

Section IV. THE AIR FORCES

24. General

The air power of the Aggressor Nation is divided into five combat organizations, each well-equipped to carry out its particular air role. The largest part of Aggressor military aviation is assigned to the Air Force of the Aggressor Army for close support of the Ground Forces. This air role has overshadowed all others, and probably will continue to be the most important element of Aggressor air strength.

25. Present Strength

a. Aggressor now has substantial capabilities in other fields, including long-range bombing, home fighter defense, airborne troop transport, and naval aviation. In addition, Aggressor has a large number of air transports in the Civil Air Fleet which in peacetime are under quasi-military control. In wartime this organization would be at the direct disposal of the military.

b. Present Aggressor air strength presents a formidable picture. In size of forces and in present military aircraft production, the Aggressor Nation is a first-rank world power. Her active force consists of about 20,000 modern aircraft in more than 400 groups (air regiments). With a force of this size, Aggressor could achieve initial air superiority in any or all of the likely theaters of operations. Aggressor first-line air strength is such that Aggressor may find it practical to employ outmoded aircraft—including an estimated 20,000 to 30,000 now in reserve—in tactical and other air operations. To build this huge force in a short time, flight training was compressed into a brief period and dealt only with fundamentals. Aircraft production was restricted to the most urgently needed and easily manufactured types—primarily fighters and ground attack planes. Specialized techniques and devices for night and instrument flying, long-range navigation, and high-altitude bombing were never highly developed.

c. Since 1950 Aggressor has overcome most of these shortcomings. Today Aggressor lags behind other powers only in strategic bombing, and even in that important field present Aggressor developments assure a substantial operational capability.

d. Flight training in the Aggressor Air Force is now prolonged and includes intensive study and practice in a variety of air skills. An expanded and well-supported research and development program is keeping Aggressor abreast of the rapid progress being made by modern aviation. Aggressor has developed a six jet engine strategic bomber with atomic capabilities. Likewise, in electronics, communications, and other technical fields, Aggressor is maintaining a position not far behind the most advanced nations.

Section V. THE NAVY

26. Expansion Policy

The Aggressor Government seems intent on carrying out the big navy policy which it announced in the late 1940's. Since 1945 high priority has been given to repairing and expanding ship-building facilities and to the production of new warships. The Aggressor

Navy has no modern capital ships; it lacks aircraft carriers; and its battleships are too obsolete to be effective in fleet actions. But Aggressor is building a sizable fleet of modern cruisers and destroyers, a great number of lesser surface-combat types, and the largest submarine fleet in the world. The Navy has an effective air arm which includes new twin-jet bombers and a number of aircraft of the piston-engine type. Like most continental navies, it also has a Coastal Service, which has jurisdiction over seacoast artillery, over naval anti-aircraft artillery installations, and over a force known as Naval Infantry.

27. Mission

The Navy's missions include defense against amphibious attacks and raids, projection of Aggressor control over offshore waters, and the conduct of short-range amphibious operations.

28. Status

The Navy is becoming an increasingly important element of the Aggressor Armed Forces. Since 1948 and particularly since 1950, it has acquired increasing prestige and increasing priority in the allocation of men and materials. Nevertheless, the Aggressor Navy still remains an underdog service—a force organized, equipped, and trained mainly for coastal operations and for the employment of great numbers of small and individually inexpensive units. For the most part naval offensive tactics are aimed at achieving local superiority in important zones, chiefly as a participant in joint operations. For more distant operations the Aggressor Navy will depend mainly on stealth, with submarines constituting the principal long-range offensive weapon.

Section VI. EVALUATION

29. Army

a. General. The Aggressor Army in 1950 was the product of an overrapid and tactically unassimilated process of mechanization. The present Aggressor Army knows how to use its machines and has achieved good balance and versatility. However, previous influences still linger.

b. Strength. The Aggressor Army's performance in maneuvers indicates that the force is efficient, flexible, and able to use effectively its modern equipment. Shortcomings in fire control and communications are being overcome. Shortages in specialists, drivers, and mechanics are no longer acute, although no army ever has an abundance of them. The 2-year minimum term of conscript service gives

adequate time to turn out confident and efficient infantrymen, well-trained and accustomed to taking part in the complex teamwork of large-scale operations. Longer terms of service permit more training of soldiers in specialized branches of the service. A thorough program of officer training has increased the all-around efficiency of the many present-day company commanders who received their commissions on the battlefield. The officer training program goes right on up to the general officers whose wartime promotions have come so rapidly that they have not had time to broaden their military outlook. Many of these generals have spent a year or more since 1945 as students of the General Staff Institute. Throughout the Army there is a concerted, well-executed and generally effective program of training which has brought efficiency to a high level.

c. Shortcomings. The Aggressor Army is not, however, without shortcomings. It tends to be infatuated with its wartime successes. When the Aggressor Army trains in the offensive, it usually does so against a rigid, immobile defense similar to that which Hitler forced on his commanders.

30. Air Forces

The past Aggressor Air Forces were little more than an arm of the army, like artillery or cavalry. Now they are impressive organizations capable not only of providing the excellent, close tactical support which was virtually their only task during the past, but of providing strategic bombing and strategic air defense as well.

31. Navy

The Aggressor Navy, once limited to the role of the army's off-shore flank, is developing a powerful striking force—the most formidable submarine force in the world. At the same time, for the coastal operations it knows best from experience, the navy is producing minor craft, new mines, and a strengthened air element. Somewhat more cautiously—perhaps waiting to see what impact new weapons will have on conventional deep-sea operations—the Aggressor Navy is building modern cruisers and perhaps capital ships as well.

32. Armed Forces

a. The Aggressor Armed Forces have a maturity, a balance, and an excellence of quality that considerably enhance their traditional outstanding characteristics of great mass.

b. The success of the Aggressor Armed Forces in their program of reorganization and development results mainly from a continuity of purpose and a long-term plan of orderly development. This pro-

gramming for the long-range is evident in the training of officer cadres, in the steady development of military production facilities, in the continued production of materiel, in the very high priority allocated to research and development of conventional and unconventional weapons, and in the close association between military and nonmilitary programs, such as mapping, oceanography, Arctic exploration, and medical training and research.

c. The Armed Forces still have shortcomings. Some they can overcome; others are inherent in the nature of Aggressor society and can never be overcome until Aggressor society changes.

d. The almost monastic seclusion in which Aggressor occupation troops abroad are held bears witness to the mistrust on the part of the Aggressor leaders of their own people. And for the career soldiers, party orthodoxy is as much as ever a requirement for advancement.

e. World War II methods still persist in many respects, though they would be less valid in the kind of actions the Armed Forces might be called on to fight in another war. The Aggressor Armed Forces' enormous investment in World War II type surplus equipment being acquired for storage now is a powerful influence against adoption of new and unconventional weapons. Acting as a counterpoise to the practical adoption of the new ideas and new procedures that Aggressor military planners and thinkers are propounding is the dead weight of habit, caution, and conservatism which is characteristic of Aggressor leaders and functionaries on the intermediate levels.

Section VII. TERRITORIAL ORGANIZATION AND MOBILIZATION

33. General

a. Military territorial organization in the Homeland provides the administrative machinery through which the High Command can exercise control over the Armed Forces despite the great area of the country, the varied demographic composition, and the limited transportation facilities. The 25 military and naval districts, which are directly subordinate to the Ministry of the Armed Forces of the Aggressor Government, are the basic units of the territorial organization of the Homeland.

b. The military districts are in many ways comparable to the army areas in the continental United States. They have legal authority over all army and air force elements within their areas, though the degree of actual control varies in practice. Just as in the United

States Army areas, there are exempted stations and units. Until recently there were 23 corps areas in the Homeland. These have been, in most cases, simply redesignated military or naval districts. In event of an attack upon the Homeland, districts in the combat area become operational commands. Districts in the interior continue to provide and train replacements and to organize new field units.

34. Military and Naval District Organization

a. The Headquarters of a military or naval district includes a commander—usually a senior general or admiral—and a full staff. The district commander is in charge of nearly all army, navy, and air force tactical units and installations in his area. The district commanders answer to the Minister of the Armed Forces through the General Staff. In general, the district commander's headquarters includes the same type of general and special staff sections and rear service agencies that are found in the Ministry of the Armed Forces. The headquarters lacks Long-Range Aviation, Airborne Troops, and Home Air Defense Headquarters, since operationally these forces are directly subordinate to the Armed Forces High Command.

b. The military district commander heads a military council which includes his chief of staff, the air force and naval force commanders of the district, one or more commanders of the principal ground forces units, and the regional secretary of the Circle Trigon Party. The military council has responsibility for the state of political training and for the combat readiness and mobilization preparedness of the troop units and the military installations located within the district. All orders concerning the district are signed by the district commander, his chief of staff, and by one other member of the military council. Orders concerning the district are given in the name of the district commander, as legally he is the "supreme commander of all troops and installations located in the district."

c. The air force and naval force commanders within a military district are concerned principally with the air and naval elements in the area. Although they are subordinate to the commander of the district, they have considerable freedom of action, particularly in the field of specialized air and naval training and in the procurement of specialized air and naval supplies. Air and naval representatives are stationed at the draft boards and mobilization agencies to select personnel suitable for air and naval technical training.

d. Despite the semiindependence of the air force and naval force commanders, the military district commander continues to have full legal responsibility for all military matters within his district.

35. Military and Naval District Responsibilities

a. Peacetime responsibilities of the military districts are two-fold—operational functions; and training, conscription, and mobilization functions. The operational functions are rarely invoked; they concern the employment of troops of the military district to combat local insurrection.

b. The training, conscription, and mobilization functions of the districts are extensive. The functions include military, naval, and aviation training for the district, political indoctrination of personnel, study of the possible enemy, requisition or procurement of needed supplies and mobilization stocks, preparation of the district mobilization plan in accordance with directives from the central authorities, the direction of the conscription and mobilization activities of the draft boards, supervision of premilitary training, and supervision of civil defense preparations.

c. Each district maintains secret files relating to the mobilization plan for its area. On order from higher authority, the district activates its portion of the overall mobilization plan and is responsible for notifying reservists when and where to report for active duty.

d. The military and naval districts also are responsible for semi-military and premilitary training activities within their areas.

e. The districts work closely with local civil authority but the chain of command is along military channels, through district headquarters. Probably for this reason military and naval district boundaries never are cut across provincial boundaries.

f. In addition to the specific responsibilities cited, the military districts have the task of providing the trained staffs and commanders needed by large operational commands in wartime. Headquarters of the larger military districts in border and coastal areas are designed to take the field in the role of army group headquarters or coastal defense regions, and each military or naval district is capable of independent action.

g. Finally, the decree setting forth the responsibilities of the military and naval districts includes the following requirement: "Indoctrination of the Aggressor Armed Forces personnel . . . in the spirit of devotion to the Homeland and the Aggressor Government, in the spirit of merciless struggle with the people's foes—with spies, saboteurs, and other subversive elements."

36. Territorial Commands Outside the Aggressor Homeland

Substantial portions of the Aggressor Armed Forces are stationed in the St. Lawrence Area, the Caribbean, Southeast Asia, and Southwest Alaska. The first three of these forces are organized into groups

which are comparable to United States Army Oversea Commands, like USAREUR and USFA. For example, the Army of Occupation Forces, St. Lawrence Area, controls over 15 divisions organized into three corps. All three occupation forces have headquarters that are organized and staffed with a view to their rapid conversion to major field commands in time of war or other emergency. The Alaskan Force has mainly administrative and occupational responsibilities. A central headquarters exercises overall command of each of these groups and represents what in wartime probably would be an army or army group headquarters.

37. Mobilization

a. General. Within the Homeland, in the event of war, mobilization would be accomplished in two main phases. The first involves the assembling of trained reserves to bring existing field units of all types to war T/O strength. Also involved in the first phase is the mobilization of new units in accordance with the Aggressor 30-day mobilization plan. The second phase involves the inducting, assembling, and training of men who for the most part are without previous formal military service. Both phases of the mobilization program would be carried out in accordance with plans and agencies already in existence.

b. Mobilization Agencies.

- (1) Aggressor readiness for war is nowhere more apparent than in the conscription and mobilization system. This system is based on a law passed in 1945. The basic policies which this law sets forth are interpreted by directives of the Trinity. These directives govern the execution of the conscription and mobilization law by the Ministry of the Armed Forces and the military districts.
- (2) The department is the basic conscription and mobilization unit. This unit maintains individual records of all physically fit males, and of some women over 18 years of age. The records kept include those of young men not yet conscripted, privates and NCO's on active duty whose residence is within the department, reservists who have completed their terms of service in the armed forces, and men whose conscript service has been deferred. The department office is the lowest level headquarters in which assigned portions of the mobilization plan are held. These portions consist of specific requisitions for men by age class and MOS, and for certain types of materiel that may be controlled at the departmental level. The department headquarters prepares orders that

direct individuals to report for duty at specified places on specified days after M-day. These plans are now on file, and the individual orders would be mailed or delivered by courier upon receipt by the department of a mobilization order from higher headquarters.

c. *First Phase of Mobilization.*

- (1) The mobilization plan for the period from M-day to M+30 is the principal instrument for mobilization of the Armed Forces at the outbreak of war or in a national emergency. The mobilization plan covers ground, air, and naval forces. It is prepared in sections by military district headquarters under directives from the Ministry of Defense. Appropriate portions of the plan are held in the headquarters of all echelons of the military establishment. The plan lists by number and location the units to be formed. It contains a time schedule for the formation of the units. The plan also indicates the sources from which personnel and materiel are to be drawn and the transportation to be used in moving units to concentration areas. Regular units are expected to be ready for combat by about M+5 days, and units to be formed from cadres and filled with trained reservists by M+30 days.
- (2) The scheme for new units to be formed by regular cadresmen and preassigned reservists by M+30 days resembles methods used by the United States Army in the 1930's. Aggressor officers are assigned by name to positions in numbered units having specific locations. Some equipment for the individual units is requisitioned locally (truck and prime-movers) and from civilian or military depots (individual equipment and small arms). Aggressor tractors and similar vehicles are manufactured with a view to their use as a military vehicle. Heavier equipment, when not available from local sources, is picked up from larger Armed Forces depots as the units move toward their assigned sectors in combat areas. Overstrength allowances and margins covering both men and equipment are provided to cover unforeseen exigencies.

d. *Second Phase of Mobilization.* The second phase of mobilization in the Homeland consists of inducting, assembling, and training men as replacements and of forming units additional to those that are to be ready by M+30. The number of replacements and additional units needed are determined by the State Defense Committee, which takes into consideration the manpower requirements for economic mobilization. On the basis of this consideration, the organiza-

tion machinery of the Defense Ministry is used to induct the requisite number of men to fill the units in the same way that the machinery provides conscripts in peacetime and troops for the first 30-day phase of the mobilization program. These men are trained in centers now in operation or in a complex of newly established replacement training installations. These centers are administered and developed by the headquarters of the military districts responsible for individual and unit training, procurement, storage, issue of supplies for current use, and for political indoctrination of military personnel. As in the case of other organizations, a declaration of mobilization alters the emphasis on the various functions performed by military districts rather than causes major organization changes.

e. Summary. A major weakness of the mobilization system is the same as that of the economic system as a whole—the inadequacies of the transportation system. The chief strength is the traditional Aggressor willingness to ignore costs in order to achieve immediate objectives.

CHAPTER 2

THE AGGRESSOR GROUND FORCES

Section I. GENERAL

38. Early Centralization

a. Centralization of control has been a guiding principle of Aggressor tactics and organization. The centralization was carried to the point where army group artillery staffs prescribed the exact employment of mortars and howitzers for rifle regiment attacks on prepared positions. Under such thoroughgoing centralization, rifle division commanders were sometimes little more than message center chiefs conveying the detailed instructions of higher headquarters to the line troops under their command.

b. In keeping with the principle of centralization, rifle divisions were stripped of a large proportion of their support and service troops. These troops then were organized into separate army, army group, and GHQ elements.

c. At its inception the Aggressor Army had about 50 rifle divisions. To give each division adequate organic special troops and support elements, these elements would have had to be spread so thin that no reserve would have been left for decisive support at the point of main effort. Furthermore, many division commanders had been promoted so rapidly that they had not increased their breadth of vision. Their understanding of the nature of combined-arms operations had not increased proportionately with their responsibilities. In these circumstances, the Aggressor Command's decision to centralize most of its supporting troops and logistical resources under army group and GHQ control probably was a sound one.

d. In addition to its rifle divisions, the Aggressor Army maintained a tank and mechanized force of about 14 divisions called armored divisions and mechanized divisions. There were also three cavalry divisions consisting of both horse cavalry and mechanized elements. These special purpose units were used to complete breakthroughs begun by infantry-tank-artillery-air teams. The units also were used for carrying out operations on enemy flanks and in depth. Nearly half of the armored and mechanized divisions were organized into mechanized and armored corps.

39. The Trend Away From Centralization

a. Some time ago the Aggressor Army began to carry out a substantial reorganization. By 1954 nearly a tenth of the Aggressor divisions had been given the "Fusilier" title for superior combat performance. Many independent tank regiments—roughly comparable to United States tank battalions—had been attached so long to individual rifle divisions that they had come to be regarded as indispensable parts of such divisions.

b. These and other organizational changes revealed a tendency to relinquish the extreme centralization that had been effected early in the war on the orders of the High Command or as a result of generally accepted battlefield practice. As campaigns progressed, divisional and lower echelon commanders acquired, through experience, the ability to command and fight their units with flexibility, resourcefulness, and originality. The Aggressor Army built up such a large pool of GHQ and army group independent support units that it could now afford to strengthen the organic support elements of its line divisions, particularly on the most important parts of the front. This tendency away from centralization has gained considerable momentum in recent hostilities. This tendency is an indication that the Aggressor High Command has not gone over to the principle of all-out centralization of control as a long-term decision, but only as an expedient made necessary by particular circumstances.

40. Reorganization and Present Composition

a. The process of reorganization took a more decided and positive turn in mid-1952. The following 2 years saw a fundamental shift in the ratio of armor to infantry and a substantial change in the organization of rifle divisions. The rifle divisions had discarded their horse-drawn transportation in favor of motor vehicles and had almost doubled their organic fire power by absorbing some former GHQ elements. The new rifle division, apart from its motorization and partial mechanization, still resembles the original divisions.

b. In overall composition the reorganized Aggressor Army approaches the goal of strategic and operational flexibility. At the same time there are important differences between the 1945 army and the army of today. Weapons and equipment have been improved considerably. Horse cavalry, then a major arm, still survives. The retarding influence of the Aggressor Civil War is just about dead, although the army still places much stress on political indoctrination. The unmilitary slogans, lax discipline, and somewhat loose tactical organization have disappeared. But the principal difference is one of quality. Largely because of the inadequate leadership, the old di-

visions looked much better on paper than they did in action. The new divisions are commanded and staffed by officers who know how to use their units with flexibility and resourcefulness.

c. Nevertheless, centralization has not entirely disappeared. It is still evident in the great economy with which the Aggressor mans his tactical units. The rifle division, for example, has more offensive fire power in proportion to personnel than have similar units of other armies. Five men suffice to man an 80-mm mortar. An Aggressor rifle company has no cook, and there are only seven men in company headquarters. These factors together with others are indications that the Aggressor division lacks the endurance in combat of the United States division.

d. The overeconomy in personnel—or oversaturation of personnel with weapons—is an organizational reflection of the way in which Aggressor usually fought his divisions in previous campaigns. Divisions were committed in the offensive so as to make the fullest initial use of their fire and shock power. The divisions often were reduced to a fraction of their original strength and then were reinforced or bypassed by fresh divisions. The Aggressor High Command used its divisions almost as if they were regimental combat teams.

e. Obviously this method of handling divisions—so overloading the divisions with fire power as to cut their endurance, then manipulating them in large blocks or waves—could be developed only in an army in which control was concentrated at army group or GHQ level. Although organizational changes indicate that the Aggressor Command is moving away from this procedure, strong traces of it are still found in Aggressor tactical organization.

41. Upgrading of Units

An expanded terminology has been particularly common with Aggressor. Tank and mechanized units the size of western-type corps are called armies. Their regiments are in many cases roughly comparable to a tank battalion with some organic infantry and reconnaissance elements. A unit with a personnel strength of over 150 men may often be designated a battalion by Aggressor. The medical unit of a rifle division is called a battalion, although it has a T/O strength of approximately 100. Such upgrading of unit designation makes the large Aggressor Army look even larger on paper.

42. Components

The arms in the Aggressor military organization include rifle troops (the basic arm), artillery troops, tank and mechanized troops, airborne troops, cavalry troops, engineer troops, and signal troops. All

of the arms except airborne troops are elements of the Ground Forces, and their headquarters are subordinate to the headquarters of the Ground Forces. The principal services are—chemical, intendance, medical, veterinary, various types of military construction and technical troops, finance department, political officers, and military justice officers.

43. Arms

a. Rifle Troops. The infantry arm has no separate headquarters. Infantry doctrine and tactics form the basis for Ground Forces doctrine, and therefore are developed by the headquarters and staff of the Ground Troops as a whole. Most Army and Army Group commanders are infantry officers.

b. Artillery. Aggressor considers artillery the most important of the supporting ground arms. Artillery includes heavy (120- and 150-mm) mortars, rocket launchers, antiaircraft and antitank artillery, conventional field artillery, and probably guided missiles. In addition to its combat elements, the artillery arm includes an ordnance element called the artillery engineer service and a supply service. Between one-fourth and one-third of all the personnel of the Aggressor Army is assigned to the artillery arm or to one of its services. This is partly due to the designation of the heavy weapons units of rifle and mechanized rifle regiments as regimental artillery and the assignment thereto of artillery personnel.

c. Tank and Mechanized Units. The tank and mechanized troops include tank troops, self-propelled artillery, and an ordnance element (tank engineer service) analogous to the artillery engineer service. At present the tank and mechanized troops constitute about one-third of total standing army strength. These troops are formed into battalions, regiments, and divisions and sometimes into mechanized armies of about four divisions each.

d. Airborne Troops. Airborne troops are administered by a headquarters which apparently is not subordinate to the Ground Forces Headquarters. Aggressor makes a distinction between parachute troops and ordinary troops who have been given familiarization training in air transport and air landings.

e. Cavalry. Cavalry (horse cavalry) is considered to be of the same branch as tank and mechanized troops and is still an active force although it now constitutes an extremely small percentage of total army strength. Still, horse cavalry is an important and elite force.

f. Engineer Troops. Engineer troops are growing in importance and capabilities. They are of three basic types—pioneers and sappers, pontoniers, and construction troops. The engineers are organ-

ized into heavy special purpose brigades and regiments, and also into separate battalions, companies, and platoons for the assignment to lower echelons of line units. They are assigned to army and higher headquarters. The sappers and pioneers are assigned to corps and lower echelons and have relatively little heavy equipment. Engineer troops have their own supply and maintenance elements.

g. Signal Troops. The signal troops have much the same function as in the United States Army, except that a certain amount of high level communications work is entrusted to special signal elements of the Ministry of Internal Affairs rather than to army signal troops.

44. Special Troops

a. Chemical. The chemical troops are subordinate to the Ground Forces High Command. While this element includes the same components as the United States Army Chemical Corps, it has never had the latter's responsibility for serving heavy mortars as infantry support weapons.

b. Intendance. The intendance troops, a rear services element, are comparable to the United States Army Quartermaster Corps.

c. Military Construction Troops. Military construction troops include various specialized engineer units. These units, also part of the rear services organization, are trained and equipped to construct buildings and to build and repair roads, airfields, and rail lines. In wartime many of the units would be mobilized from civilian life as ready-formed units.

d. Technical Troops of the Rear Services. Technical troops of the rear services include various units and individual specialists charged with the repair and maintenance of motor vehicles and with a number of other less comprehensive tasks. In field units of divisional and smaller size, technical troops of the rear services are charged with some of the repair and maintenance responsibilities which at higher levels are the concern of the technical troops of the arms.

e. Medical, Veterinary, and Finance. The medical service, veterinary service, and finance service perform generally the same functions as in the United States Army. All are parts of the rear services.

f. Political Officers. Political officers are a separate group assigned to units down through battalion level and in some cases down through company level. The senior political officer of a command is called the assistant commander for political affairs. He and his political staff are concerned with political education, propaganda, and morale. Political officers are responsible for uncovering factors that create dissatisfaction and for calling them to the attention of the commander for correction.

g. Military Justice. The Aggressor has two types of military justice officers—those who constitute military tribunals and those who regularly serve as trial judge advocates or prosecutors. Military justice officers deal only with routine and purely military offenses. Political offenses usually are dealt with secretly by counterintelligence and counterespionage agencies which operate within the Armed Forces. In many instances an officer offender may be tried by a court of honor made up of brother officers rather than by the ordinary military justice agencies.

45. Principles of Tactical Organization

a. The size of the Aggressor Army, its tendency to centralize control, and its plans for rapid mobilization, all favor organization of the army into many relatively small basic units rather than into a few large ones.

b. In a war involving dozens and possibly hundreds of divisions, the army and corps are often basic operational maneuver forces. Divisions sometimes have little more importance in such operations than regiments in smaller scale warfare. This fact is reflected in the organization of Aggressor divisions. The divisions are small and have relatively limited combat endurance. Tank and mechanized divisions in particular are less easily formed into combat commands than are United States divisions. They are designed as ready formed packages and have some of the characteristics of oversized combat teams. Their medium tank regiments, mixed heavy tank and self-propelled gun regiments, and mechanized regiments all contain small T/O components of all arms. Taking these small composite regiments apart and reshuffling their components would be difficult. The Aggressor divisions evidently are meant to be fought, whenever possible, in combat formations based closely on their T/O organization. When substantial attachments or support are necessary, the support must be provided from outside the division.

c. Even though the combined arms units tend to be overorganized, the Aggressor Army does not lack flexibility in the formation of task forces suitable for accomplishing particular missions. In wartime Aggressor has a substantial number of uniformly organized support units and special units which can be added to and taken away from line divisions in convenient packages. Furthermore, regional commanders are allowed considerable freedom in the reorganization of their line units and in the formation of tailor-made commands.

d. In the Aggressor Army large masses of artillery are placed under the direct control of an army group chief of artillery. This centralization of control makes possible the employment of overwhelming

force at the point of main effort. At the same time the Aggressor Army would have enough independent artillery regiments and brigades to provide adequate direct attachments to line divisions for use at points of main effort.

46. Peacetime Organization

To facilitate rapid mobilization, some 175 Aggressor divisions are maintained in peacetime. These divisions have full staffs and from 60 to 70 percent of their wartime TOE. Proportionately, more combined arms units are maintained in peacetime than specialized units, because mobilizing and training the specialized units is simpler and faster. Some of the combined arms units, mechanized divisions in particular, are organized so as to provide cadres for similar units of the next higher echelon. A mechanized regiment contains nearly all the cadre elements necessary for the activation of a mechanized division. In some cases rifle brigades are maintained in peacetime as mobilization cadres for divisions.

Section II. STAFF ORGANIZATION

47. General

a. Aggressor staffs are closely modeled on the staffs of European Armies, which in turn reflect German influence. Certain elements, such as the political apparatus, are peculiar to the Aggressor staff—the command group, the staff group, the special staff group, and the rear services group. In addition, there are various administrative and housekeeping elements. In a combat situation the staff is divided into a forward and a rear echelon.

b. During the major changes which were made in the organization and functions of staffs, the position of rear services was elevated in importance, a new position of assistant commander for rear services was created, and the political assistant commander lost much influence. The organization of headquarters of army groups, armies, and corps now follows a more or less common pattern.

48. Commander

The commander is the senior officer of the primary combat arm in the force. In a combined arms force he is normally an infantry or an armor officer, although this is by no means a requirement. The commander is responsible not only for overall success or failure but also for direct personal control of operations and reconnaissance in critical areas and phases of combat. The commander is especially concerned with the initial scheme of maneuver and the employment of




Figure 2. Major unit staff organization.




Figure 3. Minor unit staff organization.

reserves. During previous campaigns commanders often became so involved in directing an important part of a battle that they were unable to exercise proper control over the course of the battle as a whole.

49. Deputy Commander

The deputy commander acts as a representative and troubleshooter for the commander. In the latter's absence the deputy commander assumes command. The main routine responsibility of the deputy commander is supervision of combat training for the troops of the command.

50. Military Council

A military council of at least three men constitutes a policy advisory group for the commander on the army group and army levels. Included in the council are a representative of one of the combat arms, a representative of the rear services, and an officer secretary of the council. If the headquarters is within the Homeland, the secretary of the regional committee of the Circle Trigon Party is also a member. This party representative acts as a liaison officer between military and civil authorities. The council functions as a personal advisory group to the commander and is an element of the command group.

51. Chief of Staff

a. The chief of staff is an assistant commander. He is responsible for the execution of the commander's orders and is the only person who is authorized at all times to issue operational orders in the commander's name. The chief of staff must keep abreast of the situation and must make timely recommendations for the approval of the commander. Most of the planning and the execution of plans is done by the chief of staff or under his supervision.

b. The Aggressor concept of the staff is, in some ways, less inclusive than the United States concept. An Aggressor staff includes G3 elements, G2 elements, an element which performs some G1 functions, but no G4 element. Other sections, such as the topographical section and the ciphering section, while not general staff elements in the United States sense, are part of the Aggressor general staff.

c. The staff in the Aggressor Army is an advisory board to the chief of staff and not to the commander. The primary function of the staff is to organize and insure uninterrupted coordination between all arms and services throughout all combat phases. The staff works closely with the commanders of subordinate and reserve units in order to provide continuous and effective artillery, mortar, aviation, engineer, logistical, and other support for the infantry and armor.

52. Operations Branch

The operations branch is the most important branch of the staff. It compiles data on the current situation, estimates the comparative strength of friendly and opposing forces, and prepares field orders, operational plans, summaries, and situation maps. The operations branch plans coordination between arms and is responsible for all liaison with other units.

53. Intelligence Branch

The primary task of the intelligence branch is to keep the staff (and through it, the commander) informed regarding the enemy situation and capabilities. It collects, evaluates, interprets, and disseminates information about the enemy. The branch is divided into specialized sections, each of which performs a specific function such as order of battle work and prisoner of war interrogation. All intelligence is reported by the chief of the branch to the chief of staff and the chief of the operations branch. Control over the main sources of information—ground reconnaissance, air reconnaissance, technical reconnaissance, and special agents—is exercised through intelligence channels.

54. Signal Branch

The signal branch organizes and operates signal communications within the command group and with neighboring staffs. The branch allots signal equipment to troops, assigns radio frequencies, and prescribes signal procedure. It plans and installs the aircraft warning net, organizes postal and air mail services, and operates the message center. Its signal reconnaissance responsibilities include the interception of enemy radio and wire communications and the survey of locally available facilities. At corps level the chief of the signal branch is also the chief of the corps signal troops. At higher levels the two positions are separate; the chief of the signal branch is a staff planner, while the chief of the signal troops has functions primarily which are of an executive and supervisory nature.

55. Cipher and Topographic Branches

Two relatively small but important elements of the staff are the ciphering branch and the topographical branch. The former is responsible for coding and decoding messages, for maintaining security, and for assigning cover names. The latter gathers and analyzes terrain data; organizes geodetic, topographic, and photogrammetric services; and provides troops with maps and catalogs of bench marks.

56. The Artillery Branch

The assistant commander for artillery is directly responsible to the commander in a division or higher units for the preparation of fire plans, for the organization of antitank and antiaircraft defense, and for the procurement and supply of weapons and ammunition.

57. Chiefs of Arms and Services

a. The chiefs of arms and services in a combined arms headquarters have administrative and planning responsibility for all organic and attached units of their arms and services. These chiefs command all units not attached to subordinate organizations. Together the chiefs constitute the "special staff" to the deputy commander, although Aggressor does not explicitly recognize such a term. As command liaison officers, they supervise the performance of key missions within the scope of their arm or service. In their capacity as assistants to the deputy commander they advise him on matters pertaining to tactical and technical employment of the arms and services. Each chief of an arm or service develops plans for the utilization of his arm or service. In accordance with the requirements and within the limits set by the deputy commander, each initiates requisitions for the procurement of equipment and supplies for his particular arm or service within the force.

b. In addition to the responsibilities which are common to the chief of every arm or service, certain other responsibilities are specifically allocated. The chief of artillery is responsible to the deputy commander in minor units for the organization of antitank and antiaircraft defense and for the procurement and distribution of weapons and ammunition. The chief of engineers is responsible for the camouflage and, together with the assistant commander for artillery or the chief of artillery, or antitank defense. The chief chemical officer is responsible for the defense of the entire command against chemical warfare.

58. Political and Counterespionage Branches

a. Parallel with the purely military branches are the political and counterespionage branches. The former is responsible for the political indoctrination of friendly troops and the publication of newspapers. The political branch maintains lists of party members, handles propaganda among enemy troops and civilians, and provides recreation and entertainment for the Aggressor soldier.

b. The counterespionage branch, staffed by secret police personnel, is the representative group of the secret police in the Armed Forces. These branches are only nominally subordinate to the commander.

They receive their orders through the Ministry of Internal Affairs rather than through normal military channels. Many of their punitive activities are carried out secretly rather than through regular channels.

59. Historical Branch

The historical branch is a special unit which exists only on the army and army group levels. It is a purely administrative branch. It prepares battle-experience studies and issues training directives which serve as guides for future training. The duties of this branch on army group and army level correspond to the duties of the Historical Director on the ministerial level.

60. Personnel and Replacement

Personnel matters are treated in a manner quite different from the way they are in the United States Army. Personnel matters are handled by a personnel branch directly subordinate to the chief of staff. This branch keeps overall statistical records pertaining to personnel but does not keep individual records. The replacement branch keeps records of animals, equipment, and prisoners of war. The replacement branch is under the rear services.

61. Headquarters Administration Branch

The headquarters administration branch keeps records, provides quarters and food for headquarters personnel, and controls military police and all administrative matters pertaining to the entire command.

62 Chief of Rear Services

The chief of rear services is the assistant commander for rear services and in both planning and operations, works closely with the chief of staff. The chief of rear services receives general directives regarding supply and transportation needs from the chief of staff and in turn keeps the chief of staff informed of all supply, transportation, and rear-area matters. The relationship between the two chiefs is very close. The chief of the rear services has a sizable staff to discharge his many responsibilities. As an assistant commander of the entire command he can sign, in the commander's name, all orders concerning logistical matters.

63. Organization of Rear Areas Branch

a. The organization of rear areas branch is the principal organizing and coordinating agency of the rear services. The branch acts for the chief of rear services in organizing, maintaining, and providing for

the security of rear echelon installations and lines of supply and evacuation. The allocation of bivouac areas for troop units in rear areas is also part of its task. Finally, the branch is charged with the collection and evacuation of civilians from the battle area.

b. The titles of rear services branches indicate clearly their individual functions. First and foremost, the branches provide transportation for the delivery of all supplies. To do this, they must build, repair, and maintain roads and rail lines, and provide rail and motor transportation. Their supply functions also include the procurement of general supplies and the overall supervision and coordination of the supply activities of the specified arms and services. The rear services perform a number of miscellaneous functions such as financial management, medical care for men and horses, and calculation of casualties. Finally, they must organize a system of feeding, clothing, and quartering the troops.

64. Miscellaneous Branches

There are a number of miscellaneous branches which are administratively part of the rear echelon. There are, for example, two branches which handle military crimes—the judge-advocate general's branch which serves as the prosecutor, and the court-martial branch which acts as the judge. Other miscellaneous branches include field post offices and state banks.

65. Division Staffs

a. *General.* The organizational pattern of the major Aggressor line divisions follows that of the corps and army staffs. A line division is commanded by a general of division and has a staff of about 180 members. The commander is assisted by a brigadier general or a colonel who is called the deputy commander. This deputy is charged with the combat readiness of the division and exercises supervision over all phases of organization and training. He is the second in command. If the division commander is incapacitated, the chief of staff normally takes command of the division.

b. *Chief of Staff.* The division staff is divided into several major groups, the principal one of which is an operations group. This unit, supervised directly by the chief of staff, provides the division's forward echelon operating personnel. The first assistant of the chief of staff heads a group which corresponds generally to the United States G3 Section. The second assistant heads the intelligence group; the third assistant is the communication officer; and the fourth as-

sistant performs the G1 (personnel) functions of the division. The chief of staff's group also includes a topographic section and a cypher section where all of the classified material of the division is controlled. The chief of engineers and the chief chemical officer also work under the direction of the chief of staff. The chief of staff is an assistant division commander.

c. Deputy for Political Affairs. The political section of the staff is supervised by the assistant division commander for political affairs. This group conducts work related to education, information, morale, and recreation. The work of the party organizer, the agitator, the propagandist, the cultural officer, the chief of the editing section, and the club officer falls into this category.

d. Counterintelligence. The division's counterintelligence group works apart from the remainder of the staff. Its functions are indicated by the title. While this section functions within the division, it is actually composed of secret police personnel.

e. Assistant Division Commander for Artillery. The fourth division staff group is headed by the assistant division commander for artillery. This group is a staff within a staff, having its own operations, communications, administrative, and reconnaissance (survey) officers. The group has direct supervision over the division artillery.

f. Assistant Division Commander for Rear Services. The assistant division commander for rear services supervises the following staff functions through the appropriate branch chiefs: food supply, motor fuel and lubricants, motor transport, clothing and equipment supply, billeting, medical and finance. The chief medical officer, the chief of finance, the chief of engineers, and the chief chemical officer work closely with the deputy for rear services and have functions corresponding to those of their counterparts in the United States Army.

g. Assistant Division Commander for Technical Services. This officer is authorized in all divisions and is charged with the technical maintenance of vehicles and equipment.

Section III. ORGANIZATION OF LARGER FORMATIONS

66. Organization of an Army Group

a. An army group normally is commanded by a marshal who is assisted by a staff and by a military council of three to four members. The military council includes representatives of one or more of the principal combat arms and of the rear services. If the army group is operating within the Homeland, the highest local party

hierarchy is also a member. The army group staff is organized along the lines described in paragraphs 33 through 37.

b. On an important sector in wartime the total strength of an army group probably would be from 700,000 to 1,000,000 men. The following major elements might be subordinated to a typical army group: three rifle armies, one air army, one mechanized army, one artillery corps, additional artillery regiments and brigades as needed, numerous engineer brigades, engineer construction brigades, bridging battalions, truck brigades, signal regiments, road and railroad construction and operational units, miscellaneous security, replacement, service, and other elements (see table Ia).

67. Composition of Armies

The Aggressor Army is made up of rifle armies (which consist primarily of rifle corps and divisions) and mechanized armies. It is believed there was, at one time, also a cavalry army, consisting of two cavalry corps and a mechanized corps. It is doubtful that Aggressor would form cavalry armies in future military operations (see table Ib).





Figure 4. Typical Aggressor Army Group.

68. Rifle Army

a. A typical rifle army in wartime is composed of the following elements: two or three rifle corps, an artillery division, an antiaircraft division, an antitank brigade, a heavy tank regiment, an engineer sapper regiment, a signal regiment, and dozens of administrative and service elements. It has a strength of from 150,000 to 200,000 men.

b. An independent army probably would have substantially larger service and support elements. It might have one or more rifle, mechanized, or tank divisions subordinated directly to army headquarters in addition to those subordinated to corps.

c. The headquarters and staff of an army in the field closely parallel the headquarters and staff of an army group. This is especially true in the case of elements charged with immediate military matters. Elements charged with civilian matters are much smaller for the field army than for the army group.



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Figure 5. Typical Aggressor rifle army.

Table II. Principal Weapons—Typical Rifle Army

Unit	Anti-aircraft		Antitank		Mortar			Field artillery						Rocket		Armored fighting vehicle					
	40-mm AA	80-mm AA	80-mm anti-tank gun	105-mm anti-tank gun	80-mm mort	120-mm mort	150-mm mort	80-mm gun	120-mm how	120-mm gun	150-mm how	150-mm G/H	200-mm how	150-mm rkt	300-mm rkt	Armored car	T40/80 tank	T50/120 tank	SP-80 gun	SP-105 gun	SP-150 G/H
Rifle army total	346	64	486	92	1071	324	208	324	420	48	110	24	48	96	32	280	924	308	162	336	63
3 rifle corps	276		438	72	1071	324	144	324	396		72			96		270	924	264	162	315	63
Heavy tank and SP regt	6						64									10		44		21	
Artillery division									24	48	48	24	48	32							
Antitank brigade			48	20																	
AA division	64	64																			

69. Mechanized Army

a. The mechanized army tends to have a fixed organization. Its wartime composition is believed to be two tank divisions, two mechanized divisions, an antiaircraft division, a light artillery brigade and a rocket launcher regiment, a motorcycle reconnaissance regiment, an engineer ponton regiment, a signal regiment, and various service elements.

b. The mechanized army has no intermediate corps headquarters; its divisions are subordinated directly to army headquarters. In United States Army terminology this type of army is really a powerful armored corps. It has approximately 1,000 tanks and 300 self-propelled guns. In addition to this shock element, there are about 37 small motorized infantry battalions, a substantial supporting force of

towed artillery, mortars, and rocket launchers. This gives a personnel strength of about 60 or 70 thousand men.

c. The two tank divisions constitute a powerful shock element. The two mechanized divisions have ground-holding capabilities as well as considerable shock power. Thus the mechanized army is suitable not only for effecting deep penetrations and clear breakthroughs at the point of main effort, but for holding ground as well.

d. The staff, administrative, and service elements of mechanized armies are similar to those of ordinary armies, except that mechanized armies have additional vehicle maintenance and repair facilities (see table III).

Table III. Principal Weapons—Mechanized Army

Unit	MG's	AA guns		Antitank weapons			Mortar		Arty		Rocket		Armored fighting vehicles				
		40-mm AA	80-mm AA	80-mm AT rocket launcher	80-mm antitank gun	105-mm antitank gun	80-mm mort	120-mm how	80-mm gun	120-mm mort	150-mm rkt	300-mm rkt	Armored car	T40/80 tank	T60/120 tank	SP-106	SP-150
Mechanized army total	2333	152	64	546	204	20	324	198	108	72	32	32	180	792	134	126	168
2 mechanized division	1204	44	---	254	88	---	192	108	72	48	16	---	100	352	88	42	42
2 tank division	828	44	---	254	56	---	120	84	24	24	16	---	60	420	46	84	126
Motorcycle regt	184	---	---	38	12	---	12	6	12	---	---	---	20	20	---	---	---
Antitank brig	34	---	---	---	48	20	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
AA division	67	64	64	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
Heavy rocket brigade	16	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	32	---	---	---	---	---	---




Figure 6. Aggressor mechanized army.

70. Types of Corps

The Aggressor Army has five types of corps. The rifle corps is somewhat comparable to a United States army corps. The cavalry corps constitutes a large, mixed horse and mechanized cavalry formation. The artillery corps, with various types of field artillery pieces, rocket launchers, and heavy mortars, constitutes the main artillery support element of an army group in the field. In addition there are also maintenance and airborne corps.


71. Rifle Corps

a. Although the composition of an Aggressor rifle corps varies, a typical corps in wartime might control the following elements: three rifle divisions, a mechanized division, a light antiaircraft regiment, a brigade of guns and howitzers, a heavy tank regiment, a rocket launcher regiment, a signal battalion, and service units. In exceptional cases, rifle corps may be made up of rifle brigades instead of rifle divisions. The strength of the average rifle corps is from 45,000 to 55,000 men.

b. Rifle corps normally are subordinated to armies. An independent corps would have additional service and administrative elements and would for all practical purposes be a small army. Particularly, it would have various service and supply elements which are not found in corps subordinated to armies.

Table IV. Principal Weapons—Typical Rifle Corps

Unit	Automatic weapon		Antitank			Mortar			Artillery				Armored fighting vehicles					
	Machinegun	40-mm AA	Rkt & r at wpus	80-mm anti-tank gun	106-mm anti-tank gun	80-mm mort	120-mm mort	150-mm mort	80-mm gun	120-mm how	150-mm how	150-mm rkt	Armored car	T40/80 tank	T50/120 tank	SP-80	SP-105	SP-160
Corps total	2255	92	1176	146	24	357	108	48	108	132	24	32	90	308	88	54	105	21
3 rifle div	1605	48	1041	102	---	261	54	48	72	108	---	---	30	132	---	54	63	---
Mechanized div	602	22	127	44	---	96	54	---	36	24	---	8	50	176	44	---	21	---
Heavy tank and sp regt	3	6	8	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	10	---	44	---	21	---
Arty brig	24	---	---	---	24	---	---	---	---	24	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
Light AA regt	9	16	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
Medium rocket regt	12	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	24	---	---	---	---	---	---



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Figure 7. Typical Aggressor rifle corps.

72. Mountain Corps

The mountain corps is simply a rifle corps consisting of three mountain divisions, a cavalry division as a maneuver element, and with lighter support and service elements. It has a high proportion of horse transport and a low proportion of armor. Other units of the mountain corps include a light howitzer brigade, a light antiaircraft regiment, a heavy mortar brigade, and the necessary technical and rear services. Mountain corps are designed primarily for large-scale operations in extremely mountainous areas and are retained under general headquarters control at nearly all times.

73. Aggressor Airborne Corps

The Aggressor airborne corps consists of usually three airborne divisions, a light howitzer brigade, a light antiaircraft regiment, a rocket battalion, and the necessary technical and rear service elements. Attached to the airborne corps is troop carrier aircraft in sufficient quantity to move at least two of the airborne divisions and part of the corps support and service elements which are lighter than those of the rifle corps.

74. Cavalry Corps

a. These organizations usually are held under army group or even GHQ control and are employed separately for deep envelopment operations. They are used successfully where ordinary motorized or armored forces are handicapped by terrain or weather conditions. The cavalry corps is also useful for encirclement operations and for large-scale raids in the enemy rear.

b. A cavalry corps has a strength of from 25,000 to 30,000 men and consists of three horse-cavalry divisions, a heavy tank and SP gun regiment, a medium tank regiment, a heavy mortar brigade, a light antiaircraft regiment, and various service and supply elements.

75. Artillery Corps

An artillery corps has sufficient headquarters, reconnaissance, service, and supply elements to control and service some 48 to 90 firing battalions of field, antitank, and antiaircraft artillery. A typical artillery corps attached to an army group in an important sector might consist of three artillery divisions and three antiaircraft artillery divisions. The corps also would have several separate special-purpose artillery brigades and regiments, and numerous workshops, ammunition trains, and other units. Its strength may vary from 30,000 to 60,000 men (see table V).




Figure 8. Typical Aggressor artillery corps

Table V. Principal Weapons—Typical Artillery Corps

Unit	MG	AA		Antitank		Field Artillery						Mort and rkt		
	Machinegun	40-mm AA	80-mm AA	80-mm Anti-tank Gun	105-mm Anti-tank Gun	120-mm How	120-mm Gun	150-mm How	150-mm G/H	150-mm Gun	200-mm How	200-mm Gun	150-mm Mort	300-mm rkt
Artillery corps total	691	192	192	48	20	72	144	144	72	24	144	24	192	96
3 artillery division	513					72	144	144	72		144		192	96
3 AA division	96	192	192											
Heavy gun brig	48									24		24		
Antitank brig	34			48	20									

76. Types and General Composition of Divisions

a. There are three categories of divisions in the Aggressor Army—infantry, mobile, and artillery. For example infantry are rifle, airborne, and mountain. Mobile are tank, mechanized, and cavalry. Artillery are field artillery and antiaircraft artillery.

b. The size of aggressor divisions shows wide variation from the 14,000 of the mechanized division down to the 3,700 of the antiaircraft division. Divisions also are smaller in peacetime than they are when organized for war. For example, in the mechanized rifle regiment there usually are two motorized rifle battalions in peacetime and three in wartime. In wartime, in less important theaters or in theaters where climatic conditions or special terrain conditions influence military operations, basic changes may be made in the organization of divisions.

c. In any future large-scale war the Aggressor Army would be operating in a number of theaters having widely differing characteristics. It is to be expected that the influence of these differences will be reflected in tailor-made organizations to fit the theaters. Divisions operating from desert terrain will differ widely from those operating in northern latitudes. Nevertheless, the Aggressor Army seems to have tried to create effective combat packets in its division TOE, combat teams that can be used in many situations with little change in organization.

Section IV. INFANTRY DIVISIONS

77. Rifle Division

a. *General.* The present size and structure of the Aggressor rifle division is the result of the reorganization carried out since 1952. Through the reorganization which brought the division to its present strength, Aggressor has sought to increase the fire power of the rifle division, to improve its mobility, to make command supervision as effective as possible, and to gain the utmost from a relatively simple logistical system. This effort has been reflected throughout the division from the squad to division headquarters. The rifle division is the basic unit of Aggressor's tactical operations. It is a balanced formation capable of independent action for limited periods. When the division cannot be supported by artillery of the next higher echelon (independent or semi-independent operations), one or more artillery regiments are normally attached.

b. *Organization and Equipment of the Rifle Division.* The Aggressor rifle division consists of the divisional headquarters and headquarters troops, three rifle regiments, a medium tank regiment, a motorcycle battalion, the divisional artillery, an engineer sapper battalion, a signal battalion, and the divisional service troops.

Table VI. Principal Weapons—Rifle Division

Unit	Individual weapons			Mach guns		AA wpns		Antitank weapons			Mortars			Field arty		Armored fighting veh			
	Pistol	Submachinegun	Rifle and carbine	Light machine gun	Heavy machine gun	AA machinegun	40-mm AA	80-mm rkt launcher	80-mm recoilless rifle	80-mm antitank gun	80-mm mort	120-mm mort	160-mm mort	80-mm gun	120-mm how	Armored car	T40/80 tank	SP-80	SP-105
Division totals-----	1770	1380	8495	346	162	27	16	266	81	34	87	18	16	24	36	10	44	18	21
Division hq and hq trps-----	70	30	75	3				10										18	
3 rifle regt-----	906	822	4848	243	162	27		108	81	18	81	18					44		21
Medium tank regt-----	190	225	273					20											
Mtrcl bn-----	54	65	181	54				15			6					10			
Divisional arty-----	369	238	1828	46			16	45		16			16	24	36				
Engr bn-----	28		340					11											
Signal bn-----	27		270					11											
Divisional svc trps-----	126		680					46											

Table VII. Unit Transportation—Rifle Division

Unit	Passenger vehicles			Trucks				Trailers			
	Motor-cycle	Passenger car	Recon car	Light truck	Medium truck	Heavy truck	Light tractor	Light trailer	Medium trailer	Heavy trailer	Ammo trailer
Division totals.....	69	1	403	1 480	798	15	3	210	400	645	60
Division hq and hq trps.....	5	1	10	10	10	---	---	10	10	10	---
3 rifle regt.....	18	---	156	294	192	---	---	51	246	192	---
Medium tank regt.....	6	---	22	22	71	---	---	11	17	71	---
Mtrcl bn.....	11	---	73	11	4	---	---	7	3	4	---
Divisional arty.....	17	---	93	75	244	---	---	83	68	76	60
Engr bn.....	2	---	7	2 7	29	10	3	7	6	39	---
Signal bn.....	7	---	11	2 20	23	---	---	11	19	23	---
Divisional svc trps.....	3	---	31	3 41	225	5	---	31	31	230	---

¹ Includes 40 ambulances. ² Includes 1 ambulance. ³ Includes 10 ambulances.




Figure 9. Aggressor rifle division.

c. *Division Headquarters and Headquarters Troops* (70-O, 110-EM). The division headquarters consists of 66 officers and 75 enlisted men. It is organized along Aggressor staff lines as explained in par. 65. Division headquarters troops consist of four officers and 35 enlisted men and is organized along company lines. This unit provides security, transportation, mess, internal communication, and unit supply for division headquarters.

78. Rifle Regiment—Rifle Division

The rifle regiment (169-O, 2,109-EM) has undergone considerable reorganization resulting in an increase in rifle and heavy weapons fire power and a slight decrease in strength.




Figure 10. Rifle regiment—rifle division.

a. *Organization and Equipment of the Rifle Regiment.* The rifle regiment consists of the regimental headquarters, headquarters troops, three rifle battalions, the regimental artillery, an engineer pioneer company, a signal company, and the regimental service troops (fig. 10).

b. *Regimental Headquarters and Headquarters Troops* (15-O, 30-EM). This unit provides the personnel for the command and staff of the regiment.

Table VIII. Principal Weapons and Transportation—Rifle Regiment, Rifle Division

Unit	Individual weapons			Machinegun			Antitank weapons			Mortars		AFV ¹	Motor transportation							
	Pistol	Submachine gun	Rifle and carbine	Light machine-gun	Heavy machine-gun	AA machinegun	80-mm rocket launcher	80-mm recoilless rifle	80-mm antitank gun	80-mm mort	120-mm mort	SP-80	Motorcycle	Recon car	Light truck	Medium truck	Light trailer	Medium trailer	Heavy trailer	
Regimental totals.....	302	274	1616	81	54	9	36	27	6	27	6	6	6	52	2	98	64	17	82	64
Regimental hq and hq troops.....	15	10	20				2						3	6	4	1	3	4	1	
3 rifle bn.....	219	204	1305	81	54		24	27		27			3	33	54	21	9	51	21	
Regimental arty.....	47	37	139				4		6			6		5	28		1	16		
Engr Co.....	3	4	31				1							1		2	1		2	
Signal Co.....	3	4	26				1							3	2		1	2		
Regimental svc troops.....	15	15	94				4							4	13	40	2	9	40	

¹ Armored fighting vehicles. ² Includes 3 ambulances. ³ Includes 3 ambulances. ⁴ Includes 2 ambulances.

c. *The Rifle Battalion* (37-O, 566-EM). This battalion consists of the battalion headquarters and headquarters troops, three rifle companies, a heavy machinegun company, an antitank company, a mortar company, and the battalion service troops (fig. 11).




Figure 11. Rifle battalion—rifle regiment.

- (1) Battalion headquarters and headquarters troops (8-O, 40-EM) provide the command and staff personnel for the battalion.
- (2) The rifle company (5-O, 114-EM) consists of the company headquarters, three rifle platoons, and a heavy machinegun platoon (fig. 11).
 - (a) The Aggressor company headquarters (1-O, 10-EM) is very small by US standards. It contains only the company commander and the personnel necessary to operate the company command post.
 - (b) The rifle platoon (1-O, 29-EM) consists of three nine-man squads, each with one light machinegun, one submachinegun, and 7 rifles, and a platoon leader, a platoon sergeant, and a messenger.
 - (c) The heavy machinegun platoon (1-O, 17-EM) consists of three five-man heavy machinegun squads, each containing one heavy machinegun, one pistol, and four rifles or carbines.
- (3) The heavy machinegun company (4-O, 53-EM) contains a company headquarters and three heavy machinegun platoons.

Table IX. Principal Weapons and Vehicles—Rifle Battalion, Rifle Regiment

Unit	Individual weapons			Machineguns		AT wps		Mort	Wheeled vehicles				Trailers		
	Pistol	Submachinegun	Rifle & carbine	Light machine-gun	Heavy machine-gun	80-mm rocket launcher	80-mm recoilless rifle	80-mm mort	Motorcycle	Recon car	Light truck	Medium truck	Light trailer	Medium trailer	Heavy trailer
Battalion totals	73	68	435	27	18	8	9	9	1	11	18	7	3	17	7
Battalion hq and hq trps	8	5	35			1			1	4	4		2	4	
3 rifle Co	24	36	270	27	9	3				3	3			3	
Heavy machinegun Co	13	9	35		9	1				1	3			3	
Antitank Co	13	9	35			1	9			1	3			3	
Mortar Co	13	9	35			1		9		1	3			3	
Battalion svc trps	2		25			1				1	2	7	1	1	7

¹ Includes 1 ambulance.

Each of the heavy machinegun platoons is identical with the heavy machinegun platoon of the rifle company.

- (4) The antitank company (4-O, 53-EM) consists of a company headquarters and three antitank platoons. Each antitank platoon contains a platoon headquarters, three five-man antitank squads, each squad armed with one 80-mm recoilless antitank weapon, one pistol, and four rifles or carbines.
- (5) The mortar company (4-O, 53-EM) is organized in the same manner as the heavy machine gun and antitank companies except that it is equipped with nine 80-mm mortars.
- (6) The battalion service troops (2-O, 25-EM) provide limited mess, supply, transportation, and maintenance facilities for the battalion.

d. The Regimental Artillery (17-O, 206-EM). Regimental artillery is an operational grouping of the artillery elements of the regiment. It consists of the regimental artillery officer, a SP gun company, an antitank battery, a mortar battery, and an antiaircraft machinegun company (fig. 10).

- (1) The regimental artillery officer actually has command responsibility of the regiment artillery elements and is directly subordinate to the regimental commander.
- (2) The SP gun company (4-O, 32-EM) consists of a company headquarters and three SP gun platoons. Each platoon is armed with two 80-mm self-propelled guns.
- (3) The antitank battery (4-O, 58-EM) consists of a battery headquarters and three antitank platoons. Each platoon has two truck-drawn 80-mm antitank guns.
- (4) The medium mortar battery (4-O, 58-EM) consists of a battery headquarters and three mortar platoons. Each mortar platoon is armed with two 120-mm mortars.
- (5) The antiaircraft machinegun company (4-O, 58-EM) consists of a company headquarters and three antiaircraft machinegun platoons. Each platoon has three 12.5-mm antiaircraft machineguns.

e. The Engineer Pioneer Company (3-O, 35-EM). This company consists of a company headquarters and two officer-led pioneer sections

f. The Signal Company (3-O, 30-EM). This company consists of a company headquarters, a wire section, and a radio section.

g. The Regimental Service Troops (15-O, 110-EM). These troops provide rear services support for the regiment. They are under the command of the assistant regimental commander for rear services and are composed of service troops headquarters (2-O, 5-EM), a motor

transport company (4-O, 45-EM), a medical company (5-O, 30-EM), a chemical defense platoon (1-O, 15-EM), a small maintenance detachment (2-O, 10-EM), and a small supply detachment (1-O, 5-EM) (fig. 10).

79. Medium Tank Regiment—Rifle Division

a. The medium tank regiment (93-O, 605-EM) of the Aggressor rifle division includes the regimental headquarters and headquarters troops, two medium tank battalions, a SP gun battalion, and the regimental service troops (fig. 12).




Figure 12. Medium tank regiment—rifle division.

b. The regimental headquarters and headquarters troops (15-O, 35-EM) furnish personnel to operate the regimental headquarters.

c. The medium tank battalion (18-O, 144-EM) consists of a battalion headquarters, two medium tank companies, and the battalion service troops (fig. 12).

- (1) The battalion headquarters (8-O, 15-EM) personnel operate the battalion headquarters.
- (2) The medium tank company (4-O, 52-EM) consists of a company headquarters and three medium tank platoons. Each platoon has three T40/80 tanks and a strength of one officer and 14 enlisted men. The company headquarters has one tank.
- (3) The battalion service troops (2-O, 25-EM) provide limited logistical support for the battalion.

Table X. Principal Weapons and Vehicles — Medium Tank Regiment and Motorcycle Battalion, Rifle Division

Unit	Individual weapons			Crew svd weapons			Arm'd fighting veh			Wheeled vehicles				Trailers		
	Pistol	Sub-machinegun	Rifle and carbine	Light machinegun	80-mm rkt launcher	80-mm mort	Armored car	T40/80 tanks	SP-10s	Motorcycle	Recon car	Light truck	Medium truck	Light trailer	Medium trailer	Heavy trailer
Regimental totals.....	190	225	273	---	20	---	---	44	21	6	22	122	71	11	17	71
Regimental hq and hq trps.....	17	10	23	---	2	---	---	2	---	3	6	4	1	3	4	1
2 medium tank bn.....	102	130	92	---	8	---	---	42	---	2	8	28	20	4	6	20
SP gun bn.....	51	65	58	---	---	---	---	---	21	1	6	26	10	2	5	10
Regimental svc trps.....	20	20	110	---	4	---	---	---	---	---	2	34	40	2	2	40
Battalion totals.....	54	65	181	54	15	6	10	---	---	11	73	211	4	7	3	4
Battalion hq.....	15	5	15	---	2	---	---	---	---	6	4	2	---	2	2	---
2 motorcycle co.....	16	30	130	54	10	6	---	---	---	4	66	6	---	2	---	---
Armored car co.....	20	30	6	---	1	---	10	---	---	1	1	1	---	1	---	---
Battalion svc trps.....	3	---	30	---	2	---	---	---	---	---	2	2	4	2	1	4

¹ Include 5 ambulances. ² Include 1 ambulance per bn. ³ Include 2 ambulances.

d. The SP gun battalion (22-O, 152-EM) consists of a battalion headquarters, four SP gun companies, and the battalion service troops (fig. 12).

- (1) The battalion headquarters (8-O, 15-EM) provides the necessary personnel to operate the battalion command post.
- (2) The SP gun company (3-O, 28-EM) consists of a company headquarters with one SP-105 self-propelled gun and two SP gun platoons with two SP-105 self-propelled guns each.
- (3) The battalion service troops (2-O, 25-EM) provide limited rear services support for the battalion.

e. The regimental service troops (15-O, 110-EM) provide the logistical support for the regiment. They include a headquarters, a motor transport company, a medical company, a maintenance company, a supply platoon, a chemical defense platoon, and elements of other service troops. They are commanded by the assistant regimental commander for rear services.

80. Motorcycle Battalion—Rifle Division

a. *General.* The reorganization of this unit has resulted in an increase in mobility and fire power and a 20 percent reduction in strength.

b. *Motorcycle Battalion* (32-O, 322-EM). The motorcycle battalion of the rifle division contains the battalion headquarters and headquarters troops, two motorcycle companies, an armored car company, and the battalion service troops (fig. 9).

- (1) The battalion headquarters and headquarters troops (15-O, 20-EM) provide the necessary personnel to operate the battalion command post.
- (2) The motorcycle company (5-O, 110-EM) consists of a company headquarters (1-O, 10-EM), three motorcycle platoons, and a mortar platoon (1-O, 16-EM) with three 80-mm mortars.
- (3) The motorcycle platoon is composed of a platoon headquarters (1-O, 1-EM) and three squads with nine men, three light machineguns, and three $\frac{1}{4}$ -ton trucks each.
- (4) The armored car company (4-O, 52-EM) consists of a company headquarters (1-O, 10-EM) and three armored car platoons (1-O, 14-EM). The company has 10 KC-5 armored cars.
- (5) The battalion service troops (3-O, 30-EM) provide limited logistical support for the battalion.

81. Organization of the Divisional Artillery—Rifle Division

a. The divisional artillery is an operational grouping of the artillery elements of the division (261-O, 2,174-EM). It contains the following units: the divisional artillery headquarters and headquarters troops, a light gun regiment, a medium howitzer regiment, an antitank battalion, a light antiaircraft battalion, and a heavy mortar battalion. The division artillery is commanded by the assistant division commander for artillery.




Figure 13. Divisional artillery—rifle division.

-b. The divisional artillery headquarters and headquarters troops (17-O, 108-EM) provide command, operations, fire direction, survey, reconnaissance, communication, and liaison personnel for the divisional artillery headquarters.

c. The light gun regiment (69-O, 540-EM) consists of the regimental headquarters and headquarters troops (20-O, 50-EM), two light gun battalions, and the regimental service troops (50-O, 60-EM) (fig. 14.).

The light gun battalion (22-O, 215-EM) consists of a battalion headquarters (10-O, 35-EM) and three light gun batteries (4-O, 60-EM). Each battery has a battery headquarters and two platoons with two 80-mm field guns and one light machinegun each (figure 14).

Table XI. Principal Weapons and Vehicles—Divisional Artillery, Rifle Division

Unit	Small arms				Arty weapons				Wheeled vehicles				Trailers				
	Pistols	Submachine-gun	Rifle and car-bine	Light machine gun	40-mm AA gun	80-mm anti-tank gun	80-mm gun	120-mm how	160-mm mort	Motorcycle	Recon car	Light truck	Medium truck	Light trailer	Medium trailer	Heavy trailer	Ammo trailer
Divisional arty totals	369	238	1828	46	16	16	24	36	16	17	93	175	244	83	68	76	60
Hq and hq trps	17	30	78							5	20	10	10	10	10	10	
Light gun regt	93	48	468	12			24			4	20	18	72	20	16	22	26
Medium how regt	127	72	647	18				36		5	26	23	87	26	21	22	29
Light antitank bn	41	28	179	8		16				1	9	8	25	9	7	9	
Light AA bn	46	28	241		16					1	9	8	25	9	7	9	
Heavy mort bn	45	32	215	8					16	1	9	8	25	9	7	4	5

¹ Includes 7 ambulances. ² Includes 2 ambulances. ³ Includes 1 ambulance.





Figure 14. Light gun regiment—divisional artillery—rifle division.

d. The medium howitzer regiment (91-O, 755-EM) consists of the regimental headquarters and headquarters troops (20-O, 50-EM), three medium howitzer battalions, and the regimental service troops (5-O, 60-EM) (fig. 15).

The medium howitzer battalion (22-O, 215-EM) consists of a battalion headquarters (10-O, 35-EM) and three medium howitzer batteries (each 4-O, 60-EM). The medium howitzer battery has a battery headquarters and two platoons with two 120-mm howitzers and one light machine gun each (fig. 15).

e. The antitank battalion (25-O, 223-EM) of the rifle division consists of a battalion headquarters (10-O, 25-EM), four antitank batteries, and the battalion service troops (3-O, 30-EM). The antitank battery (3-O, 42-EM) is composed of a battery headquarters and two antitank platoons, each of which contains two 80-mm antitank guns and one light machinegun (fig. 13).



82. Engineer Sapper Battalion—Rifle Division

The engineer sapper battalion (28-O, 340-EM) of the rifle division consists of a battalion headquarters (10-O, 25-EM), two engineer sapper companies (5-O, 95-EM), an engineer ponton company (5-O, 95-EM), and the battalion service troops (3-O, 30-EM). The sapper and ponton companies each consist of a company headquarters and three platoons. The ponton company is equipped with 175 feet of 40-ton bridge (see fig. 9).

83. Signal Battalion—Rifle Division

The signal battalion (27-O, 270-EM) of the rifle division is composed of the battalion headquarters and headquarters troops (15-O, 50-EM), two signal wire companies (each 3-O, 70-EM), a signal radio company (3-O, 50-EM), and the battalion service troops (3-O, 30-EM) (see fig. 9).

84. Divisional Service Troops—Rifle Division

Division service troops (126-O, 680-EM) consist of the division service troops headquarters (30-O, 10-EM), a motor transport battalion, a small medical battalion (25-O, 75-EM), maintenance troops, supply troops, a chemical defense company (4-O, 40-EM), and sections of other services (10-O, 20-EM); i. e., finance, postal, etc. The division service troops are commanded by the assistant division commander for rear services (fig. 16).

a. The motor transport battalion (27-O, 285-EM) of the rifle division services consists of a battalion headquarters (10-O, 10-EM), three motor transport companies (4-O, 75-EM) with 60 three-ton trucks and 60 two-ton trailers each, and the battalion service troops (5-O, 50-EM) (see fig. 16).

b. The maintenance troops (20-O, 150-EM) of the rifle division service troops include truck maintenance, tank maintenance, and




Figure 16. Division service troops—rifle division.

artillery maintenance sections. Also included are personnel for maintenance of instruments, clothing, and other light equipment.

c. The supply troops (10-O, 100-EM) of the rifle division service troops include personnel for the issuing and handling of Class I, Classes II and IV, Class III, and Class V supplies.

85. Mountain Division

The mountain division (1,197-O, 11,610-EM) is an Aggressor rifle division which has had its TOE modified for mountain warfare. The basic changes include a decrease in armor, artillery, and motor transportation. These modifications also include an increase in personnel, an increase in engineer units, the addition of horse cavalry, and the addition of horse transport. The units of the Aggressor mountain division are the division headquarters and headquarters troops, three mountain rifle regiments, a medium tank regiment, a cavalry reconnaissance squadron, the divisional artillery, an engineer battalion, a signal battalion, and the divisional service troops (see fig. 17).




Figure 17. Aggressor mountain division.

86. Mountain Rifle Regiment—Mountain Division

The mountain rifle regiment (181-O, 2,319-EM) consists of the regimental headquarters and headquarters troops, three mountain rifle battalions, the regimental artillery, an engineer sapper company, a signal company, and the regimental service troops.

Table XII. Principal Weapons—Mountain Division

Unit	Individual weapons				Machine-gun		AA		Antitank			Mortars			Arty		AFV	
	Pistol	Submachinegun	Rifle and carbines	Light machinegun	Heavy machinegun	AA machinegun	40-mm AA gun	80-mm rkt launcher	80-mm recoilless rifle	80-mm antitank gun	50-mm mort	80-mm mort	106-mm mort	120-mm mort	80-mm how	80-mm gun	T40/80 tank	SP-106 gun
Division totals.....	1780	1438	9583	327	85	12	16	301	85	28	81	85	12	54	12	24	44	21
Hq and hq trps.....	70	30	75	3				10										
3 mtn rifle regt.....	912	894	5694	261	81	12		132	81	12	81	81	12		12		44	21
Medium tank regt.....	190	225	273					20										
Recon sqdn.....	48	83	165	16	4			22	4			14						
Divisional arty.....	324	206	1631	47			16	42		16				54		24		
Engr bn.....	33		435					14										
Signal bn.....	27		270					11										
Divisional svc trps.....	176		1040					50										

Table XIV. Principal Weapons—Mountain Rifle Regiment, Mountain Division

Unit	Individual weapons			Machine-gun			Antitank			Mortars			Arty
	Pistol	Submachine gun	Rifle & carbine	Light machine-gun	Heavy machine-gun	A.A. machine gun	80-mm rocket launcher	80-mm recoilless rifle	80-mm antitank gun	60-mm mortar	80-mm mortar	105-mm mortar	
Regimental totals.....	304	298	1,898	87	27	4	44	27	4	27	27	4	4
Hq and hq trps.....	15	10	20				2						
3 mtn rifle bn.....	228	216	1,449	81	27		27	27		27	27	4	4
Regimental arty.....	29	28	133	6		4	4		4				
Engr Co.....	5	10	85				3						
Signal bn.....	3	4	26				1						
Regimental svc trps.....	24	30	185				7						

Table XV. Unit Transportation—Mountain Rifle Regiment, Mountain Division

Unit	Motor transportation					Horse transportation				
	Motorcycle	Recon car	Light truck	Light trailer	Medium trailer	Riding horse	Pack horse	Draft horse	Wagon	Caisson
Regimental totals.....	6	23	¹ 25	18	20	54	501	256	128	48
Hq and hq trps.....	3	5	4	3	4	3	3	6	3	---
3 mtn rifle bn.....	3	9	² 12	9	9	15	390	42	21	---
Regimental arty.....	---	1	---	---	---	14	30	88	44	24
Engr Co.....	---	---	---	---	---	5	5	24	12	---
Signal Co.....	---	3	2	1	2	---	---	---	---	---
Regimental svc trps.....	---	5	³ 7	5	5	17	73	96	48	24

¹ Includes 5 ambulances.

² Includes 3 ambulances.

³ Includes 2 ambulances.

a. The regimental headquarters and headquarters troops (15-O, 30-EM) furnish the command and staff personnel for the regiment. They are organized the same as the headquarters and headquarters troops of the rifle regiment, rifle division.

b. The mountain rifle battalion (40-O, 591-EM) is nearly the same as the rifle battalion, rifle regiment. It contains a battalion headquarters (7-O, 25-EM), three mountain rifle companies, a heavy machinegun company (4-O, 53-EM), an antitank company (4-O, 53-EM), a mortar company (4-O, 53-EM), and engineer pioneer company, and battalion service troops (3-O, 30-EM) (see fig. 18).

(1) The mountain rifle company (5-O, 114-EM) differs from the rifle company, rifle battalion, in that it has a mortar platoon (1-O, 17-EM) equipped with three 50-mm mortars instead of a heavy machinegun platoon (see fig. 18).

(2) The engineer pioneer company (3-O, 35-EM) of the mountain rifle battalion is the same as the engineer pioneer company of the rifle regiment (see par. 78e).

c. The regimental artillery (14-O, 176-EM) of the mountain rifle regiment consists of the regimental artillery officer, a mountain howitzer battery (4-O, 60-EM) armed with four 80-mm horse-drawn mountain howitzers and two light machineguns, an antitank battery (3-O, 42-EM) armed with four 80-mm horse-drawn antitank guns and two light machineguns, an antiaircraft machinegun company (3-O, 32-EM) armed with four 12.5-mm pack antiaircraft machine-




Figure 18. Mountain rifle regiment—mountain division.

guns and mountain mortar battery (3-O, 42-EM) armed with four 105-mm horsedrawn mortars and two light machineguns (see fig. 18).

d. The engineer sapper company (5-O, 95-EM) consists of a company headquarters and three platoons. It is the same as the engineer sapper company, engineer sapper battalion, rifle division (par. 82).

e. The signal company (3-O, 30-EM) is the same as the signal company, rifle regiment (par. 78f) and consists of a company headquarters and wire and radio sections.

f. The regimental service troops (24-O, 215-EM) provide limited logistical support for the mountain rifle regiment. They include the service troops headquarters (2-O, 5-EM), a horse transport squadron, a medical company (5-O, 40-EM), a veterinary platoon (1-O, 20-EM), a chemical defense platoon (1-O, 15-EM), a maintenance detachment (2-O, 10-EM) and a supply detachment (1-O, 5-EM) (fig. 18).

(1) The horse transport squadron (12-O, 120-EM) consists of a squadron headquarters (6-O, 20-EM), a wagon transport troop (3-O, 55-EM) with forty 2-ton wagons and 80 horses, and a pack transport troop (3-O, 45-EM) with 40 pack horses.

(2) The other elements of the regimental service troops, mountain rifle regiment are very similar to the corresponding elements of the regimental service troops, rifle regiment (par. 78g).

87. Medium Tank Regiment—Mountain Division

The medium tank regiment of the mountain division is identical in strength (93-O, 605-EM) and composition (44-T40/80 tanks, 21 SP-105 guns) to the medium tank regiment, rifle division (par. 79, fig. 12).

88. Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron—Mountain Division

The cavalry reconnaissance squadron (23-O, 273-EM) consists of a squadron headquarters (5-O, 15-EM), two cavalry troops, a heavy machinegun troop (3-O; 29-EM) armed with 4 pack heavy machineguns, an antitank troop (3-O, 29-EM) armed with 4 pack 80-mm recoilless weapons, a mortar troop (3-O, 29-EM) armed with 4 pack 80-mm mortars and the squadron service troops (3-O, 25-EM) (see fig. 17).

a. The cavalry troops (3-O, 73-EM) consists of the troop headquarters (1-O, 5-EM), and two cavalry platoons (see fig. 17).

b. The cavalry platoon (1-O, 34-EM) is composed of a platoon headquarters (1-O, 2-EM) and four cavalry squads, each squad has eight men, eight horses, seven submachineguns, one light machinegun, and one 80-mm antitank rocket launcher.

89. Divisional Artillery—Mountain Division

The divisional artillery (232-O, 1,911-EM) of the mountain division consists of the divisional artillery headquarters and headquarters troops (17-O, 108-EM), a horse-drawn gun regiment, a horse-drawn mortar regiment, an antitank battalion, and a light antiaircraft battalion.

a. The horse-drawn gun regiment (69-O, 540-EM) is organized very similarly to the light gun regiment of the rifle division. It consists of the regimental headquarters and headquarters troops (20-O, 50-EM), two horse-drawn gun battalions (22-O, 215-EM) and the regimental service troops (5-O, 60-EM). The horse-drawn gun battalions are armed with 12 horse-drawn 80-mm field guns and six light machineguns each (see fig. 19).




Figure 19. Divisional artillery—mountain division.

b. The horse-drawn mortar regiment (91-O, 755-EM) consists of the regimental headquarters and headquarters troops (20-O, 50-EM), three horse-drawn mortar battalions, and the regimental service troops (5-O, 60-EM). The horse-drawn mortar battalions (22-O, 215-EM) consist of a battalion headquarters (10-O, 35-EM) and three horse-drawn mortar batteries (4-O, 60-EM); each battery being armed with six horse-drawn 120-mm mortars and three light machineguns (see fig. 19).

Table XVI. Principal Weapons and Transportation—Reconnaissance Squadron, Mountain Division

Unit	Individual weapons			Machine gun		Antitank	Mort		Wheeled transportation				Horse transportation					
	Pistol	Submachine-gun	Rifle and carbine	Light machine-gun	Heavy machine-gun		80-mm rocket launcher	80-mm recoilless rifle	50-mm mort	80-mm mort	Motorcycle	Recon car	Light truck	Light trailer	Medium trailer	Riding horse	Pack horse	Draft horse
Sqdn totals	48	83	165	16	4	22	4	---	4	1	1	12	1	1	268	68	24	12
Sqdn hq	5	5	10	---	---	1	---	---	---	1	1	---	1	---	14	---	4	2
2 cav trps	22	60	70	16	---	16	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	152	8	---	---
Heavy machinegun trp	6	6	20	---	4	1	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	32	16	---	---
Antitank trp	6	6	20	---	---	1	4	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	32	20	---	---
Mortar trp	6	6	20	---	---	1	---	---	4	---	---	---	---	---	32	24	---	---
Sqdn svc trps	3	---	25	---	---	2	---	---	---	---	---	12	---	1	6	---	20	10

¹Includes 1 ambulance.

Table XVII. Principal Weapons and Transportation—Divisional Artillery, Mountain Division

Unit	Small arms				Artillery				Motor transportation						Horse transportation					
	Pistol	Submachine-gun	Rifle and car-bine	Light machine-gun	40-mm AA	80-mm anti-tank gun	80-mm gun	120-mm mort.	Motorcycle	Recon car	Light truck	Medium truck	Light trailer	Medium trailer	Heavy trailer	Riding horse	Pack horse	Draft horse	Wagon	Caisson
Divisional arty totals	324	206	1631	47	16	16	24	54	13	59	143	144	50	36	92	110	110	838	80	312
Hq and hq trps	17	30	78						5	20	10	10	10	10	10					
Light gun regt	93	48	486	12			24		2	10	8	42	11	6	42	44	44	304	32	96
Medium mort regt	127	72	647	27				54	2	11	8	42	11	6	42	66	66	534	48	216
Light antitank bn	41	28	179	8		16			1	9	8	25	9	7	9					
Light AA bn	46	28	241		16				1	9	8	25	9	7	9					

¹ Includes 7 ambulances. ² Includes 2 ambulances. ³ Includes 3 ambulances. ⁴ Includes 1 ambulance.

c. The antitank battalion and the light antiaircraft battalion of the mountain division are identical with the antitank and light antiaircraft battalions of the rifle division (pars. 81e and f).

- (1) The antitank battalion (23-O, 223-EM) is armed with 16 truck-drawn 80-mm antitank guns and eight light machine-guns (see par. 81e and fig. 13).
- (2) The light antiaircraft battalion (30-O, 285-EM) is armed with 16 truck-drawn 40-mm antiaircraft guns (see par. 81f and fig. 13).

90. Mountain Engineer Battalion—Mountain Division

The mountain engineer battalion (33-O, 435-EM) of mountain division is the same as the engineer sapper battalion of the rifle division except that it contains three engineer sapper companies and that the transport of the sapper companies is all horse drawn. This battalion consists of a battalion headquarters (10-O, 25-EM), three engineer sapper companies (5-O, 95-EM), an engineer ponton company (5-O, 95-EM), and the battalion service troops (3-O, 30-EM). The battalion carries 175 feet of 40-ton bridge (see fig. 17).

91. Signal Battalion—Mountain Division

The signal battalion (27-O, 270-EM) of the mountain division is the same as the signal battalion of the rifle division. It consists of the battalion headquarters and headquarters troops (15-O, 50-EM), two signal wire companies (each 3-O, 70-EM), a signal radio company (3-O, 50-EM), and the battalion service troops (3-O, 30-EM) (see fig. 17).

92. Divisional Service Troops—Mountain Division

The divisional service troops (176-O, 1,040-EM) of the mountain division consist of the service troops headquarters (30-O, 10-EM), a mixed transport regiment, a small medical battalion (25-O, 100-EM), a veterinary company (5-O, 40-EM), a chemical defense company (4-O, 40-EM), maintenance troops (20-O, 150-EM), support troops (10-O, 100-EM), and other minor services (10-O, 20-EM).

The mixed transport regiment (72-O, 580-EM) consists of a regimental headquarters, two horse transport squadrons, a motor transport battalion, and the regimental service troops (10-O, 100-EM). (see fig. 20).

a. The horse transport squadron (12-O, 120-EM) consists of a squadron headquarters (6-O, 20-EM), a wagon transport troop (3-O, 55-EM) with 40 two-ton wagons and 80 horses, and a pack transport troop (3-O, 45-EM) with 40 pack horses. These squadrons are the same as the horse transport squadron of the regimental service troops of the mountain rifle regiment (par. 86f(1)).




Figure 20. Divisional service troops—mountain division.

b. The motor transport battalion (23-O, 210-EM) consists of a battalion headquarters (10-O, 10-EM), two motor transport companies (each 4-O, 75-EM) with 60 three ton trucks and the battalion service troops (5-O, 50-EM). This battalion is the same as the motor transport battalion, rifle division service troops, except that it has one less motor transport company (par. 84a).

93. Airborne Division

This division is a special unit but is listed here because of its infantry organization. Aggressor's airborne divisions were originally infantry divisions but were redesignated and placed in the elite class. It was necessary to carry out some reorganization in accordance with the intended mission. The airborne regiments of the airborne division are designated brigades, each of which is organized along conventional lines and contains most of the arms and services to make it capable of limited fighting as an independent unit. Vehicles not airborne during an operation are normally placed under the assistant division commander for rear services during such operations. The airborne division is motorized except for the airborne rifle components.

Table XVIII. Principal Weapons—Airborne Division

Unit	Individual weapons			Machinegun		AA		Antitank			Mortar				Arty	
	Pistol	Sub-machinegun		Rifle and carbine	Light machinegun	Heavy machinegun	AA machinegun	20-mm AA	80-mm recoilless rifle	80-mm antitank gun	50-mm mortar	80-mm mortar	105-mm mortar	120-mm mortar	80-mm how	80-mm gun
Division totals.....	1773	1267	8388		387	162	30	24	548	108	16	81	90	18	54	24
Hq and hq trps.....	70	30	75				3		15							
3 airborne brig.....	1113	936	5367		342	162	27		390	108		81	90	18	18	
Armored car bn.....	88	95	63						16							
Divisional arty.....	321	206	1613		47			24	45	16	16			54		24
Engr bn.....	28		340						11							
Signal bn.....	27		250						11							
Divisional svc trps.....	126		680						60							


Table XIX. Unit Transportation—Airborne Division

Unit	Wheeled veh				Trucks		Trailers		
	Motorcycle	Passenger car	Recon car	Armored car	Light truck	Medium truck	Light trailer	Medium trailer	Heavy trailer
Division totals.....	66	1	405	30	1 1011	235	234	880	235
Hq and hq trps.....	5	1	10	---	15	5	10	15	5
3 airborne brig.....	24	---	255	---	534	---	84	462	---
Armored car bn.....	9	---	9	30	11	---	9	10	---
Divisional arty.....	16	---	84	---	265	45	84	219	45
Engr bn.....	2	---	7	---	36	---	7	35	---
Signal bn.....	7	---	9	---	49	---	9	48	---
Divisional svc troops.....	3	---	31	---	101	185	31	91	185

¹ Includes 34 ambulances. ² Includes 1 ambulance. ³ Includes 10 ambulances.

a. *Units of the Airborne Division* (1,041-O, 10,589-EM). The airborne division consists of the divisional headquarters and headquarters troops, three airborne brigades, an airborne armored car battalion, the airborne divisional artillery, an airborne engineer battalion, an airborne signal battalion, and the airborne divisional service troops.

b. *The Airborne Divisional Headquarters and Headquarters Troops* (70-O, 110-EM). These troops consist of the airborne division headquarters and the airborne division headquarters troops. The airborne division headquarters (66-O, 75-EM) provides the command and staff personnel for the airborne division. The airborne division headquarters troops (4-O, 35-EM) provide the security, transport, mess, internal command, and unit supply for the division headquarters.



94. Airborne Brigade—Airborne Division

The airborne brigade (176-O, 2,364-EM) consists of the brigade headquarters and headquarters troops (15-O, 30-EM), three airborne rifle battalions, an airborne motorcycle company, the airborne brigade artillery, an airborne pioneer company, and an airborne signal company, and the airborne brigade service troops (see fig. 22).

Table XX. Principal Weapons and Vehicles—Airborne Brigade and Airborne Armored Car Battalion, Airborne Division

Unit	Individual weapons			Machinegun			Antitank			Mortar			Arty	Motor transportation					
	Pistol	Submachinegun	Rifle and carbine	Light machine-gun	Heavy machine-gun	AA machinegun	80-mm rocket launcher	80-mm recoilless rifle	80-mm antitank gun	60-mm mortar	80-mm mortar	105-mm mortar	80-mm how	Motorcycle	Armored car	Recon car	Light truck	Light trailer	Medium trailer
Brigade total.....	371	312	1,789	114	54	9	130	36	—	27	30	6	6	8	—	85	181	28	154
3 airborne rifle bn.....	279	234	1,353	81	54	—	105	27	—	27	27	—	—	3	—	33	178	9	75
Motorcycle Co.....	8	15	65	27	—	—	5	—	—	—	3	—	—	2	—	33	3	4	3
Brigade arty.....	48	30	189	6	—	9	8	9	—	—	—	6	6	—	—	5	28	1	16
Engr Co.....	3	4	31	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	2	1	2
Signal Co.....	3	4	26	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	3	2	3	2
Brigade svc trps.....	15	15	95	—	—	—	8	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	4	53	4	51
Hq and hq trps.....	15	10	20	—	—	—	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	3	—	6	5	6	5
Battalion totals.....	88	95	63	—	—	—	16	—	—	—	—	—	—	9	30	9	11	9	10
Battalion hq.....	15	5	15	—	—	—	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	6	—	4	2	4	2
3 armored car Co.....	60	90	18	—	—	—	12	—	—	—	—	—	—	3	30	3	3	3	3
Battalion svc trps.....	3	—	30	—	—	—	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	4	2	5

¹ Includes 3 ambulances.

² Includes 2 ambulances.

³ Includes 1 ambulance.

⁴ Includes 5 ambulances.

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


Figure 22. Airborne brigade—airborne division.

a. The airborne rifle battalion (39-O, 600-EM) consists of the battalion headquarters (8-O, 40-EM), three airborne rifle companies, an airborne heavy machinegun company (4-O, 53-EM) with nine heavy machineguns, an airborne antitank company (4-O, 53-EM) with nine 80-mm recoilless antitank weapons, an airborne mortar company (4-O, 53-EM) with nine 80-mm mortars, and the battalion service troops (1-O, 20-EM) (see fig. 23).




Figure 23. Airborne rifle battalion—airborne brigade.

- (1) The airborne rifle company (6-O, 127-EM) consists of a company headquarters (1-O, 10-EM), three airborne rifle platoons, an airborne heavy machinegun platoon (1-O, 16-EM) with three heavy machineguns, and an airborne mortar platoon (1-O, 17-EM) with three 50-mm mortars. (see fig. 23).
- (2) The airborne rifle platoon (1-O, 28-EM) consists of a platoon headquarters (1-O, 1-EM) and three airborne rifle squads. Each rifle squad (9-EM) is armed with seven rifles, one sub-machinegun, one light machinegun, and one 80-mm antitank rocket launcher.
- (3) The battalion headquarters and the three supporting companies of the airborne rifle battalion are the same as those of the rifle battalion, rifle regiment (par. 78c(1), (3), (4), and (5)).

b. The airborne motorcycle company (5-O, 110-EM) consists of a company headquarters (1-O, 10-EM) with four $\frac{1}{4}$ -ton trucks, three airborne motorcycle platoons (each 1-O, 28-EM) equipped with ten $\frac{1}{4}$ -ton trucks and nine light machineguns, and an airborne mortar platoon (1-O, 16-EM) equipped with six $\frac{1}{4}$ -ton trucks and three 80-mm mortars. This company is the same as the motorcycle company, motorcycle battalion, rifle division (par. 80a(2) and (3)).

c. The airborne brigade artillery (18-O, 249-EM) consists of the brigade artillery officer, an airborne howitzer battery (5-O, 80-EM) with six 80-mm howitzers and three light machineguns, an airborne antitank company (4-O, 53-EM) with nine 80-mm antitank recoilless weapons, an airborne antiaircraft machinegun company (4-O, 58-EM) with nine 12.5-mm antiaircraft machineguns, and an airborne mortar battery (4-O, 58-EM) with six 105-mm mortars and three light machineguns (see fig. 22).

d. The airborne pioneer company (3-O, 35-EM) and the airborne signal company (3-O, 30-EM) are identical with the engineer pioneer company and the signal company of the rifle regiment, rifle division (par. 78e.)

e. The airborne brigade service troops (15-O, 110-EM) are the same as the regimental service troops, rifle regiment (par. 78g). They consist of the service troops headquarters (2-O, 5-EM), an airborne motor transport company (4-O, 45-EM), an airborne medical company (5-O, 30-EM), a chemical defense platoon (1-O, 15-EM), maintenance troops (2-O, 10-EM), and supply troops (1-O, 5-EM), (see fig. 22).

95. Airborne Armored Car Battalion—Airborne Division

The airborne armored car battalion (30-O, 206-EM) consists of the battalion headquarters troops (15-O, 20-EM) with two KC-5 armored cars, three airborne armored car companies (each 4-O, 52-EM) with 10 KC-5 armored cars each, and the battalion service troops (3-O, 30-EM). This battalion is completely airborne. It performs reconnaissance functions and gives light armor support to the airborne division. The armored car companies are the same as the armored car company of the motorcycle battalion, rifle division (par. 80b(4) and fig. 21).

96. Divisional Artillery—Airborne Division

The divisional artillery (232-O, 1,911-EM) of the airborne division is similar to the divisional artillery of the mountain division except that it is 100 percent motorized and airborne.

a. The airborne divisional artillery consists of the divisional artillery headquarters and headquarters troops (17-O, 108-EM), an airborne gun regiment (69-O, 540-EM) with twenty-four 80-mm guns and 12 light machineguns, an airborne mortar regiment (91-O, 755-EM) with fifty-four 120-mm mortars and 18 light machineguns, an airborne antitank battalion (25-O, 223-EM) with sixteen 80-mm antitank guns and eight light machineguns, and an airborne antiaircraft battalion (30-O, 285-EM) with three 55-mm antiaircraft guns and 15 35-mm antiaircraft guns.




Figure 24. Divisional artillery—airborne division.

Table XXI. Principal Weapons and Vehicles—Divisional Artillery, Airborne Division

Unit	Individual weapons			Machine-guns		Antitank		Arty		Motor transportation						
	Pistol	Submachine-gun	Rifle and carbine	Light machine-gun	20-mm AA	80-mm mortar launcher	80-mm anti-tank gun	80-mm gun	120-mm mortar	Motorcycle	Recon car	Light truck	Medium truck	Light trailer	Medium trailer	Heavy trailer
Divisional arty totals	821	206	1613	47	24	45	16	24	54	16	84	1,265	45	84	219	45
Hq and hq trps	17	30	78			6				5	20	15	5	20	15	5
Airborne gun regt.	93	48	468	12		6		24		4	20	68	20	20	66	20
Airborne mortar regt.	127	72	647	27		17			54	5	26	108	20	26	106	20
Airborne antitank bn.	41	28	179	8		2	16			1	9	33		9	16	
Airborne AA bn.	46	28	241		24	14				1	9	41		9	16	

¹ Includes 6 ambulances. ² Includes 2 ambulances.³ Includes 1 ambulance.

b. The airborne antiaircraft battalion (30-O, 285-EM) consists of a battalion headquarters, four airborne antiaircraft batteries (3-O, 55-EM) with two platoons of three 20-mm antiaircraft guns each, and the battalion service troops (3-O, 30-EM) (see fig. 24).

97. Airborne Engineer Battalion—Airborne Division

The airborne engineer battalion (28-O, 340-EM) consists of a battalion headquarters (10-O, 25-EM), three airborne engineer companies (5-O, 95-EM), and the battalion service troops (3-O, 30-EM). The airborne engineer companies are the same as the engineer sapper companies of the engineer sapper battalion, rifle division (par. 92). The airborne engineer battalion carries 250 feet of 20-ton bridge (see fig. 21).

98. Airborne Signal Battalion—Airborne Division

The airborne signal battalion (27-O, 250-EM) consists of the battalion headquarters and headquarters troops (15-O, 50-EM), two airborne signal radio companies (each 3-O, 50-EM), an airborne signal wire company (3-O, 70-EM), and the battalion service troops (3-O, 30-EM) (see fig. 21).

99. Airborne Divisional Service Troops—Airborne Division

The airborne divisional service troops (126-O, 680-EM) are the same as those of the rifle division (par. 84). They consist of the service troop headquarters (30-O, 10-EM), a motor transport battalion (27-O, 285-EM) with 180 three-ton trucks and 180 two-ton trailers, a medical battalion (25-O, 75-EM), a chemical defense company (4-O, 40-EM), maintenance troops (20-O, 150-EM), supply troops (10-O, 100-EM), and detachments of other services totaling 10 officers and 20 enlisted men (see fig. 16).

Section V. MOBILE DIVISIONS

100. General

The Aggressor mobile divisions include mechanized divisions, tank divisions, and cavalry divisions. The mechanized division compares most readily with the United States infantry division when fully motorized, although it has less infantry and more tanks. The tank division is somewhat comparable to the United States armored division. The Aggressor cavalry division has no counterpart in the United States Army of today.

101. The Mechanized Division

The Aggressor mechanized division (1,402-O, 12,546-EM) consists of the divisional headquarters and headquarters troops (70-O, 110-EM), organized much the same as the headquarters and headquarters troops of other Aggressor divisions, three mechanized rifle regiments, a heavy tank and self-propelled gun regiment, a medium tank regiment, a motorcycle battalion, the divisional artillery, an engineer ponton battalion, a signal battalion, and the divisional service troops.

102. Mechanized Rifle Regiment—Mechanized Division

The mechanized rifle regiment (202-O, 2,185-EM) consists of the regimental headquarters and headquarters troops, three motorized rifle battalions, a medium tank battalion, an armored car company (4-O, 52-EM) with 10 KC-5 armored cars, the regimental artillery, and the regimental service troops.

a. The regimental headquarters and headquarters troops (20-O, 100-EM) consist of the regimental headquarters (15-O, 30-EM) and the headquarters troops (5-O, 70-EM). The regimental headquarters provides the command and staff personnel for the regiment. The headquarters troops furnish the engineer and signal troops for the regiment and the mess, supply, and transport personnel for the regimental headquarters.

b. The motorized rifle battalion (35-O, 475-EM) consists of a battalion headquarters (10-O, 20-EM), three motorized rifle companies, a motorized heavy machinegun company (4-O, 47-EM) with nine heavy machineguns and four one-ton trucks, a motorized antitank battery (3-O, 33-EM) with four 80-mm antitank guns and five one-ton trucks, a motorized mortar company (4-O, 47-EM) with nine 80-mm mortars and seven one-ton trucks and the battalion service troops (2-O, 25-EM) (see fig. 27).

c. The motorized rifle company (4-O, 95-EM) consists of a company headquarters (1-O, 5-EM) and three motorized rifle platoons (1-O, 30-EM). The motorized rifle platoon is composed of a platoon headquarters (1-O, 3-EM) with one three-ton truck, and three rifle squads. The rifle squad is the same as the rifle squad, rifle company, rifle battalion. It has nine men, seven rifles, one submachinegun, and one light machinegun (see fig. 27).

d. The medium tank battalion (26-O, 216-EM) of the mechanized rifle regiment is composed of a battalion headquarters (10-O, 20-EM) with two T40/80 tanks, three medium tank companies (each 4-O, 52-EM), with ten T40/80 tanks each, and the battalion service troops (4-O, 40-EM). The medium tank company is the same as the




Table XXII. Principal Weapons—Mechanized Division

Unit	Individual weapons			Machine-gun		AA		Antitank		Mort		Arty			AFV				
	Pistol	Submachine-gun	Rifle and carbine	Light machine-gun	Heavy machine-gun	AA machine-gun	40-mm AA	80-mm mortar launcher	80-mm anti-tank gun	80-mm mort.	120-mm mort.	80-mm gun	120-mm how.	160-mm rkt	Armored car	T40/80 tank	T60/120 tank	SP-105	SP-150
Division totals	2256	2306	9019	467	90	45	22	127	44	96	54	36	24	8	50	176	44	21	21
Hq and hq trps	70	30	75	3				10								5			
3 mechanized rifle regt	1068	1095	4737	324	81	27		24	36	81	18	36			30	96		21	
Heavy tank and sp gun regt	247	530	439	30			6								10		44		
Medium tank regt	311	375	777	30	9	9		8	4	9						65			21
Motorcycle bn	81	102	218	56				15	4	6					10	10			
Divisional arty	275	174	1453	34		9	16				36		24	8					
Engr bn	28		340					11											
Signal bn	27		250					11											
Divisional svc trps	131		730					48											

Table XXIII. Unit Transportation—Mechanized Division

Unit	Passenger vehicles			Truck			Tractor		Trailer			
	Motorcycle	Passenger car	Recon car	Light truck	Medium truck	Heavy truck	Light tractor	Medium tractor	Light trailer	Medium trailer	Heavy trailer	Ammo trailer
Division totals	112	1	471	1 559	1177	25	3	2	248	464	854	99
Hq and hq trps	5	1	10	10	10				10	10	10	
3 mechanized rifle regt	42		180	258	465				59	237	288	
Heavy tank and sp regt	10		40	46	94				21	40	53	35
Medium tank regt	15		43	57	122				26	42	94	15
Motorcycle bn	13		75	13	9				8	4	5	
Divisional arty	15		74	105	198				65	63	100	49
Engr bn	2		7	27	20	19	3	2	7	6	39	
Signal bn	7		9	20	29				9	19	29	
Divisional svc trps	3		33	43	230	6			33	43	236	

1 Includes 53 ambulances. 2 Includes 1 ambulance. 3 Includes 10 ambulances.

Table XXIV. Principal Weapons and Vehicles—Mechanized Rifle Regiment, Mechanized Division

Unit	Individual weap- ons			Machinegun			Antitank		Mort		Arty	AFV		Wheeled vehicles				Trailers		
	Pistol	Rifle and carbine		Light machine gun	Heavy machinegun	AA machinegun	80-mm rkt launcher	80-mm antitank gun	80-mm mort	120-mm mort	80-mm gun	Armored car	T40/80 tank	Motorcycle	Recon car	Light truck	Medium truck	Light trailer	Medium trailer	Heavy trailer
Regimental totals	356	365	1579	108	27	9	8	12	27	6	12	10	32	14	60	186	155	23	79	96
Hq and hq trps	20	25	75	3			4							4	10	6	3	5	6	3
3 mototized rifle bn	171	159	1083	81	27			12	27					6	33	236	87	9	33	48
Medium tank bn	71	95	52											2	5	25	10	3	4	10
Armored car Co	20	30	6									10			1	1		1	1	
Regimental arty	59	41	268	24		9				6	12			1	7	25	15	3	24	3
Regimental svc trps	15	15	95				4							1	4	13	40	2	11	40

*Includes 7 ambulances. †Includes 1 ambulance. ‡Includes 2 ambulances.




Figure 26. Mechanized rifle regiment—mechanized division.

medium tank company, medium tank battalion, medium tank regiment, rifle division (par. 78c(2)) (see fig. 26).

e. The regimental artillery (32-O, 336-EM) of the mechanized rifle regiment is composed of the regimental artillery staff (2-O, 5-EM), a motorized light gun battalion, an antiaircraft machinegun company (4-O, 58-EM) armed with nine 12.5-mm antiaircraft machineguns and a mortar battery (4-O, 58-EM) armed with six 120-mm mortars.

- (1) The motorized light gun battalion (22-O, 215-EM) consists of a battalion headquarters (10-O, 35-EM) and three motorized light gun batteries (see fig. 26).
- (2) The motorized light gun battery (4-O, 60-EM) is the same as the light gun battery, light gun battalion, light gun regi-




Figure 27. Motorized rifle battalion—mechanized rifle regiment and motorized rifle regiment.

ment, rifle divisional artillery. It is armed with four 80-mm field guns and two light machineguns (par. 81c).

- (3) The antiaircraft machinegun company and the mortar battery are identical to the antiaircraft machinegun company and the mortar battery of the rifle regiment, rifle division (see figs. 10 and 25).

103. Heavy Tank and Self-Propelled Gun Regiment

The heavy tank and self-propelled gun regiment (138-O, 1,105-EM) of the mechanized division consists of the regimental headquarters and headquarters troops (20-O, 100-EM), two heavy tank battalions, a self-propelled gun battalion, an armored car company (4-O, 52-EM) with 10 KC-5 armored cars, a submachinegun battalion, a light antiaircraft battery, and the regimental service troops.

a. The heavy tank battalion (22-O, 152-EM) consists of a battalion headquarters (8-O, 15-EM) with one T50/120 tank, four heavy tank companies (3-O, 28-EM) with five T50/120 tanks each, and the battalion service troops (2-O, 25-EM). The organizational structure of the heavy tank battalion is the same as that of the self-propelled gun battalion, medium tank regiment, rifle division (par. 79d, figs. 12 and 28).

b. The self-propelled gun battalion (22-O, 152-EM) of the heavy tank and self-propelled gun regiment consists of the same units as

the heavy tank battalion above except that the heavy tank companies are designated self-propelled gun companies. The battalion has 21 SP-105 self-propelled guns (see fig. 28).

c. The submachinegun battalion (24-O, 292-EM) of the heavy tank and self-propelled gun regiment is composed of a battalion headquarters (10-O, 10-EM), three submachinegun companies, and the battalion service troops (2-O, 15-EM). The submachinegun company (4-O, 89-EM) consists of a company headquarters (1-O, 5-EM) and three submachinegun platoons. Each submachinegun platoon (1-O,




Figure 28. Heavy tank and self-propelled gun regiment—mechanized division.

28-EM) has a platoon headquarters (1-O, 1-EM) and three submachinegun squads. The submachinegun squad has nine men, eight submachineguns, and one light machinegun. They are usually tank-borne and furnish scouts and local security for the regiment (see fig. 28).

d. The regimental service troops (20-O, 130-EM) are the same as the regimental service troops of the rifle regiment, rifle division except that they have larger maintenance and supply elements.

Table XXV. Principal Weapons and Vehicles—Heavy Tank and Self-Propelled Gun Regiment, Mechanized Division

Unit	Small arms				AA	AFV			Wheeled vehicles				Trailer			
	Pistol	Submachine-gun	Rifle and car-bine	Light machine-gun		Armored car	T50/120 tank	SP-105	Motorcycle	Recon car	Light truck	Medium truck	Light trailer	Medium trailer	Heavy trailer	Ammo trailer
Regimental totals	247	530	439	30	6	10	44	21	10	40	146	94	21	40	53	35
Hq and hq troops	20	25	75	3			2		4	10	6	3	5	6	3	
2 heavy tank bn	102	130	116				42		2	12	20	20	4	10	10	10
SP gun bn	51	65	58					21	1	6	16	10	2	5	5	5
Armored car co.	20	30	6			10			1	1	1		1	1		
Submachinegun bn	24	240	25	27					1	6	27	4	6	6	4	
Light AA btry	10	10	59		6					1	1	7	1	1	1	
Regimental svc troops	20	30	100						1	4	13	50	2	11	30	20

¹ Includes 6 ambulances. ² Includes 1 ambulance. ³ Includes 2 ambulances.

104. Medium Tank Regiment—Mechanized Division and Tank Division

The medium tank regiment (155-O, 1,329-EM) of the mechanized division differs from the medium tank regiment of the rifle division (par. 79) mainly in that it is a more balanced force and has a greater strength. It is composed of the regimental headquarters and headquarters troops (20-O, 100-EM), three medium tank battalions, a self-propelled gun battalion, a motorized infantry battalion, an anti-aircraft machinegun company and regimental service troops (20-O, 130-EM) (see fig. 29).




Figure 29. Medium tank regiment—mechanized divisions and tank divisions.

a. The medium tank battalion (18-O, 144-EM) consists of the battalion headquarters (8-O, 15-EM), two medium tank companies (4-O, 52-EM) with ten T40/80 tanks each, and the battalion service troops (2-O, 25-EM). The battalion is the same as the medium tank battalion, medium tank regiment, rifle division (par. 79c, figs. 12 and 29).

b. The motorized rifle battalion (35-O, 457-EM) and the anti-aircraft machinegun company (4-O, 58-EM) are the same as the motorized rifle battalion and anti-aircraft machinegun company of the mechanized rifle regiment (par. 102b, fig. 26).

c. The self-propelled gun battalion (22-O, 152-EM) is the same as the self-propelled gun battalion, heavy tank and self-propelled gun regiment (par. 103b) except that it is armed with 21 SP-105 self-propelled guns (see figs. 28 and 29).

Table XXVI. *Principal Weapons and Vehicles—Medium Tank Regiment, Mechanized and Tank Division*

Unit	Individual weapons			Machinegun		Antitank		Mort		AFV		Wheeled vehicles				Trailers			
	Pistol	Submachinegun	Rifle and carbine	Light machinegun	Heavy machinegun	AA machinegun	80-mm rkt launcher	80-mm antitank gun	80-mm Mort	T40/80 Tank	SP-150	Motorcycle	Recon car	Light truck	Medium truck	Light trailer	Medium trailer	Heavy trailer	Ammo trailer
Regimental totals	311	375	777	30	9	9	8	4	9	65	21	15	43	157	122	26	42	94	15
Hq and hq troops	20	25	75	3			4			2		4	10	6	3	5	6	3	
3 medium tank bn	153	195	138							63		6	12	12	30	6	9	30	
SP tun bn	51	65	58							21		2	6	6	10	2	5	5	5
Motorized rifle bn	57	53	361	27	9			4	9			2	11	12	29	3	11	16	
AA machinegun company	10	7	45		9									8		8			
Regimental service troops	20	30	100			4						1	4	13	50	2	11	40	10

¹ Includes 7 ambulances.² Includes 1 ambulance.³ Includes 2 ambulances.

105. Motorcycle Battalion—Mechanized Division and Tank Division

The motorcycle battalion (39-O, 416-EM) of the mechanized division consists of the battalion headquarters (15-O, 20-EM), two motorcycle companies, a medium tank company (4-O, 52-EM) with ten T40/80 tanks, an armored car company (4-O, 52-EM) with 10 KC-5 armored cars, a motorized antitank battery (3-O, 42-EM) with four 80-mm antitank guns and two light machineguns, and the battalion service troops (3-O, 30-EM). This battalion is the same as the motorcycle battalion of the rifle division (par. 80) with the addition of a medium tank company and an antitank battery (see figs. 9 and 25).

Table XXVII. Principal Weapons and Vehicles—Motorcycle Battalion, Mechanized and Tank Division

Unit	Small arms				Antitank		Mort	AFV		Wheeled vehicles				Trailers		
	Pistol	Submachine-gun	Rifle and carbine	Light machine-gun	80-mm mortar launcher	80-mm anti-tank gun		Armored car	T40/80 tank	Motorcycle	Recon car	Light truck	Medium truck	Light trailer	Medium trailer	Heavy trailer
Battalion totals	81	102	218	56	15	4	6	10	10	13	75	13	9	8	4	5
Battalion hq	15	5	15	—	2	—	—	—	—	6	4	2	—	2	2	—
2 motorcycle corps	16	30	130	54	10	—	6	—	—	4	66	6	—	2	—	—
Armored car co	20	30	6	—	1	—	—	10	—	1	1	1	—	1	—	—
Medium tank co	20	30	6	—	—	—	—	10	—	1	1	1	—	1	—	—
Antitank btry	7	7	31	2	—	4	—	—	—	1	1	1	5	—	1	1
Battalion svc troops	3	—	30	—	2	—	—	—	—	—	2	12	4	2	1	4

¹ Includes 1 ambulance.

106. Divisional Artillery—Mechanized Division

Divisional artillery (208-O, 1,711-EM) of the mechanized division is composed of the divisional artillery headquarters and headquarters troops (17-O, 108-EM), a medium howitzer regiment (69-O, 540-EM), a medium mortar regiment (69-O, 540-EM), a light anti-aircraft regiment (34-O, 343-EM), and a medium rocket battalion (19-O, 180-EM) (see fig. 30).




Figure 30. Divisional artillery—mechanized division.

a. The medium howitzer regiment (69-O, 540-EM) consists of the regimental headquarters and headquarters troops (20-O, 50-EM), two medium howitzer battalions (each 22-O, 215-EM) with twelve 120-mm howitzers and six light machineguns each, and regimental service troops (5-O, 60-EM).

b. The medium mortar regiment (69-O, 540-EM) is composed of the regimental headquarters and headquarters troops (20-O, 50-EM), two medium mortar battalions (each 22-O, 215-EM) with eighteen 120-mm mortars and nine light machineguns, and the regimental service troops (5-O, 60-EM).

c. The light anti-aircraft regiment (34-O, 343-EM) is the same as the light anti-aircraft battalion of the rifle division (par. 81f) with the addition of an anti-aircraft machinegun company. The regiment consists of the regimental headquarters (15-O, 35-EM), four light

Table XXVIII. Principal Weapons and Vehicles—Divisional Artillery, Mechanized Division

Unit	Individual weapons			Machinegun		Artillery			Motor transportation									
	Pistol	Submachinegun	Rifle and carbine	Light machinegun	AA machinegun	40-mm AA	120-mm mort	120-mm how	150-mm rkt	Motorcycle	Recon car	Light truck	Medium truck	Heavy truck	Light trailer	Medium trailer	Heavy trailer	Ammo trailer
Divisional arty totals	275	174	1453	34	9	16	36	24	8	15	74	105	198		65	63	100	49
Hq and hq troops	17	30	78							5	20	10	10		10	10	10	
Medium how regt	93	48	468	12			24			4	20	18	72		20	16	22	26
Light AA regt	51	35	286		9	16				1	9	16	25		9	15	9	
Medium mort regt	87	42	487	18			36			4	18	52	52		18	14	52	
Medium rocket bn	27	19	134	4					8	1	7	9	39		8	8	16	23

¹ Includes 6 ambulances. ² Includes 2 ambulances. ³ Includes 1 ambulance.

antiaircraft batteries (3-O, 55-EM) each with four 40-mm antiaircraft guns, an antiaircraft machinegun company (4-O, 58-EM) with nine 12.5-mm antiaircraft machineguns and the battalion service troops (3-O, 30-EM) (see fig. 30).

d. The medium rocket battalion (19-O, 180-EM) consists of the battalion headquarters (10-O, 30-EM), two medium rocket batteries (3-O, 50-EM) each with four 16-tube 150-mm rocket launchers, and the battalion service troops (3-O, 50-EM) (see fig. 30).

107. Engineer Ponton Battalion—Mechanized Division—Tank Division

The engineer ponton battalion (28-O, 340-EM) of the mechanized division consists of a battalion headquarters (10-O, 25-EM), two engineer ponton companies (each 5-O, 95-EM), an engineer sapper company (5-O, 95-EM), and the battalion service troops (3-O, 30-EM). The battalion carries 200 feet of 80-ton bridge (see fig. 25).

108. Signal Battalion—Mechanized Division—Tank Division

The signal battalion (27-O, 250-EM) of the mechanized division consists of the battalion headquarters and headquarters troops (15-O, 50-EM), two signal radio companies (3-O, 50-EM), a signal wire company (3-O, 70-EM), and the battalion service troops (3-O, 30-EM) (see fig. 25).

109. Divisional Service Troops—Mechanized Division and Tank Division

The mechanized divisional service troops (131-O, 730-EM) consist of the service troops headquarters (30-O, 10-EM), a maintenance battalion (25-O, 200-EM), a motor transport battalion (27-O, 285-EM) with 180 three-ton trucks and 180 two-ton trailers, a medical battalion (25-O, 75-EM), supply troops (10-O, 100-EM), a chemical defense company (4-O, 40-EM), and small detachments of other services totaling 10 officers and 20 enlisted men (see fig. 25).

110. Tank Division

The Aggressor tank division (1,229-O, 10,323-EM) is similar to the mechanized division in composition. It has nearly all the same units but in differing proportions. Most of the units of the tank division are identical in organization and equipment with those of the mechanized division.

a. The tank division (1,229-O, 10,323-EM) is composed of the divisional headquarters and headquarters troops, three medium tank regiments, a motorized rifle regiment, a heavy tank and self-propelled gun regiment, a motorcycle battalion, the divisional artillery, an engineer ponton battalion, a signal battalion, and the divisional service troops.




Figure 31. Aggressor tank division.

Table XXIX. Principal Weapons—Tank Division

Unit	Individual weapons			Machine-gun		AA		Antitank		Mortar		Arty			AFV				
	Pistol	Submachinegun	Rifle and carbine	Light machinegun	Heavy machinegun	AA machinegun	40-mm AA	80-mm rkt launcher	80-mm antitank gun	80-mm mort	120-mm mort	80-mm gun	120-mm how	150-mm rkt	Armored car	T40/80 tank	T50/120 tank	SP-105	SP-150
Division total.....	2021	2207	7104	315	54	45	22	127	28	60	42	12	12	8	30	210	23	42	63
Hq and hq troops.....	70	30	75	3				10								5			
3 medium tank regt.....	933	1125	2331	90	27	27										195			63
Heavy tank and SP regt...	247	530	439	30			6	24	12	27					10		23	42	
Motorecycle bn.....	81	102	218	56				15	4	6					10	10			
Motorized rifle regt.....	285	270	1527	108	27	9		8	12	27	6	12			10				
Divisional arty.....	219	150	1194	28		9	16				36			12					
Engr bn.....	28		340					11											
Signal bn.....	27		250					11											
Divisional svc troops....	131		730					48											

6. The division headquarters and headquarters troops (70-O, 110-EM) and the medium tank regiments (each 155-O, 1,329-EM) are identical with the division headquarters and headquarters troops and the medium tank regiment of the mechanized division (pars. 101 and 104, fig. 29).

Table XXX. Unit Transportation—Tank Division

Unit	Passenger vehicles			Trucks			Tractors		Trailers			
	Motorcycle	Passenger car	Recon car	Light truck	Medium truck	Heavy truck	Light tractor	Medium tractor	Light trailer	Medium trailer	Heavy trailer	Ammo trailer
Division total.....	109	1	419	1 485	1059	25	13	2	238	376	839	109
Hq and hq troops.....	5	1	10	10	10				10	10	10	
3 medium tank regt.....	45		129	171	366				78	126	282	45
Heavy tank and sp regt.....	10		40	46	94				21	40	58	30
Motorcycle bn.....	13		75	13	9				8	4	5	
Motorized rifle regt.....	12		55	81	145				20	75	86	
Divisional arty.....	12		61	94	156				52	53	94	34
Engr bn.....	2		7	2 7	20	19	13	2	7	6	39	
Signal bn.....	7		9	2 20	29				9	19	29	
Divisional svc troops.....	3		33	3 43	230	6			33	43	236	

1 Includes 61 ambulances. 2 Includes 1 ambulance. 3 Includes 10 ambulances.

111. Motorized Rifle Regiment—Tank Division

The motorized rifle regiment (167-O, 1,969-EM) of the tank division is composed of the regimental headquarters and headquarters troops (20-O, 100-EM), three motorized rifle battalions (35-O, 457-EM), an armored car company (4-O, 52-EM), the regimental artillery (23-O, 336-EM), and the regimental service troops (15-O, 110-EM). This regiment is the same as the mechanized rifle regiment, mechanized division (par. 102) except for the absence of the medium tank battalion (see fig. 31).

Table XXXI. Principal Weapons and Vehicles, Motorized Rifle Regiment—Tank Division

Unit	Individual weapons			Machinegun			Antitank		Mortar		Arty	Motor vehicles						Trailers		
	Pistol	Submachinegun	Rifle and carbine	Light machinegun	Heavy machinegun	A.A. machinegun	80-mm rocket launcher	80-mm antitank gun	80-mm mortar	120-mm mortar	80-mm gun	Armored car	Motorcycle	Recon car	Light truck	Medium truck	Heavy truck	Light trailer	Medium trailer	Heavy trailer
Regimental total	285	270	1527	108	27	9	8	12	27	6	12	10	12	55	181	145		20	75	86
Hq and hq troops	20	25	75	3			4						4	10	6	3		5	6	3
3 motorized rifle bn.	171	95	52	81	27			12	27				6	33	36	87		9	33	48
Armored car co.	20	30	6									10		1	1			1	1	
Regimental arty	59	41	268	24		9				6	12		1	7	25	15		3	24	3
Svc trps	15	15	95				4						1	4	13	40		2	11	40

¹ Includes 6 ambulances. ² Includes 1 ambulance.³ Includes 2 ambulances.

112. Heavy Tank and Self-Propelled Gun Regiment—Tank Division

The heavy tank and self-propelled gun regiment (138-O, 1,105-EM) of the tank division is identical with the heavy tank and self-propelled gun regiment of the mechanized division (par. 103) in strength; however, there is a variation in organization and equipment. The heavy tank and self-propelled gun regiment of the tank division consists of the regimental headquarters and headquarters troops, two heavy tank battalions, one self-propelled gun battalion, an armored car company, a submachinegun battalion, a light anti-aircraft battery, and the regimental service troops (see figs. 28 and 31).

Table XXII. Principal Weapons and Vehicles—Heavy Tank and Self-Propelled Regiment, Tank Division

Unit	Small arms				AA	APV		Wheeled vehicles				Trailers				
	Pistol	Submachinegun	Rifle and carbine	Light machinegun	40-mm AA	Armored car	T60/120 tank	SP-105	Motorcycle	Recon car	Light truck	Medium truck	Light trailer	Medium trailer	Heavy trailer	Ammo trailer
Regimental totals.....	247	530	439	30	6	10	23	42	10	40	146	94	21	40	53	35
Hq and hq troops.....	20	25	75	3			2		4	10	6	3	5	6	3	
2 sp gun bn.....	102	130	116					42	2	12	212	20	4	10	10	10
Heavy tank bn.....	51	65	58				21		1	6	26	10	2	5	5	5
Armored car Co.....	20	30	6			10			1	1	1		1	1		
Submachinegun bn.....	24	24	25	27					1	6	27	4	6	6	4	
Light AA btry.....	10	10	59		6					1	1	7	1	1	1	
Regimental svc troops.....	20	30	100						1	4	13	50	2	11	30	20

¹ Includes 6 ambulances. ² Includes 1 ambulance. ³ Includes 2 ambulances.

113. Motorcycle Battalion—Tank Division

The motorcycle battalion (39-O, 416-EM) consists of the battalion headquarters, two motorcycle companies, a medium tank company, an armored car company, an antitank battery, and the battalion services. It is the same as the motorcycle battalion, mechanized division (see par. 105, fig. 25).

114. Divisional Artillery—Tank Division

The divisional artillery (164-O, 1,416-EM) consists of the divisional artillery headquarters and headquarters troops (17-O, 108-EM), a medium howitzer battalion, a light antiaircraft regiment, a medium mortar regiment, and a medium rocket battalion (see fig 31 and table XXXIII).

a. The medium howitzer battalion (25-O, 245-EM) consists of the battalion headquarters (10-O, 35-EM), three medium howitzer batteries (each 4-O, 60-EM), with four 120-mm howitzers and two light machineguns each and the battalion service troops (3-O, 30-EM) (see fig. 31).

Table XXXIII. Principal Weapons and Vehicles—Divisional Artillery, Tank Division

Unit	Individual weapons			Machinegun		Artillery				Motor transportation								
	Pistol	Submachinegun	Rifle and carbine	Light machinegun	AA machinegun	40-mm AA	120-mm mort	120-mm how	160-mm rkt	Mortocycle	Recon car	Light truck	Medium truck	Heavy truck	Light trailer	Medium trailer	Heavy trailer	Ammo trailer
Divisional arty totals.....	219	150	1194	28	9	16	36	12	8	12	61	194	156	---	52	53	94	34
Hq and hq troops.....	17	30	78	---	---	---	---	---	---	5	20	10	10	---	10	10	10	---
Medium how bn.....	37	24	209	6	---	---	12	---	---	1	7	27	30	---	7	6	7	11
Light AA regt.....	51	35	286	---	9	16	---	---	---	1	9	26	25	---	9	15	9	---
Medium mort regt.....	87	42	487	18	---	---	36	---	---	4	18	52	52	---	18	14	52	---
Medium rocket bn.....	27	19	134	4	---	---	---	---	8	1	7	29	39	---	8	8	16	23

¹ Includes 5 ambulances. ² Includes 1 ambulance. ³ Includes 2 ambulances.

b. The light antiaircraft regiment (34-O, 343-EM), the medium mortar regiment (69-O, 540-EM), and the medium rocket battalion (19-O, 180-EM) are identical with the same units of the divisional artillery, mechanized division (see par. 106*b*, *c*, and *d*, and fig. 30).

115. Technical and Service Troops—Tank Division

The engineer ponton battalion (28-O, 340-EM), the signal battalion (27-O, 250-EM), and the divisional service troops (131-O, 730-EM) are also identical in the tank and mechanized divisions (see pars. 107, 108, and 109, and fig. 25).

116. Cavalry Division

The Aggressor Army includes an undetermined number of cavalry corps and divisions. These units are well-trained, well-equipped, and of high-fighting efficiency. These divisions are GHQ units and generally function as corps or army troops used in screening operations to protect the flanks and in mountainous or otherwise difficult terrain (see tables XXXIV and XXXV).

a. The cavalry division (821-O, 6521-EM) consists of the division headquarters and headquarters troops, three cavalry regiments, a medium tank regiment, a cavalry reconnaissance squadron, the divisional artillery, an engineer squadron, a signal squadron, and the divisional service troops.

b. The divisional headquarters and headquarters troops (70-O, 110-EM) are the same as in the other types of Aggressor divisions except that nearly all of the transportation is horse.




Table XXXIV. Principal Weapons—Cavalry Division

Unit	Individual weapons			Machinegun		AA	Antitank			Mortar		Arty		AFV	
	Pistol	Submachinegun	Rifle and carbine	Light machinegun	Heavy machinegun	AA machinegun	40-mm AA	80-mm rkt launcher	80-mm recoilless rifle	80-mm antitank gun	80-mm mort	105-mm mort	120-mm mort	80-mm how	80-mm gun
Division totals	1265	1398	4484	204	40	12	6	346	40	18	40	12	24	12	16
Hq and hq trps	70	30	75	3				10							
3 cavalry regt	63	6951	2499	162	36	12		237	36	12	36	12		12	
Medium tank regt	190	225	273					20							
Recon sqdn	48	83	165	16	4			22	4		4				
Divisional arty	143	109	692	23			6			6			24		16
Engr sqdn	23		245					8							
Signal sqdn	24		20					8							
Divisional svc trps	131		515					41							

Table XXXV. Unit Transportation—Cavalry Division

Unit	Passenger vehicle			Truck			Trac	Trailer			Horse transportation				
	Motorcycle	Passenger car	Recon car	Light truck	Medium truck	Heavy truck	Light tractor	Light trailer	Medium trailer	Heavy trailer	Riding horse	Pack horse	Draft horse	Wagon	Calsson
Division totals	44	124	1	157	210	15	2	84	129	344	2888	1244	1432	526	304
Hq and hq troops	5	10	5	5	5			10	5	5	25	25	30	15	
3 cavalry regt.	18	42		51					39		2514	1020	786	393	144
Medium tank regt.	6	22		22	71			11	17	71					
Recon sqdn.	1	1		2				1	1		268	68	24	12	
Divisional arty	2	12		13	57			12	9	45	61	61	512	56	160
Engr sqdn.	2	6		2	20	10	2	6	5	30					
Signal sqdn.	7	8		15	23			8	14	23					
Divisional svc trps	3	23		43	34	5		36	39	170	20	70	80	40	

¹ Includes 24 ambulances.² Includes 1 ambulance.³ Includes 10 ambulances.

117. Cavalry Regiment—Cavalry Division

The cavalry regiment (122-O, 1,240-EM) consists of the regimental headquarters (15-O, 30-EM), three cavalry squadrons, the regimental artillery, and the regimental service troops (see fig. 33 and table XXXVI).

a. The cavalry squadron (23-O, 273-EM) is composed of a squadron headquarters (5-O, 15-EM), two cavalry troops (each 3-O, 73-EM), a pack heavy machinegun troop (3-O, 29 EM), a pack antitank troop (3-O, 29-EM), a pack mortar troop (3-O, 29-EM), and the squadron service troops (3-O, 25-EM). The




Figure 33. Cavalry regiment—cavalry division.

Table XXXVI. *Principal Weapons and Transportation—Cavalry Regiment, Cavalry Division*

Unit	Individual weapons			Machinegun		Antitank			Mortar		Arty	Motor transportation				Horse transportation				
	Pistol	Submachinegun	Rifle and carbine	Light machinegun	Heavy machinegun	AA machinegun	80-mm mortar launcher	80-mm recoilless rifle	80-mm antitank gun	80-mm mortar	105-mm mortar	Motorcycle	Recon car	Light truck	Medium trailer	Riding horse	Pack horse	Draft horse	Wagon	Caisson
Regimental totals-----	212	317	833	54	12	4	79	12	4	12	4	6	14	17	13	838	340	262	131	48
Hq and hq troops-----	15	10	20	---	---	---	2	---	---	---	---	3	5	4	4	3	3	6	3	---
3 cavalry sqdn-----	144	249	495	48	12	---	66	12	---	12	---	3	3	6	3	804	204	72	36	---
Regimental arty-----	29	28	133	6	---	4	4	---	4	---	4	---	1	---	---	14	30	88	44	24
Regimental svc troops--	24	30	185	---	---	---	7	---	---	---	---	---	5	27	6	17	73	96	48	24

¹ Includes 4 ambulances.² Includes 1 ambulance.

cavalry squadron of the cavalry regiment is identical to the cavalry reconnaissance squadron of the mountain division (see par. 88, figs. 17 and 33).

b. The regimental artillery (14-O, 176-EM) consists of the regimental artillery officer, a pack howitzer battery (4-O, 60-EM) with four 80-mm howitzers and two light machineguns, a horse-drawn antitank battery (3-O, 42-EM) with four horse-drawn 80-mm antitank guns and two light machineguns, a pack antiaircraft machinegun company (3-O, 32-EM) with four pack 12.5-mm antiaircraft machineguns, and a pack mortar battery (3-O, 42-EM) with four 105-mm mountain mortars and two light machineguns. The regimental artillery of the cavalry regiment is the same as the regimental artillery of the mountain rifle regiment (par. 86c, figs. 18 and 33).

c. The regimental service troops (24-O, 215-EM) of the cavalry regiment consists of a horse transport squadron (12-O, 120-EM), a medical company (4-O, 30-EM), a veterinary platoon (2-O, 30-EM), maintenance troops (2-O, 10-EM), and supply troops (1-O, 5-EM). These units are the same as those of the regimental service troops, mountain rifle regiment (par. 86f and figs. 18 and 33).

118. Medium Tank Regiment—Cavalry Division

The medium tank regiment (93-O, 605-EM) is the same as the medium tank regiment, rifle division. It contains two medium tank battalions and a self-propelled gun battalion. Its main armament is 44 T40/80 tanks and 21 SP-105 guns (par. 79 and fig. 12).

119. Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron—Cavalry Division

The cavalry reconnaissance squadron (23-O, 273-EM) is the same as the cavalry reconnaissance squadron, mountain division (par. 88 and fig. 17).

120. Divisional Artillery—Cavalry Division

The divisional artillery (91-O, 853-EM) of the cavalry division is much lighter than the divisional artillery of other Aggressor divisions. It consists of the divisional artillery headquarters and headquarters troops (20-O, 50-EM), a horse-drawn gun battalion, a horse-drawn mortar battalion, a motorized anti-tank battery, a motorized light antiaircraft battery, and the divisional artillery service troops (5-O, 60-EM) (fig. 32 and table XXXVII).

a. The horse-drawn gun battalion (29-O, 305-EM) consists of the battalion headquarters (10-O, 35-EM), four horse-drawn gun batteries (each 4-O, 60-EM) armed with four 80-mm horse-drawn field guns and two light machineguns each, and the battalion service troops (3-O, 30-EM) (fig. 32).

b. The horse-drawn mortar battalion (29-O, 305-EM) is composed of a battalion headquarters (10-O, 35-EM), four horse-drawn mortar batteries (each 4-O, 60-EM) with six 120-mm horse-drawn mortars and three light machineguns each, and the battalion service troops (3-O, 30-EM) (fig. 32).

Table XXXVII. *Principal Weapons and Transportation—Divisional Artillery, Cavalry Division*

Unit	Small arms				Arty				Motor transportation							Horse transportation				
	Pistol	Submachinegun	Rifle and carbine	Light machinegun	40-mm AA	80-mm antitank gun	80-mm gun	120-mm mort	Motorcycle	Recon car	Light truck	Medium truck	Light trailer	Medium trailer	Heavy trailer	Riding horse	Pack horse	Draft horse	Wagon	Caisson
Divisional arty totals	143	109	692	23	6	6	16	24	2	12	13	57	12	9	45	61	61	512	56	160
Hq and hq troops	20	10	40						2	6	4	2	6	4	2	3	3			
Light gun bn	45	42	247	8			16			1	1		1			29	29	216	28	64
Medium mort bn	53	40	241	12				24		1	1		1			29	29	296	28	96
Light antitank btry	10	7	45	3		6			1	1		8	1		2					
Light AA btry	10	10	59		6				1	1	1	7	1	1	1					
Svc troops	5		60							2	6	40	2	4	40					

¹ Includes 4 ambulances.² Includes 1 ambulance.³ Includes 2 ambulances.

c. The motorized antitank battery (4-O, 58-EM) is the division's mobile antitank reserve and consists of a battery headquarters and three platoons, each armed with two truck-drawn 80-mm antitank guns and one light machinegun.

d. The motorized light antiaircraft battery (4-O, 75-EM) consists of a battery headquarters and three platoons with two 40-mm antitank guns each.

121. Engineer Squadron—Cavalry Division

The engineer squadron (23-O, 245-EM) of the cavalry division has a squadron headquarters (10-O, 25-EM), an engineer sapper troop (5-O, 95-EM), an engineer ponton troop (5-O, 95-EM), and the squadron service troops (3-O, 30-EM). The squadron carries 175 feet of 40 ton bridge (fig. 32).

122. Signal Squadron—Cavalry Division

The signal squadron (24-O, 200-EM) of the cavalry division consists of the squadron headquarters and headquarters troops (15-O, 50-EM), a signal wire troop (3-O, 70-EM), a signal radio troop (5-O, 50-EM), and the squadron service troops (3-O, 30-EM).

123. Divisional Service Troops—Cavalry Division

The service troops (131-O, 515-EM) of the cavalry division consist of the service troops headquarters (30-O, 10-EM), a horse transport squadron (12-O, 120-EM) with 40 pack horses, 80 draft horses, and 40 two-ton wagons, a medical squadron (25-O, 75-EM), a veterinary squadron (25-O, 75-EM), a chemical defense company (4-O, 40-EM), maintenance troops (15-O, 100-EM), supply troops (10-O, 75-EM), and detachments of other services totaling 10 officers and 20 enlisted men (fig. 32).

Section VI. ARTILLERY DIVISIONS

124. General

The artillery divisions, not to be confused with divisional artillery, are essentially task force headquarters that are normally used to control and service the field and antiaircraft artillery of the rifle armies. The organization of the divisions is not fixed. The number, caliber, and type of their component units depend primarily on their missions. These divisions may include from two to six brigades and a number of separate regiments and battalions of all types. Normally field and antiaircraft artillery are not mixed in one artillery or antiaircraft division.

125. Aggressor Artillery Division

The typical artillery division (1,073-O, 8,312-EM) will consist of the division headquarters and headquarters troops (70-O, 110-EM), a heavy howitzer brigade, a medium gun brigade with guns and gun howitzers, a medium howitzer brigade, a heavy mortar brigade, a heavy rocket brigade, an artillery observation battalion, a signal battalion, and the divisional service troops (fig. 34). The division may have other brigades, regiments, and battalions either assigned or attached.

Table XXXVIII. Principal Weapons and Vehicles—Typical Artillery Division


Unit	Machinegun		Artillery							Passenger vehicle			Truck			Tractor		Trailer		
	Light machine-gun	AA machine-gun	120-mm how	120-mm gun	150-mm mort	150-mm how	150-mm G/H	200-mm how	300-mm rkt	Motorcycle	Passenger car	Recon car	Light truck	Medium truck	Heavy truck	Medium tractor	Heavy tractor	Heavy trailer	Ammo trailer	Tractor trailer
Division totals	71	100	24	48	64	48	24	48	32	43	1	250	1,292	1,657	71	78	102	669	902	12
Hq and hq troops	3									5	1	10	10	10				10		
Heavy how brig		48						48		7		35	31	252		102		112	192	6
Medium gun brig		36		48			24			13		38	43	346		78		94	180	6
Medium how brig	36		24			48				13		38	47	298	54			100	180	
Heavy mort brig	32			64						7		35	39	276	6			68	150	
Heavy rkt brig		16							32	7		27	27	220	6			98	128	
Obsr bn										1		23	34	11				11		
Signal bn										7		14	25	23				23		
Divisional svc troops										3		30	36	221	5			153	72	

¹ Includes 32 ambulances.

² Includes 4 ambulances.

³ Includes 6 ambulances.

⁴ Includes 1 ambulance.



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126. Heavy Howitzer Brigade—Artillery Division

The heavy howitzer brigade (157-O, 1,345-EM) consists of the brigade headquarters and headquarters troops (20-O, 50-EM), four heavy howitzer battalions, and brigade service troops (5-O, 75-EM).

a. The heavy howitzer battalion (33-O, 305-EM) consists of the battalion headquarters (10-O, 35-EM), four heavy howitzer batteries, and the battalion services (3-O, 30-EM) (fig. 35).




Figure 35. Heavy howitzer brigade—artillery division.

b. The heavy howitzer battery (5-O, 60-EM) consists of the battery headquarters (2-O, 20-EM) and three platoons (1-O, 20-EM), each platoon armed with one 200-mm howitzer and one 12.5-mm anti-aircraft machinegun.

127. Medium Gun Brigade—Artillery Division

The medium gun brigade (207-O, 1,815-EM) is composed of the brigade headquarters and headquarters troops (20-O, 50-EM), two medium gun regiments, and the brigade services troops (5-O, 75-EM).




Figure 36. Medium gun brigade—artillery division.

a. The medium gun regiment (91-O, 845-EM) is composed of the regimental headquarters and headquarters troops (20-O, 50-EM), two medium gun battalions, one gun-howitzer battalion, and the regimental service troops (5-O, 60-EM) (fig. 36).

b. The medium gun battalion (22-O, 245-EM) is composed of the battalion headquarters (10-O, 35-EM) and three medium gun batteries (4-O, 70-EM), each of which is armed with four 120-mm guns and two 12.5-mm antiaircraft machineguns (fig. 36).

c. The gun-howitzer battalion (22-O, 245-EM) is composed of the battalion headquarters (10-O, 35-EM) and three gun-howitzer batteries (4-O, 70-EM), each of which is armed with four 150-mm gun-howitzers and two 12.5-mm antiaircraft machineguns (fig. 36).

128. Medium Howitzer Brigade—Artillery Division

The medium howitzer brigade (207-O, 1,635-EM) consists of the brigade headquarters and headquarters troops (20-O, 50-EM), two medium howitzer regiments, and the brigade service troops (5-O, 75-EM) (fig. 37).

a. The medium howitzer regiment (91-O, 775-EM) consists of the regimental headquarters and headquarters troops (20-O, 50-EM), two medium howitzer regiments, and the brigade service troops (5-O, 60-EM) (fig. 37).




Figure 37. Medium howitzer brigade—artillery division.

b. The first medium howitzer battalion (22-O, 215-EM) consists of the battalion headquarters (10-O, 35-EM) and three medium howitzer batteries (4-O, 60-EM), each armed with four 120-mm howitzers and two light machineguns (fig. 37).

c. The second and third medium howitzer battalions (22-O, 215-EM) consist of the battalion headquarters (10-O, 35-EM) and three medium howitzer batteries (4-O, 60-EM), each of which is armed with four 150-mm howitzers and two light machineguns (fig. 37).

129. Heavy Mortar Brigade—Artillery Division

The heavy mortar brigade (141-O, 1,177-EM) is composed of the brigade headquarters and headquarters troops (20-O, 50-EM), four heavy mortar battalions, and the brigade service troops (5-O, 75-EM) (fig. 38).

a. The heavy mortar battalion (29-O, 263-EM) is composed of the battalion headquarters (10-O, 25-EM), four heavy mortar batteries, and the battalion service troops (3-O, 30-EM) (fig. 38).

b. The heavy mortar battery (4-O, 52-EM) is composed of the battery headquarters (2-O, 12-EM) and two platoons (1-O, 20-EM) armed with two 150-mm mortars and two light machineguns each.




Figure 38. Heavy mortar brigade—artillery division.

130. Heavy Rocket Brigade

The heavy rocket brigade (101-O, 925-EM) consists of the brigade headquarters and headquarters troops (20-O, 50-EM), four heavy rocket battalions, and the brigade service troops (5-O, 75-EM).

a. The heavy rocket battalion (19-O, 200-EM) consists of the battalion headquarters (10-O, 30-EM), two heavy rocket batteries, and the battalion service troops (3-O, 50-EM) (fig. 39).

b. The heavy rocket battery (3-O, 60-EM) consists of the battery headquarters (1-O, 15-EM) and two platoons (1-O, 21-EM), each of which is armed with two 12-tube 300-mm rocket launchers and one 12.5-mm antiaircraft machinegun.

131. Artillery Observation Battalion—Artillery Division

The artillery observation battalion (34-O, 295-EM) is composed of the battalion headquarters and headquarters troops (15-O, 50-EM), three observation batteries, a reconnaissance and survey battery, and the battalion service troops (3-O, 25-EM) (fig. 36).

a. The observation battery (4-O, 60-EM) is composed of a battery headquarters (1-O, 12-EM), a sound ranging platoon (1-O, 15-EM),




Figure 39. Heavy rocket brigade—artillery division.

a flash ranging platoon (1-O, 16-EM), and a radar platoon (1-O, 17-EM).

b. The reconnaissance and survey battery (4-O, 40-EM) is composed of a battery headquarters (1-O, 5-EM), a reconnaissance platoon (2-O, 15-EM), a survey platoon (1-O, 10-EM), and a topographic section (10-EM).

132. Signal Battalion—Artillery Division

The signal battalion (30-O, 340-EM) of an artillery division consists of the battalion headquarters and headquarters troops (15-O, 50-EM), three signal wire companies (3-O, 70-EM), a signal radio company (3-O, 50-EM), and the battalion service troops (3-O, 30-EM) (fig. 34).

133. Divisional Service Troops—Artillery Division

The division service troops (126-O, 670-EM) of an artillery division are composed of the service troops headquarters (30-O, 10-EM), a motor transport battalion (27-O, 285-EM) with 180 three-ton trucks and 180 two-ton trailers, a medical battalion (25-O, 75-EM), a chemical defense company (4-O, 40-EM), and maintenance, supply, and other service troops totaling 40 officers and 260 enlisted men (fig. 34).

134. Aggressor Antiaircraft Division

The Aggressor antiaircraft division, like the artillery division, is a task organization with no fixed TOE. However, the normal composition of the antiaircraft division (424-O, 3,210-EM) includes the divisional headquarters and headquarters troops (70-O, 110-EM), a light antiaircraft brigade, a medium antiaircraft brigade, an engineer sapper company (5-O, 95-EM), a signal wire company (3-O, 70-EM), and the divisional service troops (fig. 40).

135. Light Antiaircraft Brigade—Antiaircraft Division

The light antiaircraft brigade (145-O, 1,265-EM) consists of the brigade headquarters and headquarters troops (20-O, 50-EM), four light antiaircraft battalions, and the brigade service troops (5-O, 75-EM) (fig. 40).

a. The light antiaircraft battalion (30-O, 285-EM) is very similar to the light antiaircraft battalion of the rifle division (par. 81f). It consists of a battalion headquarters (15-O, 35-EM), four light antiaircraft batteries, and the battalion service troops (3-O, 30-EM) (fig. 40).

b. The light antiaircraft battery (3-O, 55-EM) consists of a battery headquarters and two light antiaircraft platoons. Each platoon is armed with two 40-mm antiaircraft guns and one light machinegun.

136. Medium Antiaircraft Brigade—Antiaircraft Division

The medium antiaircraft brigade (161-O, 1,505-EM) consists of the brigade headquarters and headquarters troops (20-O, 50-EM), four medium antiaircraft battalions, and the brigade service troops (5-O, 75-EM).

a. The medium antiaircraft battalion (34-O, 345-EM) consists of the battalion headquarters (15-O, 35-EM), four medium antiaircraft batteries, and the battalion service troops (3-O, 30-EM) (fig. 40).

b. The medium antiaircraft battery (4-O, 70-EM) consists of a battery headquarters and two medium antiaircraft platoons, each of which is armed with two 80-mm antiaircraft guns and one 12.5-mm antiaircraft machinegun.

137. Divisional Service Troops—Antiaircraft Division

The divisional service troops (40-O, 165-EM) of an antiaircraft division consist of the service troop headquarters (20-O, 10-EM), a motor transport company (4-O, 75-EM) with 60 three-ton trucks and 60 two-ton trailers, a medical company (5-O, 40-EM), a chemical defense platoon (1-O, 15-EM), and maintenance, supply, and other service elements totaling 10 officers and 25 enlisted men (fig. 40).

Table XXXIX. Principal Weapons and Transportation—Typical Antiaircraft Division

Unit	Small arms		AA arty		Motor vehicles							Trailers			
	Light machinegun	AA machinegun	40-mm AA	80-mm AA	Motorcycle	Passenger car	Recon car	Light truck	Medium truck	Heavy truck	Light tractor	Medium trailer	Heavy trailer	Ammo trailer	Tractor trailer
Division totals.....	35	32	64	64	22	1	99	1 106	303	65	1	96	196	48	1
Hq and hq troops.....	3				5	1	10	10	10			10	10		
Light AA brig.....	32		64		7		35	2 39	142			35	78		
Medium AA brig.....		32		64	7		35	2 39	78	64		35	30	48	
Engr Co.....							1	1	9		1	1	9		1
Signal Co.....					2		3	5				5			
Divisional svc troops.....					1		15	3 12	64	1		10	65		

¹ Includes 10 ambulances. ² Includes 4 ambulances. ³ Includes 2 ambulances.




Figure 40. Typical Aggressor antiaircraft division.

Section VII. GHQ UNITS

138. General

a. GHQ troops are units held in a pool under control of Army High Command, from which they are allotted to army groups, armies, or corps. GHQ troops can be suballotted temporarily to divisions or specialized task forces for specific operations. The GHQ troops most frequently encountered are described in this section. Other units of various types are known or are suspected to exist but detailed information on their organization is lacking.

b. GHQ units, in many instances, are similar to units found in the various types of divisions. Occasionally the strength of the GHQ unit is slightly greater due to the addition of personnel to perform services normally taken care of by service units within the division.

139. Infantry Units

a. Ski Brigade. The ski brigade is an Aggressor GHQ specialized infantry unit. This unit is often attached to the rifle and mountain corps with battalions further attached to divisions for operations in mountainous and winter warfare. The ski brigade (263-O, 3,419-EM) consists of the brigade headquarters and headquarters troops (30-O, 60-EM), four ski battalions, an armored motor sled battalion, the brigade artillery, an engineer sapper company (5-O, 95-EM), a signal radio company (3-O, 50-EM), and the brigade service troops.

- (1) The ski battalion (47-O, 640-EM) is a light weight, fast-moving infantry unit composed of a battalion headquarters (8-O, 40-EM), four ski companies, a heavy machinegun company (3-O, 29-EM) with four heavy machineguns, an antitank company (3-O, 29-EM) with four 80-mm recoilless antitank weapons, a mortar company (3-O, 29-EM) with four 80-mm mortars, and the battalion service troops (2-O, 25-EM) (fig. 42).
- (a) The ski company (7-O, 122-EM) consists of a company headquarters (1-O, 10-EM), four ski platoons, an anti-tank platoon (1-O, 12-EM) with two 80-mm antitank rocket launchers, and a mortar platoon (1-O, 12-EM) with two 50-mm mortars (fig. 42).
- (b) The ski platoon (1-O, 22-EM) consists of a platoon headquarters (1-O, 2-EM) and two ski sections (each 10-EM) armed with eight submachineguns, one sniper's rifle, and one light machinegun.
- (2) The armored motor-sled battalion (34-O, 258-EM) is organized along lines similar to Aggressor medium tank and armored car units. It consists of a battalion headquarters



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(3) The brigade artillery (14-O, 176-EM) of the ski brigade is similar to the regimental artillery, mountain rifle regiment (par. 86*c*). It consists of the brigade artillery officer, a pack howitzer battery (4-O, 60-EM) with four 80-mm pack howitzers and two light machineguns, an antitank battery (3-O,




Figure 42. Ski battalion—ski brigade.

42-EM) with four truck-drawn 80-mm antitank guns and two light machineguns, an antiaircraft machinegun company (3-O, 32-EM) with four 12.5-mm antiaircraft machineguns, and a mortar battery (3-O, 42-EM) with four 105-mm mountain mortars and two light machineguns (fig. 41).

- (4) The brigade service troops (23-O, 220-EM) consist of the service troop headquarters (5-O, 5-EM), a motor transport company (4-O, 75-EM) with 60 three-ton trucks and 60 two-ton trailers, a motor-sled transport company (4-O, 75-EM) with 60 one-ton motor cargo sleds, a medical company (5-O, 30-EM), and maintenance, supply, and other service troops totaling five officers and 35 enlisted men (fig. 41).

b. Airborne Brigade (176-O, 2,364-EM). This brigade is the same as the airborne brigade, airborne division (par. 94, fig. 22).

c. Rifle Regiment (164-O, 2,109-EM). This regiment is the same as the rifle regiment, rifle division (par. 78, fig. 10).

d. Mechanized Rifle Regiment (202-O, 2,185-EM). This regiment is the same as the mechanized rifle regiment, mechanized division (par. 102, fig. 26).

e. Airborne Rifle Battalion (39-O, 600-EM). This unit is the same as the airborne rifle battalion, airborne brigade (par. 94a, fig. 23).

f. Motorized Rifle Battalion (35-O, 457-EM). This battalion is the same as the motorized rifle battalion, mechanized rifle regiment (par. 102b, fig. 27).

Table XL. Principal Weapons and Vehicles—Ski Brigade

Unit	Individual weapons			Machinegun			Antitank			Mortar			Arty	Motor transportation						
	Pistols	Submachinegun	Rifle and carbine	Light machinegun	Heavy machine-gun	A A machinegun	80-mm rkt launcher	80-mm recoilless rifle	80-mm antitank gun	50-mm mort	80-mm mort	105-mm mort		80-mm how	Recon car	Light truck	Medium truck	Armored motor sled	Motor sled	Light tractor
Brig totals	448	1527	1341	134	16	4	32	16	4	32	16	4	4	19	162	79	48	120	37	29
Hq and hq troops	30	30	30	3	5									5	5	5	5			
4 ski bn	300	1424	928	128	16		32	16		32	16			4	16			36	20	20
Armored motor sled bn	58	45	195	3	43	3								1	4	4	43	9	5	5
Brig arty	29	28	123	6		4			4			4	4	1	20			1	8	
Engr co	5		95											1	1	9		1	1	1
Signal co	3		50											1	9	1		1		
Svc troops	23		220											6	27	60		2	3	3

1 Includes 7 ambulances.

2 Includes 2 ambulances.

3 Includes 1 AA mg and 1 lng per arm'd mtr sled bn—not included in wpns totals.

4 Includes 1 ambulance per bn.

140. Armored and Cavalry Units

a. Heavy Tank and Self-Propelled Gun Regiment (138-O, 1,105-EM). This regiment is the same as the heavy tank and self-propelled gun regiment of the mechanized division (par. 103, fig. 28).

b. Medium Tank Regiment (155-O, 1,329-EM). This regiment is the same as the medium tank regiment, mechanized division (par. 104, fig. 29).

c. Motorcycle Regiment (180-O, 1,835-EM). This regiment is usually assigned to the mechanized army and consists of the regimental headquarters and headquarters troops (20-O, 100-EM), two motorcycle battalions (each 39-O, 416-EM) which are the same as the motorcycle battalion, mechanized division (par. 105), a motorized rifle battalion (35-O, 457-EM) which is the same as the motorized rifle battalion, mechanized rifle regiment (par. 102*b*), the regimental artillery, mechanized rifle regiment (par. 102*e*), and the regimental service troops (15-O, 110-EM) (fig. 43).

d. Cavalry Regiment (122-O, 1,240-EM). This regiment is the same as the cavalry regiment, cavalry division (par. 117, fig. 33).

e. Armored Flamethrower Battalion (29-O, 225-EM). This battalion consists of the battalion headquarters (10-O, 20-EM), three armored flamethrower companies, and the battalion service troops (4-O, 40-EM). The armored flamethrower company (5-O, 55-EM) consists of three armored flamethrower platoons with three flamethrower tanks each. The main armament of the battalion is 32 T40/ flamethrower tanks.

141. Field Artillery Units

a. Heavy Gun Brigade (156-O, 1,630-EM). This unit is usually assigned to the artillery corps. It consists of the brigade headquarters and headquarters troops (20-O, 50-EM), four heavy gun battalions, and the brigade service troops (5-O, 75-EM).

- (1) The first and second heavy gun battalions (33-O, 305-EM) consist of the battalion headquarters (10-O, 35-EM), four heavy gun batteries (each 5-O, 60-EM) armed with three 200-mm guns and three 12.5-mm antiaircraft machineguns, and the battalion service troops (3-O, 30-EM).
- (2) The third and fourth heavy gun battalions (33-O, 305-EM) of the heavy gun brigade consist of the battalion headquarters (10-O, 35-EM), four heavy gun batteries (5-O, 60-EM) armed with three 150-mm guns and three 12.5-mm antiaircraft machineguns, and the battalion service troops (3-O, 30-EM).

Table XLI. Principal Weapons and Vehicles—Motorcycle Regiment

Unit	Individual weapons			Machinegun			Antitank		Mortar		Arty	AFV		Wheeled vehicles				Trailers			
	Pistol	Submachinegun	Rifle and carbine	Light machinegun	Heavy machinegun	AA machinegun	80-mm rkt launcher	80-mm antitank gun	80-mm mort	120-mm mort	80-mm gun	Armored car	T40/80 tank	Motorcycle	Recon car	Light truck	Medium truck	Light trailer	Medium trailer	Heavy trailer	
Regimental totals.....	313	338	1235	166	9	9	38	12	6	12	20	20	20	34	292	1	82	105	29	60	72
Hq and hq troops.....	20	25	75	3	---	---	4	---	---	---	---	---	---	4	10	6	3	5	6	3	3
2 motorcycle bn.....	162	204	436	112	---	---	30	8	12	---	---	20	20	26	150	2	26	18	16	8	10
Motorized rifle bn.....	57	52	361	27	9	---	---	4	9	---	---	---	---	2	11	2	12	29	3	11	16
Regimental arty.....	59	41	268	24	---	9	---	---	6	12	---	---	---	1	7	2	25	15	3	24	3
Regimental svc trps.....	15	15	95	---	---	---	4	---	---	---	---	---	---	1	4	3	13	40	2	11	40

¹ Includes 6 ambulances. ² Includes 1 ambulance. ³ Includes 2 ambulances.




Figure 43. Motorcycle regiment—GHQ troops.

b. Heavy Howitzer Brigade (157-O, 1,630-EM). This brigade is the same as the heavy howitzer brigade, artillery division (par. 126, fig. 35). Its armament is forty-eight 200-mm howitzers and forty-eight 12.5-mm antiaircraft machineguns.

c. Medium Gun Brigade (207-O, 1,815-EM). This brigade is the same as the medium gun brigade, artillery division (par. 127, fig. 36). Its armament is forty-eight 120-mm guns, twenty-four 150-mm gun/howitzers, and thirty-six 12.5-mm antiaircraft machineguns.

d. Corps Artillery Brigade (163-O, 1,205-EM). The corps artillery brigade, so designated because of its usual assignment to the rifle corps, consists of the brigade headquarters and headquarters troops




Figure 44. Corps artillery brigade—GHQ troops.

(20-O, 50-EM), a medium field/antitank gun regiment, a medium howitzer regiment, and the brigade service troops (5-O, 75-EM) (fig. 44).

- (1) The medium field/antitank gun regiment (69-O, 540-EM) consists of the regimental headquarters and headquarters troops (20-O, 50-EM), two medium field/antitank gun battalions (each 22-O, 215-EM) armed with twelve 105-mm antitank guns and six light machineguns each, and the regimental service troops (5-O, 60-EM) (fig. 44).
- (2) The medium howitzer regiment (69-O, 540-EM) consists of the regimental headquarters and service troops (20-O, 50-

EM), two medium howitzer battalions (each 22-O, 215-EM) armed with twelve 150-mm howitzers and six light machine-guns each, and the regimental service troops (5-O, 60-EM) (fig. 44).

e. Medium Howitzer Brigade (207-O, 1,635-EM). This brigade is the same as the medium howitzer brigade, artillery division (par. 128, fig. 37).

f. Medium Gun Regiment (91-O, 845-EM). This regiment is the same as the medium gun regiment of the medium gun brigade, artillery division (par. 127a, fig. 37).

g. Medium Howitzer Regiment (91-O, 755-EM). This regiment is the same as the medium howitzer regiment of the medium howitzer brigade, artillery division (par. 128a, fig. 37).

h. Superheavy Gun Battalion (32-O, 260-EM). This battalion consists of the battalion headquarters and headquarters troops (15-O, 50-EM), two superheavy gun batteries, and the battalion service troops (5-O, 50-EM).

- (1) The superheavy gun battery (6-O, 80-EM) consists of the battery headquarters and headquarters troops (2-O, 20-EM), two superheavy gun platoons (each 1-O, 20-EM) armed with one 300-mm gun and two 12.5-mm antiaircraft machineguns each, and the battery technical and service troops (2-O, 20-EM) (fig. 45).




Figure 45.—Superheavy gun battalion—GHQ troops.

(2) The Aggressor superheavy (300-mm) gun is capable of firing atomic projectiles. The battalion is normally under army group control but may be detached to army control with batteries further attached to corps.

i. *Heavy Gun Battalion* (30-O, 305-EM). This battalion is the same as the heavy gun battalion of the heavy gun brigade and may be armed with either the 200-mm gun or the 150-mm gun (a(1) and (2) above).

j. *Heavy Howitzer Battalion* (33-O, 305-EM). This battalion is the same as the heavy howitzer battalion, heavy howitzer brigade, artillery division (par. 126a, fig. 35).

142. Antitank and Antiaircraft Units

a. *Army Antitank Brigade* (208-O, 1,299-EM). The army antitank brigade consists of the brigade headquarters and headquarters troops (20-O, 50-EM), two light antitank regiments, a medium antitank regiment, and the brigade service troops (5-O, 75-EM). The army antitank brigade is normally assigned to the rifle army, the mechanized army, and the artillery corps (fig. 46).

(1) The light antitank regiment (69-O, 382-EM) consists of the regimental headquarters and headquarters troops (20-O, 30-EM), two light antitank battalions (each 20-O, 151-EM)




Figure 46. Army antitank brigade—GHQ troops.

armed with twelve 80-mm antitank guns and six light machineguns each, and the regimental service troops (5-O, 50-EM) (fig. 46).

- (2) The medium antitank regiment (45-O, 410-EM) consists of the regimental headquarters and headquarters troops (20-O, 50-EM), five medium antitank batteries (each 4-O, 60-EM) each armed with four 105-mm antitank guns and two light machineguns, and the regimental service troops (5-O, 60-EM). This regiment, like the light antiaircraft regiment (par. 106c) has no battalion headquarters between the batteries and the regimental headquarters (fig. 46).

b. Medium Antiaircraft Brigade (161-O, 1,505-EM). This brigade is the same as the medium antiaircraft brigade, antiaircraft division (par. 136, fig. 40).

c. Light Antiaircraft Brigade (145-O, 1,265-EM). This brigade is the same as the light antiaircraft brigade of the antiaircraft division (par. 135, fig. 40).

d. Medium Antitank Regiment (45-O, 410-EM). This regiment is the same as the medium antitank regiment of the army antitank brigade (a(2) above, fig. 46).

e. Light Antitank Regiment (69-O, 382-EM). This regiment is the same as the light antitank regiment of the army antitank brigade (a(1) above, fig. 48).

f. Light Antiaircraft Regiment (34-O, 343-EM). This regiment is the same as the light antiaircraft regiment, mechanized and tank divisions (par. 106c, fig. 30).

143. Mortar and Rocket Units

a. Heavy Mortar Brigade (141-O, 1,177-EM). This brigade is the same as the heavy mortar brigade, artillery division (par. 129, fig. 38).

b. Heavy Rocket Brigade (101-O, 925-EM). This brigade is the same as the heavy rocket brigade, artillery division (par. 130, fig. 39).

c. Medium Mortar Regiment (91-O, 775-EM). This regiment is nearly the same as the horse-drawn mortar regiment of the mountain division and may be either motorized or horse drawn (par. 89b, fig. 19).

d. Medium Rocket Regiment (63-O, 650-EM). This regiment is composed of the regimental headquarters and headquarters troops (20-O, 50-EM), three medium rocket battalions (each 19-O, 180-EM) each armed with eight 16-tube 150-mm rocket launchers and four light machineguns, and the regimental service troops (5-O, 60-EM). The battalions of this regiment are the same as the medium rocket battalion, divisional artillery, mechanized division (par. 106d, fig. 30).

e. Heavy Mortar Battalion (29-O, 263-EM). This battalion is the same as the heavy mortar battalion, division artillery, rifle division (par. 81g, fig. 13).

144. Guided Missile Units

No information is available regarding the organization of tactical guided missile units. However, Aggressor is believed to be capable of producing, in operational quantities, ground-to-ground guided missiles. These would be versions of the German V-1 and V-2 types with somewhat improved range or payload and accuracy, but still only capable of area bombardment. It should be remembered that the German V-1 had a range of approximately 130-170 miles with a 200-pound warhead. The accuracy gave 50 percent hits within a rectangle 16 miles by 13 miles. Aggressor's missiles are capable of atomic warhead delivery. However, the accuracy limitation should prevent their use against front-line tactical targets. Aggressor also is known to have large unguided rockets capable of ranges up to 30,000 yards.

145. Observation Units

a. Observation Regiment (127-O, 995-EM). This regiment is normally assigned to the artillery corps. It consists of the regimental headquarters and headquarters troops (20-O, 50-EM), three observation battalions, and the regimental service troops (5-O, 60-EM).

b. Observation Battalion (34-O, 295-EM). This battalion is the same as the observation battalion, artillery division (par. 131, fig. 34) and may be either separate or organic to the observation regiment.

146. Engineer Units

a. Engineer Brigade (278-O, 2,820-EM). This brigade is normally assigned to the army group. It consists of the brigade headquarters and headquarters troops (25-O, 75-EM), an engineer sapper regiment, an engineer ponton regiment, and the brigade service troops (10-O, 100-EM) (fig. 47).

b. Engineer Sapper Regiment (124-O, 1,415-EM). This regiment is normally assigned to the rifle army and to the engineer brigade. It is composed of the regimental headquarters and headquarters troops (20-O, 50-EM), three engineer sapper battalions, and the regimental service troops (5-O, 60-EM). The regiment carries 525 feet of 40-ton bridge (fig. 47).

c. Engineer Sapper Battalion (33-O, 435-EM). This battalion is normally assigned to the rifle, mountain, airborne, and cavalry corps and to the engineer sapper regiment. It is composed of the battalion

Table XLII. Bridging and Motor Transportation—Engineer Brigade and Engineer Ponton Regiment

Unit	Bridging			Passenger vehicle		Truck			Tractor			Trailer			
	20-ton floating brg	40-ton floating brg	80-ton floating brg	Motorcycle	Recon car	Light truck	Medium truck	Heavy truck	Light tractor	Medium tractor	Heavy tractor	Light trailer	Medium trailer	Heavy trailer	Tractor trailer
Brig totals.....	9	3	6	17	72	171	261	205	9	31	14	72	62	466	54
Hq and hq trps.....	---	---	---	4	10	5	5	---	---	---	---	10	5	5	---
Sapper regt.....	9	3	---	6	31	32	136	32	9	4	---	31	28	168	13
Pont regt.....	---	---	6	6	28	29	80	169	---	27	13	28	25	249	40
Brig svc troops.....	---	---	---	1	3	25	40	4	---	---	1	3	4	44	1
Pont regt totals.....	---	---	---	6	28	29	80	169	---	27	13	28	25	249	40
Hq and hq troops.....	---	---	6	2	5	4	2	---	---	---	---	5	4	2	---
2 pont bn.....	---	---	6	2	14	44	32	110	---	18	8	14	12	142	26
Fixed br bn.....	---	---	---	1	7	27	16	55	---	9	4	7	6	71	13
Regimental svc troops.....	---	---	---	1	2	24	30	4	---	---	1	2	3	34	1

¹ Includes 9 ambulances. ² Includes 1 ambulance.³ Includes 4 ambulances.⁴ Includes 1 ambulance per bn.

Modified Handling Authorized

Modified Handling Authorized

Table XLIII. Bridging and Motor Transportation—Army Engineer Sapper Regiment and Corps Engineer Sapper Battalion

Unit	Bridging		Pgr Veb		Truck			Tractor		Trailer			
	20-ton bridge	40-ton bridge	Motorcycle	Recon car	Light truck	Medium truck	Heavy truck	Light tractor	Medium tractor	Light trailer	Medium trailer	Heavy trailer	Tractor trailer
Regt totals.....	9	3	6	31	1 32	136	32	9	4	31	28	168	13
Hq and hq troops.....			2	5	4	2				5	4	2	
3 sapper bn.....	9	3	3	24	2 24	114	30	9	3	24	21	144	12
Regimental svc troops.....			1	2	3 4	20	2		1	2	3	22	1
Bn totals.....	3	1	1	8	2 8	38	10	3	1	8	7	48	4
Bn hq.....			1	3	2	1				3	2	1	
3 sapper Co.....	3			3	3	27		3		3	3	27	3
Light pont Co.....		1		1	1		9		1	1	1	9	1
Bn svc troops.....				1	2 2	10	1			1	1	11	

¹ Includes 4 ambulances. ² Includes 1 ambulance per bn. ³ Includes 1 ambulance.




Figure 47. Engineer brigade—GHQ troops.

headquarters (10-O, 25-EM), three engineer sapper companies (each 5-O, 95-EM), an engineer light ponton company (5-O, 95-EM), and the battalion service troops (3-O, 30-EM). The battalion carries 175 feet of 40-ton bridge (fig. 47).

d. Engineer Ponton Regiment (119-O, 1,230-EM). This regiment is normally assigned to the mechanized army and to the engineer brigade. It consists of the regimental headquarters and headquarters troops (20-O, 50-EM), two engineer heavy ponton battalions, an engineer fixed bridge battalion, and the regimental service troops (5-O, 60-EM). This regiment carries 400 feet of 80-ton bridge (fig. 47).

e. The Engineer Heavy Ponton Battalion (33-O, 390-EM). The battalion may be organic to the engineer ponton regiment or a separate battalion. It consists of the battalion headquarters (10-O, 25-EM), three engineer heavy ponton companies (each 6-O, 110-EM), and the battalion service troops (5-O, 35-EM). It carries 200 feet of 80-ton bridge (fig. 47).

f. The Engineer Fixed Bridge Battalion (28-O, 340-EM). The battalion may also be organic to the engineer ponton regiment or a separate battalion. It is composed of the battalion headquarters

(10-O, 25-EM), three engineer fixed bridge companies (each 5-O, 95-EM), and the battalion service troops (3-O, 30-EM). The battalion is equipped to construct semipermanent fixed bridges and uses ponton equipment only in emergencies (fig. 47).

g. The Engineer Assault Battalion (37-O, 355-EM). This battalion is a separate battalion that may be attached to line units as low as regiment for the assault of fortified or built-up areas. It consists of the battalion headquarters (10-O, 25-EM), four engineer assault companies, and the battalion service troops (3-O, 30-EM). The engineer assault company (6-O, 75-EM) consists of the company headquarters (1-O, 5-EM), four assault platoons (each 1-O, 15-EM), and the company service troops (1-O, 10-EM).

h. The Engineer Mining Battalion (33-O, 433-EM). This battalion is a separate battalion established for the purpose of reinforcing the mining capabilities of line units in special situations. It consists of a battalion headquarters (10-O, 25-EM), four engineer mining companies (5-O, 95-EM), and the battalion service troops (3-O, 30-EM).

i. The Engineer Road Construction Battalion (33-O, 360-EM). This is a separate battalion containing the construction equipment and supervisory personnel to utilize several hundred laborers (civilian or POW). It is composed of a battalion headquarters (10-O, 25-EM), four engineer road construction companies (5-O, 75-EM), and the battalion service troops (3-O, 35-EM).

147. Signal Units

a. Signal Brigade (344-O, 3,708-EM). This brigade is usually assigned to the army group. It consists of the brigade headquarters and headquarters troops (25-O, 75-EM), two signal regiments, a signal communications monitoring company, and the brigade service troops (10-O, 100-EM) (fig. 48).

b. The Army Signal Regiment (152-O, 1,712-EM). This regiment is the same as the signal regiment, signal brigade (*a* above), and consists of the regimental headquarters and headquarters troops (20-O, 50-EM), three signal battalions, a signal communication interception company, and the regimental service troops (5-O, 60-EM) (fig. 48).

c. The Corps Signal Battalion (39-O, 480-EM). This unit is the same as the signal battalion of the signal regiment, signal brigade, and the signal battalion, army signal regiment. It consists of the battalion headquarters and headquarters troops (15-O, 50-EM), two signal radio companies (each 3-O, 50-EM), two signal wire com-




Figure 48. Signal brigade—GHQ troops.

panies (each 3-O, 70-EM), a signal communication countermeasures company, and the battalion service troops (4-O, 40-EM) (fig. 48).

d. *The Signal Communications Monitoring Company* (5-O, 109-EM). This company consists of a company headquarters (1-O, 10-EM), three monitoring platoons (each 1-O, 29-EM), and company service troops (1-O, 12-EM). This company is usually assigned to the signal brigade of an army group but may be a separate unit attached to an army signal regiment or a corps signal battalion. It performs the counterintelligence functions of monitoring friendly communications.

e. *The Signal Communications Intercept Company* (10-O, 162-EM). This unit consists of the company headquarters and headquarters troops (2-O, 32-EM), an intercept platoon (2-O, 29-EM), a direction-finding platoon (2-O, 41-EM), an analysis platoon (3-O, 32-EM), and the company service troops (1-O, 28-EM). The mission of this company is the interception of enemy communications. It is normally assigned to the army signal regiment or the signal regiment, signal brigade. The signal communication intercept company may also be attached to corps signal battalion as a separate company.

f. *The Signal Communications Countermeasures Company* (8-O, 150-EM). This company consists of the company headquarters (2-O,

10-EM), an intercept and control platoon (2-O, 32-EM), three jamming platoons (each 1-O, 29-EM), and the company service troops (1-O, 20-EM). The mission of this company is the jamming of enemy communications by electronic means. It is assigned to the corps signal battalion, signal battalion of the army signal regiment, or the signal battalion, signal regiment, signal brigade. It also may be attached to divisional signal battalions as a separate company.

148. Chemical Units

a. *The Army Chemical Regiment (131-O, 1,625-EM).* This regiment consists of the regimental headquarters and headquarters troops (20-O, 50-EM), three chemical battalions, a biological warfare company, a radiological warfare company, and the regimental service troops (5-O, 60-EM). This regiment is normally assigned to the rifle and mechanized armies. It may also be assigned to the army group either separately or brigaded with one or more chemical regiments (fig. 49).




Figure 49. Chemical regiment—GHQ troops.

b. *The Corps Chemical Battalion (33-O, 475-EM).* This unit is composed of the battalion headquarters (10-O, 25-EM), three chemical smoke companies, a chemical flamethrower company, and the battalion service troops (3-O, 30-EM). This battalion is the same as the chemical battalion, chemical regiment (a above) and may also be attached to divisions as a separate battalion. The chemical battalion is equipped to provide both offensive and defensive support involving

the employment of smoke and toxic chemicals. Complete organic transportation and equipment is available to enable the battalion to accomplish assigned missions requiring the use of flame, smoke, and bulk contamination or decontamination materials (fig. 49).

- (1) The chemical smoke company (5-O, 105-EM) consists of a company headquarters (2-O, 15-EM) and three chemical smoke platoons (each 1-O, 30-EM).
- (2) The chemical flamethrower company (5-O, 105-EM) consists of a company headquarters (1-O, 10-EM), three chemical flamethrowers platoons (each 1-O, 28-EM) armed with nine portable flamethrowers each, and the company service troops (1-O, 11-EM).

c. The Biological Warfare Company (3-O, 50-EM). This element of the army chemical regiment is a new unit in the Aggressor Army and very little is known of it at this time. It has been determined that the offensive aspects of biological warfare have been assigned to the Aggressor chemical warfare service while the defensive aspects of biological warfare are a medical responsibility.

d. Radiological Warfare Company (4-O, 40-EM). This unit of the army chemical regiment is also a new organization of the Aggressor Army. It has both an offensive and defensive responsibility for radiological warfare. However, no further details of its organization or mission are known at this time.

149. Transportation Units

a. Motor Transport Brigade (353-O, 3,130-EM). This brigade consists of the brigade headquarters and headquarters troops (25-O, 75-EM), three motor transport regiments, and the brigade service troops (10-O, 100-EM). The motor transport brigade is normally assigned to the army group and may be attached to a rifle army for its complete motorization for temporary periods. The brigade is equipped with 1,620 three-ton trucks and 1,620 two-ton trailers, excluding its own service vehicles.

b. Army Motor Transport Regiment (106-O, 985-EM). This unit is the same as the motor transport regiment of the motor transport brigade (*a* above). It consists of the regimental headquarters (15-O, 30-EM), three motor transport battalions, and the regimental service troops (10-O, 100-EM). The regiment has 540 three-ton trucks and 540 two-ton trailers (fig. 50), excluding its own service vehicles.

c. The Corps Motor Transport Battalion (27-O, 285-EM). This battalion consists of the battalion headquarters (10-O, 10-EM), three

Table XLIV. Motor Transportation—Motor Transport Brigade.

Unit	Tons of cargo		Passenger vehicle		Truck			Trailer		
	Normal cargo capacity	Emergency cargo capacity	Motorcycle	Recon car	Light truck	Medium truck	Heavy truck	Light trailer	Medium trailer	Heavy trailer
Brig total.....	8100	9378	20	165	¹ 100	1810	17	165	96	1827
Hq and hq troops.....		35	4	10	5	5		10	5	5
3 motor transport regt.....	8100	9219	15	153	90	1785	15	153	87	1800
Brig svc troops.....		124	1	2	² 5	20	2	2	4	22
Regt totals.....	2700	3073	5	51	³ 30	595	5	51	29	600
Hq and hq troops.....		18	2	4	4	2		4	4	2
3 motor transport bn.....	2700	2931	3	45	21	573	3	45	21	576
Regimental svc troops.....		124		2	² 5	20	2	2	4	22
Bn total.....	900	977	1	15	7	191	1	15	7	192
Bn hq.....		9	1	2	2	1		2	2	1
3 motor trans co.....	900	906		12	3	180		12	3	180
Bn svc troops.....		62		1	2	10	1	1	2	11

¹ Includes 5 ambulances.

² Includes 1 ambulance.

³ Includes 1 ambulance/Regt.

motor transport companies (4-O, 75-EM) equipped with 60 three-ton trucks and 60 two-ton trailers each, and the battalion service troops (5-O, 50-EM). This motor transport battalion is the same in most Aggressor Army units (fig. 50).

d. Wagon Transport Squadron (20-O, 235-EM). This squadron consists of a squadron headquarters (6-O, 20-EM), three wagon transport troops (each 3-O, 55-EM) with 40 two-ton wagons and 80 draft horses each, and the squadron service troops (5-O, 50-EM).

e. Pack Transportation Squadron (20-O, 205-EM). This squadron consists of the squadron headquarters (6-O, 20-EM), three pack troops (each 3-O, 45-EM), and the squadron service troops (5-O, 50-EM). Both or either of the above animal transportation units are frequently attached to mountain and cavalry divisions or corps.

f. Motor-Sled Transport Company (4-O, 75-EM). The motor-sled transport company is the same as the motor-sled transport company of the brigade service troops of the ski brigade (par. 138a(4)). This company is often attached to line infantry units during cold-weather operations.




Figure 50. Motor transport brigade—GHQ troops.

150. Medical Units

a. General Hospitals. These hospitals are of no stated capacity. Size depends upon existing structures utilized for hospital purposes. They are located in the area controlled by GHQ and correspond to Zone of Interior hospitals. The staff varies with the size of the hospital.

b. Field Hospitals. There are 300-bed units under army control. As a rule they are situated one to the rear of each division. They receive casualties from clearing stations of the regiments and brigades.

c. Medical Supply Depots. One such depot will be found in each army area. It provides medical supplies for the troops of the army to which assigned.

d. Hospital Trains. Each train has a capacity of approximately 300 patients of which about 120 can be litter cases. The medical staff

consists of one medical officer, four nurses, and twenty orderlies. Orderlies frequently are women who have had training in the care of the sick and injured. The trains are marked with red crosses about 18 inches high and 18 inches wide. There are two red crosses on top of the cars and two on each side. These trains are used to transport patients from forward hospitals to the ports or to hospitals in the interior of the homeland.

e. Ambulance Company. The company evacuates casualties from the clearing stations of the regiment or brigade to the field hospital. Some are motor ambulance companies and others are animal-drawn. Each is equipped with twenty ambulances.

f. Air Evacuation Unit. This unit consists of 1 nonmedical officer, 1 noncommissioned officer, and 24 orderlies. One orderly is allotted to each planeload of patients. There are no planes used solely for medical purposes; therefore, they do not bear a red cross marking. Returning cargo planes are used to transport patients from as far forward as the field hospitals.

151. Propaganda and Intelligence Units

Aggressor propaganda troops are organized into strategic battalions which operate at army group level, and tactical companies which operate at army level. The tactical companies have combat propaganda teams which may be attached to divisions or to other units for specific operations.

a. Strategic Propaganda Battalion (37-O, 932-EM). This battalion consists of the battalion headquarters and headquarters troops, three radio propaganda companies, three special operations companies, a signal radio company, an intelligence and defensive propaganda company, and the battalion service troops. The number of these companies may be increased to fit special situations.

b. Tactical Propaganda Company (8-O, 166-EM). This company contains a company headquarters, a publication platoon, three combat propaganda platoons, an air liaison flight, and the company service troops.

c. Tactical Intelligence Battalion (94-O, 238-EM). This battalion consists of a battalion headquarters (2-O, 10-EM) and four tactical intelligence companies (23-O, 57-EM). These battalions are normally attached on the basis of one per army with the companies further attached to corps.

CHAPTER 3

THE AGGRESSOR AIR FORCES

Section I. GENERAL

152. General

a. The Aggressor Air Forces are organized into five basic groupments.—Tactical Air Armies, Naval Aviation, Long Range Aviation, Home Air Defense Command, and the Troop Carrier Command. The latter three are under the operational control of the Armed Forces High Command while the Naval Forces are under the Naval High Command.

b. This chapter deals only with the Aggressor tactical air armies, which in the command structure of the Aggressor Armed Forces are subordinate to the army groups. This force presently consists of three tactical air armies in addition to the independent air divisions which may be assigned to and which are subordinate to a mechanized army.

153. Basis of Organization

a. The development of all branches of the Aggressor Air Force is carried out in accordance with the following principles:

- (1) Victory in present day warfare is achieved only by the combined effort of air, land, and sea forces.
- (2) Training of the air forces must be planned to provide direct assistance to the ground forces in all types of operations.
- (3) Mass employment of the air forces and close cooperation with both ground and naval forces is imperative. However, it is within the Aggressor tactical air armies that the Aggressor air arm is organized and designed as an adjunct to the ground forces and is dominated by the army.

b. In this study of the tactical air armies, it must be emphasized that Aggressor has a genius for improvisation, that the High Command deploys this highly flexible and mobile force to insure that the force is in the right place at the right time, and that the motto of the tactical air armies "Air/ground support cancels the odds" could very well be the motto of the High Command. While the Aggressor force has aircraft specifically designed for ground attack,

interception, and bombardment, any or all of these aircraft may be used in the attack if the situation warrants. Any country, to cope with Aggressor, must be prepared to engage and destroy heavy concentrations of tactical aircraft. Throughout its tactical doctrine, Aggressor stresses the utilization of large forces of aircraft in order to achieve numerical superiority over opposing forces.

154. The Aggressor Pilot

a. The typical Aggressor pilot is of peasant stock, comparatively slow-witted, and lacking in initiative, but stubborn and obdurate. He will hold tenaciously to ideas or a course of action he cannot understand intellectually. He is, therefore, a strong adherent and disciple of the tenets of the Circle Trigon Party. Physically rugged, he is capable of living under stringent conditions of climate and subsistence. He is adaptable to varying conditions and shows ingenuity in improvisation, is good-natured, fun-loving, and usually hard-drinking. Sentimentally emotional, he is subject to depths of despondency, yet inclined to ride his successes. He has a stoical disregard for death, which often leads to reckless courage in combat. He is not proficient in instrument flying and the application of radio and electronic aids and operational techniques. These weaknesses, recognized by the High Command, are rapidly being overcome by intensive training and, therefore, do not constitute a constant factor when operating against the Aggressor pilot.


b. Pilot training is conducted at the Air School which combines the function of both basic and advanced American pilot training schools. Students reporting into this school have had some civilian air instruction before being chosen for the Aggressor Air Force. The Air University provides the tactical, staff, and logistical training for combined staff operations taught at the Armed Forces University.

155. Staffs of Air Units


Aggressor air staff organization follows the same basic principles as the organization of their ground unit staffs.

a. *Major Air Unit Staffs.* The staffs of air armies, corps, and divisions are very much the same. They consist of the deputy commander, the chief of staff who is an assistant commander, the assistant commander for political affairs, and the assistant commander for rear services (1, fig. 51).

- (1) The deputy commander is the second in command of the unit. He actually has command responsibility over the air combat units of the parent organization and the ground support troops (antiaircraft units, engineer units, signal units, and the airfield security units).



①



②

Figure 51. Major and minor air unit staff organization.

- (2) The chief of staff is an assistant unit commander and has under his command the personnel of the general staff. As with the staff of ground units, the air staff is an advisory and planning board to the chief of staff, not to the unit commander. The advisors to the commander are the deputy commander and the assistant commanders. The main elements of the air unit general staff are the operations branch, intelligence branch, cypher and topographical branches, signal branch, meteorological branch, historical branch, personnel branch, inspection and training branch, and various liaison officers. The functions of these staff branches are explained in their titles.
- (3) The assistant commander for political affairs has the same responsibilities as the assistant commander for political affairs in ground units.
- (4) The assistant commander for rear services has the same responsibilities as the assistant commander for rear services in ground units. Included in this field are, of course, services peculiar to aviation units and not found in ground units.

b. Minor Air Unit Staffs. The staffs of air regiments and squadrons are very similar to major air unit staffs; however, they include no service units. On very rare occasions air force minor units may be called upon to function independently of an air division or higher headquarters. In such cases they have a small rear services staff (2, fig. 51).

Section II. ORGANIZATION OF MAJOR AIR FORCE UNITS

156. The Air Army

a. Tactical air armies, the major operational commands of the Aggressor Air Forces, correspond in many ways to the Tactical Air Commands of the United States Air Force and are composite formations equipped with light bomber, ground attack, and fighter aircraft. Typically, each one is composed of two or more air corps, each corps being composed of two or more air divisions (normally three), with each division usually consisting of three air regiments. All units, up through the air corps, are generally homogeneous. Almost all Aggressor air armies, in addition, usually control some independent reconnaissance regiments, artillery spotter regiments, antiaircraft artillery, engineer, and signal ground support troops and service troops, both ground and air. The air army headquarters, the air army independent air regiments, the headquarters and a portion of the air army ground support troops, and the headquarters and a portion of the air army service troops are based on the air army airfield.




Figure 52. Typical Aggressor air army.

b. The organization and strength of an air army varies in accordance with its assigned task and the scope of its operations. The air army usually has a strength of from 20,000 to 30,000 personnel and from 1,000 to 1,500 aircraft; however, no two air armies are of the same size and composition. This concept permits flexibility of operation of air armies assigned to different army groups.


157. Fighter, Bomber, and Ground Attack Corps

a. A corps is a staff organization controlling both the operations and administrative procedures of two or more air divisions. Corps headquarters staff organization closely resembles that of other major air units (par. 155a, fig. 53). The corps will also have attached ground support and service units from the air army. Effective liaison with the ground army being supported is, perhaps, the most important task of the corps. The Aggressor Air Force designates its corps as fighter (1, fig. 53), bomber (1, fig. 53), and ground attack (2, fig. 53); however, composite air divisions have appeared in some corps. The air corps headquarters, the headquarters and a portion of the attached ground support troops (1 and 2, fig. 53), and the headquarters and a portion of the attached service troops (1 and 2, fig. 53) are based on one of the subordinate division airfields. The remainder of the attached ground support and service troops are based on the other division fields. The air corps, unless it is an independent corps, does not have its own airfields.


b. An air army requiring reinforcements in an active sector of the front would have attached one or more complete corps, including both the corps headquarters, its subordinate divisions, and a proportional support and service troops. The corps in this case would not become an integral part of the air army, but would remain a separate organization. From the operational standpoint, it matters little whether the corps headquarters is a permanently assigned one within the air army or is only attached for a limited time and for a specific purpose. The air army prescribes the task of the air corps as concerns the whole of the operation. Within the limits of this order the corps staff is responsible for, and has a wide discretion in, the employment of its component divisions.

158. Air Division

a. The air division is a tactical organization of two or more air regiments assigned either to an air corps (1 and 2, fig. 53) or operating directly subordinate to an air army. Normally, a division includes only 3 regiments, but divisions with 4 or 5 regiments have



1. Typical bomber and fighter corps



ASSIGNED _____
ATTACHED - - - - -

2. Typical ground attack corps

Figure 53. Air army.

been known to exist. Usually each air division is based on one airfield.

b. Fighter and bomber divisions are almost invariably homogenous. The air division does not operate independently except when attached to mechanized army headquarters. Principal responsibility of the divisional commander is to effect liaison with the particular army ground units to which support is to be given.

159. Air Regiments

a. The largest flying unit with a fixed establishment is the air regiment. Air regiments are either "subordinate," that is, assigned to an air division, or "independent" (GHQ), in which case they operate directly under the control of the air army. Some of the independent regiments are specialized types such as reconnaissance and artillery observation regiments. GHQ fighter, bomber, and ground attack regiments are not known to exist.

b. The bulk of the air regiments of the air force fall into the category of subordinate regiments and are designated in the same way as corps or divisions. The regimental organization is as follows:

- (1) *Fighter regiment.* A fighter regiment has 40 aircraft, usually all of the same type. The unit is organized into a headquarters squadron, three fighter squadrons, and has a table of organization of 244 officers and enlisted men.
- (2) *Ground attack regiment.* A ground attack regiment has 40 aircraft. The unit has a headquarters squadron and three G/A squadrons and a table of organization of 337 officers and enlisted men.
- (3) *Bomber regiment.* A bomber regiment has 30 aircraft. The regiment consists of a headquarters squadron and three bomber squadrons and, although the table of organization varies slightly according to the type aircraft with which the regiment is equipped, it generally has 350 officers and enlisted men.

c. In the category of independent regiments are those specialized regiments not included in any corps or division that are assigned to an air army.

- (1) *Reconnaissance regiment and tactical (long range) reconnaissance regiments.* Air reconnaissance units have no fixed establishment, and the number of squadrons is variable. The squadrons of a single regiment may have different type aircraft. The reconnaissance units assigned to an air army are subordinate to the reconnaissance section of the air army general staff operations branch.

- (2) *Artillery observation regiments.* These air units are subordinated to the air army for administration and supply; but are otherwise under the control of the artillery commander of the front. Several such regiments may be assigned to any air army on an active front. Its pilots are trained in the adjustment of artillery fire from the artillery commander of the front. Several such regiments may be assigned to any air army on an active front. Its pilots are trained in the adjustment of artillery fire from the air. The table of equipment is 70 aircraft assigned to 4 squadrons of 17 liaison aircraft and 2 liaison planes in the regimental headquarters.
- (3) *Transport and medical evacuation regiments.* Such regiments provide courier service, transport combat troops, facilitate air evacuation of wounded, and supply isolated ground units or partisan forces. Their strengths vary according to the needs of the tactical situation. They average a strength of 350 officers and enlisted men and about 70 transport aircraft each.

160. Air Squadrons

Air squadrons almost invariably function as elements of the regiment to which they are subordinate, rather than as independent units. A few independent liaison squadrons still may be attached directly to army group and army staffs. Squadrons are divided into flights, usually 3, of from 3 to 4 planes each, depending upon their role.

161. Ground Support Troops, Air Army

The ground support troops of the air army have an approximate strength of 11,000 officers and men. They consist of the ground support troops headquarters, an airfield security brigade, a division of medium antiaircraft artillery, an engineer airfield construction regiment, and a signal airfield communication regiment (fig. 52).

a. Airfield Security Brigade (3,400 officers and enlisted men). This brigade consists of the brigade headquarters and headquarters troops (60-O and EM), an air army airfield security battalion, three airfield security regiments, and the brigade service troops (80-O and M). These troops are air force personnel (fig. 54).

- (1) The air army airfield security battalion (305-O and EM) consists of the battalion headquarters (10-O and EM), three airfield security companies (each 90-O and EM), and the battalion service troops (25-O and EM). The airfield security battalions and companies are organized very similarly to the submachinegun battalion of the heavy tank and self-




Figure 54. Airfield security brigade—air army.

propelled gun regiment, mechanized division (par. 103c). The companies consist of a company headquarters (1-O, 2-EM) and three airfield security platoons (each 1-O, 28-EM). Each platoon has three nine-man squads armed with eight submachineguns and one light machinegun (fig. 54).

- (2) The airfield security regiment (985-O and EM) consists of the regimental headquarters (30-O and EM), three airfield security battalions (each 305-O and EM), three airfield security battalions (each 305-O and EM), and the regimental service troops (40-O and EM). Three battalions are the same as the air army airfield security battalion (par. 160a(1)). The airfield security regiment usually has its headquarters and service troops and one battalion at the divisional airfield that houses the corps headquarters. The other two airfield security battalions are based at the other two divisional airfields.

b. The Antiaircraft Division (4,290-O and EM). The antiaircraft division of the air army, like the antiaircraft divisions of the ground forces, is a task force headquarters for the antiaircraft units of the command. The strength and components of this division will vary with the number of airfields in the air army, but it will be usually one antiaircraft battalion (normally medium antiaircraft) for each airfield. The division headquarters, the division services, and one medium antiaircraft battalion are located at the army headquarters airfield. The division consists of the division headquarters and headquarters troops (100-O and EM), three medium antiaircraft brigades, the army airfield medium antiaircraft battalion, and the division service troops (200-O and EM). These troops are army personnel.

- (1) The medium antiaircraft brigade (1,208-O and EM) consists of the brigade headquarters and headquarters troops (50-O and EM), three medium antiaircraft battalions, and the brigade service troops (60-O and EM). The brigade headquarters and service troops are located with the corps headquarters (fig. 55).




Figure 55. Typical antiaircraft division—air army.

- (2) The medium anti-aircraft battalions (366-O and EM) are the same as the medium anti-aircraft battalions of the medium anti-aircraft brigade, anti-aircraft divisions of the ground forces (par. 136a). The medium anti-aircraft battalions of the medium anti-aircraft brigades are based on the air division airfields (figs. 40 and 55).

c. Engineer and Airfield Construction Regiment (1,620-O and EM). This regiment consists of the regimental headquarters and headquarters troops (60-O and EM), four engineer airfield construction battalions, and the regimental service troops (80-O and EM). This is an army engineer regiment with special training and equipment for airfield construction work. It is assigned on the basis of one regiment per air army. The regimental headquarters and service troops and one battalion are based at the air army airfield (fig. 56).




Figure 56. Engineer airfield construction regiment—air army.

- (1) The engineer airfield construction battalion (370-O and EM) consists of the battalion headquarters (30-O and EM). The battalion headquarters and service troops and one company are located at the air corps headquarters. The other two engineer airfield construction companies are based at the other two division airfields subordinate to the corps.
- (2) The regimental and battalion service troops of this unit contain, in addition to the normal service elements, pools of engineer airfield construction and maintenance equipment.

d. *Signal Airfield Communications Regiment* (1,764-O and EM). This regiment consists of the regimental headquarters and headquarters troops (70-O and EM), four signal airfield communication battalions, a signal communication monitoring company, and the regimental service troops (80-O and EM). These are army troops assigned as ground support troops to the air army. The regimental headquarters and service elements, one signal airfield command battalion, and the signal communication monitoring company are located at the air army headquarters.




Figure 57. *Signal airfield communications regiment—air army.*

- (1) The signal airfield communication battalion (375-O and EM) consists of the battalion headquarters (40-O and EM), four signal radio companies (53-O and EM), a signal wire company (73-O and EM), and the battalion service troops (50-O and EM). One battalion is located at each air corps headquarters with one signal radio company further attached to each air division headquarters (fig. 51).
- (2) The signal communication monitoring company (114-O and EM) is the same as the signal communication monitoring company, signal brigade (par. 147d). This company is usually retained at air army headquarters and monitors the radio communication of the air army.

162. Service Troops—Air Army

The service troops of the air army have an approximate strength of 4,900 officers and enlisted men including both army and air forces personnel. They consist of the air army service troops headquarters (50-O and EM), an air service brigade, and the aviation ground services (fig. 52).

a. Air Service Brigade (710-O and EM). The air service brigade consists of the brigade headquarters (10-O and EM) and at least two air transport and medical evacuation regiments (par. 159c(3)) (fig. 52).

b. Aviation Ground Services, Air Army (3,211-O and EM). The aviation ground services of the air army consists of the ground services headquarters (20-O and EM), a motor transport regiment, an aviation maintenance regiment, an aviation support battalion, and a medical regiment (fig. 52).

c. Motor Transport Regiment (1,091-O and EM). This regiment is the same as the army motor transport regiment and the motor transport regiment, motor transport brigade (par. 149b). It has three motor transport battalions and a total of 540 three-ton trucks and 540 two-ton trailers for general cargo use. Its capacity is 2,700 tons of cargo not including its own rear service requirements (fig. 52).

d. Air Force Maintenance Regiment (1,600-O and EM). This regiment consists of the necessary regimental headquarters and service troops, a maintenance company for the air army headquarters airfield, a static aviation maintenance company, and three maintenance battalions. Each maintenance battalion consists of the battalion headquarters and service troops and three maintenance companies. The army maintenance company and the battalion maintenance company have the responsibility of second echelon maintenance for aircraft, motor vehicles, and general military equipment. The static aviation maintenance company has the responsibility for third echelon maintenance aircraft for the air army. These units are augmented by separate air force maintenance regiments and battalions as required (fig. 52).

e. Air Force Supply Battalion (700-O and EM). This battalion consists of the battalion headquarters, four air force supply companies and the battalion service troops. The air force supply companies are based at the air army and air corps headquarters. Platoons of the supply companies attached to corps are further attached to the air division headquarters. This unit has the responsibility of processing and storing all of the supplies of the air army (fig. 52).

f. Medical Regiment (700-O and EM). This regiment consists of the regimental headquarters, three small medical battalions, an army headquarters medical company, and the regimental service troops. The medical battalions are attached on the basis of one per air corps with the battalion headquarters and service troops and one medical company based at the division airfield which houses the corps headquarters. The other two medical companies of the battalion are further attached to the other two air divisions of the corps (fig. 52).

CHAPTER 4

THE AGGRESSOR NAVAL FORCES

Section I. MAJOR COMPONENTS

163. General

a. At the time of the formation of the Aggressor nation, its navy consisted of the few surface units and submarines which were available to it after World War II.

b. Since that time, emphasis has been upon the expansion of the Navy and particularly upon the construction of submarines. Because of this emphasis, the Aggressor undersea fleet presently exceeds any submarine fleet of World War II. It is well known that Aggressor obtained the services of highly capable scientific persons from the integrated countries to further its development of the latest types of submarines. Modern surface vessels have also been made available by the industrial capacity of Aggressor. A limited number of carriers have been constructed in addition to many cruisers, destroyers, and smaller surface craft. These vessels are primarily intended for close-in shore and coastal operations.

c. It is expected that the Aggressor Navy will continue its expansion with emphasis upon submarines and close-in shore surface vessels. Aggressor industry has demonstrated its ability to produce large numbers of amphibious craft and Aggressor will probably stockpile a large supply of these.

d. The Aggressor Navy has the responsibility of coastal defense, both coastal artillery and coastal antiaircraft. The military districts in the maritime areas of the Homeland are commanded by naval officers or have a large naval staff to advise the army or air force commander.

164. Administration

The navy is administered as a unit of the Armed Forces (fig. 1) under the Armed Forces High Command. It is not known how much importance will be given to naval operations under this type of organization. However, submarine operations are considered highly important by the Naval Forces High Command, and it is expected that several well-located and well-guarded submarine pens exist along Aggressor's coastline.

165. Bases and Disposition of Forces

Aggressor's Navy is based principally in the Homeland. However, submarine operations may be extended to any part of the world through the use of submarine tenders. Some of these tenders have been observed in the Aggressor occupied Puerto Rican area. The necessity of air cover for submarine tenders has governed their location.

166. Naval Vessels

a. Aggressor has a few escort type carriers in service. These carriers are relatively small and for that reason jet planes are in very limited operation.

b. Aggressor possesses a number of high speed, lightly armored, but heavily gunned cruisers. These cruisers follow Italian and German designs and have displacements near 9,000 tons. Their main batteries consist of nine 200-mm guns which have exceptionally long range. These cruisers have a designed speed of 40 knots.

c. Destroyers in the Aggressor Navy include a miscellaneous group of World War II units in addition to many of Aggressor construction. These Aggressor built vessels have comparatively heavy displacements.

d. Aggressor submarines are of very modern design. Schnorkel submarines and high-speed underwater craft are being built. It is believed that atomic-powered submarines have been or are being constructed (see par. 373).

167. Naval Air

The naval air arm is small in comparison with the tactical air force. Its organization, training, and tactical operation are directly under the Naval High Command. Aggressor naval air pilots are of a high caliber. They receive their flight training only after graduating from the Naval College. Because of their greater experience, more thorough training, and a lower attrition rate made possible by fewer commitments in battle, naval airmen are usually better trained than air force pilots.

168. Naval Infantry

The Aggressor Navy maintains a small well-trained marine force known as naval infantry. Naval infantry officers are usually graduates of the Naval College. In addition to many special operations teams, Aggressor has separate naval infantry brigades and other separate naval battalions.

Section II. NAVAL INFANTRY ORGANIZATION

169. Naval Infantry Brigade (389-O, 4,801-EM)

This brigade is a small combined arms force especially trained and equipped for amphibious operations. It consists of the brigade headquarters and headquarters troops (30-O, 60-EM), four naval rifle battalions, a naval amphibious tank battalion, the brigade artillery, a naval engineer assault battalion, a naval signal company, and the brigade service troops. It is composed entirely of naval personnel (fig. 58).




Figure 58. Aggressor naval infantry brigade.

AL—Modified Handling Authorized

Table XLV. Principal Weapons and Transportation—Naval Infantry Brigade

Unit	Individual weapons		Automatic weapons			Antitank weapons			Mortar		Artillery	Amphibious vehicles		Wheeled vehicles			
	Rifle and carbine	Submachinegun	Light machinegun	Heavy machinegun	20-mm AA	80-mm recoilless	80-mm rifle	80-mm antitank gun	50-mm mort	80-mm mort	105-mm mort	80-mm how	AM trac	Medium truck	Light truck	Heavy trailer	Medium trailer
Brig totals.....	1152	280	294	16	24	64	16	4	64	16	4	4	1	76	138	76	66
Hq and hq troops.....													1				
4 nav rifle bn.....	3 1152	3 56	256	16		64	16		64	16			4		10		10
Nav amph tank bn.....													4		64		40
Brig arty.....			6		24			4			4	21	4	10	3	1	1
Nav engr aslt bn.....		3 224	32										4	10	40	10	3
Nav sig co.....													4	3	7	3	5
Brig svc troops.....													5		5		
													6	60	11	60	

¹ Includes 8 ambulances. ² Includes 3 ambulances. ³ Primary weapons only. ⁴ Includes 1 ambulance/bn. ⁵ Includes 2 ambulances.

AL—Modified Handling Authorized

a. *The Naval Rifle Battalion* (58-O, 874-EM). This battalion consists of the battalion headquarters (8-O, 40-EM), four naval rifle companies, a heavy machinegun company (3-O, 27-EM) with four heavy machineguns, an antitank company (3-O, 27-EM) with four 80-mm recoilless antitank weapons, a mortar company (3-O, 27-EM) with four 80-mm mortars, a naval engineer assault company, and the battalion service troops (3-O, 30-EM). This battalion may be organic to the naval infantry brigade or separate (fig. 59).




Figure 59. Naval rifle battalion—naval infantry brigade.

- (1) The naval rifle company (8-O, 162-EM) is composed of the company headquarters (1-O, 10-EM), four naval rifle platoons (each 1-O, 29-EM) which have four seven-man squads with one light machinegun and six rifles each, an antitank platoon (1-O, 13-EM) with four 80-mm antitank rocket launchers, a mortar platoon (1-O, 13-EM) with four 50-mm mortars, and the company service troops (1-O, 10-EM) (fig. 59).
- (2) The naval engineer assault company (6-O, 75-EM) consists of the company headquarters (1-O, 5-EM), four assault platoons (each 1-O, 15-EM) armed with two light machineguns and fourteen submachineguns, and the company service troops (1-O, 10-EM).

b. *The Naval Amphibious Tank Battalion* (22-O, 184-EM). This battalion is composed of the battalion headquarters (8-O, 15-EM),

four amphibious tank companies, and the battalion service troops (2-O, 25-EM). The amphibious tank company (3-O, 36-EM) is organized along lines similar to those of army self-propelled gun battalions. It consists of a company headquarters (1-O, 10-EM) equipped with one TA20/80H amphibious tank and two platoons (each 1-O, 13-EM) equipped with two TA20/80H amphibious tanks each. This battalion may be organic to the naval infantry brigade or separate (fig. 58).

c. *The Brigade Artillery* (42-O, 436-EM). The brigade artillery consists of the brigade artillery staff (2-O, 7-EM), a naval howitzer battery (4-O, 60-EM) with four 80-mm howitzers and two light machineguns, a naval antitank battery (3-O, 42-EM) with four 80-mm antitank guns and two light machineguns, a naval antiaircraft battalion, and a naval mortar battery (3-O, 42-EM) with four 105-mm mortars and two light machineguns. The naval antiaircraft battalion is composed of the battalion headquarters (15-O, 35-EM), four anti-aircraft batteries (each 3-O, 55-EM) armed with six 20-mm anti-aircraft guns each, and the battalion service troops (3-O, 30-EM). This battalion may be either organic to the naval infantry brigade or separate (fig. 58).

d. *The Naval Engineer Assault Battalion* (37-O, 355-EM). This battalion is very similar to the army engineer assault battalion (par. 146g). It consists of the battalion headquarters (10-O, 25-EM), four engineer assault companies (each 6-O, 75-EM) (par. 169a (2)), and the battalion service troops (3-O, 30-EM). This battalion may be organic to the naval infantry brigade or separate (fig. 58).

e. *The Brigade Service Troops* (23-O, 220-EM) of the naval infantry brigade consist of the service troops headquarters (5-O, 5-EM), a naval motor transport company (4-O, 75-EM) with 60 three-ton trucks and 60 two-ton trailers, an amphibious tractor company (4-O, 75-EM) with 60 five-ton amphibious tractors, a naval medical company (5-O, 30-EM), and other services totaling 5 officers and 35 enlisted men (fig. 58).

170. Naval Amphibious Tractor Battalion (31-O, 360-EM)

This battalion is a separate naval amphibious unit. It consists of a battalion headquarters (15-O, 30-EM), four amphibious tractor companies (each 4-O, 75-EM) equipped with 60 five-ton amphibious tractors each, and the battalion service troops (5-O, 50-EM). The battalion's overwater cargo capacity is 1,200 tons.

PART TWO

DOCTRINE AND TACTICS

CHAPTER 5

AGGRESSOR DOCTRINE

Section I. MILITARY PLANNING

171. Levels of Planning

a. Strategic. In Aggressor military doctrine, strategy is the highest level of purely military planning. Strategy is based on the policy of the Circle Trigon Party and on the national policy of the Aggressor Nation as these are formulated by the Trinity. Strategy is thus an instrument of a political party as well as of a national government. Military strategy translates overall national and party policies into military decisions, makes plans designed for implementing these decisions, and exercises supervision over their execution on the national level.

b. Operational. Operations, which Aggressor calls “the Operational Art,” are the next level of planning and control. It consists of the implementation of strategy in specific theaters or large areas and the accomplishment of specific major tasks. Control on the higher operational level may be vested in one or more army group commanders or in specifically designated teams of experts from the general staff.

c. Tactical. Tactics is the lowest level of military control and planning. It consists of the preparation and direction of individual combat actions. The highest ranking commander in a tactical situation usually exercises overall, combined arms control. An army group commander may be the overall combined arms commander in a large-scale battle, but usually this type command falls to an army or corps commander. In special situations overall combined arms command may even be exercised at the divisional level.

172. Distinction Between Operations and Tactics

Despite the clear theoretical distinction between the “Operational Art” and tactics, a meaningful distinction between the two in application is difficult to draw. They overlap in practice because the distinction between them is based as much upon significance as upon scope.

Two battle actions of equivalent size may be respectively operational and tactical. The one is operational because it inflicts a serious injury upon the enemy and is a significant step toward the accomplishment of the strategic plan. For example, a major combat action which penetrates into the operational depth (soft rear areas) of the enemy is considered to be operational. An action of similar size is considered tactical if its effect upon the overall military situation is negligible.

173. Relation to Foreign Policy

a. Aggressor believes, with Clausewitz, that war is merely a continuation of diplomacy by other means. Thus Aggressor carefully tailors his war to achieve the foreign policy aims of the regime. During a war in which he is seriously threatened, Aggressor may be unable to further his national policy actively by military means. But he does not lose sight of the policy, and as soon as the situation permits him freedom of action, he moves in the prescribed direction.

b. So long as they remain within the framework established by the national foreign policy of the Aggressor Nation, the top-level military planners enjoy relative freedom of action. However, as in all other phases of Aggressor society, this freedom exists only at the highest level. Lower echelons simply execute plans made and supervised by their superiors.

c. Aggressor military policy in major wars is based upon achieving the utter defeat of the enemy in order to facilitate a thorough realization of political aims. Thus the basic decision of Aggressor strategists is to determine the direction in which they must move to accomplish this end best. The decision is made after the relative strengths of friendly and of hostile forces have been weighed in terms of the desired solution.

d. Once the decision has been made, the planners are guided by two basic strategic concepts—the principle of concentration of effort and a belief in the necessity for thorough and detailed planning.

e. The concept of a minutely planned strategy does not preclude rapid and complete changes of plan when changes appear necessary. But such flexibility is permitted only at the very top of the command pyramid. Lower levels are presented with a new and equally detailed plan which supersedes the previous one.

f. Sabotage, partisan warfare, strikes, and appeals to the international solidarity of the workers are part and parcel of the military planning of the Aggressor High Command. Aggressor emphasis upon defense against the use of such measures by the enemy is an index of the importance Aggressor ascribes to these measures as politico-military weapons.

174. Principles of War

Aggressor military theorists usually avoid explicit references to abstract "principles of war." This is probably a result of their indecisive struggle over the adoption of such principles. Aggressor lists of decisive factors in war include not only universal military principles, but also economic, social, industrial, and psychological factors. The Aggressor Army does, however, apply a number of abstract military principles in its training and combat plans. For example, it emphasizes the importance of maneuver, mass, surprise, and offense. But in the training of troops and junior officers, less emphasis is placed upon principle than is the case in most contemporary armies.

175. Evaluation

The top-ranking Aggressor strategists have a firm understanding of the essentials of their trade, and they apply strategic and tactical theories effectively. Serious weaknesses should not be overemphasized, however, because increased training and study undoubtedly have done much to strengthen the overall proficiency of the Aggressor officer corps in tactical theory and practice.

Section II. BASIC PRINCIPLES

176. General

Aggressor doctrine stresses the principle that decisive victory on the battlefield, the ultimate purpose of the army, can be achieved only by the offensive. While Aggressor troops are well trained in defense and withdrawal, it is considered that only by attack can the commander retain the initiative and control the vital factors—time and space.

177. Combined Arms

Current Aggressor doctrine considers military operations as the combat of all arms in which artillery, tank, and mechanized, and air power are essential to success. These arms, however, have as their primary roles the support of infantry and the exploitation of its gains. They are seldom employed tactically without consideration for the specific requirements of the infantry. Artillery provides massed fire power; tanks and mechanized forces provide mobile fire power; but infantry provides the base of fire, manpower, and momentum which bring about the ultimate defeat of the enemy.

178. Mass

The paramount characteristic of Aggressor tactical doctrine is the employment of mass (both manpower and fire power) as the basic form of ground fighting. Mass is achieved by concentrating assault units and their supporting arms on narrow fronts.

179. Command

a. A basic Aggressor tactical principle is unity of command at all echelons. All commanders, up to and including those of the mechanized divisions and the rifle corps, are required to make detailed personal reconnaissance and exercise close personal supervision of decisive actions. A combined arms force is generally commanded by the senior infantry, armored, or cavalry officer present.

b. Air armies supporting ground forces are under the command of army group commanders.

c. Each commander, from army group to and including the battalion, has a political guidance officer on his staff. This officer wields strong influence in personnel matters and, at times, in tactical decisions.

d. Tactical planning and the resultant orders are detailed. Small unit commanders are allowed little exercise of initiative. They are told what to do and when, where, and how to do it, and they are not permitted to deviate from their instructions. However, when the need arises, individual initiative among all commanders is encouraged. Aggressor doctrine stresses initiative in reconnaissance, for example, and in particular, during the meeting engagement.

180. Combat Intelligence and Counterintelligence

Aggressor forces are acutely aware of the value of combat intelligence and counterintelligence. They make effective use of all intelligence agencies, particularly clandestine, and have a highly developed and ruthlessly employed counterintelligence system.

181. Individual Tactics

Aggressor realizes that the effectiveness of unit tactics is dependent upon individual tactics. Troops are highly trained in patrolling, field craft, camouflage, and night movement. The individual soldier is clever at improvisation, adept at living off the land, and capable of enduring incredible hardships. These characteristics are exploited to achieve surprise by attack over difficult terrain and under rigorous climatic conditions.

182. Concept of the Offensive

Basically, Aggressor's concept is this: Offensives are launched in the wake of pulverizing artillery and air preparations. Rifle and

mechanized forces are organized into echelons to break the crust of enemy defenses and push into the rear areas. The number of echelons necessary for a given operation depends primarily upon the mission, means available, terrain, and character of enemy defenses. The general principle to be applied is as follows: The more echeloned in depth the defense, the deeper should be the deployment of the battle formations for the attack.

183. Offensive Pattern

In general, an Aggressor offensive takes the form of simultaneous attacks at a number of points on a broad front with heavy concentrations of artillery, tanks, and air power at decisive points. Normally, Aggressor seeks a double envelopment, but if enemy flanks cannot be bypassed for this purpose, he attempts to penetrate the enemy defenses in two or more sectors so as to converge on an objective in the enemy rear, after which simultaneous attacks are launched to destroy the enveloped enemy.

184. Offensive Characteristics

The Aggressor offensive is characterized by elaborate preparations, detailed plans and orders, secrecy, and heavy concentrations of infantry, tanks, artillery, and aircraft. Attacks are made on narrow fronts, and power in the direction of the main effort is maintained by providing a continuity of superiority over hostile forces and equipment. The high state of individual discipline, rigid adherence to prior plans, and disregard for human life tend to cause Aggressor to incur a high number of casualties in return for objectives gained.

185. Concept of the Defense

The defense consists of a series of defensive areas (strong points) located laterally and in great depth. These areas are so dispersed that the attacker is forced to attack echeloned strong points, thus reducing his momentum and strength. When the attacker is extended and weakened by well-planned defenses, the defender initiates counter-offensive operations because defensive battles are won only by resumption of the initiative and subsequent annihilation of the enemy force. Aggressor undertakes the defensive only when forced to do so in order to gain time, to economize on one front, to provide more mass on another, or to prevent destruction by a superior enemy.

186. Defensive Pattern

a. Position Defense. In general, the position defense consists of four zones—a security zone, usually manned by elements of the front line divisions; a main defensive zone, manned by rifle divisions of the

rifle corps; a second defensive zone occupied by army reserves of infantry, artillery, and antitank units; and a rear defensive zone, garrisoned by units of the army group placed under the control of the army commander. Aggressor doctrine envisages that these zones will —

- (1) Delay an enemy.
- (2) Stop him at the main defensive zone.
- (3) Establish basis for counterattack against him if he breaks through the main defensive zone.
- (4) Make it possible to strike him with a major counterattack if he succeeds in breaking through the second defensive zone.

b. Mobile Defense. Aggressor's mobile defense consists of a series of generally parallel lines of defense over which delaying actions are fought. The mobile defense is designed to—

- (1) Gain time.
- (2) Inflict losses upon the enemy.
- (3) Conserve forces at the expense of loss of ground.

187. Defensive Characteristics

The Aggressor defense is characterized by the same elaborate preparation, detailed plans and orders, and tactical rigidity that apply to offensive. Coordination is effected at army group or army level. Defense in depth on narrow fronts, the high proportion of weapons to personnel, and the strict discipline of the individual soldier make Aggressor static defenses extremely strong. He expects to extend and weaken an enemy and then launch enveloping counterattacks or counteroffensives.

188. Special Operations

a. Aggressor applies to the conduct of special operations the same tactical principles that govern normal conduct. There is, of course, some variation in the application of the principles, but this is permitted only to the extent dictated by particular situations or conditions. The principal special operations are—

- (1) Airborne operations.
- (2) Amphibious operations.
- (3) Winter and Arctic warfare.
- (4) Combat in woods and forests.
- (5) Night fighting.
- (6) Partisan operations.
- (7) Mountain operations.
- (8) City warfare.

(9) River crossing.

(10) Attack on a fortified zone.

b. Special operations are carried out by regular Aggressor forces assisted and augmented by specially trained troops and special units. Airborne divisions, mountain divisions, naval infantry brigades, ski brigades, and partisan units are examples of these. Preparation for a special operation involves early selection of the troops to be used, intensive training in the use of appropriate clothing and equipment, and the tactics applicable to the operation, and detailed rehearsal of unit tasks.

CHAPTER 6

THE AGGRESSOR OFFENSIVE TACTICS

Section I. GENERAL

189. Objective

a. The main objective of an Aggressor attack is the complete destruction of the enemy. This is accomplished by means of heavy fire and by thrusts into the depths of the enemy position. The thrusts normally are developed into encirclement when the rear of the main body of the hostile force has been reached.

b. For the attack Aggressor forces are distributed into two or more tactical groupings—one group for the main attack and one or more groups for secondary attacks. In practice, Aggressor likes to attain a superiority of at least 4 to 1 in men and materiel at the point of main effort. The type of grouping will depend upon the strength and organization of the hostile positions. An army or corps at the point of main effort usually will attack in two echelons. The selection of the direction of the main thrust is the first and most important decision made by the responsible Aggressor commander. The selection is based upon friendly and enemy strengths and dispositions, and upon terrain and weather factors.

190. Forms of Offensive Action

a. The Aggressor employs two basic forms of offensive action—envelopment and frontal attack penetration. When the main attack is directed against the flank or rear of the enemy's main forces in order to encircle, such offensive action is known as envelopment. When the main attack is designed to pass through some portion of the area occupied by the enemy's main forces and is directed against an objective in his rear, that form of offensive action is known as a frontal attack for purpose of effecting a break through.

b. The Aggressor Army employs both of these basic forms of attack, but the Aggressor doctrine states that envelopment must always be attempted when an exposed enemy flank exists or when an exposed flank develops in the course of combat. Three types of envelopment—single, double, and deep—are used by the Aggressor. A single envelopment is directed against one enemy flank, a double envelopment

against both flanks. Both of these actions take place in coordination with a secondary frontal attack. Deep envelopment is made parallel to but outside of an ordinary single or double envelopment. Its purpose is to form a safety zone to prevent relief of the surrounded enemy forces. The Aggressors speak of the normal envelopment (whether single or double) as the inner ring of encirclement and of the deep envelopment as the outer ring of encirclement. Whenever possible, Aggressor attempts to make a deep as well as a normal envelopment.

c. When neither of the enemy flanks is exposed, the Aggressor employs penetration. Sometimes single penetrations are attempted, but more often several forward thrusts are undertaken simultaneously or in close coordination with one another. Successful penetrations usually are developed into encirclements in the course of the combat action. Envelopments developed from penetrations often are paralleled by continued deep penetration conducted by motorized and mechanized forces.

191. Frontages and Depths

a. The attack frontage and depth of sector for main thrusts depend upon the mission assigned, the forces and equipment available, the terrain, and the enemy situation.

b. A division of average strength attacking deliberate field fortifications usually is assigned a sector approximately 3,500 yards wide and 5,000 yards deep. A regiment normally occupies a sector about 1,500 yards wide, while a battalion is assigned a front of approximately 770 yards.

192. Reserves

The Aggressor concept of reserves is different from that of most other armies. There are really two separate types of Aggressor reserves—the troops of the second echelon, and the actual reserves. The troops of the second echelon fulfill many of the functions assigned to the reserves in United States doctrine. Second echelon troops are used to maintain or to increase the momentum of the attack by supporting the troops of the first echelon and by passing through them when the first echelon becomes exhausted. The second echelon differs from a true reserve in that its actions and its area of commitment are predetermined. In addition to this second echelon, each commander above the battalion level holds back a small true reserve. There are very small reserves in lower units. This reserve usually consists of one-ninth of the regiment or other unit concerned and is, like its American counterpart, at the disposition of the commander of the unit to enable him to influence the course of battle at the decisive

points and time. When a commander commits his reserve to combat, he must immediately form a new one from whatever forces he can scrape together. He must have some reserve at all times.

193. Coordination

a. Aggressor doctrine insists upon the maintenance of uninterrupted cooperation of all units and of all individual arms and services that have received common battle missions. The senior commander attains this cooperation by close control of all units, and by directing combat according to a detailed battle plan and fire plan. Achieving this cooperation means much centralization of control.

b. The main object of the cooperation of all arms is to insure that the forward movement of tanks and infantry is coordinated with artillery, engineer, and air support. The army and lower unit commanders brief their staffs and subordinate commanders on the ground chosen for the attack, and special attention is given to the establishment of signal tables and to the maintenance of signal communications.

194. Meeting Engagement

a. According to Aggressor tactical theory, success in a meeting engagement is based upon the delivery of a rapid, powerful blow at the point of main effort, preferably on the enemy's flank or rear. Aggressor teaches that the first force to complete deployment attains a decisive advantage over its undeployed or partially deployed opponent. Swift action of massed mortars, artillery (including rocket units), armor, and air units is considered extremely important in meeting engagements.

b. Aggressor advances to combat contact in a manner similar to United States practice. Wherever the situation permits, Aggressor troops advance to contact in separate parallel columns. Each column is shielded from surprise by a particularly strong advance guard. Cover for the advancing columns is provided by the air force.

c. Aerial reconnaissance is used to locate the enemy force and to observe his movements. The air force, long-range artillery, and mobile troops are employed to engage the enemy while both friendly and hostile troops are still in the approach march.

d. Aggressor troops are warned to avoid premature deployment. Although they must complete deployment before the enemy does, they are not to do so until they can immediately engage the foe.

e. The greater part of the artillery deploys upon the orders of individual column commanders. Army and corps artillery groups march as separate elements and deploy upon the orders of the commander to

whom they are subordinated. The overall commander is responsible, however, for the overall control of artillery.

f. Aggressor troops generally initiate a meeting engagement along a broad front. The advance guard is assigned a mission in accordance with the general mission of the column. This assignment is made while both are still on the march. If the advance guard is forced to deploy before receiving a mission assignment, the commander of the advance guard acts upon his own initiative. The column commander may not interfere with his dispositions. The advance guards of parallel columns coordinate their actions upon deployment.

g. Should the enemy succeed in deploying first, the Aggressor advance guard automatically goes over to the defensive on a broad front. Simultaneously, the main body deploys for the attack.

h. Should the Aggressor force deploy before the enemy force completes its deployment, Aggressor tanks are committed to combat in the first attacking waves. If the enemy precedes the Aggressor in deployment, Aggressor tanks (except large mechanized or tank formations) operate in the closest cooperation with the infantry.

i. Aggressor controls a meeting engagement by means of individual short orders. These orders usually are issued orally or are delivered by liaison officers.

j. Radio silence, maintained during the approach march, is ended, and upon deployment, wire laying is commenced. Radio is considered to be the primary means of communication in a meeting engagement.

195. Attack on an Organized Position

a. Reconnaissance and Observation.

- (1) Thorough preattack reconnaissance is stressed heavily in Aggressor tactical doctrine. All forms of reconnaissance are used to observe the entire organized depth of the enemy position. Photographs obtained by aerial reconnaissance are painstakingly analyzed. Infantry, artillery, engineer, and armored patrols penetrate enemy lines, to study the terrain, hostile troop concentration, dispositions, fortifications, and communications. As the attack preparations progress, combat reconnaissance patrols are mounted in increasing strength and intensity. The patrols attempt to take prisoners and to force the enemy to disclose antitank artillery and heavy weapons positions. Special efforts are made to identify unit boundaries because these are considered particularly susceptible to attack. In an attempt to confuse the enemy, feint reconnaissance frequently is conducted in zones outside the

areas to be attacked. All reconnaissance activities are carried on by units already in contact with the enemy.

- (2) Available reconnaissance information is carefully collated and evaluated. The information is incorporated into an overall enemy situation map upon which the integrated combat plans and artillery fire plans are based. These plans are made by the staff of the senior commander. Pertinent portions are incorporated into the plans of all lower commanders. Annotated maps and aerial mosaics are placed in the hands of battalion and lower echelon commanders well before the actual launching of the assault.
- (3) Before any major attack, the senior commander must conduct a commander's reconnaissance on the terrain selected for the main effort. He briefs the commanders of the primary and supporting arms on their missions and arranges for co-operation among the arms. He assigns code designations to key terrain features and makes certain that subordinate commanders understand their role in the planned operation. Each of the subordinate commanders in turn conducts a reconnaissance of his own assigned sector and briefs his subordinate and attached commanders down to company level. Thus, there is no excuse for confusion as to the mission or assigned sectors in the early phase of the attack.
- (4) Aggressor is a strong advocate of thorough and constant observation of the enemy. A network of observation posts is set up along every frontline sector. The posts are arranged so as to permit the fullest possible coverage of enemy positions by means of interlocking sectors, oblique observation, and distant observation. If trenches are used, observers in the frontlines are provided with periscopes. Before an attack, regular observers at the point of main effort are replaced or supplemented by officer observers.

b. Concentration and Deployment.

- (1) The movement of troops into built-up areas requires precautions for maintaining secrecy. Troops arriving by rail are detrained well away from their concentration area and at various points along the rail line. All marches are conducted at night or under conditions of poor visibility. All columns are camouflaged during daylight hours as are all positions and emplacements.
- (2) Aggressor troops move into concentration areas upon their arrival in the offensive sector. Infantry concentration areas are usually 15 to 20 miles behind the frontlines. Large

armored forces intended for operational use an independent task forces usually occupy concentration areas some 25 to 30 miles back. Concentration areas for infantry support armor are slightly further forward. In general, the concentration areas are similar to the United States Army's assembly areas.

- (3) A few days before the actual attack, the troops in the concentration areas move forward again. The infantry enters assembly areas 4 to 6 miles from the front. Armored units occupy intermediate positions 9 to 12 miles from the front. The troops usually remain in these areas from 1 to 3 days before moving forward again.
- (4) Sometime during the 24 hours immediately preceding the attack, the infantry moves into its departure positions. These positions are about 800 yards from the enemy front lines. Terrain and other factors influence the choice of this position. Approximately 1 hour before the assault begins, the tanks move into their attack positions. These are normally between 1,000 and 3,000 yards from the enemy lines.
- (5) The tanks are committed from their attack position. They move forward in full battle deployment in an effort to push through the enemy lines without interruption. Infantry troops, on the other hand, work slowly forward until they reach a predesignated assault line about 200 yards from the enemy's forward emplacements. The actual infantry assault on the enemy's positions is launched from this assault line. If tanks are supporting the infantry, the passage of the tanks through the assault line is timed so that the passage will be the signal for the commencement of the infantry assault.
- (6) Artillery is brought into position throughout the period preceding the attack. The last batteries are usually in position at least 24 hours before the attack is made. Registration is conducted within the pattern of the regular daily fires of units already in contact with the enemy. Frequently only one piece of each caliber registers in any front sector. Corrections are applied to the data thus obtained. The corrections, then, are applied to all pieces of that caliber. This loss of accuracy is acceptable from the Aggressor point of view, because much of their indirect artillery fire is area rather than point fire.
- (7) During the night preceding the attack, pieces to be used for direct fire destruction are manhandled into previously prepared and camouflaged emplacements in the forward Ag-

gressor positions. Usually each piece is assigned a particular, specific objective within the hostile defensive complex. For particularly important targets, more than one piece may be assigned. Some overstrength is provided to allow for normal combat attrition.

- (8) Organic artillery normally is heavily supplanted by the attachment of additional units from GHQ troops. Seven or more artillery battalions may often support one infantry regiment in the attack. All Aggressor artillery, whether organic, attached, or supporting, is organized into groups for combat action. Regimental, divisional, and corps counter-battery and long-range groups usually are formed. Above the division level there are variations in both pattern and nomenclature.
- (9) Regimental and divisional groups normally are composed of pieces lighter than those found in corps in the specialized groups. But the Aggressor system for forming artillery groups is highly elastic. If larger pieces are needed by a regimental group, they will be provided. Pieces as heavy as 152-mm gun-howitzers often are used in the frontlines to deliver direct fire against formidable pillboxes that impede the attacking echelons.

c. Preparation.

- (1) The artillery offensive consists of a combined air force-artillery attack coordinated with the tank and infantry attack. Large numbers of ground support aircraft are committed by Aggressor in any major attack. Close cooperation between ground and air units is assured by ground control of air action at the army level and by air force teams who direct air strikes by radio from within the combat formations of assaulting infantry and armor.
- (2) The artillery preparation for the attack is one of the most important elements in an Aggressor offensive operation. Every available artillery piece and all infantry battalion and regimental mortars are included in the preparation fire plan. Preparation fires are planned carefully and are centrally directed by the senior artillery commander of the attacking force. During his campaigns Aggressor has employed as many as 250-300 tubes (including mortars) for each 1,000 yards of front in the sector of main effort.
- (3) The artillery preparation usually is of short duration—two hours or less—but intensive. Both destruction and neutralization fires are included in the preparation. No regular pat-

tern is followed. Ruses such as false preparations, false lifts, and safety lanes through the preparatory fires are employed. The ruses may be designed to lure enemy tactical reserves into positions where these reserves can be destroyed by the preparation. Again, the ruses may be used to enable the Aggressor infantry to reach the enemy while the enemy is still disorganized and demoralized by the pounding he has undergone.

- (4) The Aggressor regimental, divisional, and corps artillery groups attempt to smash the forward positions of the enemy, pin down or destroy his immediate reserves, and destroy his communications system, staffs, and command personnel. The artillery also provides protection for the initial infantry advance. Tactical air elements and the artillery of higher echelons concentrate on counterbattery fires and the interdiction of lines of approach to the battle area.
- (5) The infantry utilizes the preparation to complete its move to the assault line. If the infantry already occupies positions along this line, the time is used to prepare for the assault itself. The infantry begins the assault as soon as the danger of incurring heavy casualties from friendly fire is past. If tanks are supporting the infantry, the infantry jumps off when the tanks roll through prearranged gaps in the infantry assault position.
- (6) During the preparation period, the armor supporting the infantry also makes final preparations for the attack. The preparation includes moving forward to the infantry assault line which it crosses at a predesignated time. When available, large armored forces are used in the second or third major wave of the attacking force. These forces are not committed until the backbone of the defense has been broken, because the mission of these forces usually is exploitation on an operational scale.
- (7) The second and third echelons of the army group and army are meant to extend the breakthrough in width and depth. Hence, these echelons are composed primarily of tank, mechanized, and other mobile formations. The initial elements perform the tactical mission of puncturing the enemy defenses, but the second and third waves perform the operational mission of driving deep into enemy rear areas. Their aim is to destroy large segments of the enemy force as well as his command and logistical support system.

d. Assault.

- (1) The infantry sweeps forward at the appointed time or signal. They charge the enemy positions with shouts of "hurrah." In the assault, stress is placed on hand grenades, automatic weapons fire, and the employment of the tank-infantry team as a shock force. Infantry mortars are released to local control as soon as the preparation ends. The mortars follow directly behind the rifle units and deliver close-in fire support. Heavy machinegun sections also follow directly behind the rifle units and deliver close-in fire through predesignated lanes or around the flanks of units. Aggressor assault troops seek out gaps in enemy lines through which the more vulnerable rear areas can be reached. Strong points offering heavy resistance are blocked and bypassed. The troops of later echelons liquidate these strong points while the assault troops continue the attack close behind their artillery supporting fires.
- (2) Tanks support the infantry by supplying mobile, direct artillery fire. The infantry, in turn, mop up antitank guns that threaten the tanks. Self-propelled (assault) guns aid both infantry and antitank artillery.
- (3) Regimental, divisional, and corps artillery groups normally continue to support the infantry under unified control during the assault phase. This support usually takes the form of an accompanying (rolling) barrage, which moves into the enemy positions by 100-yard steps. The infantry controls the advance of this barrage from one major phase line to another by means of pyrotechnic or radio signals. The barrage is often supplemented by planned area concentrations.
- (4) A portion of the regimental artillery group usually is released from central control to provide infantry-controlled indirect fire support for the assault infantry units. These direct support units follow the infantry as closely as possible. They travel in two by bounds and take advantage of the nearest defilade to deliver fire as needed.
- (5) The pieces assigned direct fire missions during the preparation are normally designated as infantry-accompanying pieces unless they are of heavy or medium caliber. Many of the infantry-accompanying pieces are SP (assault) guns. Towed pieces are man-handled by their crews and by infantrymen of the assault units. These pieces provide direct fire against targets of opportunity that are harassing or delaying the infantry unit.

- (6) Organic and attached antitank artillery (antitank gun) units also accompany the advancing assault infantry. These units attack enemy antitank guns or strong points, emplaced tanks, and other obstacles, delaying the infantry advance. In case of a counterattack, the units form the backbone of the hasty defense organization of the assault teams. Armor is their priority target; in its absence, these antitank units fire regular direct fire missions.
- (7) Other antitank units accompany the subsequent waves of the advancing troops. The units are concentrated especially upon the flanks of the breakthrough force, where the force is most vulnerable to armored counterattack.
- (8) All regimental and higher commanders maintain mobile antitank reserves for use against armored counterattacks. These reserves usually contain combat engineers, infantry close-support elements, tank-killer teams armed with short-range antitank weapons, and antitank artillery. Aggressor is able to construct deep defensive systems of mines, obstacles, and fire in a very short time. These defensive positions have proved capable of resolute resistance against even large-scale armored thrusts.

e. Battle in the Depth of the Enemy Position.

- (1) The battle in the depth of the enemy position begins either upon the successful penetration of the hard crust of the battle position (1.5 to 2 miles) or when enemy action necessitates a regrouping of the Aggressor tactical formation.
- (2) The infantry continues the attack as rapidly as possible. Assaulting echelons continue to avoid strong points in order to exploit penetrations in undefended or weakly defended sectors. When the effectiveness of the assault troops has been seriously reduced by losses, succeeding echelons reinforce or pass through them. These succeeding echelons attempt to reduce the bypassed strong points.
- (3) As in the preceding phase of the attack, infantry-support armor accompanies the infantry and performs a dual shock and fire mission.
- (4) At this stage operational (large-scale) tank and mechanized elements are usually introduced into the battle. These mobile formations are equipped with organic and attached support in the form of assault guns, rocket battalions, and mobile artillery. The formations stab deep into the enemy communications zone and attempt to isolate and destroy large portions of the enemy force and logistical support. The formations

also try to keep the enemy from preparing new defensive positions. Every effort is made to develop operational exploitation into strategic gains, to seize enemy industrial centers, and to occupy stretches of enemy territory.

- (5) Artillery control is still further decentralized in this attack phase. The accompanying (rolling) barrage is succeeded by the firing of on-call concentrations. At this time a portion of the remaining regimental artillery and possibly the divisional artillery is subordinated to the commanders of regiments or independent battalions. The divisional commander retains a reserve strong enough to engage the enemy by fire. The senior artillery commander retains the authority to concentrate all supporting and reinforcing fire under his command.

196. Planned Defensive-Offensive

a. In a planned defensive-offensive operation, the Aggressor commander may choose to remain on the defensive, if already so deployed, or go over to the defensive, if on the offensive. The commander may do this even when he has an offensive mission. Aggressor resorts to the planned defensive-offensive especially when the balance of troop strength does not meet his standard requirements for the immediate offensive.

b. The purpose of the planned defensive-offensive operation is to preserve troop strength and to retain dispositions favorable for attack, while the enemy is bleeding himself white against strong defenses. When the enemy is deemed to be sufficiently weakened and overextended, the defending Aggressor force goes over to the attack. If successful, the attack may be developed into a counteroffensive on a grand scale.

197. Forced Defensive-Offensive

Although an Aggressor commander is obliged to bend every effort toward the attack, the forced defensive-offensive operation is recognized in Aggressor doctrine as a necessary temporary expedient. When this tactic is *forced* on an Aggressor commander, his aim is to reestablish a balance of forces favorable to a resumption of the offensive.

198. Pursuit

a. As soon as the enemy begins to withdraw, pursuit is initiated independently by units and formations. Once initiated, the pursuit must be incessant until the enemy is completely annihilated.

b. Aggressor conducts pursuit by means of powerful independent columns composed of motorized, mechanized, and tank formations. The columns are supported by large numbers of assault guns, rocket battalions, and highly mobile towed artillery. Cavalry often is employed if the terrain and the situation are more favorable than for tank or mechanized units.

c. The leading pursuit formations attempt to penetrate as deeply as possible into the retreating enemy force and to throw the enemy into disorder. Pockets of resistance are bypassed by the leading elements, and are suppressed by followup units.

d. Whenever possible, pursuit is carried out along parallel routes. The aim is to reach the rear of the fleeing enemy and to cut off his retreat. According to Aggressor doctrine, pursuit which turns the enemy flanks gives the pursuer the opportunity for decisive success.

e. When parallel pursuit is not possible because of terrain conditions, the road net, or the military situation, Aggressor employs frontal pursuit. Frontal pursuit consists of orthodox maintenance of contact, coupled with efforts to break through the hostile covering force in order to smash the main body of the enemy.

f. The pursuing column or columns must be organized so that they can deploy swiftly along a broad front. Thus the columns will be able to meet an enemy counterattack or an organized defensive front.

g. Communication in the pursuit is maintained by means of radio, pyrotechnics, and liaison officers.

Section II. THE RIFLE REGIMENT IN THE ATTACK

199. General

a. The most comprehensive picture of regimental offensive tactics can be obtained through a description of the combat operations of a rifle regiment in the first echelon of a rifle division during an attack on deliberate field fortifications organized in moderate depth. Tactics and battle formations will vary however, according to the situation.

b. A rifle regiment, attacking deliberate field fortifications organized in depth, is normally reinforced by artillery, tanks, self-propelled (assault) guns, and engineer troops. When heavy resistance is anticipated, the regimental artillery group may comprise as many as seven battalions of artillery. Some of the reinforcing artillery may come from the divisional artillery but most of them will be provided from a GHQ artillery pool. The individual artillery pieces furnishing direct fire support are drawn from these units. Most of the group, however, deliver indirect fire in accordance with the fire sup-

port plan which assigns specific missions to each regimental group for the various phases of the attack. The regimental fire support group commander can assign additional fire missions to units within his group or to the group as a whole.

c. A battalion of tanks, supported by self-propelled guns, is also normally placed in support of a rifle regiment making the main effort. Aggressor insists upon close teamwork between these tank units and the assaulting infantry.

d. If the enemy position includes an extensive system of obstacles, division engineer units may also be assigned or placed in support of the regiment.

e. If the opposing force is believed to contain sizable armored units, Aggressor may attach independent antitank artillery units to the rifle regiment to reinforce its organic antitank weapons.

200. The Regimental Command Post and Observation Post

a. In combat regimental headquarters is divided into forward and rear command posts to facilitate mobility and control.

b. The forward command post (CP) includes the regimental commander, the deputy commander, the political guidance officer, the operational staff, the chief of the fire support group, the engineer and chemical officers, and a portion of the headquarters platoon.

c. The principal physical elements of the forward CP are the commander's observation post, an operation group, and a signal or message center.

d. The observation post (OP) is carefully selected and prepared. Alternate OP sites are chosen to supplement the main establishment. An observer is always on duty and during preparations for an offensive, special officer observers supplement the usual system.

e. Just before the offensive, the regimental commander, selected staff officers and observers, and required communications personnel (radio and telephone operators), situate themselves in the command CP to conduct the battle. The regimental artillery officer takes his place in his own OP, about 110 to 220 yards from the OP of the regimental commander, from which he controls his weapons. Because artillery plays such an important supporting role in offensive combat, the regimental artillery officer maintains direct communication with the command OP.

f. The operations staff carry on their duties together in an operational groupment located about 550 yards behind the regimental OP. They are in constant touch with the commander and act as a sort of command "bridge" to the rear CP. They are in communication with both, for their job is to control the entire regiment.

g. The signal center, which normally is established near the operational group, provides and maintains the command communication net for the regiment. Personnel of the headquarters platoon are used wherever necessary for security of the area and for housekeeping duties of the staff.

h. The regimental rear CP is usually located far enough from the front to allow its personnel to carry on their work with a minimum of interruption. The distance varies from one to three miles. Personnel in the rear CP include most of the supply and maintenance personnel of the regiment. The rear CP is responsible for controlling the reception and distribution of arms, ammunition, equipment, and rations; for salvage operations; the processing of reinforcements; evacuation of casualties; and other services. Traffic control and the maintenance of communications with the forward CP are also the responsibility of rear CP. The regimental surgeon is located in the aid station, which is a part of the rear CP.

201. Frontages

The frontage assigned to a regiment in the attack depends upon its mission, its combat strength, available fire support, terrain, and the nature of the enemy's defenses. In an attack against a heavily fortified area or deliberate field fortifications in depth, regiments are sometimes committed in three echelons with a frontage of 770 yards (one battalion), whereas in an attack against hasty field fortifications the regimental frontage may be as high as 2,500 yards (three battalions in line).

202. Immediate and Subsequent Missions in the Offense

a. For planning purposes, the general or overall mission is divided into an immediate mission and a subsequent mission. This subdivision determines the sequence in which the general mission will be carried out. The immediate mission is meticulously planned in every detail. The subsequent mission is planned in slightly less detail. This principle of thorough planning for the early phases of a mission and of more general planning for subsequent phases is applied in the conduct of operations at all levels. A regiment's immediate mission defines the tasks the regiment must accomplish during the first few hours of an operation.

b. The commander, based on his separation of the general mission into the immediate and the subsequent missions, determines supporting missions for tanks and artillery, missions for the second-echelon troops and reserves, and the time for displacing artillery and other supporting units. The immediate missions assigned the regiment,

the battalions, and the companies are determined largely on the basis of intelligence concerning observed and identified enemy defensive installations. Detailed plans for the accomplishment of the mission are developed before the attack is launched.

c. The initial combat formations used by the regiments and battalions are determined by analysis of the following factors:

- (1) Direction of the main effort of the division.
- (2) Friendly and enemy situations.
- (3) The mission assigned to the unit.

As a rule, the battalions and the regiment will accomplish their immediate missions before reorganizing or adopting new combat formations.

d. The mission of the regiment is the capture of objectives within the enemy's main battle position. The reduction of the enemy's forward system of infantry, mortar, and antitank positions normally constitutes the immediate mission.

e. According to doctrine, the subsequent mission of a regiment depends upon the ultimate objective of the operation and follows from the immediate mission of the division. The subsequent mission of the regiment normally consists of the reduction of the enemy's defenses as far back as his light artillery positions. If necessary, the regiment can reorganize and adopt new combat formations to carry out the subsequent mission. The second or third echelons (should they exist), or perhaps the commander's reserve, may be committed to accomplish the subsequent mission.

203. Preparation for Combat

a. The regimental commander normally receives his attack order after participating in the division commander's reconnaissance. At the same time, he is usually given a time limit for the submission of his own order to division for approval. The regimental commander makes a tentative attack decision, based upon his assigned mission and the general situation. The choice of the point of main effort is stressed by Aggressor as the most important element of the decision, and it is the point upon which all remaining factors are based.

b. In all combat planning, Aggressor emphasizes the importance of coordination of elements of all arms and participating units. The regimental commander is expected to follow the following troop leading procedure to insure cooperation among the units which he controls:

- (1) Establish general reference points (terrain features).
- (2) Determine the mission and direction of attack of each battalion.

- (3) Determine the sector and objectives to be assigned to tanks operating with the battalion.
- (4) Designate targets to be neutralized or destroyed by artillery and mortars (after consulting with his regimental artillery officer).
- (5) Establish departure positions and lines of assault for the battalions.
- (6) Establish signals for the calling, lifting, or cessation of artillery fire.
- (7) Fix the time by which all units must be ready for the assault.
- (8) Fix the method by which tanks are to be furnished fire support and assistance in getting through obstacles.
- (9) Fix the method to be used in destroying antitank and anti-personnel obstacles.
- (10) Inform his subordinates of the timing and objectives of aerial attacks in support of the regiment and of signals for communicating with the aircraft.
- (11) Establish mutual target designation procedures for use by infantry, tanks, artillery, and mortars.
- (12) Assign the work to be done by the engineers before and during the attack.

g. After arriving at his tentative decision as to the employment of his troops, the regimental commander conducts a command reconnaissance in the zone of action. Accompanying him on this reconnaissance are the chief of staff, the battalion commander, the regimental artillery officer, the regimental engineer, and the commanders of attached and supporting troop units.

d. The regimental commander makes his final decision during the reconnaissance. The decision is based primarily upon the choice of the sector in which the main effort of the regiment is to be made. The commander then explains his plan of attack in detail to his subordinates and arranges for the proper coordination of the efforts of all arms. In outlining the battle plan, the regimental commander gives special attention to antitank and antiaircraft defense and to the protection of flanks and the designation of limiting points.

e. Upon completion of the command reconnaissance, the commander establishes his CP-OP in a position from which the sector of the main effort can be observed, and a reserve CP-OP within the sector of the main effort. He then issues an oral combat order which includes the following items:

- (1) Commander's decision.
- (2) Direction of the main effort.
- (3) Sectors assigned to the battalions.

- (4) Departure position.
- (5) Immediate and subsequent missions of the battalions.
- (6) Attached and supporting units.
- (7) Time by which preparations for the attack must be completed.
- (8) Arrangements for coordination.
- (9) Mission of reserves.
- (10) Arrangements for the protection of the flanks and limiting points.
- (11) Site within the enemy position at which reorganization of the unit is to take place.
- (12) Location of the CP and its displacement schedule. Time permitting, the Chief of Staff writes the order. Lower unit commanders are not permitted to take written notes. Aggressor regulations prescribe that the regimental commander so time the issuance of his orders as to allow battalion commanders at least two, and preferably three, hours of daylight in which to organize their units and supporting troops for combat.

f. In the development of the battle plan, the regimental commander and his subordinates pay particular attention to the protection of flanks and unit boundaries. He establishes responsibility for protection of gaps between battalions, organizes reconnaissance on the flanks, and orders preparation to cover them with fire if required. During the attack, he moves his reserve forward, normally by bounds, so that it will be available to exploit gains or meet possible enemy counterattacks. The regimental commander decides, as a result of observations made during his reconnaissance, which portion of his sector is most vulnerable to armored attack, and he allots his antitank guns accordingly. In some cases, all of the guns of the antitank company may support one battalion; normally, however, the regimental commander retains at least two guns as a part of his mobile antitank reserve. In an obscure situation, the commander may hold all antitank guns in reserve. Normally, the guns follow closely behind the battalions to which attached. They displace from one firing position to another as the infantry advances, always near enough to knock out by immediate direct fire any enemy tanks, self-propelled guns, or strong points holding up the attack.

g. The regiment's six 80-mm SP (assault) guns are used to give close support to the attacking infantry. Normally, they are placed in direct support of assaulting rifle battalions. By moving close behind the rifle troops, they provide a ready means of direct-fire artillery support. They fire from the flanks of the battalions, or through

the gaps between attacking companies. The system of target designation to be used is determined by the rifle units and the SP company commander before the battle. The mission of the SP guns is to insure the steady advance of the rifle elements by the delivery of close supporting fires. The riflemen are expected to keep the SP gun commanders informed of targets to be fired upon, to give the guns close-in protection, and to assist them in passing through enemy obstacles.

204. The Departure Position

The departure position is organized in accordance with the combat organization chosen for the approaching attack and with the configuration of the terrain. Battalion departure positions may be approximately in line, or they may be at varying distances from the enemy MLR. In the latter case, if battalions are to attack in line, the battalion farthest from the enemy will move toward the assault line before the others. The advance is calculated to bring the battalions of the first echelon of the regiment to the assault line at approximately the same time.

205. The Attack

After having driven into the battle position of the enemy, the regimental commander attempts to insure the resolute advance of the rifle battalions. If possible, enemy strong points that cannot be reduced swiftly must be bypassed to avoid battalions becoming engaged in prolonged actions that stop the momentum of the attack. Small units are detached from battalions to block strong points that are bypassed. The regimental second echelon or reserve and the blocking force then destroy the isolated strong point. If they fail, the positions are reduced later.

206. Combat Within the Enemy Main Battle Position

a. When the mission battle position has been overrun, the combat within the main battle position begins. In this phase of combat against individual strong points and enemy reserves brought up from the rear, the regimental commander utilizes the fire and movement capabilities of his battalions to the utmost so as to continue the attack successfully. The attacks of his battalions are coordinated by changing the direction, if necessary, and by lifting or intensifying supporting artillery fires. He is expected to utilize to the maximum his own organic fire power and assign new missions to supporting armor.

b. During this phase the regimental commander must be particularly alert to counter enemy flanking armored attacks. In these instances, the mobile antitank reserves (AT guns, engineers, and tank killer teams) are displaced immediately to any threatened sector.

Antitank mines are used almost as widely in offense as in defense. Possible enemy tank approaches are sealed off by lavish use of AT mines strewn in a threatened sector. Mines are recovered and moved forward when the threat of tank counterattacks no longer exists. Mines, in this instance, are often handled by special combat-engineer details from division.

c. The commander supports the battalion with the bulk of fire power at his disposal to insure that the momentum of the attack is maintained. Should a weak point in the enemy defense system be revealed, the regimental commander commits his reserve against this point in an effort to encircle the enemy and annihilate them. If an adjacent unit is held up by enemy resistance, the regimental commander assists the other unit by fire only, pushing his own attack with renewed vigor. Terrain or artificial obstacles that stop the supporting tanks are dealt with summarily—the infantry drives on, supported by AT guns and other support weapons, leaving the tanks behind. First consideration is given to maintaining the momentum of the attack.

d. Rapid defensive organization to consolidate successes is considered imperative. Machineguns, mortars, antitank guns, rocket launchers, recoilless rifles, and combat engineer equipment are employed to secure captured objectives.

207. Pursuit

a. Aggressor doctrine emphasizes that only an intensive, unremitting pursuit can lead to the total destruction of a withdrawing enemy. Pursuit begins as soon as it becomes evident that the enemy is attempting to break contact. The regimental commander makes the decision to pursue, and only a senior commander can halt the pursuit once it commences.

b. Once the decision to pursue the enemy is made, the regimental commander maintains pressure on the enemy with the units in contact to prevent him from organizing into columns. Normally, he takes the following action:

- (1) Orders the artillery and heavy weapons to interdict cross-roads, bridges, highways, and other places where the enemy's retreat route appears to be.
- (2) Orders the engineers to clear and restore roads or paths for the troops.
- (3) Organizes transportation for the rapid advance of infantry and weapons.
- (4) Attempts to infiltrate light, automatic weapons units into the enemy rear.

- (5) Provides for speedy forward displacement of mortars and artillery.
- (6) Prepares his reserve for attack.
- (7) Informs the division commander of the enemy's withdrawal and his plans for pursuit.

c. During the initial phases of a pursuit, all of the regimental combat formations normally take part, seeking to infiltrate and destroy the enemy units. In order to reduce strong points bypassed by the assault units along the main axis of advance, the regimental reserve deploys reinforced platoons. The primary mission of the regiment during this period is to prevent the enemy from breaking contact and to frustrate his efforts to launch a counterattack.

d. Should the enemy succeed in breaking contact, a new pursuit phase commences. The commander organizes portion of his force into a column and initiates pursuit with this column parallel to the axis of withdrawal of the enemy as well as continuing frontal pursuit with the remaining units. Aggressor doctrine prescribes the utilization of all types of transportation to increase the mobility of this column in the parallel pursuit. The column will include tanks, artillery, and heavy weapons. Small groups from the pursuing force may penetrate the retreating enemy columns in enemy uniforms to create confusion, establish road blocks, and generally harass him. Such groups may also pose as local civilian refugees and clog roads, particularly at critical junctions, fords, and bridge sites. At night, small armored units may attempt to infiltrate the enemy columns.

e. During actual pursuit operations, obstacles are bypassed rather than eliminated. The main effort is directed at smashing the rear guard of the enemy so as to reach and destroy his main body and cut off and delay his retreating units.

Section III. THE RIFLE BATTALION IN THE ATTACK

208. Battalion Command Post

The battalion command post, in combat, consists of an OP and a communications center 25 to 50 yards apart. The commander, the adjutant, observers, and selected communications personnel operate from the OP. The remainder of the staff stays in the communications center. Transportation and extra equipment for the OP personnel are kept under cover at a safe distance in the rear.

209. Preparations for Combat

a. At the battalion assembly area some three to five miles from the enemy's MLR the battalion commander receives an order to accom-

pany the regimental commander on a personal reconnaissance of the regimental zone of attack. Higher echelon reconnaissance elements will already be in contact with the enemy. Upon completion of the reconnaissance of the regimental zone and the receipt of the regimental attack order, the battalion commander returns to his unit with his mission and orders and conducts his own reconnaissance prior to issuing the battalion attack order.

b. The procedure followed by the battalion commander in conducting his reconnaissance is analogous to United States Army practice. He alerts his unit, makes an estimate of the situation (enemy forces, friendly forces, terrain, time available) and forms a tentative plan. His reconnaissance develops and clarifies further details of his decision, which ends with the combat plan of action. To achieve the best possible plan, the commander:

- (1) Determines the best approaches to the enemy positions, the disposition and strength of hostile strong points, and the location of artificial obstacles in front of the enemy positions.
- (2) Points out on the terrain reference points, objectives, and enemy positions that artillery and mortars must destroy.
- (3) Selects the direction and objective of the main attack in view of the battalion's mission, the planned operations of adjacent units, enemy dispositions, nature of the enemy defense, and terrain.
- (4) Coordinates with commanders of supporting and attached artillery and tank units concerning targets, direction of attack, reference points, mutual target designation, and communications.
- (5) Determines the number and location of passages to be made through enemy obstacles.
- (6) Plans the combat formation of the battalion and the attachments to be made to the companies.

c. Upon completion of his reconnaissance and after approval of the plan by the regimental commander, the battalion commander issues an oral attack order. The following points, in the order given, are included:

- (1) Enemy situations.
- (2) Mission of the battalion.
- (3) Mission of adjacent units.
- (4) Commander's decision, direction of attack, objectives, and how they are to be taken.
- (5) Specific missions for companies, unit boundaries, and measures for flank protection.
- (6) Missions of organic, attached, and supporting weapons.

- (7) Location of CP and supply point, axis of signal communications, and time and sequence of reports.

d. The battalion commander specifies in his order the employment of the machinegun company, antitank company, mortar company, and attached artillery, tanks, and SP guns (if any). Normally the machinegun company is attached by platoons to the rifle companies while in the departure positions. The mortar company is normally kept under battalion control until the battle within the enemy position begins. Then it may be broken down for attachment to companies. Customarily, the antitank guns remain with the battalion reserve and assist in repelling enemy tank counterattacks on the flanks. Direct fire guns (self-propelled and individual artillery pieces) usually provide direct support to the assaulting companies.

210. Departure Position

a. The battalion, normally assigned a frontage of 550 yards to 770 yards, moves at night from the assembly area to its departure position. The battalion commander in his order specifies when and how this position is to be occupied. The departure position is the area from which the battalion moves into the attack in combat formation under the protection of all battalion weapons. Characteristics of a good departure position are that it provide good observation of the enemy, cover and concealment for the infantry, covered approaches to the assault line, and favorable conditions for the use of machine guns, mortars, and close-support artillery. The departure position of the battalion is as close to the enemy as possible. If all of the characteristics of a good departure position are present, the battalion can occupy a position within 900 to 1,000 yards of the enemy MLR.

b. Upon reaching the departure position, companies are placed directly in front of their objectives. Heavy machineguns, mortars, and artillery are assigned positions from which they can support the attack and still be capable of repelling surprise enemy tank and infantry counterattacks. Battalion mortars normally occupy firing positions 200 to 400 yards behind the infantry.

c. The machinegun company occupies positions on the flanks of the battalion or in the areas separating the rifle units. Platoons of the machinegun company may be placed between the different companies of the battalion, or squads may be interspersed in the gaps separating the platoons of the rifle companies. Artillery attached to the battalion for direct-fire support occupies camouflaged firing positions, either in the intervals between companies, on the battalion flanks, or to the rear of the battalion if the terrain is suitable.

211. The Attack

a. During the night prior to a dawn attack, the battalion commander organizes and dispatches obstacle clearing groups to prepare approaches to the enemy position. The engineers use mine detectors and wire cutters to make passages and are protected by squads of riflemen and by artillery, mortar, and machinegun fire. Normally two to three passages are cleared for each company. The passages are designated by markers clearly visible to advancing Aggressor troops but invisible to the enemy.

b. Upon receipt of a prearranged commander's signal, the battalion, in its initial combat formation, advances from the departure position to the assault line under cover of the artillery preparation. The assault line is normally about 150 to 200 yards from the enemy main line of resistance, close enough to reach the enemy position in one bound, yet sufficiently distant to avoid Aggressor artillery bursts on the enemy MLR. To maintain a regulated advance, the battalion commander designates a base company upon which the others guide. The base company is given detailed data on reference points, direction of advance, and location of the assault line. Other units follow the base company at intervals and distances prescribed by the battalion commander. (The battalion commander normally chooses one of the following formations: Line of companies, wedge of companies, inverted wedge of companies, echelon right or left. However, a column of companies may be prescribed if the attack is against a heavily fortified zone.)

c. The primary consideration is uninterrupted fire support for the infantry. Mortars, machineguns, and supporting artillery are placed in the best possible positions to attain maximum effectiveness. The mortars support from their initial firing sites at the departure position. For the machineguns and the attached or supporting direct fire artillery, such is not the case. These weapons are displaced forward immediately behind the foremost rifle units, and are so controlled that two-thirds of the weapons are always capable of delivering immediate supporting fire. Artillery preparations are timed so that the greatest volume of fire will fall on the enemy's forward defensive positions as the battalion reaches the assault line. The preparation is augmented by the concentrated fire of all organic, attached, and supporting weapons of the battalion, with particular attention focused upon enemy antitank guns and flanking machineguns.

d. As the infantry reaches the assault line, the tanks pass through the rifle units. This is often the signal for the infantry assault; however, pyrotechnics, radio, or other prearranged signals may be used.

The artillery is notified, and its fires are shifted to the next predesignated phase line, normally 50 to 100 yards deeper into the enemy position. As soon as the companies capture the forward strong points of the enemy position, the mortars, heavy machineguns, and accompanying artillery are displaced forward by the battalion commander. This insures the assistance of these weapons in continuing the attack and, at the same time, places them in position to repel counterattacks.

e. When the battalion breaks into the enemy's main battle position, all commanders hastily consolidate their gains. Men are regrouped while still on the move and the attack continued. The heaviest support is given to the company making the greatest advance. The battalion reserve may be committed at this time; if so, the battalion commander must immediately designate a new reserve.

212. Combat Within the Enemy Main Battle Position

During combat within the enemy main battle position, the battalion commander further decentralizes control of his mortars and attached direct-fire weapons. They are often attached to rifle companies. He still tries, however, to keep under his control sufficient fire power to influence the course of the battle. He is always alert to changes in the situation that would require quick regrouping of forces and fire power in accordance with prearranged plans. Fire and maneuver are particularly important in this phase of battle. Opportunities to execute flanking movements are continuously sought. The battalion commander is expected to be ready to deal summarily with enemy counterattacks directed against his flanks.

213. Pursuit

a. The battalion commander initiates the pursuit without hesitation as soon as the enemy resistance is broken and a withdrawal has begun. He, of course, reports his action to the regimental commander. While frontal pressure is maintained on the retreating enemy, rifle units, reinforced with automatic weapons, are moved around the flanks to cut off the enemy; the bulk of the battalion-controlled fire power is used to support this maneuvering element.

b. The battalion commander stays with the pursuing elements. He maintains rigid control over the operation by indicating the direction of the pursuit and by staying as close as possible to the leading companies. He insures continuous reconnaissance and flank protection through personal supervision. To destroy as many of the enemy as possible, Aggressor is most diligent in his efforts to maintain a uniform and orderly pursuit.

Section IV. THE RIFLE COMPANY IN THE ATTACK

214. Preparation for Combat

a. To keep himself informed of the status of personnel, their weapons and equipment, the condition of first aid and chemical defense kits, the supply of emergency rations, and the reserves of food and water on hand, the company commander inspects his company at the end of each day. Supply discipline is strict and shortages must be accounted for. As in any well-regulated army, the company commander is expected to care for his men and to assure them sufficient rest and other necessities.

b. The company ammunition supply point is organized by the senior sergeant (first sergeant) under the supervision and control of the company commander. The supply point is located as close as possible to the forward platoons and never more than 500 yards away. Medical service to troops is allotted a secondary role. When battle conditions permit and then only when returning empty supply trucks are available for transporting the casualties, the seriously wounded are evacuated. Normally, treatment consists of first aid administered by company aid men who carry or guide the wounded to sheltered points in the battalion area. The company commander may assign personnel as litter bearers to assist in evacuation. If the platoons have suffered heavy casualties, the company commander may reorganize his unit or combine the remnants into one group. However, permission to do this must be obtained from the battalion commander. Regardless of the severity of its combat losses, the company must press on to fulfill the assigned mission until relieved.

c. Although the orders received from higher headquarters leave little latitude in planning, the company commander nevertheless studies the terrain and the enemy situations by observation and reconnaissance, checks the unit's security, and devises combat plans to implement the orders received from his superiors. He is at all times responsible for the effectiveness of his force when in contact with the enemy. As a part of his tactical planning, the company commander is required to establish an antiair defense with means available within the company. He instructs his men in passive air defense measures and may assign as much as one platoon to fire by volley at attacking aircraft. Wire and radio are considered the primary means of communications. However, both are augmented by runners, whistles, colored smoke, panels, and flares.

d. After receiving the battalion attack order, the company commander assembles his platoon leaders and briefs them on the mission of the company and on the general situation. He then conducts a

reconnaissance of the company zone and establishes the details of the company attack at positions from which the enemy-held terrain is visible. He arranges for the coordination of the advance of the platoons and plans the fires of supporting and attached weapons and forward displacement. When the reconnaissance is completed, he issues an oral attack order which defines the missions of the platoons, location of phase lines, detailed outline of each phase of the attack, and the fire support of the attached weapons. Measures for antitank and antiaircraft defense are initiated and he emphasizes the company defensive plan to cope with an enemy tank attack. An artillery forward observer moves with the company to maintain liaison between the company and the artillery unit supporting it. Organic and attached heavy weapons are assigned definite places in the company formation. Crews are instructed on their probable fire missions in the attack.

215. The Attack

a. The attack begins on order from the battalion commander. Under cover of the artillery preparation, the company, which normally has a frontage of 300 to 400 yards, moves out from the departure position by platoon bounds. Strict control is maintained to preserve the integrity of the attacking line. If enemy resistance is strong, individual soldiers dig in at each phase line. One platoon at a time is then sent forward while the remaining riflemen and supporting weapons cover the movement with heavy fire. The company commander directs the attack from the company CP-OP which is located close enough to the forward elements for direct observation of the combat situation, assuring immediate and effective control of supporting fire. Observers are alert to locate targets which might hold up the advance. Targets that cannot be destroyed by organic company fires are reported to battalion by the artillery observer.

b. The rifle company normally attacks in a line of skirmishers. However, it may attack in two waves, employing a shallow wedge or shallow inverted wedge. All supporting fires are intensified immediately prior to the assault. Breaches are made in the enemy's obstacle system during the night preceding the attack, if possible. Should the obstacles remain intact, tanks with the help of riflemen and engineers equipped with wire cutters, bangalore torpedoes, axes, mats, and even coats make passageways for the infantry units. Each rifle platoon picks an opening and slips through, squad by squad. When only one or two passages can be cleared for the entire company, the commander controls the sequence of entrance for both infantry and supporting weapons. The gap is covered by fire during all passage

of troops. Passage and obstacles are accomplished as quickly as possible by running forward and firing. When within grenade range, the position is assaulted. It is hoped that the weight of the initial attack will penetrate the forward positions and attain a breakthrough.

c. Normally, tanks support the attack and accompany the riflemen. The signal for the infantry assault is the passage of the tanks through the assault line. It is realized that the coordination between tanks and infantry is difficult, but every effort is made to keep a constant distance of less than 400 yards between the two elements of the attacking force. The smaller the separation, the more effective the assault. Tank unit commanders keep the infantry under constant observation and the infantry observers do the same with tanks. If the assault fails, the company regroups on the most feasible advanced line or returns to the assault line. The attack is renewed as soon as possible.

d. Successful penetrations at any point on the company front are exploited to envelop enemy positions that may be retarding the advance of other platoons. Once beyond these strong points the company reorganizes and pushes on to its next objective. Observers are kept to the front and flanks, control is reestablished, heavy weapons are displaced to furnish support for continuation of the attack and to protect the company against counterattacks, ammunition is redistributed, and new primary and supplementary positions are assigned.

216. Combat Within the Enemy Main Battle Position

As the attack continues into the enemy's main battle position, a second preplanned phase commences. Flexibility and initiative are increasingly necessary in this phase. Mopping-up squads designated by the company commander finish the job started by the assault troops. Large centers of resistance are left for battalion and regimental reserves. Adjacent units are assisted by whatever fire power the company can spare. In general, the company commander follows the principle that his own rigorous advance is the best support an adjacent unit can have. Frequently companies employed in the attack phase are virtually platoons in strength by the time the battle within the enemy's main battle position commences. The tactics of such a unit are the same as for a freshly committed, full-strength company.

217. Pursuit

The commander is expected to launch the pursuit at the first indication of enemy withdrawal. Since such enemy action along a company front may be an indication of the enemy's intentions on a larger scale, the company commander is required to report his action to battalion headquarters. Pursuit is automatic; it can be broken off only on

order of the battalion commander. Part of the pursuing company may move in column for greater speed. Supporting weapons, in this case, are kept in position to repel attacks against the flanks of the column. These weapons also play an important part in the destruction of the withdrawing enemy. They are employed to seal off escape routes, inflict casualties, and protect the pursuing infantry who are free to destroy the retreating enemy.

Section V. SEPARATE COMPANIES IN THE ATTACK

218. The Machinegun Company in the Offense

a. Although the machinegun company may be used for such secondary missions as antiaircraft defense, basically it supports the infantry. The machinegun company is used to protect flanks and to increase fire power. Sometimes the company is assigned a general infantry support mission—Aggressor uses the term “centralized control” to designate this mission—but more often it is split up and attached by platoons to the rifle companies to furnish close support fire.

b. In both situations the machinegun company commander is responsible for the operation and performance of his platoons. When the platoons operate separately, he remains in a central location, usually at battalion headquarters, from which he can observe and coordinate the operations of the platoons. When the machinegun company is used as a unit, in general support, the commander stays with the company, much like a rifle company commander, and directs operations according to the battalion plan.

c. Together with the other company commanders, the machinegun company commander accompanies the battalion commander on his reconnaissance and advises him on the capabilities of the machineguns.

d. When the plans are completed, the company commander transmits his orders orally to his men. The orders are precise. Platoon sectors of fire and fire positions are pinpointed. Time and place of attachment to the rifle companies are established, if attachments are to be made. Where the company is to fight as a unit, the commander prescribes the time to open fire or to be ready to open fire. He describes the location of the company ammunition supply point and his own headquarters.

e. If attachment of individual platoons to the rifle companies has been ordered, the attachment takes place when the battalion takes up its combat formation at the departure position. One platoon is often assigned to the battalion reserve.

f. Even after the attachment to the rifle companies is made, the machinegun company commander is expected to maintain technical supervision over his platoons. Furthermore, he observes the action of his platoons and the development of the enemy situation. He is also the center of a target observation net which often receives reports from neighboring units as well as from his own forward observers. Finally, he is responsible for the maintenance of communication with the platoons.

g. As the troops leave the departure position to advance to the line of assault, the machineguns are placed so that they can cover the advance. They continue to furnish covering fire as the troops keep moving, displacing forward one squad at a time until they are set to support the actual assault. If the assault is successful, the machineguns again move forward close behind the attackers. If the assault is unsuccessful, positions should be established to cover the withdrawal and prepare to support a new assault.

h. The firing positions of the machineguns are established either on the flanks of a rifle company or in the intervals between platoons. If it is necessary to concentrate fire in the intervals between companies or on the flanks of the battalion, the company commander, with the permission of the battalion commander, may use the reserve platoon for this purpose if one has been designated.

i. When the rifle units break through the enemy's main line of resistance, the machinegun company commander displaces the reserve weapons under his control and directs them against remaining strong points. This action is a customary commitment of the machinegun reserve. If the task is too difficult for one platoon, the machinegun company commander may ask the battalion commander to return one or more of the attached platoons.

j. In the event the machinegun reserve was not committed during the attack phase, it normally is committed at the beginning of the pursuit.

219. The Mortar Company or Battery in the Offense

a. Since the tactics of the mortar company of the battalion and the mortar battery of the regiment are very similar, these two units are treated here as one. Despite this similarity of tactics, the two units are generally assigned different fire missions because of differences in range and capabilities. The 120-mm mortar, with a maximum range of 7,000 yards and firing a 35-pound projectile, is used to destroy or neutralize enemy personnel and weapons in the open or in trenches with light overhead cover; to make passages through barbed wire entanglements; to destroy trenches and light field fortifications; to

damage the tracks of tanks or to knock out armored cars; and to neutralize forward enemy artillery or mortar positions.

b. The 80-mm mortar has a maximum range of 3,500 yards and fires an 8-pound projectile. This weapon is employed to destroy or neutralize enemy personnel in the open or in trenches without overhead cover; to repel infantry attacks or counterattacks; to destroy tank-borne infantry; or to cut off infantry from their accompanying tanks.

c. Before going into action, both the mortar company and the mortar battery require the following information to enable them to carry out their mission:

- (1) Reference points and coded names of objectives.
- (2) Coordination signals with infantry and tanks.
- (3) Mission of rifle units.
- (4) Sequence in which fire missions are to be executed.
- (5) Missions of the artillery group in support of the infantry.
- (6) General location of firing positions and observation posts and zones of observation responsibility.
- (7) At what time the mortars must be ready to fire.
- (8) The authority designated to give the order to open fire.

d. After having received his mission and other information pertinent to the attack plan, the mortar unit commander begins his preparations for battle. He works out, in coordination with the commander of the direct-support artillery group, the distribution of targets and a displacement plan. He makes certain that all targets are reconnoitered visually, and he sets up observation posts for forward observers to control fire in his assigned zone. He selects firing positions, including alternate positions, and supervises their occupation. He orders the preparation of firing data and arranges for a steady flow of ammunition to his unit.

e. Both the battalion and the regimental mortar units are normally assigned general-support missions in the early stages of an attack. This enables the infantry commanders to concentrate heavy fire at any given point and enables the mortars to participate effectively in the artillery's preparatory and attack support fires.

f. The initial firing positions of both mortar units are close behind the infantry departure position, and are located so that they can protect the departure position from a surprise attack as well as support the attack. One platoon from each mortar unit sometimes moves forward shortly before the beginning of the artillery preparation, taking up positions in front of the infantry departure position but behind the security outposts.

g. The mortar companies and batteries take part in the artillery preparation, directing heavy destructive and neutralization fires

against the enemy's forward positions. Fire missions for the battalion and regimental mortar units are generally included in the overall artillery fire plan.

h. Mortars of regiments in the second echelon of an assault division will often be brought forward so that they can support the forward regiments during the initial phases of the battle. These units are placed along the preplanned route of advance by their own regiments so that they can be picked up by their parent units. Special mortar groups are set up to control these detached or borrowed mortar units until they revert to normal control. The fires of these groups add measurably to the weight of the preparatory fires. Usually these units revert to parent control after the preparation, but in some instances the 120-mm mortar units of second-echelon units also participate in the rolling barrage which accompanies the attack.

i. At the end of the artillery preparation, mortars usually shift their fires to the rear or to the flanks of the enemy position, firing area barrages or concentrations. If the assault against the forward positions is successful, the mortar units belonging to the assault troops immediately commence to displace forward. Two platoons remain in firing position while the third moves forward. Two-thirds of the unit must be prepared to deliver fires at all times according to Aggressor regulations. If the assaulting troops are repulsed, the mortars cover the reorganization of the rifle units and support a second assault.

j. As the battle progresses and the Aggressor troops drive deeper into the enemy's position, the control of mortar units is increasingly decentralized. Platoons of 80-mm mortars may be assigned to rifle companies, and platoons of 120-mm mortars may be assigned to rifle battalions. This decentralization is normal in the battle in the depth of the enemy position. One platoon is usually retained in the regimental and battalion reserve. The other mortar units accompany the units to which they have been attached.

k. In the battle in the depths and in the pursuit, Aggressor lays great stress upon constant and adequate replenishment of ammunition, since mortar fires become increasingly important as the artillery supporting the infantry is forced to displace and move beyond the zone of its preplanned fires. The mortars are employed extensively in this phase to interdict the withdrawal of hostile forces and to prevent them from establishing new defensive lines or strong points.

220. The Submachinegun Company

a. Aggressor rifle regiments apparently do not contain submachinegun companies, although submachinegun battalions are a standard element of heavy tank and self-propelled gun regiments in mechanized

and tank divisions. The submachinegun company performs specialized and hazardous missions. According to Aggressor concept, only hardy and exceptionally well-trained soldiers as are assigned to submachinegun companies can successfully accomplish hazardous reconnaissance, provide exceedingly mobile fire support, and infiltrate the enemy's position. Submachinegunners are often employed to disrupt the enemy's communications by raiding his CP's.

b. The submachinegunners frequently cross the roughest terrain in order to launch surprise attacks from an unexpected quarter. Strong individual fire power and surprise in the attack are the essential factors of their success.

c. Cooperation with tanks, however, is one of the submachinegun company's most important missions. The men ride tanks into combat, dropping off when necessary to fight antitank weapons and tank-killer teams threatening the combined assault.

d. The company has a variety of uses. It is a mobile and potent unit in the offensive. A good part or all of it is often kept in regimental reserve for quick use when needed, although the company has also proven itself to be excellent when operating with the smaller infantry units.

e. In the attack the submachinegunners may be formed in an extended skirmish line or gathered into small groups of half-squad size and are placed ahead of and on the flanks of battalion formations. Thus, they can be used to protect the assault force and work their way indirectly into the enemy rear.

f. The company often accomplishes unexpected and daring missions. An open enemy flank may rest on a natural obstacle such as a swamp or heavy wood, from which the enemy expects little or no attack. While the main force presses frontally, the submachinegunners catch the enemy unawares and envelop his flank.

g. The company also may be sent out to infiltrate a gap in the enemy position before the attack begins. The gunners in this case work their way to a prearranged location behind the enemy lines and wait there, camouflaged and silent, until the main assault begins. Then they attack elements in the enemy's rear. Obviously, these tactics are useful not only for destroying such key enemy points as mortar positions and communications lines, but also for creating panic—an important objective of any attack.

h. Because the company infiltrates before or during the preparation, the artillery must pay close attention to its plan of maneuver. Otherwise, the infiltrating elements might come under friendly fire. To cover the infiltrating group, bombardment of the actual infiltration

route is suspended, and fire is concentrated in neighboring areas. Shelling continues as scheduled in the rest of the sector.

i. The battle in the depth of the enemy position provides a new role for the submachinegun company. In this role, initiative and speed are of particular significance and Aggressor, therefore, usually breaks up the unit into separate and unattached platoons, and assigns each one individual missions to infiltrate through weakly defended openings and around enemy flanks.

j. During the pursuit, independent hit-and-run missions may be assigned to separate platoons or companies. The gunners attack deep in the enemy rear, create panic and confusion, then disengage and move on to a rallying point where a new mission is assigned. Communication is maintained between the regiment and the company during these independent tasks by means of radio, flares, and runners.

221. The Antiaircraft Machinegun Company and Platoon in the Offense

a. The primary mission of these machinegun units is to protect the infantry from air attack, but they also are used in a ground role to support attacking infantry when the enemy air threat is slight. In this case, the machineguns are fired at targets of opportunity rather than at predesignated and assigned targets.

b. To accomplish their primary mission, these units must remain near the attacking infantry. In no case may the AAMG squad lag more than 800 to 1,000 yards behind the rifle unit it is supporting.

c. Generally, the regimental AAMG company follows the infantry in platoon bounds. The platoon leader remains with one of his squads or with the commander of the unit being supported. The platoon leader indicates targets, and orders displacement by means of runners, whistles, and similar signals. Such communications limitations impel the squad leader to assume a greater responsibility in selecting targets than the Aggressor otherwise desire. Radios may be used in these units in the future.

222. Infantry Antitank Units in the Offense

a. Each Aggressor rifle regiment contains an antitank company. In addition, each of the regiment's three rifle battalions has its antitank company. These antitank weapons form the backbone of the rifle regiment's defense against armor.

b. Besides high-velocity antitank guns manned by specially trained troops, the Aggressor infantry is provided with a wide variety of close-combat antitank weapons. These close-contact weapons are co-

ordinated with the organic and supporting antitank artillery and engineer mine fields and obstacles for greater overall effect.

c. Two new close-range antitank weapons have appeared in the Aggressor Army to supplant conventional type antitank guns.

- (1) A hand weapon similar to the United States 3.5" rocket launcher, the 80-mm antitank rocket launcher.
- (2) A heavier weapon that operates on the recoilless principle, the 80-mm recoilless antitank weapon.

d. In addition, the Aggressor infantryman employs a number of efficient grenades against tanks. These grenades range from the primitive "Molotov Cocktail" type, consisting of a fused bottle filled with an inflammable liquid, to shaped-charge antitank grenades. Antitank mines are thrown or placed in the path of approaching tanks. Aggressor tank-killer teams operate boldly and successfully against enemy armor. In view of the new, light close-combat weapons available and the stress placed upon antitank defense in training and organization, it seems safe to assume that Aggressor infantry will conduct a tough and tenacious defense against hostile tank forces. The tactics of the antitank units included in the rifle regiment are treated in section I (General), section II (The Rifle Regiment), section III (The Rifle Battalion), and section IV (The Rifle Company), this chapter.

Section VI. THE RIFLE PLATOON AND SQUAD IN THE ATTACK

223. General

All the men are trained in antitank combat and may be issued a *Panzerfaust* type antitank weapon in addition to their primary weapons. Fragmentation, offensive, or incendiary grenades, depending upon the mission assigned, are normally issued to all members of the squad. When the platoon is engaged in combat, it is normally supported by the fire of heavy machineguns, mortars, and light artillery. Individual antitank guns and light artillery pieces may be assigned to accompany the platoon and support it by direct fires. Tanks and assault guns attached to or supporting larger units may operate within the assigned zone of an attacking platoon. The platoon zone is an integral part of the company zone and rarely exceeds one hundred yards in width.

224. Preparation for Combat

a. The tactics of the rifle platoon and squad are similar. The following situation illustrates the normal tactics employed by a rifle platoon in the attack.

b. The company commander surveys the area, selects specific attack objectives for each platoon, indicates the direction and route of advance, and points out the most easily distinguishable landmarks to be used as reference points. He further instructs the platoon leaders on the combat mission of the attached and supporting weapons and adjacent units, and the plan of the artillery preparation. He prescribes when and where the barbed wire in front of the enemy positions will be cut, the plan of coordination with the tanks, signals for liaison and reporting, firing signals, signals for target identification, and indicates the number and type of tanks that are assigned to the platoon area. After receiving the company order, the platoon leader returns to his CP, discusses the order with his squad leaders, and conducts a brief reconnaissance of his own area.

c. Among the items the platoon leader discusses or points out to his men are—

- (1) Reference points on which the platoon will guide.
- (2) Company mission, platoon mission, mission of adjacent units.
- (3) Mission of each squad and specific instructions for its accomplishment.
- (4) Tasks of attached and supporting weapons, subsequent firing positions, methods and types of fire, sequence of forward displacement.
- (5) Attack formation.
- (6) Line of assault and best approaches.
- (7) Intermediate phase lines, normally 150 to 250 yards apart.
- (8) Method of coordination with tanks, direction of tank movement, point at which tanks pass through infantry.
- (9) Location of mortar and artillery targets.
- (10) Security against enemy counterattack.
- (11) Signals for requesting, shifting, or lifting supporting fires, signals for liaison and reporting. (Only the battalion commander has the authority to give signals controlling the supporting fire of artillery during this phase of combat, although he may delegate the responsibility to the company commander. The platoon leader and his subordinates, however, should know the signals to respond properly when exploiting the supporting fires.)
- (12) The line of supply and evacuation.
- (13) His own position and his personal axis of advance.

d. When the platoon leader is satisfied that his attack order and plan are understood, he releases the squad leaders who return to their squads and there explain the missions and other essential infor-

mation of the attack plans. The platoon normally moves out to its assigned departure position with the rest of the company during the night preceding the attack. Here the platoon deploys into the formation to be used for the attack and digs in.

225. The Attack

a. When the signal is given, the platoon begins its advance. If the line of assault can be approached under concealment, the platoon moves out in a column of squads. This formation is maintained until the line of assault is reached. If concealment is not possible, the platoon deploys into a skirmish line, normally with all three squads abreast. The platoon leader's position is about 50 yards behind the designated base squad. When deploying from column to skirmish line, the platoon leader designates the base squad, direction of advance, and specific squad formations.

b. When the command is given, the base squad takes up a skirmish formation and continues the advance in the designated direction. The remaining squads deploy quickly while on the move, adjusting their rate of advance and direction of advance on the base squad. While advancing, an interval of six to eight paces, unless otherwise ordered, is maintained between individual riflemen. Aggressor riflemen are thoroughly trained to take advantage of all existing cover and concealment afforded by the terrain.

c. The platoon may advance at a walk, on the run, or by bounds. The method is determined by the platoon leader. The primary consideration is to close with and destroy the enemy as soon as possible. The advance is controlled by voice and hand signals. Individual riflemen carry their weapons in any convenient manner; the piece is kept locked as a safety precaution, but the weapon is held in a position of readiness. If the advance is by squad bounds, the platoon leader indicates the new firing position and the sequence of advance of the squads. Each squad leader, as his turn comes, halts the fire of his squad and designates the firing position to be taken by individuals, bearing in mind the location of the base squad. If the advance to the next firing position requires more than one bound, the squad leader indicates where intermediate halts will be taken.

d. The squads in position cover the advance of the other squads. As soon as advancing squads reach the new firing position and have taken up the fire or given the appropriate signal, the remaining squads, in turn, continue to advance. Automatic weapons attached to the platoon support the advance from one firing position or phase line to the next. Generally they fire from behind the flanks of the advancing platoon and then follow or pass through predetermined lanes

in the platoon ranks. The platoon leader decides their sequence of advance as well as their successive support tasks. As soon as two squads have reached the new firing position, the platoon leader joins them and directs the fire in order to cover the rapid advance of the rest of the platoon. The platoon sergeant normally advances with the lead squad.

e. To extricate itself from enemy mortar and artillery fire, the platoon accelerates its rate of advance. Any lulls in enemy fire or increase in friendly artillery and mortar fire are taken advantage of by vigorously pushing the entire platoon forward. He will take the same advantage of fire of adjacent units. If units on his flanks are temporarily stopped the platoon leader assists them with his own fire. While advancing to the assault line, the platoon leader observes the enemy carefully, reporting often to his company commander. Commanders of attached and supporting weapons are notified of any strong points he is unable to reduce with the fire of his platoon. When necessary, additional mortar and artillery fire is requested.

f. At the last firing position before reaching the assault line, the platoon leader often indicates the route of advance and the specific task for each squad during the assault. He also insures that all attached weapons are located so as to provide maximum covering fire during the assault. Prior to the shifting of artillery fires deeper into the enemy position, the fire of the platoon is increased to the maximum. On signal the infantry moves forward staying as close as possible to the artillery barrage. When the infantry is not accompanied by tanks (this is the exception and not the rule), the signal for the assault may be given by the company or battalion commander. Normally, the passage of the tanks across the assault line is the signal for the infantry assault.

g. The infantrymen advance on the run, firing rifles and light automatic weapons as they move. About 40 to 50 yards from the enemy MLR the volume of marching fire and rate of advance is increased. Grenades, bayonets, and rifle butts are used in the close-in fighting which follows. Heavy weapons supporting the platoon during the assault are displaced forward as the MLR has been penetrated. If the enemy succeeds in halting the assault, the infantrymen dig in as close as possible to the enemy and create a new assault line. After regrouping and further artillery and mortar preparation, the assault is repeated until successful or until higher headquarters countermands the attack order.

h. After the penetration is effected, the platoon continues to fight its way deeper into the battle position. It seeks to destroy antitank

guns and heavy weapons. Enemy strong points are bypassed if they cannot be easily reduced. Maintaining the momentum of the attack is always the primary consideration.

226. Combat Within the Enemy Main Battle Position

Combat within the enemy main battle position consists primarily of the neutralization of individual strong points and repulsing counterattacks. The platoon may stop briefly for regrouping and reestablishment of control and communication before continuing the attack. Troops are ordered to push forward despite the holdup of adjacent units. The platoon leader is quick to exploit gaps in the enemy's fire or unoccupied points in his defensive position. Although he may temporarily deviate from his assigned direction of attack, he will attempt to penetrate the flanks and rear of enemy strong points. The danger of counterattacks is always uppermost in the platoon leader's mind. A defensive position is taken up immediately if the enemy strikes a powerful counterblow. Attached and supporting weapons are quickly shifted forward and to the flanks. Every means at hand is thrown into the battle to hold ground. If the enemy counterattacks with tanks, the first priority is given to the destruction of the accompanying enemy infantry. The tanks are then dealt with separately.

227. Pursuit

Loss of contact with the retreating enemy is not permitted; the platoon leader initiates the pursuit immediately and pushes the enemy vigorously, giving him no chance to reorganize and regroup in secondary positions. The platoon carefully observes and secures its flanks against possible counterattack throughout the pursuit operation.

CHAPTER 7

AGGRESSOR DEFENSE TACTICS

Section I. GENERAL

228. Types of Defense

Aggressor recognizes two forms of defense—positional and mobile. The purpose of positional defense is to hold at all costs a definite terrain area prepared for defensive action, and to prepare for the resumption of the offensive. The aim of mobile defense is to gain time and to economize Aggressor forces, while inflicting losses on the enemy.

229. Positional Defense

a. Type and Uses.

- (1) Positional defense is considered by Aggressor to be the normal form of defensive action. They recognize two types—defense on a broad front and a defense on a normal front. Positional defense on a broad front consists of a series of strong points spaced relatively far apart. The strong points are backed by a much larger reserve force than is used for defense on a normal front. Defense on a normal front consists of a line with only minor breaks. Normal front defense is a much stronger type of positional defense than the broad front, because larger forces of men and equipment are available to the commander.
- (2) Positional defense is adopted by Aggressor for any one or a combination of the following reasons: When enemy forces are superior to their own; to permit the dispatch of troops to some other decisive area; or to await the development of a particularly suitable situation for the launching of an Aggressor attack.

b. Organization for Positional Defense. Positional defense is a rigid defense. Ground may be yielded to the enemy only upon receipt of explicit orders from above. Aggressor doctrine states that positional defense is to be organized in great depth. Particular emphasis is placed upon antitank measures, switch positions, and deep echelons of artillery.

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DEPARTMENTS OF THE ARMY
AND THE NAVY

WASHINGTON 25, D. C., 5 September 1956

FM 30-102/JLFM-3, 23 September 1955, is changed as follows:

1. *Pages 215 and 216* will be physically removed from the manual and destroyed by burning. Upon completion of this action the manual is downgraded to UNCLASSIFIED. The front cover, pages 1 through 3, and back cover will be amended by marking through the classification markings. These changes constitute authority for the downgrading action.

2. The following is substituted for the pages destroyed in accordance with paragraph 1 above:

"c. Reconnaissance and Selection of Position.

- (1) The Aggressor commander must choose a defensive position which fulfills a number of diverse requirements. The position must be suitable for use as a base for launching an effective counterattack or counteroffensive. The position must be situated so that the enemy force cannot avoid passing through it in any general advance. Finally, the position must possess the usual attributes of a good defensive position: terrain features favoring the defensive forces, such as river lines, mountains; good observation into the enemy's assembly and attack areas; and natural obstacles to the wide-scale employment of tank and mechanized forces.
- (2) Reconnaissance for the defensive is stressed as strongly as it is for the offensive. The commander must know the terrain and the enemy situation intimately at all times.

"d. Tactical Organization.

- (1) As a preliminary measure in setting up a positional defense, the Aggressor assigns defensive zones, sectors, and areas. Armies, corps, and divisions are assigned defensive zones; regiments are assigned sectors; battalions and companies are given areas to organize. The entire army defense zone is organized into a comprehensive and formidable defensive complex.
- (2) If the Aggressor forces are not in direct contact with the enemy forces, a security zone is usually established upon the

authority of the army commander. This zone extends about six to ten miles ahead of the main line of resistance (MLR). The security zone consists of advanced positions and intermediate positions strengthened by individual strong points and by engineer obstacles. The zone is defended by advanced units acting under the orders of divisional commanders. The advanced units fight in accordance with the principles of mobile defense.

- (3) Combat outposts are established about one mile forward of the MLR. These outposts serve to slow down the enemy and to impede his efforts to observe and reconnoiter the battle position. The combat outposts consist of individual strong points tied together by mutual fire support. They are protected by a network of obstacles as well as by mortar and artillery fire from the battle position. The combat outposts are established by frontline battalions upon the orders of the divisional commander.
- (4) A decoy MLR is often established in sectors where heavy attack is anticipated. This false MLR is placed at an angle to the true one so that the flank of an attacking enemy will be exposed to fire from the main position. In order to assault the actual MLR, the enemy who has attacked this false MLR must regroup his forces in the middle of combat.
- (5) The battle position (whose frontlines form the MLR) is a heavy defensive position about 3 to 3½ miles deep. The position is designed to halt the enemy and to destroy him. The main forces at the disposal of the Aggressor commander are concentrated in this area.
- (6) The second defensive position is set up 6 to 10 miles behind MLR. The third or rear defensive position is 6 to 11 miles behind the frontline of the second defensive position. This third zone, in contrast to the others, consists of individual defensive focal points concentrated in the most vulnerable areas.
- (7) The entire army zone is tied together by a system of switch positions. These positions provide flanking fire against hostile groups which may succeed in penetrating the MLR. The zone contains fire-pockets designed to entrap and destroy hostile armor. In addition, there are two or three oblique lines of antitank artillery positions and special antitank positions prepared by artillery batteries within the army zone.
- (8) Artillery is gathered into groups similar to those formed for the conduct of offensive operations. Control of these groups, however, is often vested in lower commanders. Batteries that in the offensive would form the divisional artillery group are

usually part of the regimental artillery group in the positional defense.

- (9) Three types of reserves are used in the positional defense—infantry reserves, mobile antitank reserves, and tank reserves. The infantry reserves are completely at the disposal of the respective commanders. Infantry reserves exist on all levels, but are small below the regimental level. For example, the Aggressor divisional commander has a defense reserve of two rifle battalions.
- (10) The mobile antitank reserve consists of a balanced motorized force of infantry tank-hunter teams, self-propelled guns, anti-tank artillery, combat engineers, and sometimes heavy artillery. Such reserves are formed as low as regimental level. They reconnoiter possible routes of movement.

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and areas of employment to insure speedy and effective commitment. They are held in central locations and can be thrown into battle wherever hostile armor threatens to make a serious penetration.

- (11) Tank reserves generally are employed for delivering counterattacks against enemy infantry which has penetrated the battle position. Aggressor doctrine forbids the employment of tanks against a tank thrust, except in coordinated flank and frontal attacks by regular antitank artillery or self-propelled guns. Occasionally, Aggressor tanks are dug in and are used as stationary pillboxes or antitank guns.

e. Normal Frontages. In normal positional defense an Aggressor division holds a front of about 6 miles. The defensive area of a battalion is about 1 mile in breadth and three-quarters of a mile in depth. An Aggressor rifle company has a defensive area of about 700 square yards. These frontages are all approximate and vary greatly in accordance with the terrain and the situation.

f. Organization of Fire.

- (1) Aggressor uses an orthodox fire system in positional defense. The fires of infantry weapons—including mortars, artillery, and antitank artillery—are included in a common detailed fire plan. Defensive units are tied together by interlocking fires and are set up for all-round defense. Provision is made, as in the United States Army, for concentration of all fires directly in front of the MLR.
- (2) Aggressor rifle companies and platoons for strong points which are grouped together to form a battalion center of defense. Both line and reserve units are organized in defensive positions to lend depth to the system.
- (3) The artillery prepares a comprehensive fire plan before the defensive battle begins. This fire plan provides for area concentrations in prospective enemy assembly areas and along routes of approach. Closer to the friendly positions, the artillery prepares an antitank defensive (rolling) barrage in ladderlike blocks along probable tank approaches. This barrage is planned so as to catch the leading enemy tanks in the first bursts of fire and then to roll inward toward the friendly positions along with the hostile armor. A standing barrage is laid down directly in front of the MLR to halt enemy infantry and to separate them from their tanks. Additional fires are prepared within the friendly position itself. Individual pieces and units of artillery are assigned

direct fire missions, and their fires are included in the overall plan.

- (4) The fires of the antitank artillery (antitank guns), infantry close-range antitank weapons, and conventional artillery in their antitank positions, are coordinated into a tight network. The fires are echeloned in depth, especially in areas where the terrain is favorable for armored operations. Positions for conventional artillery are always chosen with the secondary antitank mission of the batteries in mind.
- (5) Tanks usually are held in counterattack reserve but, if they are to be used as pillboxes, their fires are included in the general fire plan.

Organization of the Ground.

- (1) Aggressor organizes the terrain as thoroughly as possible. He possesses a great facility for constructing complicated systems of trenches and firing positions in a short time. Primary attention is given to the construction of a network of strong emplacements within the battle position. These emplacements serve as the backbone of the entire defensive complex. Shelters for personnel are usually constructed after the fighting positions have been completed. Only under conditions of extreme cold do they receive first priority.
- (2) Obstacles of all types constitute an important part of an Aggressor defensive position. Although most of the obstacles are found in the battle position, the system extends into the security and rear defensive zones. Obstacles are used especially for filling gaps in the friendly defenses and at unit boundaries. Aggressor doctrine makes the covering of obstacles by fire mandatory under all conditions. Infantry obstacles include: wire, antipersonnel mines, sharpened stakes, and combinations of these obstacles. Antitank obstacles include mines, hedgehogs, tank ditches, and tank traps. Aggressor combines mines, obstacles, and fire to form effective defense systems.
- (3) Mine-obstacle-fire combinations are employed to inflict casualties and to slow down or halt the enemy advance. These combinations also serve to channelize attacks into areas where the attacks can be neutralized or destroyed. Open areas frequently lead into fire-sacks or other ambushes.
- (4) Camouflage is an integral part of the organization of the ground in Aggressor practice. Wherever feasible, obstacles, emplacements, and installations are camouflaged. The

effectiveness of the camouflage is tested periodically by aerial photography, and shortcomings are speedily repaired.

- (5) Only the most important and most complicated installations and fortifications are constructed by the engineer troops. Other construction is performed by infantry manpower under the direction of engineer teams. In this way a limited number of specialists is utilized to the best advantage.

h. Conduct of Positional Defense.

- (1) In the struggle for the battle position, all arms take part with the full weight of their power. The Aggressor scheme of defense is to separate enemy infantry and armor and to destroy them singly. The whole fire and fortification scheme is constructed with this end in mind.
- (2) Although the greatest effort is directed at a line directly in front of the MLR, Aggressor begins the defensive battle at the greatest possible distance. Air, long-range artillery, and security forces are used to delay the enemy advance or to tire his forces by premature deployment.
- (3) During the artillery preparation, the greater part of the Aggressor forces are held under cover in field fortifications. Only a few observers and the crews of the heavy weapons remain in their battle positions so that they can warn of or halt any sneak attack. In this manner, Aggressor hopes to reduce casualties and maintain the morale of their troops.
- (4) As the enemy approaches the MLR, all infantry weapons are trained upon him to deliver a surprise burst of withering fire. Units under attack are supported by those which are not.
- (5) If Aggressor has been able to ascertain the approximate time of the projected attack, a counterpreparation artillery fire is released before the hostile preparation can begin. The Aggressor aim is to demoralize and decimate the hostile forces in the attack positions, to cut the enemy's communications, to destroy his command personnel, and to silence his batteries. The counterpreparation is considered to be the most effective means of halting the enemy attack at its inception.
- (6) When not in contact with the enemy, Aggressor uses heavy artillery to deliver long-range fires upon assembly areas and probable routes of approach. As the hostile troops come within range, the Aggressor light artillery opens fire. If the enemy is using massed armor in the assault, the Aggressor antitank defensive (rolling) barrage is begun when

the enemy tanks are about 2½ miles from the MLR. When the tanks come within range, the heavy and light antitank guns of the forward line also open fire upon them.

- (7) As the enemy approaches the MLR, the Aggressor artillery fires a standing barrage, supplemented by heavy infantry fire. This is calculated to destroy or halt the infantry, and thus deprive the enemy tanks of infantry support. Weaker tank forces are then countered largely by infantry antitank weapons.
- (8) During this early phase of the defense, Aggressor armor is held in the rear area as a counterattack reserve.
- (9) If the enemy succeeds in breaking into the defensive position in strength, he is hit from the flanks and from the depths of the Aggressor position by all fires that can be brought to bear. When the enemy has been weakened sufficiently, he is destroyed by a counterattack of infantry or armor or both. Aggressor armor plays an important role in the destruction of highly vulnerable infantry forces in the depth of the friendly position.
- (10) Tank forces that break through are lured into firesacks (AT ambushes) or are gradually worn down by defense in depth. Once the enemy tank forces have been worn down, individual tanks can be destroyed by an armored flank attack in coordination with frontal action on the part of mobile anti-tank reserves and self-propelled (assault) guns. The chief mission of Aggressor armor, however, is the annihilation of the attacking infantry. Unless Aggressor tanks possess an overwhelming superiority in numbers, they are specifically forbidden to meet a hostile armored force frontally.
- (11) If the enemy succeeds in breaking through the battle position, the Aggressor troops of the second and third defensive zones are expected to halt and destroy him. The troops of the battle position continue to fight, seeking to maintain or restore the MLR despite the danger of encirclement.
- (12) The army or corps commander is responsible for seeing that all units actually remain in the line despite losses and heavy pressure. He must also continue to launch counterattacks until he has succeeded in restoring the original MLR. In the event of a deep penetration, the emphasis shifts, and the commander uses all the forces at his disposal to hurl back the threat. In no case is a withdrawal permitted without authority from above.

230. Mobile Defense

a. Purpose. Mobile defense is the second form of defense recognized by Aggressor. In mobile defense, ground can be relinquished to the enemy. The mission of Aggressor troops in this form of defense is to force the foe to deploy prematurely and to inflict heavy casualties without allowing him to close with the main body of the Aggressor force.

b. Organization for Mobile Defense. The Aggressor mobile defense is organized as a series of defensive battles. These battles are fought at previously designated lines of resistance in conjunction with short, surprise counterattacks. The strength of mobile defense depends upon a close coordination of all troop movements with the fire plan and the obstacle network.

c. Reconnaissance and Selection of a Position.

- (1) The factors of primary importance in selecting lines for mobile defense are—the difficulty of the terrain from the point of view of armor; the existence of concealed routes of escape; and the absence of gaps which cannot be covered effectively by fire. The flanks of the defensive line should be protected by natural obstacles.
- (2) Defensive lines are located far enough apart to force an enemy capturing one line to displace his artillery forward before initiating an attack upon the next.

d. Tactical Organization.

- (1) Aggressor infantry occupies battalion defense centers in conducting mobile defense. Areas between defensive positions are covered by fire and obstacle nets. The strength and composition of the defense forces upon each line vary according to the situation, and are altered steadily during the course of the battle.
- (2) In mobile defense divisional artillery generally is subordinated to regimental and battalion artillery commanders.
- (3) Reserves withdraw early and man the second line of defense. The maintenance of strong mobile antitank reserves is stressed in mobile defense.

e. Organization of Fire. The organization of fire is similar to that in positional defense, except that artillery fires are arranged to delay the enemy and to cover the withdrawal of friendly forces rather than to destroy the foe in front of the MLR or in the friendly battle position.

f. Organization of the Ground. The terrain is organized according to a carefully prepared obstacle plan. Natural obstacles are supplemented by artificial ones, and all obstacles are covered by fire.

g. Conduct of Mobile Defense.

- (1) Aggressor forces follow the battle plan closely in mobile defense. Selected lines of resistance are occupied one after another. Withdrawal from one line to another usually is accomplished on one of the flanks. The withdrawing force is protected by short, sharp counterattacks, artillery barrages, and covering parties. Ambushes are set up frequently.
- (2) The air force attacks the enemy at great distances in an effort to destroy transport, fuel supplies, and armor. Mortars and machineguns open up on the enemy when he comes within maximum effective range. These fires are supplemented by rifle fire as the enemy continues to advance. Small groups of Aggressor infantrymen with antitank weapons form covering parties to shield the withdrawal of the main body.
- (3) Artillery opens fire at its maximum effective range with area barrages. The artillery then covers the withdrawal with heavy barrage and concentration fires. The fires often are coordinated with tank or tank-infantry counterattacks. The artillery and mortars leapfrog backwards in two or more echelons in order to provide thorough and efficient fire coverage for the troops.
- (4) Tank and mechanized formations are used primarily as a shock element. They deliver counterattacks, sometimes in conjunction with infantry units, to insure the safe disengagement of their main body.
- (5) Communication in mobile defense is maintained primarily by radio, messengers, and signals. Wire is not used except for short distances and then only at right angles to the front.

h. Specialized Defense.

- (1) Aggressor is placing increasing emphasis upon an effective anti-aircraft system for the protection of important forces and installations. Organic anti-aircraft artillery and machinegun units, supplemented when needed by GHQ troops, fulfill the requirement. Aggressor anti-aircraft defenses may be expected to interfere seriously with aircraft fulfilling tactical missions in support of hostile ground operations.
- (2) The Aggressor Army appears to be aware of the potentialities of chemical warfare, and chemical warfare specialists are found at all levels among the troops. Although there are some indications that Aggressor preparations against this type of warfare may be insufficient, actual experience by which to judge this branch of the service is lacking.

i. Withdrawal.

- (1) For withdrawal purposes the Aggressor forces are divided into a main body and a rear guard. The strong rear guard bears the brunt of the hostile attacks in covering the escape of the main body.
- (2) The rear guard conducts a mobile defense against the pursuing enemy. It disengages under artillery cover by means of counterattacks, and leaves small covering and ambush forces behind to delay the foe.

Section II. THE RIFLE REGIMENT IN THE DEFENSE

231. Planning of the Defense Position

a. The mission of the rifle regiment in the positional defense is to hold its assigned position and to destroy the enemy forces by fire and counterattacks.

b. Upon receiving a warning order alerting him to take up the defense, the regimental commander immediately dispatches reconnaissance patrols to ascertain the situation in front of his defensive sector. Simultaneously, he sends out combat security forces to secure the regimental sector.

c. The regimental commander with his battalion commanders then accompanies the divisional commander on the latter's command reconnaissance of the division defense zone. During this reconnaissance the divisional commander determines the location of the main line of resistance. If the divisional commander and the regimental commander are unable to make a personal reconnaissance, selection of a MLR is left to the discretion of the battalion commanders but must be approved by the regimental commander.

d. Upon his return from the divisional commander's reconnaissance, the regimental commander makes his own command reconnaissance of the regiment's defense sector with his chief of staff, artillery officer, engineer officer, battalion commanders, and the commanders of attached and supporting units.

e. During this reconnaissance the regimental commander designates the regimental defensive sector, the outpost line of resistance, the main line of resistance, the location of antitank obstacles, the defensive works within the regimental sector which division intends to construct, and the time when defense preparations must be completed.

f. The regimental commander's orders to his subordinate commanders are based on his plan of defense and his fire plan. The fire plan of the regiment is calculated to achieve the following ends:

- (1) Support the combat outposts.

- (2) Stop the enemy infantry and tanks on the line of departure or before they reach it to prevent him from launching his attack.
 - (3) Lay down a screen of fire to halt the enemy infantry and tank attack.
 - (4) Cut off enemy infantry (within the battle positions) from accompanying tanks and destroy them.
 - (5) Support the counterattacks of reserves.
- g. The regimental defense plan details—
- (1) Duties of the battalions during a partial or general enemy breakthrough into the regimental sector.
 - (2) Probable time and direction of counterattacks by the reserve.
 - (3) Organization of the antitank defense (both AT guns and mine fields).
 - (4) Organization of chemical defense.
 - (5) Organization of observation, reconnaissance, and communication.
 - (6) Organization of the ground and camouflage.
 - (7) Logistic support (supply and evacuation).

232. Organization of the Defense Position

a. *General.* Aggressor regulations state that the regimental defensive position must be organized in depth. Provisions must be made for antitank defense and artillery concentrations so that mass armor and infantry attacks can be successfully repelled.

b. *The Combat Outpost Line.*

- (1) The division commander normally designates the location of the outpost line which is organized between 1,100 and 2,200 yards in front of the MLR and consists of combat outposts of small infantry units supported by heavy weapons or individual artillery pieces furnished by the frontline rifle battalions. Additional fire support for the combat outposts is provided by the frontline units and by the artillery.
- (2) The combat outposts are organized as individual strong points so as to provide mutual fire support. Their mission is to warn friendly troops of sudden enemy attacks, to obstruct enemy ground reconnaissance and observation, and to mislead the enemy as to the true location of the main line of resistance. Where the Aggressor frontlines are not located along natural defensive barriers, the combat outposts are exceptionally strong.
- (3) The combat outpost line is sometimes placed at an angle to the MLR in order to deceive the enemy, to expose his flanks,

to fire from the MLR, and to force him to regroup for the final attack while under fire from the MLR. In some cases a decoy MLR is established behind the combat outpost line to achieve this end.

c. The Regimental Defense Sector.

- (1) An Aggressor rifle regiment is assigned a defensive sector which includes the battalion defensive areas and the regimental reserve defense area. The regimental defense sector is organized for all-ground defense, with particular emphasis upon antitank defense. The regiment is expected to defend its sector at all costs and it may withdraw only upon orders from higher authority.
- (2) The size of the regimental defense sector varies according to the terrain and the mission of the Aggressor force. The width of the defense sector is about 4,400 to 6,600 yards, and it extends throughout the depth of the regiment. If the regiment has an exposed flank, a battalion is placed to cover it and the reserve is situated nearby. The width of the battalion defense area is determined by the probable direction of the enemy's attack. The battalion defending the most vulnerable sector is given the narrowest front. Adjoining battalion defense areas are contiguous.
- (3) The regimental reserve is assigned its defense area by the regimental commander after consideration of its probable counterattack and defensive missions. The mobile antitank reserve is held in a central location from which it can move to intercept any enemy tanks or assault guns that penetrate the battle position. This mobile antitank reserve, normally motorized, consists of riflemen (armed with antitank weapons); engineers; and artillery pieces or assault guns.

d. Organization of Fire.

- (1) The regimental fire plan is organized so that the various types of weapons mutually support each other. They form a definite and effective pattern of fire defending the entire regimental sector and the terrain in front of the MLR. Supporting infantry fires are planned by the frontline battalions for the defense of the combat outposts in the opening stages of the attack. Fires (almost identical with the final protective line fires of United States units) are planned immediately in front of the MLR. According to Aggressor doctrine, flat trajectory weapons should have a field of grazing fire of 440 yards in front of the MLR. Within the battle position itself, perimeter fires are planned for each company and bat-

talion area and for the regimental sector, as well as for the platoon, company, battalion, and regimental strong points. Particularly heavy fires are planned at limiting points and along unit boundaries. All obstacles, whether natural or artificial, are covered by fire.

- (2) The artillery supporting the regiment plans fires along likely routes of approach, in possible enemy forward assembly areas, on lines of departure, and along the final protective line. These fires include all those assigned to the regimental artillery in the artillery fire plan sent down from division and those additional fires which the regimental commander and his chief of fire support group may assign. The artillery operating under divisional and high control supplements these fires according to plan. Individual field artillery pieces which are assigned direct fire missions measure ranges and azimuths to specific reference points to insure accuracy of fire against attacking enemy troops. Range cards are prepared for these weapons.
- (3) The antitank fires of infantry and artillery units are carefully planned to form an integrated, interwoven network of fire extending into the security area and throughout the regimental defense sector. Personnel armed with short range antitank weapons are stationed in strong points throughout the regimental sector. These men work together with the antitank artillery whose commander plans the entire antitank defense.
- (4) Antitank guns are staggered throughout the entire depth of the regimental defensive sector but most of them are concentrated in the area most vulnerable to armor. The most forward pieces—usually of lighter caliber than those sited further back—are sited approximately 220 yards behind the MLR. These antitank guns form the backbone of the platoon, company, battalion, and regimental strong points as well as the principal protection against attacking armor. Conventional field artillery units plan an antitank (rolling) barrage along likely enemy tank approaches to the Aggressor defensive positions. These units, normally placed along the second most likely tank approach, also construct special direct fire antitank positions, and plan fires from these positions. These positions are usually protected by natural or artificial antitank obstacles and mine fields. All antitank obstacles are covered by fires, preferably by both flat-trajectory and artillery type weapons.

- (5) The antiaircraft elements with the rifle regiment, and any attached or supporting antiaircraft units, are concentrated in the vicinity of key units and installations. The fires of the special antiaircraft units are supplemented by massed infantry small arms fire in case of low level attacks.
- (6) The 80-mm self-propelled gun company of the regiment is normally held back as part of the regimental reserve and is used to add weight to counterattacks. On occasion, the self-propelled guns may be dug in and fought as individual pill-boxes; at other times they may be employed as roving guns. If tank units are attached to or are supporting the regiment, such units normally will be held back as an armored counter-attack reserve.

e. Organization of the Ground.

- (1) According to Aggressor doctrine, the regimental commander and his subordinate commanders are directly responsible for the organization of the ground within their defense sectors. They are expected to personally supervise and check the progress of the ground organization. The regimental engineer officer prepares the plans for the organization of the ground within the regimental defense sector. His plan (subject to the regimental commander's approval) specifies the work to be done, the time allotted for each operation, the priority of tasks, and the distribution of the working force. Most of the work involved in the organization of the ground in the regimental defense sector is the responsibility of personnel of the units concerned. Engineer teams supervise this work and actually construct only installations or fortifications requiring engineering skill.
- (2) The organization of the ground for defense includes the construction of antitank obstacles and strong points; command posts, firing positions for individual riflemen and crew-served weapons (including the clearing of fields of fire); concealed routes of communication; dummy installations; departure areas for counterattacks by the reserve; and personnel shelters. Camouflage of all positions and installations is mandatory. Engineer works are constructed in a sequence that depends upon the defensive mission of the regiment, the situation, and the terrain. In winter construction of personnel shelters has high priority, whereas such shelters are secondary consideration at other seasons. In mountains, woods, and swamps the construction of roads is considered to be of primary importance. In open terrain, great emphasis is laid

upon construction of concealed routes of communication. Ground organization is expected to be a continuous process and past Aggressor campaigns indicate that the doctrine is effectively applied.

- (3) Aggressor utilizes natural obstacles whenever possible, often reinforcing them with artificial ones such as land mines, barbed wire, antitank ditches, steel-beam obstacles, and road blocks. Mine fields are laid only with the permission of the divisional commander.
- (4) The positions occupied by the combat outposts are carefully prepared for defense and strengthened with obstacle networks. Continuous belts of obstacles are constructed along the final protective line and are especially strong at limiting points. Fields of fire for flat-trajectory weapons are cleared. Weapons emplacements, trenches, foxholes, bunkers, and obstacle systems are constructed within the main battle position itself. Unit boundaries are normally protected by obstacle belts as are the individual platoon, company, battalion, and regimental strong points. Artillery positions are also protected. Channels permitting the passage of counterattacking forces are left in these obstacle systems. In sectors which are considered particularly vulnerable, Aggressor prepares the ground for the rapid laying of mine fields. Dummy installations, emplacements, and strong points are built in accordance with the overall deception plan.

233. Conduct of the Defense

a. General.

- (1) Aggressor doctrine advocates the destruction of the enemy force in front of the MLR. The defensive dispositions of the regiment and the forces supporting it are arranged to achieve this end. If the enemy does succeed in penetrating the Aggressor main battle position, the regiment is expected to hold its ground stubbornly, to halt and destroy the enemy within its defense sector by fire and counterattack. Normally, aid will come from division in case of a serious breakthrough.
- (2) The regimental commander directs the combat action of the regiment from his CP-OP (one or two alternate CP-OP's are prepared) which is located in that portion of the regimental sector where the enemy is expected to make his main effort. A network of supplementary OP's keeps the commander informed of developments in areas beyond his range of vision.

b. Infantry.

- (1) Most of the personnel of the regiment are held under cover during the enemy's artillery preparation. Only a few observers and the crews of selected heavy weapons remain at their battle positions to guard against surprise attacks. Reconnaissance units are sent out to discover the enemy's disposition, to report his progress, strength, and the combat formation he is using.
- (2) When the enemy attacks the combat outposts, the frontline battalions support the outposts and cover their withdrawal by fire. The full force of the fire of the available infantry weapons is concentrated upon the enemy when he reaches the final protective line. The infantry's fire is intended to destroy the enemy or, at least, to separate his infantry from the attacking tanks.
- (3) Where conditions are favorable, Aggressor forces launch counterattacks beyond their MLR from quiet sectors. Small enemy forces that penetrate the main battle position are destroyed by counterattacks launched by the battalion reserves. All units in the vicinity support the counterattacks by fire. As soon as the enemy has been repulsed, the regiment reoccupies its original positions.

c. Artillery.

- (1) The regimental artillery participates in the Aggressor counterpreparation, if one is fired, concentrating upon the forward assembly areas of the enemy's forces. When forces are not in direct combat, the artillery opens fire as the enemy enters its maximum effective range, usually firing previously prepared area concentrations. If the attacking force includes armor, the antitank (rolling) barrage is fired by the artillery under divisional and higher control.
- (2) When the enemy reaches the final protective line, the prepared standing barrage is fired. Hostile units which succeed in entering the main battle position are kept under intensive artillery and mortar fire. Should enemy tanks penetrate the main battle position, all direct and indirect artillery fire is concentrated upon them until they either withdraw or are destroyed. All artillery units cooperate with antitank gun units and infantry tank-killer teams in liquidating the armored threat to the regimental sector.

d. Reserves.

- (1) Armored units attached to or supporting the regiment and the regimental self-propelled guns are held in reserve for use in counterattacks. Tanks or SP guns may be dug in and

fought as pillboxes. SP guns often participate in anti-armor ambushes.

- (2) Besides the armored reserve, the Aggressor rifle regiment maintains an infantry reserve and a mobile antitank reserve. The Aggressor infantry reserve functions like a United States Army reserve, although the Aggressor reserve is somewhat smaller and can be used either as a counterattacking force or to lend depth to the defensive position. The mobile antitank reserve is responsible for stopping armor attacks which cannot be sealed off and destroyed by the forces at the disposal of the battalion commanders.

234. Defense on a Wide Front

a. The Aggressor rifle regiment may adopt a defense on a wide front if it has sufficient men and material to maintain a normal defense position or if the terrain is broken. In the latter case, the defense consists of separate defensive areas commanding the most important sectors, connected by fire and obstacle networks. The gaps between battalion defensive centers are covered by small infantry units reinforced with heavy weapons and by obstacle systems.

b. The regimental commander maintains exceptionally heavy reserves, both general and antitank, in this type of defense. His reserve is deployed behind the battalions and is prepared to establish and maintain a perimeter defense. Open flanks are covered by units assigned for this purpose.

c. Each strong point is expected to hold its position, especially the battalion centers of defense, in the event the enemy succeeds in penetrating the main battle position. Meanwhile, the regimental commander attempts to halt and destroy the enemy by counterattacking with his reserves.

235. Mobile Defense

a. The Aggressor mobile defense, similar to a delaying action, consists of a series of battles fought from successive lines previously prepared for defense. The success of the mobile defense depends upon careful and effective coordination of all arms and units included in the defense force. Successive defensive positions are set up in such a way that, after the enemy takes one line, he is forced to displace his artillery forward and regroup his forces before attacking the next one. Covered routes of withdrawals are a primary consideration in the choice of positions. Obstacles, protected by fire and often by small units, are placed in front of the defensive positions.

b. A rifle regiment occupies two defensive positions at the same time, the larger force being concentrated in the forward position. Battalions organize defense centers which can provide mutual fire support. Gaps between strong points are covered by fire, antitank ambushes, and obstacle networks. In the mobile defense, portions of the regimental artillery are usually attached to the rifle battalions.

c. In the conduct of operations, the Aggressor forces attempt to delay the enemy and to inflict casualties upon him without allowing him to close with their main force. When the enemy's pressure becomes too strong, or at a predesignated time—preferably at night or in conditions of poor visibility—the troops occupying the forward positions withdraw. If the enemy detects an attempt to break contact, the withdrawal of the forces on the first delaying line is covered by fire from the artillery (including that of higher echelons in most cases). Counterattacks, especially by armored units, are often launched to aid the troops in the first line in their withdrawal. Ambushes and roadblocks manned by small units are employed to delay the enemy in his attempts to follow and close with the retiring Aggressor.

d. Each of the predesignated defensive lines is defended in this manner as the regiment slowly withdraws.

Section III. THE RIFLE BATTALION IN THE DEFENSE

236. Planning of the Defense Position

a. The divisional, regimental, and battalion commanders make a joint personal reconnaissance to lay out the approximate location of the MLR. Should a joint reconnaissance be impossible, the battalion commander selects his own MLR and establishes his own local security. He then submits a report of his dispositions to the regimental and divisional commanders for their approval. The battalion commander then conducts his own command reconnaissance taking with him his company commanders, the commanders of attached and supporting units, and the leader of the platoon which will be placed on the OPLR.

b. During the course of his reconnaissance, the battalion commander usually inspects—

- (1) The battalion's area of defense.
- (2) The terrain in front of the MLR and at the battalion flanks.
- (3) Possible avenues of enemy approach (especially armor).
- (4) His own rear area (all-round defense and obstacles which might hamper a counterattack).

c. Aggressor regulations prescribe that the commander's most important combat orders are given in the course of the command reconnaissance. At this time he—

- (1) Designates company defense areas and location of strong points.
- (2) Lays out the firing plan for the company weapons and indicates the line on which the standing artillery barrage will be laid.
- (3) Designates observation posts.
- (4) Indicates possible enemy routes of approach.
- (5) Assigns fire missions and positions to the heavy weapons, including antitank guns, under his control.
- (6) Designates probable routes for counterattacks.
- (7) Informs his subordinates of the signals for requesting, halting, and transferring fires for infantry weapons, mortars, and artillery.
- (8) Designates signals for the withdrawal of the combat outposts and the routes by which they will withdraw.

237. Organization of the Defense Position

a. *General.* The battalion is organized for defense in accordance with the orders of the regimental and divisional commanders. Its mission is to hold the positions assigned to it at all costs and to destroy the enemy in front of or within its defensive area. The battalion is forbidden to withdraw without specific permission from the regimental commander.

b. *The Combat Outpost Line.*

- (1) The combat outpost line of resistance is designated by the divisional commander, except in unusual situations. The frontline battalions provide the combat outposts of the OPLR. A combat outpost normally consists of a rifle platoon supported by heavy machine-guns, mortars, antitank weapons and, possibly, individual artillery pieces. The combat outposts are also supported by fire from the battalion positions and the divisional artillery.
- (2) The combat outpost line is expected to prevent enemy reconnaissance from approaching the MLR; to prevent surprise attacks upon the MLR; to hinder the work of enemy ground observers; to force the enemy to deploy for combat in front of the combat outpost line; to inflict maximum casualties on the enemy forces; and to deceive the enemy concerning the location of the MLR. A reinforced decoy MLR may be

established at an angle to the MLR to deceive the enemy and to expose his flanks to fire from the MLR.

c. The Battalion Defense Area.

- (1) The rifle battalion is assigned a defense area normally not greater than 2,200 yards wide and 1,600 yards deep. The battalion defense area is essentially a series of interconnected strong points of varying strength and size with the foremost line forming the battalion MLR. Aggressor regulations state that the formation of the companies within the battalion defense areas and that of the platoons within company areas will be regulated according to the situation. Wedge, inverted wedge, and line formations are considered to be normal.
- (2) The battalion defense center is the heart of the battalion defense area. The battalion reserve, most of the battalion's antitank weapons, and the majority of the company strong points are included in the battalion defense center. If an open flank exists, the battalion reserve is located where it can cover this flank. The battalion defense area is organized for all-round defense and its strong points are so located as to provide interlocking and mutual protective fires of all weapons. The battalion commander is required to submit a plan of his dispositions to regiment for approval after he has organized the battalion defense area.

d. Organization of Fire.

- (1) The most important task of the battalion commander in the defense position is the organization of his infantry fire power. He is responsible for insuring that the troops along the MLR have a 400-yard belt of grazing fire forward; that the heavy machineguns are sited so as to obtain oblique or flanking fire; and that all approaches to his defense sector are covered by fire. Flanks and unit boundaries are protected by exceptionally heavy fires and, if an open flank exists, the heavy weapons and individual units are ordered to plan fires for its defense.
- (2) The battalion commander assigns concentrations to cover vulnerable areas which have not been covered by the orders of higher commanders. He also informs the supporting artillery of friendly dispositions, including the combat outposts. Mortar and artillery fires cover defiladed areas and all natural or artificial obstacles.
- (3) The location and proper coordination of antitank fires within the battalion area are also the personal responsibility of the

battalion commander. Artillery pieces are sited so as to permit direct fire against tanks on any of the likely tank approaches without shifting position. Antitank weapons are placed well forward so that their fire can destroy enemy armor before it can penetrate into the friendly positions. In a defensive situation, Aggressor may employ eight to twelve antitank guns per 1,000 yards of front if a large scale armored attack is expected. No artillery piece will be located less than 200 yards behind the MLR. The senior antitank artillery officer within the battalion defense area usually controls the fires of these weapons according to directions issued by the battalion commander.

e. Organization of the Ground.

- (1) Aggressor doctrine emphasizes the responsibility of the battalion commander for the creation of antitank obstacles throughout his defensive area and especially around the company strong points and the battalion defense center. Obstacle networks protect the combat outposts, limiting points, unit boundaries, and defiladed areas within or in front of the battalion area.
- (2) If time and manpower permit, the battalion commander orders the construction of dummy positions and other installations to deceive the enemy. Obstacles and positions are constructed by the troops of the battalion, although engineer teams may supervise the work. Engineers may be employed to lay mines only if the battalion troops are otherwise occupied.

238. Conduct of the Defense

a. General. Aggressor doctrine prescribes the destruction of the enemy force in front of the MLR. If the enemy succeeds in penetrating the friendly forward positions, local units are expected to hold their positions at all costs and, together with counterattacking forces, to destroy him within the main battle position.

b. Infantry.

- (1) With the exception of a few observers and crews of selected weapons who watch for an enemy surprise attack, the battalion personnel are held under cover during the enemy's artillery preparation. When the preparatory fires cease and the battalion commander feels certain that the cessation is not a ruse, he orders his men to their battle positions.
- (2) As the enemy infantry comes within range, heavy weapons open fire upon them from alternate positions. Light ma-

chineguns normally open fire at a range of 800 yards, selected riflemen open fire at 600 yards, and the other riflemen commence firing at 400 yards (the appropriate location of the final protective line).

- (3) The battalion mortars fire concentrations against the advancing infantry as soon as they come into range and keep them under continuous fire as they approach the MLR. Antitank guns open fire against tanks at their maximum effective ranges. If no armor appears, these weapons fire on the advancing infantry. If the enemy succeeds in penetrating the main battle positions, all fires are concentrated upon them. At close range, Aggressor employs a variety of antipersonnel and antitank grenades to supplement the fires of individual and crew-served weapons.
- (4) The defenders of bypassed or surrounded strong points and positions are expected to remain at their posts and deliver flanking fire, or fire from behind, against enemy units which are pushing deeper into the main battle position. The battalion may take part in counterattacks if ordered to do so by higher headquarters.

c. Artillery. Aggressor artillery attached to and supporting the battalion commences firing against the enemy when he comes within effective range. Fire continues in area concentrations until the enemy reaches the final protective line. The artillery then shifts to a standing barrage. Hostile units penetrating the main battle position are subjected to preplanned indirect artillery fires and—when they come within range—to direct fire from all available artillery pieces. In the event of an enemy armor penetration, all artillery fires are concentrated against the advancing tanks.

d. Reserves. Two types of reserves are usually found at battalion level. The infantry reserve is normally held within the battalion center of defense and is at the commander's disposal to influence the course of battle. The mobile antitank reserve, which is very small in the battalion, is thrust into the path of advancing enemy armor to halt and annihilate it or at least to reduce its momentum.

239. Defense on a Wide Front

a. In the defense position on a wide front, the battalion defends an area approximately 4 miles wide. Aggressor adopts this type of defense either because of numerical weakness or because the ground is broken by a series of terrain features. In the defense on a wide front, the rifle companies of the battalion organize separate defense areas with squads or groups of submachinegunners occupying the

gaps between them. Antitank and antipersonnel mines and other obstacles lend additional strength to the small forces defending these gaps. Most of the battalion is placed where the enemy is expected to make his main effort. Artillery and mortars attached to the battalion are given infantry protection and are situated, if possible, on terrain inaccessible to tanks.

b. Tactical and fire control is decentralized in this type of defense. The battalion commander normally maintains a small, mobile reserve in defense operations on a wide front, but this force is usually too small to launch an effective counterattack without aid from higher headquarters.

240. Mobile Defense

a. The rifle battalion may participate in mobile defense operations as part of a larger unit. The battalion occupies and defends a prescribed line, supported by regimental and divisional artillery, and is so organized that it can deliver a maximum of fire at great ranges. Mortars and artillery pieces may be attached to companies by the battalion commander.

b. In the conduct of the defense, the battalion opens fire at maximum ranges with all weapons. The forward companies withdraw under the enemy attack to previously prepared positions. The withdrawal is covered by fire from the battalion reserve, which is situated within the defensive area. Next, the battalion reserve and the units operating with it withdraw and occupy their normal position in the new battle formation. The battalion commander conducts further combat operations in the same manner as in the first engagement.

Section IV. THE RIFLE COMPANY IN THE DEFENSE

241. Organization of the Defense Position

a. In a normal defensive situation, the rifle company defends an area approximately 750 yards square. The area consists of mutually supporting platoon defense areas, each containing a platoon strong point, with the most important platoon strong point serving as the company strong point. The formation of platoons within the company defense area varies according to the size of the area and the character of the terrain. No gaps may exist between company defense areas; limiting points must be inconspicuous. Usual defense formations are the wedge, the inverted wedge, echelon right or left, or all three platoons on line.

b. The company commander plans his defense on the basis of orders received from the battalion commander. He explains the organiza-

tion of the company position to the platoon leaders and to commanders of attached and supporting weapons to insure complete understanding of the defense plan. He designates each platoon defense area, the location of each heavy weapon, and the boundaries of all fields of fire. His orders are so precise that relatively little freedom of action is left to his subordinates.

c. In organizing the defense, the company commander takes into account limitations imposed on commanders of supporting weapons by their own superiors. The commander of an attached antitank unit, for example, must comply with the provisions of the division artillery fire plan. He may carry out missions assigned by the company commander only if they do not conflict with his, the antitank unit commander's, primary mission.

d. A company usually has two CP-OP's which, if possible, are located in areas impenetrable to tanks and offering concealment. Good observation, however, is much more important to Aggressor than safety and security.

e. Platoon strong points are located so as to facilitate all-round defense for the company; strong fires at extreme range; concentration on important avenues of approach; lines of final protective fire; fire to cover flanks and limiting points; and arrangements to tie in with adjacent units by fire. Weapons are emplaced in depth and along the front so that a belt approximately 400 yards wide in front of the platoon strong points can be covered by heavy interlocking, automatic weapons fire. The fire plan also provides for frontal, flanking, oblique, and enfilade fires and for concentrations of artillery and mortar fire on the main approaches as well as on areas not covered by flat-trajectory fire.

f. The company strong point is based on the most important platoon strong point, and this position must be held when all other parts of the defense area have been lost. Therefore, the position is fortified as strongly as possible, reinforced by attached weapons, and surrounded by numerous antipersonnel and antitank obstacles. Part or all of the company strong point is included in the battalion defense center.

g. The building of strong points starts as soon as the company reverts to the defensive. Field fortification work ordered by the battalion commander is allotted to the platoons by the company commander who sets a time limit for completion. First priority work includes the clearance of fields of observation and fire; camouflage and construction of individual or two-man foxholes; construction of the supply point, aid station, CP-OP, and dummy positions. Second pri-

ority work covers the construction of alternate trenches and foxholes; linking of foxholes into a trench system; and digging of connecting trenches that can also be used for defense purposes. Third priority work includes construction of communication trenches leading to the rear and to alternate positions; an alternate CP-OP; shelters (these have first priority in winter); and improvement of previously constructed works.

h. At the same time the construction of antitank obstacles and the laying of wires and mines are in progress. Obstacles are placed so as to insure the all-round defense of the company as well as the defense of each platoon separately. Natural and artificial obstacles located just forward of the MLR are covered by antitank and small arms fire, preferably flanking fire. Every effort is made to prevent the enemy from estimating correctly the location of the covering weapons.

242. Conduct of the Defense Position

a. During the enemy artillery preparation, most of the company stays under cover. The company commander determines the time to return to the battle stations. Small enemy groups attacking or reconnoitering the company position are usually taken under surprise point-blank fire by specially designated weapons firing from alternate positions. Large enemy forces are taken under fire by heavy weapons, some of which may even be in front of the MLR. The company commander tries to concentrate his fire successively against favorable targets in order to demoralize the enemy forces before it reaches the MLR. As the enemy troops enter the zone of final protective fire ahead of the MLR, they are met by heavy fire from all weapons. Weapons sited for specialized fire do not fire until the target is favorably located. The company commander in his CP-OP stands ready to shift fires as necessary to support one or another of his platoons. If the battle becomes critical at any point, he must join his troops there.

b. Penetrations are brought under the fire of every available weapon in an all out effort to hold the position. The company usually can seal off or throw back minor penetrations with its own forces, but if a large-scale penetration is made, the company is expected to hold its strong point until battalion and regimental reserves counterattack and restore the position, or until it is ordered to withdraw. Once an attack or penetration has been repulsed, the company and the position are reorganized and prepare for subsequent enemy attacks. Weapons are moved to other prepared positions when the situation warrants.

243. Defense on a Wide Front

a. A wider front is usually assigned to units when they are on difficult terrain having few passable approaches, or when the Aggressor forces are insufficient in numbers to organize a positional defense. In this situation, the company must organize defensive positions across or covering only the most important approaches.

b. The company is responsible for the gap on its left, which may extend as far as 1,500 yards. Gaps are covered by patrols, artillery and mortar concentrations, squads of submachinegunners, cross-fires of adjacent units, or obstacles. Obstacles include mine fields, cratering of roads, booby traps, buried explosive charges, wire entanglements, fallen trees, and any other device dictated by the particular situation. All obstacles should be covered by fire. Listening posts are established in the gaps to warn the company of any attempts at penetration, especially at night.

244. Mobile Defense

a. The rifle company may take part in mobile defensive operations of larger units; however, it will seldom conduct a mobile defense on its own initiative. An independent operation probably would be conducted only under exceptional circumstances.

b. In a mobile defense, the company opens fire at maximum ranges against the enemy. As the enemy attempts to close with his unit, the company commander withdraws his platoons under cover of fire from heavy weapons and the artillery. The platoons retire by bounds and, if possible, the movement is concealed from the enemy. Aggressor doctrine states that the commander will be particularly alert for threats to his flanks and that he will remain with the last platoon to withdraw.

c. After accomplishing his withdrawal, the company commander occupies a new defensive position and repeats the procedure described above. The defense of each position is conducted in accordance with the principles for defense on a wide front. Counterattacks frequently are used to help cover the withdrawal from one line to the next.

Section V. THE SEPARATE COMPANIES IN THE DEFENSE

245. Heavy Machinegun Company

a. In defense operations, decentralized control of the heavy machinegun company is the rule. Platoons and squads are cited at various points throughout the defense area according to the requirements of the defense plan. They are then attached to the rifle company in whose areas they happen to be situated.

b. One platoon is given the additional duty of providing antiaircraft protection for the battalion defense center. Each machinegun of this platoon is sited to attain the maximum overlap of fires.

c. Upon receipt of his defense missions, the machinegun company commander conducts a reconnaissance with his platoon leaders and issues an oral order. The order designates reference points, approaches to be used in occupying fire positions (principally for flanking, oblique, and enfilade fire), and the locations of OP's, priority of work on the emplacements, and the location of the company's vehicles. He must insure that his fire plan fits in with the fire plans of the artillery, mortars, and antitank weapons.

d. During an enemy attack the machineguns still under control of the company commander support the most threatened sectors of the defense. The guns may switch to alternate positions when necessary. If the position is breached, the machineguns support counterattacks. Meanwhile, all guns open up with flanking and crossfires. Some guns may be designated "stab-in-the-back" guns. Such weapons hold their fire and remain concealed until the enemy assault units have passed. They then open fire upon the enemy from behind.

e. If the battalion is withdrawing, the machinegun company commander takes over control of the nearest machinegun platoon and directs fire to cover the withdrawal. He pays particular attention to the flanks.

f. Machinegun squads and platoons withdraw in a series of leapfrog movements; coordination, meanwhile, is maintained with other supporting weapons to assure continuous infantry support fires. Under favorable conditions, such as darkness or fog, the machineguns may withdraw with the unit to which they are attached, proceeding with it to the new defense line.

g. For greater battalion protection during a withdrawal, the machinegun company commander, on orders of the battalion commander, may detail one or more platoons to antiaircraft defense. He assigns these platoons fire missions and successive firing positions along the battalion route of withdrawal.

246. The Mortar Company (Battery)

a. The 80-mm mortar company is organic to battalion; the 120-mm mortar battery is organic to regiment. Concentrations of mortar fire in the defense are planned by the regimental artillery group as part of the artillery fire plan.

b. Missions assigned to mortar units in the defense may include—

- (1) Annihilation of enemy personnel concentrating for the attack.

- (2) Neutralization of weapons (such as machineguns and mortars) and laying of smoke screens.
- (3) Participation in counterpreparation fires.
- (4) The support of the combat outpost from alternate positions.
- (5) The placing of barrage fire on the close-in approaches to the MLR.
- (6) Sealing off withdrawal routes and annihilating enemy forces that have penetrated into the position.
- (7) Supporting counterattacks.

c. Mortar positions within the battalion or regimental defense areas are echeloned in depth. Full coverage thus can be given to the infantry. Fire plans can be prepared for concentrations both in front of and within the battle position. Alternate firing positions are selected and prepared. A network of observation posts quickly supplies firing data to supplement the planned concentrations.

d. During defensive operations the mortar company or battery remains under the control of its commander. Decentralization takes place only in the defense on a wide front, in mobile defense, in the withdrawal, under conditions of poor visibility, or in extremely broken terrain.

e. The unit ammunition dump is located near the battalion (regimental) CP. Nevertheless, the company (battery) also establishes a small dump so that platoon ammunition bearers can carry loads more easily to the firing positions. In addition, reserves of mortar ammunition are put in trenches or in other available cover near the firing positions. Each mortar squad always must have on hand a reserve of at least one-eighth of a unit of fire, which may be used only on order of the commander. (The unit of fire for an 80-mm mortar is approx. 120 rounds.)

f. In the defense mortar fires are laid down on previously designated lines or areas and on targets of opportunity. The flexibility of mortar fire permits the shifting of fire on the advancing enemy infantry until the attackers reach the line of the "standing barrage" which generally corresponds to the United States final protective line (FPL).

g. The mortar units take part in the standing barrage on the FPL. These barrage fires not only help to repel attacks, but also help to separate the enemy infantry from their tanks; to prevent the approach of reserves; and to destroy the enemy within the battle position.

h. If the enemy penetrates the battle position, a portion of the mortar fires is assigned to box in the assaulting enemy, while other forces attempt to wipe out the boxed-in force.

i. The mortar company operating at night conducts barrages from previously prepared data. The company also may fire against indi-

vidual targets revealed by flares or illuminated by rockets or shells. Plans and preparations for conducting fire at night will include—

- (1) Preparation of firing positions for night firing (lanterns, aiming stakes).
- (2) Selection of night reference points.
- (3) Preparation of firing data.
- (4) Planning of concentrations.
- (5) Establishment of signals calling for fire.

247. The Submachinegun Companies

a. These organizations are found in heavy tank and self-propelled gun regiments. In the defense, the submachinegun company is utilized by the regimental commander as additional fire support for closely pressed frontline units, as a part of the regimental reserve, or for securing unit boundaries.

b. When the company mission is to add its fire support to frontline units, the commander disposes his company by platoons under cover near the MLR. As the enemy assault begins, the platoons move independently to previously indicated trenches from which they fire on the enemy.

c. In the event that the submachinegun company is held in reserve, it counterattacks in platoon-sized groups in conjunction with the counterattack of other units of the reserve if the enemy penetrates the defensive positions. The submachinegun company strives to envelop the flanks and rear of the enemy before opening fire.

d. The company is sometimes assigned the mission of securing unit boundaries. In this event, the company is divided into platoons and is assigned to sectors of the boundaries. The company commander is responsible for verifying the platoon's positions and for organizing the system of fire.

248. Antiaircraft Machinegun Company

The employment of the antiaircraft machinegun company in the defense is similar to its employment in the offense. Antiaircraft positions in the defense, however, are more deliberate and more thoroughly camouflaged.

Section VI. THE RIFLE PLATOON AND SQUAD IN THE DEFENSE

249. Organization of the Defense Position

a. The defense position of a rifle platoon, whether on the MLR or deep within the company's defensive position, is laid out around a platoon strong point or main defensive area. The strong point is the key

terrain feature within the platoon defensive sector and its possession assures control of the entire sector. The strong point is not merely covered by fire; it is occupied by troops and attached weapons. The primary mission of the rifle platoon in the defense position is to hold this strong point at all costs and it may not withdraw unless it receives specific orders to do so. The platoon, with its attached and supporting weapons, attempts to disrupt or destroy the enemy before he can concentrate for an assault. If the enemy succeeds in penetrating the platoon position, the platoon strives to contain the penetration until other units can counterattack and drive the enemy off.

b. A platoon with attached and supporting weapons may hold a front 300 yards wide and 250 yards in depth, although the size is usually less. The normal frontage of the rifle squad is from 40 to 50 yards. Grazing fire with flat-trajectory weapons should be possible for a distance of at least 400 yards in front of the MLR. If a reverse slope defensive position is used, the crests and approaches must be covered by flanking fire from other positions. The platoon leader must know in detail the positions of all parts of his platoon and of all attached and supporting weapons as well as the location of the artillery forward observer. He must always be in contact with these elements so that they will contribute efficiently to his overall fire plan.

c. When he has received his instructions from the company commander concerning the planning and conduct of the defense, the platoon leader—

- (1) Establishes within his defense sector observation in the direction of the enemy as well as to the flanks and rear.
- (2) Reconnoiters, together with his squad leaders and the commanders of attached weapons, the defense sector and the area in front of the main line of resistance so that he can properly organize the fire power at his disposal.
- (3) Indicates primary and alternate firing positions, direction, and sectors of fire to each squad leader.
- (4) Assigns specific tasks to each squad and attached unit in combating enemy tanks.
- (5) Passes on to commanders of attached and supporting weapons the instructions of the company commander as to where the primary, alternate, and supplementary positions are to be and what missions the supporting weapons are to fire.
- (6) Shows where, when, and what type of defensive construction is to be undertaken.

d. After the platoon leader has completed his reconnaissance and prepared his plan of action, he explains his ideas to the squad leaders and the commanders of attached units. His plan of action anticipates

the action his unit must take throughout all phases of the enemy attack and includes the action to be taken in case the unit is overrun or cut off. If time is short, the platoon leader may give a brief overall plan to his subordinates during the reconnaissance itself.

e. Each squad is given a primary sector of fire as well as supplementary firing sectors. When possible, all the sectors are tied in with definite terrain features. Small arms covering fire is organized to protect attached and supporting weapons. Possible artillery concentration areas on the front and along covered approaches to the platoon area are indicated, together with the signals used to call and to lift these concentrations.

f. The platoon leader must ascertain the missions of adjacent platoons and of their attached and supporting weapons, and must tell them his mission and how he intends to carry it out. He decides how he can assist the adjacent units by fire when they are attacked and when they are counterattacking. He checks to see that the fires of the attached and supporting weapons will be able to neutralize targets beyond the range of his platoon's small arms fire. The platoon leader also prepares withdrawal cover for his platoon by using the fire of attached or supporting weapons. When these arrangements are completed, the platoon leader establishes his OP within the platoon strong point. He checks to see that proper contact and communications are established within the platoon defense sector as well as with the company commander and adjacent units. (Each unit makes contact with the adjacent unit to its left.) Then he reports to the company commander.

250. Conduct of the Defense Position

a. Once the position has been prepared, the platoon, with the exception of one observer from each squad and an observer in the OP, stays under cover in dugouts until the order is received to occupy its positions and to open fire. To avoid disclosing the main firing positions prematurely and to minimize losses, the weapons are emplaced and employed by stages—first the selected riflemen, then the light machineguns, the attached heavy machineguns, and finally the remaining riflemen. Crew-served weapons and artillery pieces fire initially from alternate positions. By the time the enemy comes within 400 yards of the MLR, the whole platoon should be in its primary firing positions.

b. Aggressor considers an ambush useful on occasion, especially if the platoon has an exceptionally well-concealed position. In setting up an ambush, the entire platoon holds its fire until the enemy comes

within 300 yards of the MLR. Then all weapons open fire on the unsuspecting attackers.

c. The platoon attempts to stop the enemy by fire before he reaches assault distance. If the enemy does develop his advance into an assault, the platoon increases its fire to the maximum to destroy the enemy infantry ahead of the MLR and to annihilate any enemy groups that may have made a local penetration. The most critical moment arrives when the enemy succeeds in penetrating the platoon strong point. In Aggressor tactical doctrine, extreme emphasis is placed on preventing the enemy from occupying this position.

d. When the enemy attacks with armor, the mission of halting the tanks falls first of all to the supporting antitank weapons and artillery. Small arms, mortar, and machinegun fire are employed to separate the enemy infantrymen from the tanks. Those tanks that succeed in penetrating the platoon sector are attacked with all available weapons including incendiary grenades, infantry close combat antitank weapons, and improvised explosive charges.

e. If the platoon succeeds in repulsing the enemy, the platoon leader quickly makes an estimate of the situation, reorganizes his platoon, and prepares to ward off a new attack. Knocked out firing positions of attached and supporting weapons are changed and gaps in obstacles and barriers are repaired. Mines and booby traps cover the gaps that cannot be repaired immediately. Then the wounded are evacuated, the platoon replenishes its ammunition from the company supply point, and a report of the situation is sent to the company commander.

251. Mobile Defense or Withdrawal

If a withdrawal is ordered, the platoon leader indicates to his squad leaders and to the commanders of attached and supporting units the direction of withdrawal, the method of evacuating seriously wounded, intermediate firing positions, sequence of withdrawal, and control signals. The platoon moves back by squad bounds. It occupies successive firing positions until the platoon has withdrawn to a new line of defense or until the withdrawing company column has been reached. The platoon sergeant withdraws with the first echelon, and the platoon leader moves back with the last.

CHAPTER 8

TACTICS OF SUPPORTING ARMS

Section I. ARTILLERY IN SUPPORT OF INFANTRY UNITS

252. Introduction

a. The Aggressor Army is artillery minded. In no other army has artillery achieved the status it has attained in the Aggressor Army. With the weight of the Trinity's sponsorship, the Aggressor Army has succeeded in building up an artillery empire that provides artillery command units in the field as large as artillery divisions (20-24 firing battalions) and artillery corps (72-96 firing battalions). Emil Deutsch, head of the Trinity (par. 370), has stated that artillery is the "main striking force of the Aggressor Army."

b. Although political patronage may have helped the Aggressor artillery gain this position, circumstances have proved the merit of Aggressor artillery.

c. Aggressor artillery is a supporting combat arm. Artillery officers do not, as a rule, become commanders of combined-arms forces at the army or army group level. The Aggressor artillery is the most important of the specialist arms and probably will retain the position in all future Aggressor operations. The sheer numerical weight of artillery, as compared to that of the Aggressor Army's other components, is a vital factor in the maintenance of its importance and prestige. Artillery personnel comprises between 25 and 30 percent of the present Aggressor Army strength, a much higher percentage than is normal in other armies, including the United States Army.

d. During recent years the Aggressor Army has made a great effort to achieve fire concentration through greater technical efficiency and better command initiative, but the emphasis on mass in decisive sectors of the offensive or defensive front is still apparent. Whether this emphasis will be maintained remains to be seen, now that Aggressor is attaining greater flexibility of fire. Evidently, the employment of tremendous numbers of artillery pieces would be the rule in major Aggressor military operations against strong hostile forces in the future.

253. Tactical Control, Concepts, and Practices

a. Tactical control of Aggressor artillery is influenced by the system of GHQ artillery and its consequently low relative degree of operational flexibility. Instead of maintaining a fixed command relationship to permit the shifting of fire rapidly when needed, the Aggressor attempts to plan in advance for every possible contingency shifting not only the fire, but the command responsibilities and even the pieces themselves. Aggressor artillery employment, therefore, must be governed by a detailed fire plan.

b. Foreigners often misunderstand the Aggressor concept of massed artillery pieces and concentrated fire. The concept is not a theory of unlimited expendability which the Aggressor nation alone can afford. On the contrary, the Aggressor concept is based upon the tactical principle of concentration at decisive points. Superiority is achieved by area fire of massed guns rather than by accurate fire of dispersed guns.

c. Direct fire from individual artillery pieces to destroy point targets is used by the Aggressor to supplement the none-too-accurate fire of their massed guns. Aggressor gunnery techniques reduce the accuracy of indirect firing considerably; direct line-of-sight fire, therefore, is necessary when particular (point) targets must be eliminated. Direct firing requires less skill by the crews and the commanders, conserves ammunition, and insures destruction of the target. Hence, with both massed and individual direct-fire pieces, Aggressor artillery is prepared to destroy either point or area targets.

d. The tactical methods employed by Aggressor artillery place a premium upon the use of camouflage and deception. Both massed and direct-fire guns are highly vulnerable to counterbattery fire and, if prematurely discovered, may betray the main point of an offensive effort or the most vulnerable sectors of a defensive complex. Secrecy is of paramount importance in the Aggressor Army.

e. Aggressor commanders normally permit artillery to move only at night, and they insure that weapons are pulled off the road and are camouflaged before daylight. Guns and firing positions are meticulously camouflaged in forward areas. Predetermined fire missions are fired from temporary positions. (Aggressor batteries use temporary and auxiliary positions throughout the course of battle to mislead the enemy, especially before the main attack.)

f. Aggressor's ingenuity in the use of available local materials and their willingness to dig endlessly, results in great masses of false positions and dummy observation posts assembled in areas near points of main effort. Dummy gun positions often are equipped not only with

guns, but also with sound-and-flash devices and are sometimes manned by roving platoons to add realism.

g. Deceptive measures also are employed in the actual firing practices of the Aggressor. False preparations, false lifts of fire, and maintenance of normal rather than increased volume of fire before an offensive were adopted to hoodwink the enemy.

h. Aggressor field artillery is grouped and organized for combat according to the requirements of the situation. The type of operation, the expected resistance, the available material and units, and the mission of the maneuvering elements all help to determine the command structures created for each operation or phase of an operation. Although all tank, mechanized, and infantry divisions have sizable organic artillery components, much Aggressor artillery is still included in GHQ units in the form of artillery brigades or even as independent artillery regiments and battalions. The assignment of support from this pool is governed by anticipated need rather than by any set procedure. Thus, seven or eight artillery battalions may support one infantry regiment if the army commander and his artillery deputy believe that such heavy support is required for the fulfillment of the regiment's mission.

i. The artillery fire plan is a combat order which regulates minutely the time of firing, rate of fire, expenditure of ammunition, targets, barrages and concentrations, displacement, and regrouping. The fire plan is the means employed by higher commanders to insure that their orders are effectively translated into action by their subordinates. Subordinate commanders may add targets to the fire plan but they are permitted to make no other modification.

254. Technique

a. Aggressor artillery ground reconnaissance is thorough, aggressive, and effective. Patrols are pushed deep into enemy territory to spot and locate enemy batteries, concentration areas, defense patterns, and supply points. Combat patrols tempt the enemy to reveal his guns and heavy weapons by premature fire. Observations and listening posts scan the enemy position.

b. The artillery observation posts are established either across the forward areas of a front or in the forward echelons of troops in movement. The OP's are placed in the observation pattern with the intent of minimizing the dead spaces (areas which cannot be observed) in the enemy position. At night, listening posts are pushed forward from the observation posts to compensate for reduced visibility.

c. Rear and defiladed areas are scanned by spotter planes and observation balloons. Much firing data is computed from aerial photographs which are carefully analyzed by specialists.

d. Divisional and GHQ artillery observation battalions and regiments collect information by means of sound and flash-ranging batteries. The information acquired from reconnaissance and observation is collated and evaluated at higher headquarters and is used as a basis for constructing the overall fire plan.

e. The guns most commonly employed by Aggressor field artillery are the 80-mm divisional gun and the 120-mm howitzer both of which are organic to the rifle division. The 150-mm and 200-mm howitzers; the 150-mm gun-howitzer; and the 150-mm, 200mm, and the new 300-mm guns also are used widely.

f. Aggressor relies heavily upon command liaison for the maintenance of communication and for cooperation between the artillery and the maneuvering arms. Infantry and artillery commanders often use a joint OP. Their separate headquarters are tied in by direct wire lines, although radio communication may supplant the wire net in an offensive. Artillery battery commanders accompany infantry and armored small-unit (usually company) commanders as forward observers. Special signals, tracer bullets, smoke bombs, and shells frequently are used as a supplementary means for direction of artillery fire by maneuvering elements.

g. Emphasis also is placed upon local defense of battery positions. Immediately upon occupying a position, each battery is required to establish all-round defense and to coordinate the defense of the position with those of adjacent units to insure a mutually supporting system of strong points. Obstacles may be constructed when the position is vulnerable to tank attack and, if necessary, mine fields may be laid with the permission of the battalion commander.

255. Tactics of Artillery in Support of the Infantry Regiment in the Attack

a. In the offense Aggressor artillery fire decisively supports the movement of infantry and tanks through the first line of the enemy's defensive system. The artillery further insures the carrying forward of the attack in depth by providing supporting fires for the forward thrust of the mobile forces at the point of the breakthrough.

b. Artillery planning and deployment for the attack develop simultaneously with planning and development by the maneuvering elements. Information acquired from combat reconnaissance and observation is integrated into the detailed fire plan. During the command reconnaissance, the responsible artillery officers familiarize

themselves with their mission, the terrain, and the missions of the units they support. In addition, common code designations, special signals, and the order of artillery displacements are settled.

c. During the planning phase artillery units are assigned to groups and missions are assigned for each phase of the attack. Groups are formed and dissolved and artillery units are attached to infantry or tank units, according to the overall fire plan. The relationship between organic and nonorganic artillery in each sector and for each phase of the battle is established, and mutual cooperation procedures are arranged.

d. The firing batteries move into position one or two nights prior to the attack, and assigned artillery pieces are registered without increasing the volume or changing the pattern of regular defensive fires. Carefully camouflaged positions approximately 200 to 600 yards behind the forward infantry positions are prepared for guns assigned direct fire missions. The direct fire positions usually are occupied during the night preceding the launching of the attack.

e. The artillery attack is part of the "artillery offensive" (which includes tactical air support) and as such is a coordinated and effective combination of close-support air attacks and artillery fire. Many of the deficiencies of Aggressor artillery are at least partly compensated for by the heavy tactical air support available to the ground troops.

256. Attack

The Aggressor "artillery attack" is divided into the following three phases:

a. Preparation.

- (1) A "trial" preparation often is fired two to three hours before the actual preparation begins. This false preparation is designed to deceive the enemy as to the time the attack will begin, and thus cause him prematurely to uncover his heavy weapons and artillery and draw his reserve forward. By this tactic, enemy forces may be drawn into their combat stations before the actual artillery preparation begins.
- (2) The actual preparation is planned and used to cripple the enemy's defense, to disorganize his communications and command, and to cause maximum losses in personnel and materiel.
- (3) During the preparation all available artillery and mortars are fired under centralized control. Various types of firing groups are formed—direct fire groups, mortar groups, close infantry support groups, breakthrough or corps groups, counterbattery groups, and long-range groups. Each group

has one or more assigned missions to perform; the missions are fired according to the specifications set forth in the fire plan.

- (4) Artillery pieces assigned direct fire missions fire from bunker-type emplacements on specific, previously pin-pointed targets—heavy hostile weapons, bunkers, antitank guns, or other significant objectives. The mortar groups concentrate on communication trenches and enemy frontline troops. The close infantry support groups (regimental and divisional) which have close indirect support missions normally concentrate their fire on the frontline trenches. The breakthrough (corps) groups shell the most important sectors in the enemy's defensive position. Counterbattery and long-range groups engage hostile artillery, interdict crossroads and defiles, bombard probable concentration areas and routes of approach for reserves, and attempt to demolish any concrete fortifications within the enemy's defensive complex.
- (5) A sudden, heavy burst of fire starts the preparation. No definite fire pattern is set, because Aggressor desires to keep the enemy off balance and to prevent him from predicting their next move. Destruction fire sometimes may precede neutralization fire; often the two are conducted simultaneously.
- (6) Various ruses are employed to deceive the enemy as to the exact starting time of the infantry or tank assault. The preparation often is interrupted shortly before the beginning of the attack and then is continued with redoubled vigor in the hope of catching the enemy troops at their battle stations. On other occasions a false lift is employed. The artillery's fire is shifted farther back into the defensive area and then suddenly returned to fall again on the main line of resistance. "Sliding off" which consists of moving the fire in depth gradually so that the enemy's frontline troops fail to realize that the bulk of the fire is no longer falling upon them is another trick used to conceal the time of the assault.

b. Support of the Attack

- (1) As soon as the infantry-tank assault commences, the second phase of the artillery attack is initiated. This phase also is outlined carefully in the fire plan.
- (2) The support phase usually is characterized by the first steps toward decentralization of artillery control. With the commencement of the assault, both battalion (80-mm) and regimental (120-mm) mortars revert to the control of their parent

infantry units and cease to form part of the artillery force. Most of the artillery pieces assigned direct-fire roles during the preparation accompany the first waves of the infantry in order to knock out surviving or newly-discovered strong points; to destroy heavy weapons, antitank guns, and tanks; and to aid in the repelling of counterattacks. In addition to these artillery pieces, some units of the close infantry support group also may accompany the infantry for direct-fire missions during the support phase.

- (3) Other portions of the close infantry support group are ordered to provide close-up indirect support. These groups also revert to local control and follow the advancing infantry by bounds as soon as the infantry have overrun the first hostile trench line. Thereafter, they remain as close to the infantry as possible.
- (4) The remainder of the artillery force continues to support the attack under centralized control. Depending upon the strength and dispositions of the enemy, one of the following three support methods normally is employed: An accompanying (rolling) barrage; a series of heavy concentrations; or a combination of the two.
- (5) Of these, the accompanying (rolling) barrage is the most frequently employed method of supporting the attack especially against a systematically prepared and mutually supporting position or against regular trench lines. The accompanying (rolling) barrage consists of a series of successive barrages spaced 50 to 100 meters apart. The barrage moves into the depth of the enemy position—the Aggressor calls it a “rolling wall of fire in front of the infantry”—and it conforms to the enemy’s defensive system as it moves. The attacking infantry, however, retains some control over the advance of fire. The infantry elements can affect the course of artillery fire by setting off special signals at any prearranged phase lines.
- (6) Advancing swiftly behind this barrage, the assault troops hope to catch the enemy while he is still dazed and disorganized.

c. Support of the Attack in the Depth of the Enemy Position.

- (1) After the maneuver element has passed through the strongly organized defensive positions of the enemy, the third phase of the artillery attack develops—the support of the attack in the depth of the enemy position. In this last phase still further decentralization occurs, and the rolling barrage is

abandoned in favor of previously prepared concentrations designed to neutralize individual points of resistance.

- (2) The divisional commander, however, although he may subordinate a portion of the close-support artillery to commanders of rifle regiments and independent battalions, still retains a sufficient reserve to engage the enemy directly by fire. Furthermore, the senior artillery commander is authorized to recall supporting and reinforcing artillery fires whenever he requires mass concentration again.
- (3) Enemy withdrawal results in further decentralization of artillery control. In order to keep within effective range of the enemy, weapons other than long-range guns displace forward by bounds. This advance, however, is planned so that not more than one-third of the total artillery force displaces at one time.
- (4) When the enemy's defense ceases to pose a serious problem, or he seeks to disengage entirely, or when contact with the enemy is lost, the attack is converted into a pursuit. The artillery then is further decentralized. Large quantities of mortars, rockets, and antitank guns are assigned to pursuit columns to replace the bulk of the conventional artillery which usually is outdistanced.
- (5) Organic artillery accompanies the pursuing units and sometimes is supplemented by elements of corps artillery which have been attached to the forward echelons in anticipation of the pursuit.
- (6) Heavy artillery groups continue under army control; maintain fire upon reserves, intersections, defiles, bridges, and retreat routes; conduct counterbattery fire. They displace forward in order to remain within effective range of their objectives.
- (7) The employment of antitank guns is another important phase of the employment of artillery in the offense. Antitank guns under decentralized control accompany the advancing echelons of infantry and tanks and swiftly take up new positions.
- (8) Antitank guns are the backbone of Aggressor resistance to a counterattack. Moving by bounds with the assault troops, they protect the flanks against penetration by dividing the flanks into antitank zones which are organized in depth and prepared for ambush. Special attention is given to the organization of antitank defense at the shoulders of the breakthrough wedge to prevent the enemy from cutting off the forward assaulting element. In addition, mobile antitank

reserves are maintained at regimental and divisional level to reinforce seriously threatened areas.

- (9) Antitank artillery is an essential part of the Aggressor attack force because it counters not only hostile armor, but also has a secondary mission of combatting hostile antitank guns, artillery, and strong points. If the enemy counterattacks or if the offensive bogs down, the antitank guns are employed as a base of fire to protect the changeover to positional defense.

257. Tactics of Artillery in Support of the Infantry Regiment in the Defense

The mission of Aggressor artillery in the defense is to destroy the enemy's infantry, mortars, and artillery and, in cooperation with friendly infantry, to annihilate hostile tanks and infantry at the approaches to the MLR and in the depths of the battle position.

a. Planning and Control of Artillery in Positional Defense.

- (1) Aggressor artillery is thoroughly organized for positional defense. The skeletal framework about which the entire Aggressor defensive system is constructed is made up of the field guns, the antitank guns, and the mortars. These weapons are used to halt enemy attacks short of the MLR.
- (2) Artillery in positional defense is characterized by organization in depth, deceptive practices, large numbers of direct firing pieces, the firing of a counter-preparation, and the large-scale utilization of pre-planned barrages and concentrations.
- (3) The divisional artillery units are organized into tactical groups. More control is vested in lower level commanders than would be the case in offensive operations. Thus, in the offense, divisional artillery belongs to a divisional artillery group, but in the positional defense this artillery is included in the regimental artillery groups.
- (4) Concentrations and barrages, both beyond the MLR and within the friendly battle position, are plotted and assigned to various artillery regiments of the defense force. The batteries within the artillery regiments are thus enabled to prepare in advance their firing data for the most important fire missions.

b. Conduct of Positional Defense.

- (1) Small battalion or company-size units may be used initially forward of the MLR to support security zone forces and the

combat outposts; these units are withdrawn, however, when enemy pressure becomes too heavy.

- (2) If the Aggressor knows the approximate time and place of a hostile attack, the artillery usually fires a counterpreparation that is timed to strike one or two hours before the launching of the attack. This counterpreparation is aimed at destruction of enemy personnel, communications, and command posts and at the neutralization of the enemy artillery. The counterpreparation is considered the best means of halting an attack in its beginning.
- (3) Once the actual enemy assault begins, the artillery concentrates on separating the enemy's armor from his infantry and then destroying both elements separately. Hostile tanks and assault guns are taken under direct fire by Aggressor antitank guns and by guns assigned to direct-fire missions as soon as they come within range. Artillery firing from defilade strikes at tanks with an antitank defensive (rolling) barrage (an inward rolling barrage planned in ladderlike blocks along likely tank approaches). The barrage is fired so that the leading tanks are caught in the initial burst zone. The barrage then rolls inward with the attacking tanks toward the friendly positions.
- (4) Aggressor plans to repel infantry usually by firing a "standing barrage" a short distance in front of the MLR. The "standing barrage" is fired by artillery and mortars, supplemented by the flat-trajectory fire of infantry weapons. Concentrations into the depth of the enemy position, however, harass enemy forces before the enemy can enter the zone of the planned barrages.
- (5) If hostile forces break through the MLR and an immediate restoration of the line is not feasible, the main body of the Aggressor artillery is concentrated upon the penetrating enemy force while a counterattack is launched by reserve units. Direct-fire guns reinforce the fires of the batteries in defilade. Infantry and engineers assist the local security personnel of the artillery to prevent the enemy from overrunning battery positions and silencing the guns. Meanwhile, harassing fire on the enemy's rear areas is maintained by long-range batteries.

c. Artillery in Mobile Defense.

- (1) Artillery is decentralized to a much greater degree in mobile defense than in positional defense. Divisional artillery usually is subordinated to regiments and sometimes is sub-

ordinated even to battalions. These units, individually, form interdependent defensive strong points, each of which is responsible for its own all-round defense and therefore requires its own artillery to cover the most likely avenues of hostile approach. Alternate positions are prepared to cover the areas outside the primary zones of fire. The defensive artillery is emplaced in positions not readily accessible to armored vehicles if motorized or mechanized forces are attacking.

- (2) Mobile defense doctrine requires the artillery and mortars to open fire upon enemy forces at maximum ranges to slow down the enemy and force him to deploy. They continue to harass him during his approach to the infantry positions. The supported units usually avoid prolonged close combat. Therefore, they commence preparations for withdrawal when the hostile forces approach to their positions. Actual withdrawal often is performed under cover of a brief but sharp counterattack, heavily supported by artillery fire. In order to maintain constant and adequate fire, the artillery and mortars leap-frog backward; a portion continues to fire while other units move rearward to previously selected positions. Corps artillery is withdrawn early. The portion of the artillery covering the retreat of the infantry is not withdrawn until the infantry disengages itself successfully. In this manner the withdrawal and the establishment of new positions can be carried out while the enemy is still partly disorganized and extended, and thus is in no position to exploit fully the possibilities for pursuit.
- (3) If hostile pressure forces the mobile defense into a premature withdrawal, the tempo of the artillery action may be increased, although the key tactical principles of mobile defense continue to be applied.

258. Antitank Guns in the Defensive

The primary mission of Aggressor antitank defense is to halt and destroy hostile tank and self-propelled (assault) gun forces. The secondary mission is to reinforce and support the infantry defenses in the absence of enemy armor.

a. Materiel. Aggressor arsenals provide a large and varied supply of antitank weapons. Two new antitank weapons have been adopted by the infantry—an effective rocket launcher weapon using hollow-charge projectiles and a recoilless rifle. The artillery fires AT, HEAT, and HVAP missiles against armored vehicles.

Planning and Control of Aggressor Antitank Defense.

- (1) Antitank defense is one of the most important elements in the Aggressor defensive system and is planned carefully in advance. Engineer, infantry, and artillery antitank measures from a precise, cohesive pattern.
- (2) Aggressor antitank defense is characterized by its depth—usually two or three broad, oblique defensive lines or zones—and by the extensive use of mobile antitank reserves. Camouflage and dummy installations are widely and effectively employed.
- (3) Antitank defense is established under the control of the senior commander (division or higher); his subordinate commanders establish an antitank defense in accordance with his directions.
- (4) The regimental commander organizes and is responsible for antitank defense in his regimental area. The commanding officer of the regimental artillery group is the regimental commander's assistant for antitank defense. Together they organize antitank defense sectors and centers, set up the fire network, and establish the mobile antitank reserve.
- (5) The planning of the antitank defense is based upon the results of terrain evaluation; reconnaissance, and observation, in conjunction with a number of basic principles. Aggressor principles for an antitank defense including utilization of the terrain in constructing the defensive system, the employment of antitank artillery in depth rather than in line, the covering of all obstacles with fire, and the inclusion of infantry, artillery, antitank artillery, mine fields, and obstacles in a single, coordinated, mutually supporting defensive system.
- (6) The fire and obstacle network is thickest in areas where armored attack is believed likely. This immediate direct fire defense is coordinated with long-range concentrations of heavy artillery and with the antitank defensive (rolling) barrage fired from defiladed positions.
- (7) Some antitank guns are placed 200 to 400 yards behind the MLR at intervals of 200 to 300 yards. These guns are organized into rifle company antitank strong points which include infantry antitank weapons. All weapons are placed usually in rhomboid, trapezoid, or diamond formation.
- (8) The battalion antitank strong point organizes the fire of the company antitank strong points and includes the battalion antitank defense center which may have the heavy field guns or gun-howitzers as well as antitank guns at its

disposal. Both types of guns are placed on the most likely route of attack. The defense center should comprise at least 7 to 10 guns per 1,000 yards of frontage. The senior artillery commander supporting the infantry battalion usually commands the center. He is subordinate to the infantry battalion commander.

- (9) Antitank strong points are placed wherever needed in the divisional area on the orders of the senior artillery commander of the division or from higher authority. The strong points are located usually where terrain facilitates the defense. They are often established on unit boundaries or flanks.
 - (10) Antitank strong points normally contain three to six batteries of medium artillery disposed to cover all approaches to their positions. Batteries are positioned in arrowhead formation with intervals of 150 to 300 yards between pieces and 800 to 1,100 yards between batteries.
 - (11) The battery positions of conventional artillery are massed on the second most likely tank approach. This artillery engages attacking tanks from previously prepared antitank positions.
 - (12) The Aggressor also prepares "firesacks" or ambushes for the destruction of hostile armor. Such action frequently is coordinated with armored counterattacks. Heavy and medium artillery pieces and antitank guns are placed in well-camouflaged positions so as to form a pocket. Tanks entering the trap are hit from the flanks.
 - (13) Diverting guns are used to lure the enemy into the "firesack" and dummy positions are established to draw his fire. The guns in ambush remain silent until the hostile armor is well within effective range and then open fire simultaneously.
 - (14) When attacks by heavy tanks or self-propelled guns are anticipated, heavy self-propelled guns are included in the "firesack." Medium self-propelled guns often are employed in this manner.
- c. *Conduct of the Antitank Defense.*

- (1) If the opposing forces are not in contact when the enemy's armored attack begins, Aggressor long-range artillery tries to strike over great distances. Conventional artillery fires from defilade as soon as the tanks come within range. Later, when the tanks enter the zone of the preplanned antitank defensive (rolling) barrage, the artillery fires this mission.

- (2) The advancing tanks are taken under fire by the heavier direct-fire artillery pieces and antitank guns of the first echelon at a distance of 1,100 to 800 yards from the MLR. Lighter field guns and antitank guns open fire at 600 to 300 yards.
- (3) Tanks which have breached the main line of resistance are slowed down in the depth of the battle position by mine fields and obstacles and are destroyed by direct fire from artillery and antitank guns assisted by infantry tank-killer teams armed with short-range antitank weapons.
- (4) If the threat of a serious breakthrough develops, the mobile antitank reserves of the various echelons are committed in the path of the main armored spearhead. Field artillery emplaced on the flanks or in the path of the penetration also fire on hostile tanks. In this manner the enemy is subjected to a maximum of resistance in the direction of his main effort.

259. Antiaircraft Defense

a. Aggressor employs antiaircraft in rear and forward areas and in support of both offensive and defensive operations. Antiaircraft is divided into two general categories—the automatic weapons and mobile guns of the field forces, and the semimobile and fixed guns of the rear areas and the Homeland. Antiaircraft of the field forces is organized into antiaircraft divisions and the organic regiments and battalions of divisions.

b. The antiaircraft divisions consist of sixty-four 80-mm guns, sixty-four 40-mm guns, thirty-two 12.5-mm antiaircraft machineguns, and 35 light machineguns. Normally, each army group has three divisions and each rifle and mechanized army has one.

c. The divisional organic regiments and battalions are equipped with 40-mm guns and 12.5-mm machineguns and the airborne antiaircraft battalion with 20-mm guns. These units are able to protect only the most important air targets within their division areas.

260. Employment in Rear Areas

a. In rear areas the mission of antiaircraft artillery is to protect troop assembly areas, lines of communications, logistical installations, and artillery position areas. In protecting troop assembly areas and rear echelon installations, antiaircraft artillery normally is deployed in two concentric circles. The inner circle is located within the defended area and the outer circle is approximately 1,000 yards from the perimeter of the defended area.

b. The 40-mm antiaircraft guns are employed by batteries sited 1,000 to 2,000 yards from each other. Within each battery the distance between individual guns is at least 30 yards.

c. The 80-mm guns are also emplaced by batteries, the distance between batteries being from 2,000 to 3,000 yards. The distance between individual pieces is at least 30 yards.

d. All positions are dug in and camouflaged. Alternate and dummy positions are prepared for the entire battery. Maneuvers, movements, and preparation of emplacements are habitually accomplished at night.

261. Employment in Forward Areas

a. In forward areas the primary mission of Aggressor antiaircraft artillery is to protect troop concentrations, forward area installations, and lines of communication from hostile aircraft attacks. Antiaircraft artillery also conducts direct fire against land fortifications, attacks hostile infantry in assembly and deployment areas, assists in repelling attacks of enemy ground forces, and executes other firing missions which are normally assigned to light field artillery.

b. In protecting troops deployed in forward areas, antiaircraft artillery is deployed in lines. The heavy machineguns are employed by platoons from 300 to 500 yards in rear of the forward elements. Light antiaircraft guns are employed by batteries on a line 1,000 to 1,500 yards from the forward lines. The distance between batteries is from 1,000 to 2,000 yards; the distance between individual pieces is at least 30 yards. The medium antiaircraft guns are emplaced by batteries on a line approximately from 2,000 to 3,000 yards from the forward lines. The distance between batteries is also from 2,000 to 3,000 yards, and the distance between individual pieces is at least 30 yards.

c. In protecting assembly areas and forward echelon installations, antiaircraft artillery is deployed in two concentric circles. The inner circle is located within the defended area; the outer circle is approximately 1,000 yards from the perimeter of the defended area. Distances between the batteries, platoons, and individual pieces are the same as those employed in linear defense.

d. Medium antiaircraft batteries are normally employed approximately 2,000 yards apart in dug-in positions and are camouflaged. Alternate and dummy positions are always prepared for the whole battery. If fire against land targets is anticipated, special dual purpose emplacements are also prepared. The depth of emplacements is such that gun sights are protected from shell fragments.

e. Light antiaircraft artillery is normally emplaced by platoons in dug-in and camouflaged positions. Emplacements are deep enough

to protect gun sights from shell fragments. Alternate positions and positions for fire against land targets are prepared with embrasures covering the sectors of responsibility for antitank defense. Light antiaircraft artillery employs direct fire only. The platoon is the firing unit. Effective range against approaching targets is 2,000 yards; against departing targets 1,000 yards. In attacking ground targets, light antiaircraft guns are effective against embrasures of fortifications, personnel, observation posts, machine gun and antitank positions, and in blinding tanks.

262. Command

a. The commander of the antiaircraft artillery units of an Aggressor combined-arms force is subordinate to the artillery commander of the force. The artillery commander is the only person who may change the missions of the antiaircraft artillery; only he may shift its effort from a primary to a secondary mission or vice versa. The commander of the antiaircraft artillery keeps himself informed of the general situation and of the mission of the supported units. He maintains communication with the artillery commander and the staff of the supported organization. Jointly with the signal office he establishes the antiaircraft warning service.

b. In supporting ground operations, the commander of the antiaircraft artillery groups his batteries to give maximum support to units which are in a most advantageous position to develop the offensive. In a static situation he groups his batteries to achieve concentration of fire over important installations and assembly areas.

c. Antiaircraft artillery tactics are not stereotyped or passive. Based on reconnaissance reports and study of the tactics and habits of the enemy, the commander maneuvers his batteries, uses ruses and, in cooperation with interceptor aviation, leads the enemy into fire traps.

263. Fire Control

a. Different types of fire control are used by Aggressor medium antiaircraft artillery in controlling fires on its missions; fire against individual targets, moving barrage, stationary barrage, direct fire against land targets, and observed indirect fire against land targets.

b. In tracking individual targets, a battery fires as a unit from data computed by a range finder and director or by radar.

c. In firing moving and stationary barrages, a battalion or a larger groupment is a firing unit. These barrages are considered inefficient and wasteful of ammunition and are used only when tracking is impossible because of meteorological conditions or other causes.

d. In direct fire against land targets, fire is controlled by individual gun commanders against designated targets. When massed fire is desired, a battery may be used as a unit.

e. Direct and indirect observed fire is used against land targets as part of artillery preparations. Antiaircraft artillery guns are assigned targets whose destruction requires high velocity projectiles. Observed indirect fire is controlled in the same manner as that of light field artillery.

264. Support of Defensive Operations

a. In the defense first priority for antiaircraft protection is given to major rear installations and rail lines. Divisional antiaircraft units operate integrally, protecting only selected installations or positions within the division area.

b. Priority of protection is given, in order, to the division artillery, reserves, frontline positions, and counterattacks. Reinforcing or attached antiaircraft artillery units assist in protection of front-line troops and in support of counterattacks.

Section II. ARMOR IN SUPPORT OF INFANTRY UNITS

265. Introduction

a. The Aggressor makes a sharp distinction between operational armor and infantry-support armor. Tanks and assault guns in support of infantry have different missions and tactics from tanks and assault guns assigned to formations of operational armor such as the tank or mechanized division. As operational armor, Aggressor tanks and assault guns are employed as a primary striking force in large numbers. In infantry-support operations tanks and self-propelled guns are used to add weight, shock, and fire power to the infantry attack.

b. In recent reorganizations of the Aggressor Army, self-propelled (assault) guns were first made organic to the rifle regiment, and then a medium tank self-propelled gun regiment was made organic to the rifle division. This measure, while essentially a ratification of existing combat practices, confirms the intention of Aggressor to stress armor-infantry cooperation.

c. At present the SP-80 armed with an 80-mm gun is the standard rifle regiment assault gun. However, in view of its age, its light armament and fairly light armor—as compared with other Aggressor assault guns—this vehicle may be replaced by a more modern assault gun.

d. The T40/80 is the standard medium tank of the medium tank regiment of the rifle division. It is armed with an 80-mm tank gun. The SP-105 which mounts a version of the 105-mm antitank gun on a T-40 chassis is the standard self-propelled gun of the medium tank regiment, rifle division. This vehicle apparently serves primarily as a tank-support assault gun rather than as an infantry-support assault gun although it is found within the rifle division.

e. In addition to the armored units organic to the rifle regiment and the rifle division, infantry units may be supported by independent tank regiments from GHQ troops. During previous campaigns these units usually supported infantry regiments taking part in a major offensive and, since they still exist in the Aggressor Army, it is probably that they will be similarly employed in the future.

f. Tank or assault guns are not, as a rule, detached from large mechanized formations for use in an infantry support role. Large mechanized formations are held together to perform operational missions.

266. Tank Units in Support of Infantry in the Offense

a. General.

- (1) The tanks organic to a rifle division and attached tank units are normally parcelled out in small units (companies) for the support of the division's subordinate units. During previous campaigns the Aggressor usually placed a tank battalion in support of each infantry regiment for an attack against deliberate field fortifications in some depth.
- (2) The mission of a tank battalion or other armored unit supporting an infantry attack is to give close support to the infantry and to assist it in its mission of taking and holding ground and of annihilating the enemy forces. The battalion, by application of its superior fire and movement, concentrates its efforts upon the liquidation of strong points and upon heavy weapons holding up the infantry.
- (3) When assault guns are not available to support the tanks, infantry antitank guns often are attached to the tank units and assigned tank-support missions. Where assault guns are available, towed antitank guns normally are not used in this manner. Small groups of riflemen or submachinegunners also may be assigned to protect tanks from enemy infantrymen.

b. Preparation for the Attack.

- (1) Tank units are held in a bivouac area (concentration area) approximately 25 miles behind the frontlines during the initial preparations for a major offensive operation. The bi-

vousac area should be located well out of hostile artillery range and should provide cover and concealment from enemy air and ground observation. The position must provide good approach roads and good routes of advance to the sector of commitment.

- (2) Two or three days before the attack, the tank units normally move forward to an assembly area (intermediate position). In this assembly area the units are organized for combat and supplies are issued. The assembly area should provide concealment for the tanks and is located between 8 and 10 miles behind the forward positions. Every effort is made to conceal the movement forward to the assembly area.
- (3) Tank units are assigned to dispersal areas within the assembly areas. Individual tanks are placed at 50-yard intervals from each other. Tanks are camouflaged immediately, and the tracks made by entering the assembly area are eradicated. Attack preparations undertaken in the assembly area include—
 - (a) A mechanical check of the tanks and the performance of necessary maintenance.
 - (b) Digging of emplacements for the tanks and pits for the crews.
 - (c) Bore-sighting of cannon and checking of machinegun sights.
 - (d) Checking the traversing and elevating mechanisms, optical sights, recoil and firing mechanisms, and making necessary adjustments.
 - (e) Cleaning of all weapons.
 - (f) Checking of all communications equipment, including the tank radios and intercom sets.
 - (g) Checking and replenishing of fuel and water.
 - (h) Checking of spare parts kits, instruments, accessories, and entrenching tools.
 - (i) Issuing of emergency rations.
- (4) As a result of previous experience, Aggressor places heavy stress upon passive air defense in armored assembly areas. Tanks normally are dug in and an observation and warning network is set up. Organic and attached antiaircraft units provide active antiaircraft defense for the tank units.
- (5) While the troops are in the assembly area, the unit commanders move forward to make a reconnaissance of the terrain and enemy in the sector in which they are to be com-

mitted. The various tank commanders take part in the command reconnaissance of the infantry commander whose units they will support.

- (6) After the command reconnaissance the tank platoon leader summons his tank commanders and drivers to join him at the attack positions. The platoon leader then issues his orders from an observation point. When he is certain that his orders are understood, the platoon leader and subordinates return to the assembly area. The platoon commander then makes a final check of his vehicles and reports the status of his preparations to the company commander.
- (7) Just prior to the attack, the tank units move forward to the attack position. The distance from this position to the front-line differs according to the terrain and the situation but normally is between 1,000 and 3,500 yards. The attack position, according to Aggressor doctrine, must provide cover for the tanks against fire from mortars, light artillery, and direct-fire weapons and should have concealed approaches to the front and rear. If time permits, vehicle and personnel shelters are dug before the arrival of the tanks. The tanks do not remain in this position more than 1 hour.
- (8) The move forward into the attack position often is made at night or under cover of an artillery barrage calculated to make the noises made by the tanks from the foe. Smoke also may be used to mask this move.
- (9) If possible, the tank units observe the effects of the friendly artillery preparation from the attack position.
- (10) In some cases, especially where time is short or the terrain is difficult, tank units do not occupy an attack position but move into a line of deployment. In such cases, the tanks prepare to take up their combat formations on the way forward from the assembly area. The final deployment takes place on the line of inverted wedge and echelon right or left. The choice of formation depends upon the nature of the attack objective, the width of the attack frontage, and upon the terrain. The wedge and inverted-wedge formations are adopted when the situation is unclear since it is comparatively easy to change direction from these formations. The wedge formation also affords strong security for the flanks, while the inverted wedge makes reinforcement of either flank simple. Echelon formations are used when it is necessary to afford special protection to one flank of the unit.

c. Conduct of the Attack.

- (1) Approximately 10 minutes before the tanks move out, their motors are normally started on a signal from the company commander. On a further signal from him, the tanks move out of the attack position at the highest speed the terrain will permit. When they have passed through the infantry formations drawn up on the line of assault, the tanks open fire on the move with both cannon and machineguns. Aggressor regulations stipulate that tanks in the offensive will thus fire on the move against enemy infantry and heavy weapons. Even during the assault phase, fire from the halt will be used only against enemy armor—from hull defilade if possible.
- (2) The tank units take full advantage of available cover and concealment in their advance, without reducing the momentum of their attack. As the tanks approach the enemy MLR, they intensify their fire without slowing down, and seek to destroy enemy antitank and mortar crews and infantrymen. At the same time the tanks assist the friendly infantry by tearing passages through barbed wire entanglements; by making concerted attacks against strong points holding up the infantry; and by holding captured strong points until the arrival of the infantry.
- (3) Tank units cross antitank obstacles aided by fire from other tanks, from self-propelled (assault) guns and from the artillery. If the tanks cannot overcome a barrier without assistance, the tanks retire behind cover from which they keep up an intensive fire upon the enemy position until the infantry and engineers arrive with help to create the necessary passages through the antitank obstacle. If only a limited passage can be created, one or more tanks pass through at a time, covered by fire from other tanks.
- (4) The infantry in designating targets to tanks and vice versa usually employs tracer bullets, colored smoke, and similar signals as well as radio. It is probable that radio will be used far more frequently, although tracers and smoke undoubtedly will continue to play an important role in target designation between the components of the tank-infantry team.
- (5) Tanks, seeking to neutralize individual targets, adopt tactics according to the terrain and the situation. Usually a frontal, flanking, or rear attack is employed. The frontal attack is made when the terrain or other factors preclude envelopment, e. g., in swamps, deep ravines, and mine fields. The

flanking or rear attack is used whenever the enemy objective has an open flank. If the terrain does not permit a concealed approach to the open flank, one tank may seek to draw the fire and the attention of the strong point's crew while the other tanks maneuver into position for a flank or rear attack. In some cases, double envelopment is employed. Flanking attacks are generally preferable to frontal attacks.

- (6) During the battle within the enemy's battle position, the tanks are expected to keep close behind the accompanying (rolling) barrage. Aggressor regulations suggest 75 to 100 yards as an appropriate distance, and stress that failure to keep up with the barrage results in increased tank losses.
- (7) In the event of a tank-infantry counterattack by the enemy, Aggressor attempts to hit the enemy tanks from the flank rather than frontally. If the terrain does not permit maneuver, the Aggressor tanks take cover and allow the enemy tanks to approach. The Aggressor then opens fire at short ranges from the flank. When necessary, smoke pots and smoke grenades may be used to conceal maneuver or to fake the burning of tanks.
- (8) Various assembly areas are planned for tank units within the enemy position according to need. These assembly areas are established to permit resupply and reorganization after the completion of all or part of the combat mission.
- (9) If it appears that the enemy is seeking to disengage and retreat, the tank commanders from company level report this fact to higher echelons and take up the pursuit without waiting for orders. If the enemy is retreating in disorder, the tanks seek to break into formations and destroy them.

267. Tank Units in Support of Infantry in the Defense

a. Tank units supporting infantry are used as a reserve force for counterattacks from the depth of the defense and for defending lines or points until the arrival of friendly infantry. Some tanks may be assigned special missions to fight as individual pillboxes, to take part in ambushes, or to serve as roving tanks.

b. When the tank unit functions as a counterattack reserve, the commander places it in an assembly area (intermediate position). The assembly area is chosen with the area of commitment in mind. It is organized for perimeter defense and an observation system is established. The tank platoons are assigned primary and secondary sectors of observation and fire for local security. Individual tanks are dug in and each tank commander prepares at least one alternate posi-

tion. Fields of fire from tank positions are cleared and firing data calculated. Camouflage discipline is strictly enforced.

c. After receiving his combat mission, the tank commander takes his subordinate commanders on a terrain reconnaissance in the areas in which counterattacks are contemplated. Special care is devoted to the selection of concealed firing positions and ambushes and to the preparation of passages through obstacle networks and other barriers within the battle positions.

d. To assure proper and efficient operation, the commander provides his subordinate commanders with the following information:

- (1) Nature of the enemy force and the expected direction of the attack.
- (2) Mission of the rifle unit operating with the tank unit in the area or sector of defense.
- (3) Identity and mission of adjacent forces.
- (4) Mission assigned to the tank unit and probable direction of commitment, the attack position or deployment line, and assembly areas.
- (5) Signals for launching and counterattack, for opening fire from position, and proper radio communications procedure.
- (6) His own position.

e. The tank unit commences its counterattack upon a signal from its commander, usually in response to orders from above. The tank unit on occasion may open surprise fire from position before counter-attacking.

f. When the tank unit has the mission of defending a terrain, sector, or position until the arrival of friendly infantry, the commander organizes an all-round defense, selects favorable firing positions, and employs his tanks, which are dug in, as pillboxes. In siting his tanks, the commander seeks to insure—

- (1) All-round fire.
- (2) Commencing fire at maximum ranges.
- (3) Protection of his flanks, limiting points, and boundaries by fire.
- (4) Fire coordination with adjacent units.
- (5) Possibility of delivering flank attacks against penetrating hostile forces.
- (6) Speed of commitment as a counterattack force.

g. Pits and slit trenches are prepared for the tanks and crews. The tanks are camouflaged against ground and air reconnaissance.

h. The tank unit is expected to continue to fight even if completely surrounded and may withdraw only upon orders from above. In-

fantry troops cooperating with the tanks may be called upon to provide combat security.

i. Individual tanks assigned the mission of fighting as a pillbox are dug in and carefully camouflaged. Distances to prominent terrain features chosen as reference points are measured and range cards are prepared. The tank crew then fights like the crew of any strong point.

j. Tanks operating as part of an ambush force usually deliver surprise counterattacks against the flanks of enemy armored forces already halted by fire from Aggressor towed antitank guns, assault guns, or heavy tanks. When necessary, however, Aggressor tanks will directly engage enemy tanks frontally from covered and concealed positions.

k. The usual Aggressor antitank ambush is called a "firesack." The "firesack" is formed by disposing towed antitank guns, assault guns, heavy and medium tanks, or a mixed force including these elements to form a deep pocket into which enemy tanks are lured or driven. Valleys or ravines often are utilized for this purpose. During this type of operation, Aggressor forces are deployed along the surrounding slopes. The enemy enters the "firesack" unmolested and then is hit by a sudden burst of fire from all sides. A counterattack may be launched to insure complete annihilation.

l. Under special conditions tanks may be employed as roving guns. These tanks seek to deceive the enemy concerning the real disposition within the Aggressor defensive system. The roving tank operates by firing several rounds, changing position, and firing again. In this manner the enemy often can be deceived as to the number and the location of the tanks, antitank guns, and artillery units of the Aggressor force.

m. Firing positions for roving tanks are chosen according to orders from higher headquarters. Employment of roving tanks is a part of the overall deception plan of the higher commander.

268. Self-Propelled Guns in Support of Infantry in the Offense

a. Self-propelled (assault) guns operating in support of infantry units in the offense, function as close-support, direct-fire artillery pieces. They are expected to destroy infantry heavy weapons and antitank guns firing upon the infantry and to neutralize or destroy enemy strong points.

b. Self-propelled gun companies move up from their assembly areas in the same manner as tanks and occupy attack positions as do the tanks. Tactics thereafter, however, differ from those of the tanks.

c. Shortly before the end of the artillery preparation, the assault guns move forward and occupy previously prepared and camouflaged firing positions behind the forward elements of the infantry. Their movement forward is screened by the artillery preparation and, if necessary, by smoke. The firing positions usually are located on unit flanks and are sited so as to permit direct fire upon enemy weapons firing on the infantry.

d. During the attack the assault guns advance behind the forward infantry units, firing on targets of opportunity or on targets which the infantry designate to them by use of tracers, smoke, or radio. Assault guns, unlike tanks, are expected to fire from the halt. They advance slowly by bounds from firing position to firing position keeping pace with the infantry. Usually the first few firing positions are prechosen. In the depth of the enemy defenses, however, the assault gun unit commanders must choose their own positions.

e. The importance of the self-propelled gun units increases as the Aggressor infantry penetrates deeper into the enemy's defenses and as conventional artillery support decreases in efficiency and volume. Tactics of the assault guns, however, remain the same.

269. Self-Propelled Guns in Support of Infantry in the Defense

a. In the defense the assault guns supporting an infantry unit normally are employed as part of the regimental counterattack reserve or as individual pillboxes. When they are employed as part of the counterattack reserve, the assault guns function essentially as they do when taking part in normal offensive actions.

b. Self-propelled guns also can be used as roving guns or in ambush. In a roving gun mission, they operate in the same general manner as a roving tank. As part of an antitank ambush, the assault guns often are placed where they can take the enemy force under frontal fire, whereas medium tanks normally are placed on the flanks or held for counterattack against the flanks.

270. Self-Propelled Guns in Support of Tanks

a. Since the medium tank regiment of the infantry division contains assault guns as well as tanks and because Aggressor independent tank units operating in support of infantry may be supported by self-propelled guns, it is necessary to consider the tactics of self-propelled guns supporting tanks.

b. In the support of tanks the primary mission of Aggressor self-propelled guns (which usually carry a heavier caliber or more effective guns than the tanks they support) is to protect the tanks from the direct fire of enemy tanks, self-propelled guns, and antitank guns.

These self-propelled gun units have a secondary mission of destroying strong points or weapons which are holding up or harassing the Aggressor infantry. They perform this secondary mission in the absence of a threat to the Aggressor tanks.

c. The comparatively greater range and heavier hitting ability of the SP-guns coupled with the increased accuracy achieved by firing from the halt, enables them to provide much more effective tank-support fire than could be delivered by towed guns or by indirect artillery fire.

d. In the defense the self-propelled guns usually operate as part of the counterattack force, performing their usual tank support role. They may also be used in conjunction with tank units, in antitank ambushes, or as individual pillboxes.

CHAPTER 9

SPECIAL OPERATIONS

Section I. AIRBORNE OPERATIONS

271. Basic Tactics

a. The Aggressor considers that airborne troops should be used as a surprise element and should be employed in sufficient strength to insure successful operation against the selected objective. When dropped on enemy rear and flank areas, airborne troops can contribute to the defeat and destruction of the enemy by bold and determined maneuvers. Darkness and deception are used to strike the enemy where he least expects it. Once landed, basic infantry tactics are employed. Full use is made of captured weapons and equipment because Aggressor airborne units are armed and equipped lighter than regular infantry.

b. A drop during an offensive breakthrough is most effective if made during the day or at dusk and coordinated with the operations of the advancing ground forces. Tactical control of landed airborne units operating in support of mobile elements in an offensive passes to the commander of the mobile troops when the two elements join forces.

272. Types of Airborne Operations

a. Strategic. Aggressor defines airborne operations as strategic, operational, or tactical. These types are distinguished one from another by the scope and significance of the action. The term strategic is used for large-scale operations carried out well behind enemy lines. The objective of this type of operation is to impair the enemy's war-making capabilities by seizing or neutralizing industrial, administrative, and other strategic targets. Continuous air superiority is needed to protect the airborne force before and after landing and to secure air resupply routes. The operation is carried out in two stages—parachutists and glider forces are landed first; then the main army size body is landed by transport aircraft.

b. Operational. Operational airborne operations are carried out deep in the enemy rear defensive area. The operations proceed in conjunction with frontal operations by large ground forces of army

or army group size. A small parachute force usually is dropped to seize airfields or potential landing areas. This force is followed by the main body which is landed from transport aircraft and gliders. The composition and size of the units landed depend upon the mission and the expected enemy opposition. The operational airborne units are relieved or reinforced by the main body when the two forces join.

c. Tactical. Tactical airborne operations are on a somewhat smaller scale than the above-mentioned types. These operations are executed by parachute and glider troops in limited depth behind enemy lines. According to Aggressor doctrine, this type of unit is not to remain isolated from the advancing Aggressor ground forces for more than 5 days. A tactical airborne force normally is used in the direction of the main effort. Aggressor doctrine prescribes the following objectives for tactical airborne operations:

- (1) Facilitate the breakthrough of the main zone of resistance.
- (2) Delay the forward movement of enemy reserves or divert their commitment from the point of main effort.
- (3) Complete the encirclement of enemy forces and take control of commanding heights.
- (4) Seize enemy antitank and artillery positions and simultaneously disrupt his communication lines.
- (5) Disrupt enemy rear area activities and destroy his stocks of tactical ammunition and fuel.
- (6) Seize tactical airfields, brigades, and other objectives.

273. Concentrated and Dispersed Action

a. Two general tactical schemes of operation are followed by Aggressor airborne forces—concentrated action and dispersed action. The choice between these two methods depends upon the purpose of the airborne operation, the strength and disposition of the enemy, and geographical considerations. For both concentrated and dispersed action, Aggressor stresses the advantages provided by the cover of darkness. Reconnaissance teams are dropped two or three days before the major landings. These teams carry out a thorough reconnaissance of the area and report their findings by radio to the headquarters directing the commitment of the airborne force. Thus, when the troops land, they have a fairly detailed knowledge of the local situation and of the terrain.

b. Concentrated action is undertaken by a relatively large coordinated force. The action is similar to the type of operation performed by United States paratroops in World War II. It is used by the Aggressor to reduce fortified areas or strong points, to destroy key installations, or to hold important areas until relieved by ground

forces. Aggressor airborne forces have had limited practical experience in the execution of concentrated action.

c. Dispersed action generally is directed against targets covering a wide area or is used for harassing operations aimed at the destruction of materiel and the disruption of communications and command. The action is often coordinated with the operations of large Aggressor ground units. It is then a highly effective means of achieving the maximum of confusion in enemy ranks at the most propitious time. Aggressor airborne forces have had fairly extensive experience in this type of operation.

d. Dispersed action may be initiated in two ways—the entire force may be landed in a central drop zone from which the individual subordinate units disperse to perform their assigned tasks; or the small units may be dropped in the vicinity of specific targets. Plans are provided for assembling dispersed units.

Section II. AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS

274. Previous Experiences

Heretofore, Aggressor has carried out a number of amphibious operations, several of which involved large forces, such as the Caribbean, California, and St. Lawrence campaigns. A number of smaller operations were carried out in Hawaii and Alaska.

275. Present Capabilities

a. Judging from their literature, Aggressor appreciates fully the potentialities of amphibious operations. Furthermore, the use of naval forces for coastal action fits particularly well with their general concept of naval power. Aggressor has had the opportunity to study United States and British amphibious techniques, and Aggressor possesses numerous United States amphibious craft; also, German World War II equipment and knowledge are available to them. Since 1946, in addition to the above-mentioned campaigns, numerous amphibious exercises involving divisional size forces have been held in the maritime areas of the Homeland.

b. Present Aggressor amphibious capabilities, consequently, must be assessed much higher than they have been.

276. Doctrine

a. Aggressor amphibious doctrine is conventional and unexceptional. Amphibious operations of any size are conducted by mixed forces of both army and navy units. Naval personnel, known as Naval Infantry (*Marfuzilieroj*), usually compose the initial assault force and the army troops make up the main body.

b. The primary offensive mission of Aggressor Naval Infantry is to establish an initial beachhead of sufficient depth for the subsequent employment of large-scale ground forces. Secondary offensive missions include commando-type raids, reconnaissance patrols, and sorties in force.

c. Although numerous army divisions have participated in amphibious exercises since 1945, no army units are specifically designated as amphibious units. Once the beachhead has been established, regularly trained and equipped army units extend the battle from the beachhead.

d. Ground, naval, and air components assigned to an amphibious mission are organized under a unified commander. Aggressor regulations state that the senior naval officer embarked shall be designated the overall commander of the landing operation and that the commander of the army troops is to be initially subordinate to him.

e. The naval commander conducts amphibious operations in the planning and movement phase. He has the responsibility of fixing the date, time, and place of the landing within the framework of the basic plan. Control is transferred when the commander of landing troops reports to the overall commander that the beachhead is firmly established. On orders from the ground commander, the ships and aircraft supporting the ground forces open fire. The ground commander gives this order through his artillery commander who exercises overall fire control.

f. In sizable amphibious operations, one or more brigades of naval infantry are normally attached to each rifle corps, with battalions often further attached to divisions as specialized troops to form the assault wave of the landing. These troops are landed over a wide front in platoon-size teams. The landings take place in three phases each with a specific objective.

(1) The first landing party is armed with light machineguns, 80-mm mortars, SMG's and rifles. The party moves inland, bypassing fortified strong points to establish a perimeter of defense. Each subunit of this group defends its sector of the front and ties in with elements on either flank.

(2) The second group is an obstacle-clearing party equipped with demolition equipment, wire cutters, and explosives. The group is responsible for the removal of mines, wire, and other obstacles.

(3) The third group is heavily armed with automatic weapons and is responsible for reducing the bypassed strong points.

g. Debarkation schedules for rifle and mine-clearing parties are arranged according to the type of defenses expected.

h. If the primary defenses are known to consist of permanent installations, the mine-clearing groups may be landed under cover of darkness as much as 8 to 10 hours prior to the actual assault. If, on the other hand, the defense is expected to depend chiefly upon fire power, the rifle elements may be landed first.

i. After a shallow beachhead has been established by the special naval infantry troops, the main body is landed. The main body passes through the preliminary beachhead and undertakes the assault and reduction of the inland enemy forces. When this is accomplished, the naval infantry troops are relieved. Whenever possible, the Aggressor tries to establish a preliminary beachhead near port facilities. They try to take these facilities as soon as possible so that the main force can be landed directly from transports.

Section III. WINTER AND ARCTIC WARFARE

277. Distinctive Features

a. Aggressor cold-weather operations differ from normal operations less in tactics than in maintenance and supply techniques. Vehicles for this type of operation are provided with simple, sturdy motors. The vehicles are regularly heated and are provided with special lubricants. Some special transport vehicles, such as motor sleds, are used.

b. The tactical differences that do exist are mainly those imposed by the terrain and weather. Thus, in cold weather, operations are slower and objectives less distant than under normal conditions. Adequate personnel shelters, ignored where exposure causes mere discomfort, receive top priority in winter operations. Hence, settlements become focal points for winter combat operations.

c. Troop movements generally are restricted to the vicinity of roads because snow over open terrain not only impedes movement but hides obstacles. However, roads usually are avoided in order to preserve their snow cover and protect them from destruction during the spring thaws. Special "winter roads" of ice and snow are used instead. Aggressor policy calls for only a limited number of special ski troops, motor sled battalions, and other specialized winter units. Most of the winter fighting is done by ordinary units with limited special training. The special ski brigades are fusilier troops, but the "ski battalions" in rifle divisions are frequently ordinary infantrymen equipped with skis or snowshoes. Special arrangements are made for supplying heavier caliber artillery than is normal. These arrangements are needed to compensate for the greater resistance of frozen earthworks and for the reduced efficiency of mortar and artillery bursts in deep snow.

278. Camouflage and Deception

The usual stress on camouflage and deception is carried over into winter warfare in an intensified form. Vehicles are painted white or mottled white; troops wear white camouflage suits; tanks travel in columns with the last tank dragging a tree trunk or roller to obliterate the tracks. Sometimes skiers drag branches behind them for the same purpose. Small-scale attacks often are initiated in blizzards or snowstorms. Everywhere there is an unrelenting effort to maintain camouflage and to attain deception and surprise.

279. Winter Roads

Aggressor measures to overcome reduced mobility in Arctic regions represent their greatest contribution to winter warfare. The local population and captured personnel are impressed to lay corduroy log roads. Winter roads, ice bridges, and similar improvisations aid in building new transportation nets. Aggressor troops, therefore, are freed from dependence upon the local road system and are able to achieve tactical surprise.

280. Offense

a. The preliminary activities phase of Aggressor offensive operations frequently is timed to coincide with cold weather. The cold reduces the vigilance of hostile sentries and keeps the main body of the enemy force indoors. Swift-moving ski brigades, with or without armored units, can slip easily through the enemy lines to conduct raids and to study enemy activities and dispositions. Such forces move swiftly and constantly, covering great distances. The men return to their own lines by a different route. These reconnaissance forces often mine their tracks to harass and delay possible pursuers.

b. Concentrations and assembly areas for the attack are much closer to the front than in normal operations. The infantry assault line also is pushed forward, practically to the enemy frontlines. Sometimes Aggressor assault troops tunnel forward through deep snow to avoid betraying their presence.

c. The attack is preceded by air and artillery preparations. Aerial reconnaissance is stressed because hostile forces often are betrayed by traces in the snow.

d. The first echelons of the attacking troops do not remain long in their assault positions because of the cold. These first echelons often wear skis or snowshoes and are armed with submachineguns and grenades. Succeeding echelons, including the reserves of the assault units, also may be equipped with skis or snowshoes.

e. Wherever possible, tanks and self-propelled guns are used instead of conventional artillery. If the snow is light, tanks operate according to normal tactical doctrine. In heavy snow the tanks follow the advancing infantry. Where necessary, the infantry makes paths and bridges for the vehicles.

f. Ski troops and motor sleds may be expected to spearhead Aggressor pursuit columns in winter warfare. Cavalry, tank, and mechanized formations, and motorized infantry are employed only if the snow is less than 20 inches deep. Artillery's main mission in cold-weather pursuit is to drive the enemy from roads and out of open areas. The enemy thus is held floundering in deep snow while the pursuit overtakes or bypasses him. Air support is used extensively in winter pursuit.

281. Defense

a. Defensive systems are far more difficult to build in winter than in summer. Aggressor engineers are kept busy building and supervising the building of shelters, emplacements, and supply routes in defensive situations.

b. Aggressor defensive plans utilize inclement weather to harass and destroy the enemy. The entire defensive system is organized so as to minimize the effect of the weather upon Aggressor personnel and to exaggerate its effect on the foe. All cover in a broad zone forward of the main line of resistance is destroyed so that the enemy is forced to remain in the open when attacking the Aggressor defensive position. The battle position selected usually lies on high ground behind obstacles, so that attacking enemy infantry will be exhausted. If possible, rolling terrain with enough patches of wood and villages to accommodate the Aggressor force is included in the position.

c. The defense system usually is not continuous. Instead, the system consists of strong points and battalion defense centers built around villages and hamlets. Dead areas which cannot be covered by small arms fire are blocked by obstacles and are covered by mortar and artillery concentrations. Reserves are held under cover; they are trained in ski or snowshoe travel and are familiarized with the terrain where they are likely to be committed during the battle.

d. The chief use of the artillery beyond the defense of the battle position is to deny to the enemy the use of settled areas and roads. The object is to force the enemy to remain exposed in deployed formations.

Section IV. COMBAT IN WOODS AND SWAMPS

282. General

a. The Aggressor shows a decided preference for fighting in woodlands and swamps. He is attracted to this sort of terrain because of the possibilities for surprise and because he feels that he excels in combat under such conditions. Not even flooded swamps are absolute barriers to the Aggressor infantry.

b. The main burden of attack in woodlands falls upon the infantry. The usefulness of artillery is reduced considerably. Tanks cannot be used in large numbers independently of infantry. Great emphasis is placed upon mortars and automatic or semiautomatic infantry weapons. Submachineguns, pistols, and semiautomatic rifles are preferred to light and heavy machineguns.

c. Aggressor forest operations are distinguished by the rapidity with which the road network necessary for large-scale logistical support is constructed. Mass impressment of local labor and the use of the troops themselves enable the engineers to construct an entirely new road net behind the advancing force. This added manpower makes the attacking force independent of the existing road net. It also permits freedom of movement and reduces vulnerability to hostile reconnaissance.

283. Offense

a. Additional automatic weapons are issued to the troops if necessary. The troops are trained in methods of orienting themselves with and without a compass. Reconnaissance is conducted throughout the enemy positions. The information obtained is checked by interrogation of prisoners and civilians and by aerial photography.

b. The attack usually is preceded by a heavy air and artillery preparation. The air force concentrates on clearings, on the edges of forest areas, and on roads and paths. Artillery and mortar fires are directed toward the main lines of resistance and on any forward pockets of resistance.

c. The infantry attack is launched as the preparation ends. The infantry attempts to close with the foe as swiftly as possible. With heavy automatic fire and liberal use of grenades, the infantry advances to within bayonet range of the enemy. The general inclination of Aggressor troops to use the bayonet is intensified in forest combat.

d. When out of contact, Aggressor troops maintain strict silence in order to avoid identification and spotting by the enemy. Crossings and clearings are avoided in order to maintain combat security and because of vulnerability to air attack. Clearings held by the

enemy are bypassed until the arrival of reserves. The reserves clear out such pockets and guard against flank attacks.

e. The chief indirect fire support for the attack is provided by mortars, although the artillery fires an accompanying (rolling) barrage ahead of the troops. Heavy machineguns are used along roads and paths to protect flanks. Antitank guns are concentrated in areas favorable for enemy armored strikes. Individual artillery pieces accompany the infantry to provide direct fire support.

f. If tanks are used, they generally advance slowly behind the infantry screen, functioning as self-propelled guns. However, if the forest leads out upon good tank country, operational tank and mechanized units may follow the attacking force, ready to undertake missions beyond the edge of the forest.

284. Defense

a. The Aggressor defense of forest and swampland is extremely stubborn. Even when the ground is too waterlogged to permit digging useful foxholes, the Aggressor infantryman exploits the natural possibilities of the terrain to create a concealed and at least partly covered position. Wherever digging is possible, he disappears completely.

b. The main line of resistance usually is located in the depth of the forest, and never at its edge. The defensive position is carefully and cleverly constructed to provide interlocking fires and a formidable fire and obstacle network. Bunkers are set up in clumps of bushes or thickets. Foxholes and gun positions are sunk between the roots of trees. Barbed wire entanglements are threaded through the underbrush and are covered with foliage. All of these obstacles are covered by fire. Reserves are held in positions organized for perimeter defense.

c. Fields of fire are cleared only to the height of a man's hip so that they cannot be seen by an erect enemy soldier. Cut foliage and other debris are moved away and normal conditions are restored.

d. Mortars are located close behind the defensive lines to provide adequate support. Antitank guns and individual field pieces are emplaced for direct fire from the defensive position.

e. The infantry, as always in the defense, is the primary arm. Aggressor doctrine requires that the troops close with the enemy in hand-to-hand combat as soon as possible. Thus, the troops hold their fire until the enemy infantry is almost upon them. Then the Aggressor troops open withering automatic and mortar fire and strike with a counterattack.

f. In areas where the woods form salients, interdictory barrages are fired by the artillery because the enemy is expected to try to take these projections first. Direct support is rendered primarily by individual guns assigned direct fire missions.

g. If the forest is sufficiently open, armor is held as a mobile reserve. If the forest is thick, tanks may be dug individually and employed as pillboxes. General reserves are used for counterattacks as needed.

Section V. NIGHT FIGHTING

285. General

Aggressor makes extensive use of the cover of darkness for movement and for offensive operations. Aggressor night attacks are highly disconcerting even after troops have been trained to expect and to counter these attacks.

286. Offense

a. Aggressor prepares for night attacks even more carefully than for other offensive operations. Surprise is the chief factor considered in choosing the time for a night attack. Where surprise is doubtful, the Aggressor may attack just as the foe has settled down for the night. But other conditions being equal, the Aggressor prefers the predawn hours so that he can exploit his success by daylight.

b. The area to be attacked is painstakingly observed and reconnoitered in advance. Plans are made for neutralizing all emplacements and weapons included in the enemy defensive system. Lanes through friendly obstacle systems are laid and if necessary are marked. Troops are familiarized with the special recognition measures adopted to minimize the confusion normal to night fighting.

c. Major offensives sometimes are launched with a night attack designed to seize footholds within the enemy position. Such footholds enable the main force to launch the major attack from closer proximity to the hostile positions.

d. Aggressor units frequently infiltrate the enemy lines during the night. These units either attack the enemy's vulnerable rear areas or set up stubborn defensive positions within the enemy's battle zone. Here the Aggressor units can assist an attacking force by delivering enfilade fire and by directing artillery fire. The infiltrated units often are not discovered until daylight. By then they have set up a perimeter defense that includes heavy weapons and sometimes artillery pieces. These positions are extremely hard to dislodge. They are further expanded and fortified during every additional night that they remain undestroyed.

e. To facilitate surprise, night attacks usually are launched without an artillery preparation, although a full fire plan is developed. Where surprise is unlikely or when neutralization of key strong points is deemed essential, a short but violent artillery preparation is employed.

f. The main burden of the night attack falls upon the infantry. The troops advance in formation at reduced intervals, seeking to close with the enemy. Marching fire, grenades, and bayonets are the primary weapons of the attackers. Machineguns are used primarily to defend the flanks of the attacking echelons.

g. Armor often is employed in support of the infantry. In some cases attacks by operational tank and mechanized formations are launched at night.

h. Artillery and mortars support the actual attack by means of prepared concentrations and by interdictory barrages designed to seal off routes of approach for enemy reserves or counterattacks. Tactical air action often supplements artillery support. Searchlights often are used to provide better visibility for the attackers and to blind the enemy forces. Tracers, illuminating shells, and other pyrotechnic means are used also for illumination and target designation.

i. In the event of a repulse the infantry reorganizes and launches a new attack which follows an artillery, mortar, and machinegun preparation.

j. After a partial success has been achieved or a limited objective captured, Aggressor quickly organizes and fortifies the newly won terrain for use as a defensive or offensive base.

287. Defense

a. Despite his own preference for night warfare, the Aggressor is himself vulnerable to night attacks. In defense at night, the Aggressor adopts elaborate precautions to prevent surprise. Reconnaissance activity is redoubled and regular observation posts are supplemented by advanced listening posts. "Artificial moonlight" provided by searchlight beams projected against clouds is also used where the situation appears to warrant special precautions.

b. The defense is planned and fires are prepared during daylight hours. Thus, full fire support is available immediately for the infantry. Added weight of automatic weapons is placed in the forward line of defense. Additional direct fire support is provided by dug-in tanks.

c. The brunt of the actual battle is borne by the infantry, but all arms cooperate in providing support.

d. Wherever the enemy gains a foothold, counterattacks are launched immediately in an attempt to dislodge him before he can dig in and organize the captured terrain.

Section VI. PARTISAN OPERATIONS

288. General

a. Aggressor partisan operations are based on the same principle as the Circle Trigon strategic doctrine and tactics. The principle of working against an enemy from within and then striking unexpectedly at his weakest point, is stressed. Supporters of the Circle Trigon Party provide a worldwide network of underground movements which are at the continuous disposal of the Aggressor High Command. In wartime the Party sympathizers make an easy transition to partisan warfare.

b. Partisan tactics generally do not take the form of mass action. Instead, they become hit-and-run actions against small-scale limited objectives. The primary objective of the partisans is to enlarge the depth of the combat zone. This action adds to enemy confusion and siphons his frontline combat troops into security duties. Partisans must retain the initiative because the invading forces normally are able to bring superior numbers into action against them. The full effect of incessant partisan actions is felt only gradually by the enemy.

c. Official Aggressor histories of the Aggressor Uprising, books on partisan achievements, and songs about partisan heroes have all been aimed at making the Aggressor partisan a romantic legend.

289. Organization

a. There are two main types of Aggressor partisan groups. There are those that arise spontaneously, and those that are specially trained in Aggressor rear areas. Most partisan groups began as small units. They gradually expanded into detachments of from 50 to 200 persons. These light and mobile assault detachments proved to be the most effective. They in turn formed basic subdivisions of brigades. The brigade ordinarily contained a strength of from 400 to 3,000 men and women. This flexible organization permits considerable latitude in the type of partisan operation to be carried out.

b. The staff, whose identity and whereabouts are kept a closely guarded secret, consists of the commander, the political officer, and the chief of staff.

290. Personnel

a. As a general rule the Aggressor partisan is at least a semispecialist. His trade requires such technical abilities as good marksmanship and familiarity with explosives and communications. A partisan is tough and he is clever. He knows that he must always be alert.

b. Partisan's ranks included active fighters as young as 11 and as old as 80. Of 800 guerrillas captured from the Green Brigade in 1948

nine percent were women. The young, the old, and the women partisans served mainly as scouts, couriers, and service forces.

c. Many of the partisan leaders are either Aggressor Army regulars or Circle Trigonists. Others are former civic leaders and battle-tested veterans.

d. Partisan personnel included regular army men, party members, Aggressor Army personnel who have been cut off from their units, and local citizens. The majority of the partisans belong to the latter group. Thoroughly familiar with the local terrain, they flee to the country to escape the enemy and to support the Aggressor cause actively.

291. Supplies and Equipment

a. Initially, most partisan supplies are obtained from depots abandoned by the retreating Aggressor armies and from previously hidden caches. The Aggressor Army "Field Service Regulations" for 1945 stated that partisans provided themselves with arms and supplies mainly by capturing them from the enemy. Because it is easier to get ammunition for enemy weapons in behind the line operations, Aggressor partisans seem to prefer them to Aggressor weapons. In several instances the partisans have also captured a few armored cars and tanks from the enemy.

b. Aggressor airborne supplies are dropped to supply partisan forces. Weapons, ammunition, and medical supplies are the chief items dropped by parachute. Trained partisan leaders are often sent into combat areas via the same method. In some instances the partisans control areas large enough to justify construction of their own landing strips behind the front lines.

c. Partisan weapons vary almost as much as does the size of each unit. The most prevalent weapons are automatic rifles, machine-guns, and airborne and light mortars. Antitank mines and homemade box charges are used effectively against rail lines.

d. Partisans obtain their food supplies from the local population and from raids on enemy food stocks. The clothing worn is mostly of a civilian nature, though Aggressor and United States uniforms are commonly used. Although it is not standard procedure, some detachments are equipped with wireless transmitting-receiving sets.

292. Training

a. Demolition squads and sabotage groups are given special training by the Aggressor. The average partisan, however, receives only a minimum basic training. He receives most of his training from active participation.

b. The training at partisan schools stresses the use of weapons, grenades, and explosive charges. Special training is given in the collection of information. Furthermore, Aggressor civilians employed by the enemy are instructed to bring enemy information to Aggressor agents and contact men.

c. Aggressor secret agents often use partisan-controlled territory as a jumping-off ground for espionage work.

d. As happens in almost all Aggressor organizations, three or four counterintelligence agents are assigned to each partisan detachment. These agents are instructed to eliminate all traitors and those who do not adhere to Aggressor standards.

293. Tactics

a. A number of factors are favorable for partisan warfare in the Homeland. The terrain provides an abundance of shelter for concealment. The Aggressor people fight well from ambush. The few serviceable railroads are of great strategic importance to the enemy forces and the railroads are highly vulnerable.

b. The principal tasks of Aggressor partisans are to disrupt the enemy's logistical system, to destroy the enemy's forces and material, to engage in counterpropaganda, and to furnish intelligence of the enemy to the Aggressor.

c. The outstanding characteristics of most partisan attacks are thorough reconnaissance, excellent camouflage, surprise night attacks, initiative in action, and speedy withdrawals to wooded areas or swamps.

d. The success of any operation depends upon the ability of the partisan commander to act independently under entirely unexpected conditions. Thus, new tactics are developed continually to meet these needs.

294. Future of Partisan Operations

a. In view of the conspicuous success attained by partisans in the past, the Aggressor undoubtedly will include an army-coordinated partisan organization in his overall future planning. To achieve greater control over partisan operations and to avoid a repetition of the problems involved in disbanding partisan units, Aggressor will probably place greater stress upon trusted army leadership of partisan detachments. A military-political form of partisan organization can be expected to increase Aggressor control of these forces.

b. A successful partisan movement depends upon two main factors—the local population must be in sympathy with the movement, and the surrounding terrain must be suitable for concealing the partisan

bands. The absence of either or both of these factors will lessen the chances of a successful Aggressor partisan movement in these areas.

c. Future partisan operations probably will continue to be carried out by small units. Meanwhile, organizational flexibility will enable these small units to combine with similar groups should the circumstances prove favorable for large-scale action. To keep the party spirit alive and to inspire patriotism, the Aggressor will make maximum use of patriotic slogans and propaganda.

d. The emphasis currently being placed upon training parachutists and pilots among members of paramilitary units indicates a growing Aggressor appreciation of an air-minded youth. These trainees add large numbers to the vast reserve of skilled potential partisans in the Aggressor nations.

e. Increased paramilitary training and the rapid expansion of the Aggressor Air Force in the postwar period should enable Aggressor to furnish airborne supplies to future partisan detachments on a scale far greater than in the past. Furthermore, postwar communication advances in the Homeland should help to diminish the supply problem and should increase the close cooperation which exists between the partisans and regular army units.

f. Reports of existing International Brigades and of Aggressor aid to partisan movements in colonial areas are increasing. With nationalistic feeling surging throughout the world, direct Aggressor assistance to partisan-revolutionary groups will continue to magnify the already existing political problems.

g. If the Aggressor front advances, flexible underground Circle Trigon cells may be expected to advance along with it as "an organized advance guard of the new order."

Section VII. MOUNTAIN WARFARE

295. General

Aggressor military authorities believe that ordinary troops with some special mountain training are capable of fighting effectively in mountainous country up to levels of 9,000 feet. In higher mountains ordinary troops usually are reinforced by small units of mountain troops. In exceptionally high or rugged areas, Aggressor may use mountain divisions exclusively. Often in the past Aggressor mountain divisions were expended on regular infantry tasks. When they were needed for their own special type of mission, they were frequently understrength or diluted with poorly trained men.

296. Offense

a. Aggressor doctrine for mountain warfare is mainly basic Aggressor tactical doctrine with some modifications for special terrain and weather factors. The cold weather of high mountains is not exclusively a mountain phenomenon, so the truly distinctive characteristics of Aggressor mountain warfare are those imposed by terrain.

b. Mountainous terrain limits military activities in four principal respects—it channelizes maneuvers; it reduces the effectiveness of machineguns and low-trajectory artillery pieces; it complicates logistics; and finally, it adds hardships which lower personnel efficiency.

c. Aggressor mountain tactics involve unusually wide unit frontages with open flanks and gaps. Control is decentralized. Armor and artillery become less important while engineer troops become more so. Large reserves are held behind the intermittent front lines.

d. Antiaircraft defense is concentrated at sensitive points—at defiles, passes, crossroads, and at river crossings. Radio is the chief means of communication, although messengers and heliographs are also used. Wire is usually laid at right angles to the front and serves only the principal command posts.

e. Aggressor reconnaissance in mountain warfare is even more thorough and aggressive than usual. Because mountains severely limit static observation, patrols bear the main burden of reconnaissance. Parties of 15 or 20 men infiltrate enemy lines and often remain there for days at a time. Smaller groups parachute into enemy rear areas for reconnaissance or sabotage tasks. Specially trained teams of submachinegunners are considered particularly effective for combat reconnaissance work.

f. Mountainous terrain usually makes a closed front impossible to maintain. Therefore, Aggressor doctrine states that speed and violence in mountain offensive actions are the best protection for flank and rear areas.

g. Attacks are directed along broad valleys, plateaus, and crest levels. Frontal assaults are used only as a last resort. The terrain almost always forces the enemy to leave a flank exposed. Thus, the Aggressor prefers to outflank the enemy and force him to withdraw. If the enemy stands his ground, he will be surrounded. Meanwhile, infiltrating groups attack his rear installations and lines of communication. When the enemy attempts to withdraw, the infiltrating groups attack while the enemy forces are on the move. The attackers seek to delay or destroy enemy forces.

h. In mountain, as elsewhere, Aggressor doctrine stresses the advantage of the cover of darkness or storms for offensive action. On

more than one occasion Aggressor tanks have climbed a steep grade at night along a previously reconnoitered route to be in position to launch a surprise attack from an unexpected direction.

i. The flanks of forces operating along valleys are protected by sizable security units located on commanding heights.

j. Reserves are left at crossroads or at the heads of valleys to protect the rear of an advancing Aggressor force. These reserves are usually strong, amounting to as much as a sixth of an infantry force or a fourth of a cavalry one. Thus the reserves are of sufficient strength to meet the increased risks of surprise or infiltration so common in mountain warfare.

k. Infantry bears the brunt of mountain combat. Echeloned in depth, the infantry advances behind a fire screen that covers draws and approaches with fire and occupies intervening heights. Obstacles usually are bypassed rather than assaulted.

l. One regiment of a division normally proceeds along a road or trail while the other two move along adjacent heights, remaining within range of their artillery and mortar support. Mortars and light guns accompany the infantry. They are transported either by pack animals or manhandled by their crews and assigned infantrymen.

m. Regimental artillery, in most cases, is attached to infantry companies and platoons. Divisional artillery also may be decentralized or may be concentrated in a broad valley. The artillery, most of which is roadbound, directs its fire primarily upon enemy flanks to assist the envelopment efforts of the maneuver elements. In mountain operations many of the normal functions of artillery are taken over by mortars. The higher trajectory enables the mortars to place plunging fires on a greater number of targets.

n. Decreased mobility and increased vulnerability deprive armor of most of its value as a concentrated shock force. Direct infantry support becomes the chief mission of the tanks, although in broad valleys armor may be used in mass. Individual tanks or tank platoons may operate along the crests of the mountains if grades do not exceed 30°.

o. Engineers gain added importance in mountain operations. At least twice as many engineers are assigned each infantry division. The engineers are employed primarily in building and maintaining roads and paths and in setting up and clearing obstacles. The engineers also carry out demolitions behind enemy lines.

p. Aggressor cavalry has been used extensively in mountains, especially for envelopment, exploitation, and pursuit missions. Several of the 7,500-man cavalry divisions operate semi-independently

under the command of mountain corps rather than as part of cavalry corps.

q. Aggressor theory emphasizes the employment of airborne troops in mountain warfare. The theory holds that small units of paratroopers dropped in the rear of the foe can decide the entire action.

r. Tactical air support, used on a greater scale in mountain operations, helps to compensate for the reduced efficiency of artillery. Sometimes in rugged terrain this support is the only heavy "fire support" available to the troops.

297. Defense

a. The normal Aggressor defense in mountains is positional defense. When used in this type of terrain, positional defense is based upon deeply echeloned strong position points organized for perimeter defense. A powerful secondary zone of defenses and strong reserves back up the units in the main battle position.

b. Defensive positions are located on the forward slopes of commanding heights. All dominant terrain features are occupied. Gaps are covered by fire. Adjacent units organize their fires so as to cover each other's blind spots. Artillery and mortar-fires supplement flat trajectory fires. These fires cover dead ground and gaps, and they interdict approaches and enemy communication lines.

c. All villages are prepared for all-round defense. The defenses of narrow valleys are situated on the surrounding slopes. A fire and obstacle network with combat outposts is set up on the valley floor. Passes in the rear of friendly positions are prepared for perimeter defense. Command posts and observation posts are heavily guarded.

d. Routes along which counterattacks may be launched are carefully reconnoitered and are prepared in advance.

e. In the actual conduct of the defense, infantry assumes the major role. Reinforced combat outposts force the enemy to deploy early. Once the enemy has deployed, Aggressor discounts the likelihood of a frontal assault. They concentrate upon the enveloping element of the hostile force. Aggressor troops holding commanding heights remain in their positions even if bypassed. Reserves counterattack and destroy the penetrating force. Counterattacks are planned to catch the enemy while he is displacing forward. The counterattacks are carried out with or without armored support, depending upon the terrain and the situation.

f. The artillery is set up in chessboard fashion, staggered both in depth and in altitude. This complicates the hostile counterbattery problem. The artillery seeks to blind or destroy hostile observers, to hit reverse slopes, to interdict trails and roads, and to furnish direct support to the defenders of the various strong points. Some pieces

are placed on reverse slopes to deliver surprise short-range fires at troops advancing across the crest. Others are used to form fire-sacks in deep valleys. The principle of unified control is applied so far as the terrain will permit.

g. Armor is held on roads and in valleys and is used for counter-attacks. Small tank units often are employed in ambushes or for holding mouths of narrow valleys. Engineers are employed in building roads and trails behind friendly lines, in demolishing roads and trails behind the foe, and in setting up obstacle systems.

h. Tactical aviation supplies close combat support, delivers supplies and messages, attacks enemy rear areas, and is expected to combat hostile airborne forces which might be landed in localities inaccessible to Aggressor fire.

i. Mobile defense in mountains is based upon the holding of successive strong points. Mobile defense also is meant to provide energetic reserve action in covering withdrawal of the main force and in slowing down and inflicting casualties on the pursuing foe. Cavalry is considered to be well suited for mobile defense in mountains.

j. In the past, performance of Aggressor mountain troops has been at least equal to that of their opponents when they have encountered well-trained mountain divisions.

k. Because the Aggressor faces mountains in many directions, the military authorities are highly conscious of the problems posed by mountain warfare. Current indications are that the Aggressor Army has improved greatly its mountain training for some specialized units.

Section VIII. CITY WARFARE

298. Offense

a. Aggressor doctrine for city warfare, like that of the United States, requires that large towns or cities be surrounded before they are attacked. Attack on the city proper is not begun until the outlying field positions have been neutralized and captured.

b. Aggressor recognizes the difficulties of offensive operations in built-up areas. He takes great pains to overcome the difficulties by careful pre-assault training. The objective area is mapped in detail according to information collected by aggressive reconnaissance, careful observation, and the interrogation of local civilians. The city is divided into sectors which are assigned to individual units.

c. The reinforced rifle battalion is the primary tactical unit in street fighting. Three to six special assault teams are created from each battalion. These teams are heavily equipped with automatic weapons, all types of grenades, flame throwers, mortars, and machineguns.

Tanks, self-propelled guns, and artillery pieces are assigned to each team. In addition to the teams, each battalion forms a strong support group and a battalion reserve. The attack is preceded by an intensive artillery and air preparation. The intention is to saturate the town, destroy the enemy's heavy weapons, cut his communications, and knock out his command posts.

d. After the preparation, assault units infiltrate into the city, avoiding streets and squares. The assault usually is spearheaded by tanks or self-propelled guns carrying submachinegunners. Artillery pieces accompanying the infantry smash resistance by direct fire while automatic weapons cover windows and doors. Mortars deliver close-in fire. Tanks are used in main traffic arteries. Blocks are sealed off before the attack is undertaken. Houses are cleaned out systematically and methodically. Key houses or buildings are reduced first, especially corner one. Fighting is continuous. As one house is reduced, the teams move forward to another. The teams proceed through gaps in the walls of the captured houses.

e. Infantry reserves set up a strong defensive system in the cleared areas and provide new teams to replace groups destroyed or bled white. Mobile reserves are held ready to repel hostile counterattacks.

299. Defense

a. Aggressor considers towns and cities excellent defensive centers. They are willing to accept the consequent destruction of buildings and materiel. Therefore all urban communities are prepared in advance for defense.

b. The civilian population is mobilized and preparations are undertaken before the enemy arrives. Superfluous roads are blocked by obstacles and are covered by fire. Houses are reinforced. Subterranean communication passages are provided within the sewer or power networks. Strong points are developed into key positions and are tied together by fire.

c. The main line of defense is set up well forward of the edge of the city or at some distance back from the outskirts if possible. The line never is set up in the outskirts where it would be an exposed target. All the usual ruses and tactical devices are used to trap and destroy armor and to halt advancing enemy assault teams.

d. Aggressor defense of cities is extremely tenacious. In previous examples of Aggressor defense of cities, every house and every pile of rubble was tied into the defensive scheme. Antitank guns and conventional artillery were carefully emplaced and concealed. Areas relinquished to the enemy were frequently saturated with antitank and antipersonnel mines, booby traps, delay mines, and radio mines.

e. If the enemy succeeds in making a penetration of a city proper, Aggressor doctrine states that he must be expelled by immediate and successive counterattacks. Armor generally is employed for this purpose, usually in cooperation with infantry.

Section IX. RIVER CROSSINGS

300. Offense

a. General.

- (1) The Aggressor Army has had considerable experience in river crossings, both opposed and unopposed.
- (2) The Aggressor Army is adept at improvising bridging and ferrying equipment from local resources. During recent years, river-crossing training has been emphasized in Aggressor field training. Adequate regulation bridging and ferrying equipment now is available. Furthermore, many more troops have received formal training in river crossings and have learned to handle the specialized equipment. Consequently, Aggressor's capabilities for such operations have undoubtedly increased. If the equipment should be unavailable, the Aggressor troops always will be able to revert to more primitive methods.
- (3) Aggressor theory requires thorough and methodical preparation for a river crossing. Where the enemy has succeeded in creating a tight defensive system along the river line, a crossing undoubtedly will be carried out with thorough preparation. But wherever the enemy is still in flight or is struggling to reorganize, the Aggressor Army may be expected to effect a crossing in an improvised but successful manner. Thus, Aggressor river crossings may be divided generally into two types—prepared and hasty.

b. Prepared River Crossing. There are three major phases in a prepared Aggressor river crossing—preliminary activities, assault, and the crossing of the main body.

- (1) The preparatory phase is typical of the Aggressor pre-attack operations. Thorough reconnaissance of the river banks, observation, and aerial reconnaissance of the far bank are supplemented by interrogation of the local population to obtain a complete picture of the terrain and the military situation. Security measures are unremitting and meticulous.
- (2) The selection of the crossing site is determined by the suitability of the terrain, the availability of covered routes of approach, and gaps or weaknesses in hostile dispositions. To

deceive the enemy, feint preparations for crossing are made in other areas. Islands, if present, are usually seized before the main crossing is attempted.

- (3) The actual river crossing may commence under conditions of limited visibility—at dawn or dusk, during the night, or under cover of smoke screen. The crossing normally is preceded by an artillery preparation, the intensity of which is determined by the strength of the enemy defensive system.
- (4) Large quantities of artillery and mortars are used to support the actual crossing, and direct fire pieces are placed on the river bank to engage point targets.
- (5) After the assault waves succeed in gaining a foothold on the opposite bank, the artillery support takes the form of an accompanying (rolling) barrage, with or without area concentrations. Armor and artillery are brought across as swiftly as possible by ferry, ponton bridge, or hasty bridge. Standard bridging and ferrying equipment is supplemented by local materiel of all sorts.
- (6) The feint river crossings are also mounted, and if they are successful, they usually are expanded into major bridgeheads.
- (7) The main body is thrown across as soon as the assault wave is in firm possession of a defensive perimeter.

c. Hasty River Crossing. The hasty river crossing usually occurs during pursuit operations when the enemy is still disorganized and fleeing. In this situation the primary concern is to keep the enemy on the run and to prevent him from organizing a defensive front. The book, therefore, is thrown out the window, and crossings are made wherever and however they can be made.

301. River Lines in the Defense

a. Aggressor recognizes the importance of river lines as natural obstacles. He attempts to utilize river lines in their defensive scheme. Aggressor believes that the best way to defend the river line is to set up the main line of resistance along the nearer bank. The river line provides a well-defined boundary that assists the air force in carrying out its support mission. Enemy troops concentrating for the river crossing become vulnerable to air and long-range artillery attack. As the enemy starts to cross the river, infantry fire is withheld until he is within effective range. Aggressor defensive units are held in a mobile status so that they may be moved rapidly to threatened sectors. Usually the river bank defenses are particularly strong at sectors where the enemy is expected to cross. Antitank, antipersonnel,

and other obstacles are employed. Special attention is given to the mining of all forts and to covering them with strong antitank fire.

b. The type of defense established behind the river depends upon the terrain. When the terrain immediately behind the river bank is relatively flat and does not offer concealed routes of approach or assembly areas, Aggressor prefers to set up his main defensive position on the nearest high ground. This is also true when the bank of the river is under observation from the higher ground held by the enemy on the other side. The main defense is set up on the nearest high ground that affords adequate fields of fire and observation of the river bank. Strong security forces are established along the river bank. Aggressor seeks to destroy in sequence each enemy unit that crosses the river and that appears on the river bank. Aggressor mobile reserve units are dispatched to threatened sectors. Likely avenues of approach are protected with antitank and antipersonnel defenses.

c. When Aggressor plans to go over to the offense, shortly, a bridgehead on the far bank is retained. This bridgehead must be of depth sufficient to protect the potential crossing site from enemy small-arms and mortar fires as well as from observed artillery fire.

d. Withdrawal from an established bridgehead requires detailed planning. Bridges that have been prepared for demolition are blown up. Ferries, landing craft, and other crossing equipment are destroyed or brought across to the nearer bank. Aggressor takes the precaution of waiting until the last possible moment before destruction because they may want to use the facilities for their own offensive action.

Section X. ATTACK ON A FORTIFIED ZONE

302. General

a. An attack on a fortified zone differs from an attack on field fortifications—in the scope of planning and training, the intensity of the artillery preparation, and the proportion of shock elements in the attacking force.

b. Bitter experience against deeply echeloned defense complexes has made the Aggressor Army efficient in the deliberate reduction of heavy defensive zones. Aggressor attacks upon such positions become almost a matter of routine.

303. Preliminary Activities

a. Upon encountering a deep, heavily fortified zone that defies immediate efforts at reduction, Aggressor enters a long and tedious pre-attack phase. His reconnaissance, always thorough, become exhaustive. Aerial photographs are examined minutely. Observers

study the hostile position from every possible direction. The results of this study are gathered on a situation map, and plans for the reduction of each pillbox and gun emplacement are worked out in detail.

b. When the attack plan has been completed, troops of advance assault echelons are given training on terrain similar to that held by the enemy. Replicas of enemy installations are constructed for use in this training so that every man will know his task by rote.

c. The troops destined for the assault are organized into assault divisions. Cooperation with supporting arms and the creation of specialized combat teams are heavily stressed. The organization for combat is similar to that of any Aggressor attack unit, except that frontages are much narrower. A division at the point of main effort will have a front sector of 1,000 to 2,000 yards and the regiment a sector of 500 to 1,000 yards.

304. Conduct of Battle

a. The assault on a fortified zone is preceded by an exceptionally long and intense artillery and air preparation. The air force concentrates its efforts on rear areas, reserve concentrations, hostile artillery, defiled areas, armor, transport, and supplies. Heavy artillery shares these objectives and fires counterbattery fires against all known artillery positions. The light and medium artillery and mortars concentrate on the enemy battle positions. Artillery pieces assigned direct fire missions destroy identified emplacements, heavy weapons, and pillboxes, and silence any new firing positions. The artillery preparation is sufficiently intense to insure the destruction of a high proportion of the hostile heavy weapons and artillery. Surviving personnel in the forward portion of the battle position are disorganized and badly shaken. Staffs are neutralized or destroyed and wire communications are disrupted.

b. During the preparation, obstacle-clearing teams make paths through Aggressor obstacle networks. The teams cut lanes in enemy obstacle system in order to permit the unimpeded progress of assaulting elements. The teams also neutralize or remove mines.

c. The assault is launched when the tanks accompanying the infantry pass through the infantry's line of assault. This line is usually is a trench line about 200 yards from the enemy MLR. The assault is timed to catch the enemy off balance. It usually comes as soon after the preparatory artillery fires as safety will permit.

d. The attack generally is supported by an exceptionally heavy accompanying (rolling) barrage supplemented by area concentration. After the initial assault wave has pierced the battle position,

which may be two or three miles in depth, tank formations are poured in to add shock to the momentum of the attack. Motorized infantry follows the tanks and cleans up bypassed strong points.

e. Mechanized and other mobile formations then are pushed forward through the widening gap to conduct deep exploitation operations.

Section XI. MINE WARFARE

305. General

Mine warfare in Aggressor doctrine is one of the most important aspects of ground-combat operations. So great is the emphasis placed on mine warfare that special battalion-size units, engineer mining battalions, have been organized and employed. In the Aggressor Army the engineers have primary responsibility for mine warfare. However, as in our own army, training and indoctrination in the importance of mine warfare is stressed in all ground forces units. The individual rifle soldier is adept in the techniques of mine arming, laying, and removal. He is ingenious at improvising and employing booby traps. Aggressor stresses exploitation of captured mines and explosives.

306. Mines

Aggressor land mines are noteworthy for their simplicity, rugged construction and their wide variety of models, shapes, sizes, and methods of fuzing. Aggressor designed and used more models and varieties of land mines than has any other nation. On the offensive the Aggressor Army employs antitank and antipersonnel mines as immediate protection against counterattacks. The types used for offensive operations are the standard metallic and nonmetallic pressure or pull operated mine. On the defensive or in a withdrawal or retreat, Aggressor saturates the abandoned area with all types of mines, booby traps, and delayed charges. Aggressor classifies land mines into the following six groups:

- (1) Antitank mines.
- (2) Antitransport or road mines.
- (3) Multipurpose or general purpose mines.
- (4) Antipersonnel mines.
- (5) Antibridge or river mines.
- (6) Booby traps.

307. Mine Fuzes

The majority of Aggressor antitank and antipersonnel mines employ either the pull fuze or the pressure fuze. A variety of electrical,

chemical, and clockwork fuzes, instantaneous or delayed action, are available for use in booby traps and in antitransport, general purpose and improvised mines. Some Aggressor mines are armed with unremovable vibration fuzes. Remote control detonation or delayed-action fuzes frequently are used with large hidden explosive charges.

308. Mine Lay, Marking, and Recording

a. Aggressor mine laying, marking, and recording techniques are generally similar to those of the United States Army. The differences that do exist are mainly in equipment used and in the details of placing mines. Aggressor employs mines in the offensive more extensively than do most other armies. When an objective has been taken, Aggressor engineer and rifle troops immediately place mines around their position to delay or stop expected counterattacks by enemy armor or infantry.

b. Forward of the main defensive zone, mining is usually confined to tank approaches, sunken roads, defiles, crossroads, and road blocks. A fairly continuous belt of antitank mine fields, 400 yards in depth, is laid along the front of the main defensive zone about 400 yards in front of the main line of resistance. Inside the main defensive zone, priority is given to mining approaches to the artillery, antitank, and divisional reserve areas. Additional mine laying is carried out during lulls in the battle under fire, if necessary. Other obstacles are planned in conjunction with mine fields and include antitank ditches and wire.

c. Aggressor mines are usually carried and placed by hand. A special mine spacing cord is used to place mines in an irregular pattern in a mine belt. A simple cord is used in laying a hasty antitank mine field. These cords are used to relocate mines for removal.

d. Antipersonnel mines are used in separate mine fields on the approaches to antitank mine fields. These are usually laid from 66 to 330 feet in front of the antitank mine field. Antipersonnel mines will sometimes be found within antitank mine fields. In the separate antipersonnel mine fields, concussion type antipersonnel mines are laid at a density of not less than two mines per yard of front. Shrapnel-type antipersonnel mines normally are rigged with trip wires and are spaced with consideration of effective radius of fragmentation. Aggressor doctrine stresses the use of controlled mines detonated by concealed observers and automatic mines fuzed to detonate after a set time interval. Controlled mines are laid in railroad beds, in lanes through mine fields, in bridges, at road intersections and in places where the enemy is expected to concentrate. Automatic mines are employed defensively or during a retreat.

e. Detected enemy mines which are to be lifted are marked with small red flags labeled with the letter "E" (Explodilo). Marking signs labeled with the letters "MK" (Minkampo) or single strand barbed wire fences are used to mark mine fields. Guards are posted on all mine fields.

f. Aggressor records his mine fields on marked maps or sketches kept at headquarters of laying unit and rifle regiment, division, and corps.

309. Mine Detecting and Clearing

a. Hand probes and electronic mine detectors are used by Aggressor for mine detection. Probing is the most extensively used while troops are under fire. Electronic devices are used mostly in rear areas and for mopping up operations.

b. Aggressor also has a tank-mounted device which is designed to clear two wide tracks through a mine field. This device consists of two groups of heavy metal disks mounted on axles and hinged to the front of a tank. Aggressor also uses various field improvised grapnels, drags, and hand operated devices to clear trip-wires and pressure detonated land mines.

c. Aggressor organizes mine clearing parties and conducts clearing operations in much the same manner as does the United States Army. He may resort to artillery or bombing to clear gaps through known mine fields. In an initial attack across a mine field, successive waves of infantry are sent across the field until the far side is reached. Troops are sacrificed in this manner to save time, to achieve surprise, and to maintain momentum of the attack.

Section XII. ATOMIC WARFARE

310. Aggressor Atomic Capability

a. Weapons. As of January 1954 Aggressor has developed and is capable of employing atomic weapons of 15 to 100 KT yield.

b. *Delivery Means.* Aggressor's atomic delivery means include air, guided missile, free rocket, and prepositioning. He can also deliver 15 to 20 KT weapons by very heavy artillery. The range and accuracy of these delivery means are approximately the same as those of similar United States delivery means.

c. *Weapons Available.* The number, type and size of weapons, and delivery means available in any one situation will vary according to the importance and scope of the overall operation considered.

311. Tactical Fundamentals in the Employment of and Defense Against Atomic Weapons

a. General.

- (1) Aggressor's basic doctrine, "decisive victory can be achieved only by the offensive," is unchanged by the advent of atomic weapons. Victory still will be achieved through the media of combined arms and the employment of mass. However, part of the mass (fire power) can now be obtained with atomic weapons. Offensive frontages and depths of objectives have been greatly increased. Concentration of assault units on a narrow front continues to be required, but the timing of the movement of units into the area of concentration is controlled by a rigid time schedule for the purpose of presenting a target for the minimum period. Mobility, dispersion and the use of fluid tactics are emphasized.
- (2) Atomic delivery means, including air, normally are under direct command of army group commanders who have the authority to make further attachments.
- (3) Tactical planning for both the offense and the defense includes numerous detailed atomic defense plans. These plans are based on assumed enemy atomic attacks and provide for the subsequent action to be taken.
- (4) Aggressor tactics indicate the acceptance of considerable risk of incurring casualties among his own personnel if necessary for the accomplishment of the mission. This is reflected in low troop safety factors in the employment of atomic weapons and in negotiating contaminated areas.

b. The Offensive.

- (1) *General.* Basic concepts of offensive tactics remain unchanged. Greater emphasis is placed on dispersion, mobility, timing, and counterintelligence measures—particularly concealment. More emphasis is placed on the construction of entrenchments and tunnels toward enemy positions. When feasible and when availability permits, atomic weapons are employed in conjunction with the usual air and artillery preparation. When surprise is paramount an atomic preparation may actually take the place of the normal artillery and air preparation, thereby reducing to a minimum the time available for the enemy to react.
- (2) *Employment of divisions.* In order to achieve the desired mobility for the maximum exploitation of the effects of friendly atomic strikes in the main effort to present the minimum target for the minimum period, the first echelon,

where possible, will be composed of highly mobile divisions (heavy in armored support), and the second echelon will be composed of rifle divisions. The first echelon immediately follows up atomic strikes on the enemy, attempting to reach its objective in the rear of the enemy defenses in the shortest time possible. It bypasses remaining enemy resistance, which is neutralized or destroyed by the second echelon. However, on terrain unfavorable for the employment of highly mobile divisions, and under conditions where atomic strikes are not employed, rifle divisions can continue to constitute the first echelon, followed by more mobile elements.

- (3) *Concentration.* In the concentration area and subsequently in the assembly area, divisions will be so dispersed and, in turn, units within divisions will be dispersed so as to present targets none of which are larger than a regiment in size.
- (4) *Artillery and air support.* Atomic weapons have not negated or changed materially the role of Aggressor artillery and air support in offensive operations. Rather, atomic weapons have been integrated with artillery and air as an additional powerful means to enhance the devastating effect of massed fire support. In many situations an atomic attack may replace the artillery and air preparation. Thus, the available artillery and air can be used to give greater close support to the breakthrough and exploitation forces. The mission of short-range bombers and ground attack aircraft now includes the important task of destroying enemy atomic delivery means before they can be employed effectively against Aggressor's forces.
- (5) *Larger units in the offensive.* In the offensive conducted by larger units greater emphasis is placed on the "armored offensive" because of the speed of movement of the units involved, the superior organic communication facilities, and the relative invulnerability as compared with rifle units.

c. *The Defensive.*

- (1) *General.* The missions of the rifle, mechanized, and armored divisions in the defensive remain the same. However, in order to achieve the greater dispersion necessary for protection against atomic attack, emphasis is placed on the use of the decentralized defense. With wide defensive frontages and defense in considerable depth with the exception that a relatively large mobile reserve of tank and mechanized divisions will be constituted and centrally controlled by higher

headquarters to execute counterattacks in conjunction with the employment of atomic weapons.

- (2) *Organization for the defense.* Because of the mass destructive ability of atomic weapons and the opportunity it affords for rapid penetration, defense in depth is essential. Further, when enemy attack is imminent the second defensive zone normally will be occupied.
- (3) *Artillery and air support.* Atomic weapons are integrated with artillery and air support. Atomic weapons in the defense are used primarily for—
 - (a) Destruction of suitable enemy targets forward of the line of contact.
 - (b) Counteratomic preparation.
 - (c) Use behind the lines of contact in conjunction with counter-attack to cut off and destroy an enemy preparation.

In both defensive and retrograde operations, Aggressor cautions commanders to be alert to terrain conditions and enemy actions which lend themselves to the use of prepositioned atomic weapons.

d. Special operations.

- (1) *Attack of fortified areas.* Planning includes complete details for the use of atomic weapons. Tactics prescribing preparation preceding an attack of a fortified area remain unchanged except that atomic weapons may be used to create a breach of the enemy fortified area.
- (2) *Attack of a river line.* Emphasis continues to be placed on the hasty river crossing. It may be possible, through the proper use of atomic weapons to effect an otherwise impossible hasty crossing, thus avoiding the concentration of forces and equipment inherent in a deliberate crossing. If a deliberate crossing is necessary, atomic weapons may be used along a wide front to facilitate numerous crossing and thus avoid presenting a concentrated target for enemy atomic attack.
- (3) *Night attack.* Emphasis is placed on the many advantages to be derived by using atomic weapons in conjunction with night attacks. Enemy defenders viewing the atomic fireball will suffer temporary flash blindness. Enemy commanders will have difficulty assessing the damage and taking counter-action. Enemy casualties may be greater than a similar daylight attack because of the normal increased movement and other (above ground) activity during the hours of darkness.

- (4) *Mountain operations.* The use of atomic weapons in the offense and defense in mountain operations is generally the same as their use in normal offensive and defensive operations. Due regard is given to the more restrictive nature of the terrain which will tend to concentrate forces in certain areas and along certain avenues of approach, and may limit the size of the forces that can be employed.
- (5) *Airborne operations.* Atomic weapons have greatly increased the importance of airborne units in the offensive and the defensive. Atomic weapons air delivered now furnish airborne units with more powerful, flexible air support, thus permitting a stronger defense of airheads. Normal dispersion within an airhead provides a good defense against enemy atomic attack. In the defense, airborne units may be used to provide a vertical enveloping force in the counterattack in conjunction with atomic weapons. In both the offense and defense small airborne units will be used, where possible, to seize and disrupt enemy atomic delivery means. In airborne operations of larger units, because of the destructive potential of atomic weapons used in mass, wherever feasible, the so-called "dispersed action tactics" are employed. "Dispersed action tactics" envision initially several airborne assaults in different localities, the reinforcement of the more successful of these and their subsequent merging into one airhead.
- (6) *Partisan operations.* Guerrilla forces are used to locate suitable targets for atomic attack and to attack enemy atomic support and delivery agencies. In addition, guerrilla operations may be conducted against dispersed enemy logistical units and installations to force a concentration of the logistical units to present a target suitable for atomic attack.

Section XIII. OTHER OPERATIONS

312. Chemical Operations

a. Aggressor has reportedly employed chemical agents in previous operations and possesses the necessary equipment and stocks of toxic agents, together with the installed industrial capacity, to logistically support sustained chemical warfare operations should he desire to do so in the future. Aggressor tactics are generally sound in conception and envision the use of toxic chemicals in a variety of tactical roles.

b. Offensively, nonpersistent chemical agents are employed for casualty effect with "crash" concentrations of toxic chemicals being laid

down in a minimum time to fully exploit the elements of surprise. Assembly areas or other heavy troop concentrations are considered the most appropriate targets for this type of attack. Harassing agents are frequently used to force the enemy to mask. Aerial bombing and spray attacks are employed offensively for both casualty and harassing effect on troop dispositions or on moving columns. Bivouacs, supply dumps, and troop assembly areas are also considered suitable targets for the persistent spray or bombing missions.

c. Defensively, Aggressor may be expected to make extensive use of persistent chemical agents. Artificial barriers across the expected avenues of approach fronting his defensive position or to the flanks may be encountered in his efforts to slow or channelize our assault. Aerial spray or bombing attacks on routes of approach, moving columns, bivouacs, assembly areas, and supply dumps can be expected in further support of his defense.

d. Extensive use of smoke, both offensively and defensively, is made by Aggressor in order to screen his actual movements, deny observation of his activities or dispositions, serve as a ruse in an attempt to force the concentration of our effort in a wrong direction or location, and may even be used to disguise an actual attack with toxic agents.

e. Aggressor makes wide use of incendiary and flame materials. Portable flame weapons are used to support Aggressor assaulting forces in the reduction of enemy pillboxes and strong points and assist in repelling counterattacks. Mechanized flame throwers are employed in support of the assault element in the breakthrough and to operate against enemy reserves in the development of the breakthrough. Defensively, flame weapons are used to strengthen positions, provide additional antitank defense, assist in covering a withdrawal, and provide additional support to counterattacking forces.

313. Biological Warfare Operation

a. Aggressor tactics for the employment of biological warfare are not known, but will probably take the form of extended covert operations combined with and reinforced by overt operations of short duration. These latter operations in all probability would be performed by the nondivisional (GHQ) biological warfare companies of the chemical regiments.

b. The most likely targets for such attack would be the food and water supplies of the enemy. Extra precautions should be taken to guard against contamination of vital materials.

314. Radiological Operations

Aggressor tactics for the employment of radiological warfare are unknown. It has been reported that there are in existence radio-

logical warfare companies assigned to the chemical regiment. However, it is not known whether their mission is purely defensive or if it includes offensive radiological warfare operations.

315. Electronic Warfare

a. Aggressor considers electronic warfare to be a highly effective weapon in modern warfare. He utilizes his jamming equipment extensively in order to deny the enemy his command communications and the use of his electronic devices. He employs his search equipment to determine information concerning enemy electronic devices and enemy order of battle.

b. Aggressor utilizes communications jamming of tactical radio nets only when such jamming is more advantageous to him than the communications intelligence which could be derived from their nets.

c. He is capable of searching for, locating, identifying, and rapidly jamming all types of electronic devices over a wide range of frequencies.

d. He employs both spot jamming (one specific frequency) and barrage jamming (a band of frequencies).

CHAPTER 10

AIR TACTICS

Section I. DOCTRINE AND EQUIPMENT

316. General

The Aggressor Air Force was designed and organized primarily as an instrument for direct support of the Aggressor Army. The air force has become highly proficient in the ground-support role. This role involves achieving air superiority over the battle area, attacking targets in the communications zone, supporting the action of ground troops in breaching enemy defense, and cooperating with ground troops during the advance beyond the tactical defense zone. An independent long-range force has been organized by Aggressor, but the force has not yet acquired either the equipment or the training necessary to conduct strategic air operations of the nature carried out by the United States and Great Britain.

317. Ground-Support Role

Aggressor emphasis on the ground-support role of the air force is the result of traditional doctrine and expediency more than of a failure to understand the diversified roles of modern air power. For the support of ground operations, Aggressor air units are employed as members of teams that also include armor, artillery, and other arms. Aircraft assigned to these formations attack both the enemy rear and enemy positions at the front.

318. Other Roles

a. Since 1945 Aggressor has made a substantial effort to develop a well-rounded air force. They now have a sizable bombing fleet for long-range missions, a stronger fighter defense force, a large fleet of air transports, and they have broadened their air capabilities in other ways. Thus, although about 65 percent of Aggressor aircraft are assigned to tactical aviation, Aggressor is well equipped to carry out other specialized tasks.

b. The composition of the various Aggressor air components, as they were revealed by Aggressor air action in previous campaigns, are described in paragraphs 152 through 162. Their missions and methods of operations are described in paragraphs 319 through 330.

Section II. AIR FORCE OF THE AGGRESSOR ARMY

319. Composition

This force consists of a number of tactical air armies. A typical tactical air army is composed of a bomber corps, a ground-attack corps, and one or more fighter corps. The commander of each army group usually has one air army and several ground armies under his command. Originally, air armies did not exist as separate entities. Air units were allocated to, and placed under, the air command of the army group headquarters. Air armies were created in mid-1947. Their commanders were given a role in the planning of air operations and were permitted some latitude in the method of employing the air units.

320. Air-Ground Planning

a. The system of cooperation between a given army group and its supporting air army works as follows. Plans for large-scale operations are formulated by the general staff. The army group commander is assigned his task in accordance with the overall plan. The army group commander then confers with the air army commander concerning the role that air units are to play in the operations. Specific responsibilities then are allocated. In planning offensive missions, the below-listed matters are decided in advance—

- (1) Type and degree of air support required for each phase of the operation.
- (2) The order in which air missions are to be executed in carrying out the operation.
- (3) The areas and sectors to be covered by aerial reconnaissance.
- (4) The amount and type of support to be provided by the air army and ground units operating outside the zone of main effort.
- (5) The number of air units to be attached directly to ground commanders in the event the ground forces should break through and advance rapidly into the enemy rear.
- (6) The assistance that the ground forces will render the air army in terrain reconnaissance, construction of airfields, and ground defense of air installations.

b. The staff of the army group commander (including air officers) works out details of the planned offensive. The staff gives particular attention to the precise coordination of all arms. These details include determination of lanes, frontline crossing points, bomb lines, and radio and supplementary signals for air-ground communications and target designation. Effective air cover for artillery and mobile

troops during all phases of combat is stressed. Effective support of the air forces by ground-air warning units and by counterbattery fire against enemy antiaircraft artillery also is emphasized. Finally, a detailed plan of aerial reconnaissance requirements is prepared.

c. In addition to these matters of joint interest, the air army staff works out the operational and logistics plans needed by its own units for executing their assigned tasks. These plans include specific assignment of air units, assignment of operational airfields to air units, and other instructions relating to the preparation of navigation, ground control, and target-designation signal networks.

321. Role of the Air Army

a. For a major offensive the air army role usually includes the following successive measures:

- (1) Buildup of air strength, meanwhile maintaining steady but not highly active pressure on the enemy frontlines and rear areas.
- (2) Increase of attacks on the enemy zone to a depth of 20 to 120 miles behind the frontlines and, at the same time, intensification of aerial reconnaissance.
- (3) Decrease of attacks on areas in the enemy's rear and a concurrent increase of attacks in his main battle zone.
- (4) Almost complete cessation of bomber and ground attack missions, while massed fighter formations cleared the skies of enemy aircraft and screened friendly ground concentration and deployment.
- (5) Concentrated assault by all available aircraft to facilitate the breakthrough attempt of the ground troops.

b. Thus, in the preparation phase, Aggressor ground-attack units assist the artillery by attacking enemy ground formations. These units support the friendly ground forces during the breakthrough and covered them during the exploitation and pursuit. While the ground-attack regiments function as "flying artillery" for the ground forces, Aggressor bombers attack enemy airfields, lines of communication, and reserves. Aerial reconnaissance is provided by specialized units and by fighter, ground-attack, or bomber units.

322. Control and Cooperation

a. During the preparation and breakthrough phase of an operation, air units act in support of ground units. Control of the air units is maintained by the air commander. Requests of the ground commander are transmitted to the air commander through an air liaison officer stationed at the ground unit's commander post. In the ex-

ploitation and pursuit phase, air units are attached directly to ground units. The ground forces commander transmits his orders directly to the air commander. The air unit commander is either present at the ground commander's forward observation post or is in continuous personal radio contact with him.

b. Air-ground cooperation is facilitated by the following measures:

- (1) Stationing of forward air liaison sections with the ground forces. These sections employ two radio nets—one to aircraft in flight and one to the air unit commander.
- (2) Mutual briefings and detailed combined-staff discussions.
- (3) Establishment of control check points and ground-control stations; and mutual evaluation, by combined staffs, of the operations in progress.

c. When close air-artillery coordination is required, the artillery commander receives information on the same radio frequency as the aircraft in flight. Likewise, tank crews frequently operate their radios on the same wavelength used for directing friendly aircraft to targets. Aggressor infantry sometimes guides friendly pilots by means of ground signals, rockets, flares, or even by waving arms and pointing out enemy strong points.

d. In the control of aircraft, an important role is played by an extensive net of ground-control stations. At chief controls stations near the frontlines, air staff officers maintain close liaison between the staffs of army and air force commands. These air staff officers not only vector aircraft but also direct air operations. The air warning system provides information on the approach of hostile aircraft detected by visual, sonic, or radar methods. The warning system is linked with the control stations that vectored fighters on interceptor missions.

e. Aggressor stresses the cooperation of air units with forward ground units as much for the defense as for the offense. But air units never are attached directly to ground units in defensive operations. Aggressor fighters seek to prevent enemy air units from supporting hostile armored and infantry formations and from conducting reconnaissance of Aggressor positions. Ground-attack units are used for strafing enemy ground forces and for conducting counterbattery operations.

323. Reconnaissance

a. Aerial reconnaissance is a vital secondary role of Aggressor tactical air units. Air armies usually have independent reconnaissance regiments for both long- and short-range missions. In addition, combat aircraft often are diverted from their regular tasks and are equipped with cameras for special reconnaissance missions.

b. Under orders of the army group staff, long-range reconnaissance is conducted as far as 300 miles into the enemy rear. Aggressor ground corps and division staffs direct short-range aerial reconnaissance of combat areas to a depth of up to 35 miles. Special artillery-spotting units are employed in the aerial direction of artillery fire. Meteorological reconnaissance is carried out to determine flying conditions.

c. When there is little or no cloud cover, reconnaissance planes usually fly at about 25,000 feet and photograph from that altitude. Fortified positions along the main line of battle are photographed at much lower altitudes. The minimum altitude for photographic reconnaissance is about 4,000 feet; below that level all reconnaissance is visual.

324. Transport Aircraft

a. Transport aircraft assigned to tactical air armies performs many useful services. Transport planes move men, equipment, and supplies behind the lines. They drop fuel, food, and ammunition to mobile ground units that have penetrated enemy rear areas. Finally, they support partisan or other friendly forces operating behind enemy front lines.

b. Aggressor appears to be well aware of the increasing importance of air transportation in time of war. Rapid troop movement by air will facilitate greatly the mobilization and deployment of troops and also the redistribution of reserves behind friendly lines. Combat operations employing airborne forces far in the enemy rear probably will become more and more common.

c. At present most Aggressor transport aircraft are of a type comparable to the veteran United States C-47. Few four-engine transports are in use. Aggressor, however, is improving and expanding his air transport fleet. Newer and better types soon may be in service.

Section III. LONG-RANGE AVIATION

325. General

The urgent need for ground-support aviation must be considered as the basic reason for Aggressor failure to develop an effective strategic air force. Long-range aviation retained an independent status in the past and while the concept of strategic air attacks was never abandoned, its practical application had to be postponed. No real strategic air capability, however, was developed until recently. In the development of this capability, the seizure of several United States B-29's was of great importance. These planes were copied, and the

Aggressor version was put into series production in a very short time. A large fleet of these ships is now at the disposal of Aggressor long-range aviation. Also an Aggressor developed bomber of still greater range and payload soon may be operational.

326. Present Emphasis

One of the most significant aspects of the Aggressor military program has been the emphasis given to the creation and operational development of an air arm with truly long-range capabilities. The speed with which the American B-29's were copied and put into series production indicates the extremely high priority given to the project. Aggressor efforts to develop a long-range bomber force take on added significance when viewed in the light of Aggressor atomic bomb production.

Section IV. FIGHTER AVIATION OF AIR DEFENSE

327. General

During previous campaigns the United States carried out virtually no strategic bombing against the homeland. Thus Aggressor had little occasion to develop an effective air-defense force. Like long-range aviation, the fighter defense has been substantially improved and augmented since 1945. At present, many jet fighters are assigned to this force. In fact, production of this outstanding fighter may have resulted from the urgent need for a first-class jet interceptor for home defense against strategic bombing.

328. Evaluation

In the Aggressor air-defense system, sizable fighter forces together with AA defenses are available to protect important cities and civil and military installations. Nevertheless, present Aggressor capabilities in such aspects of air defense as night or bad-weather interception appear to be limited.

Section V. TROOP CARRIER COMMAND

329. General

The armed forces of the Aggressor nation do not have an independently organized air transport force such as the Military Air Transport Service (MATS) of the United States. Aggressor military transport aircraft are assigned to all aviation components and are employed in a variety of ways.

330. Organization and Evaluation

The troop carrier command is a headquarters organization that functions probably as an agency for peacetime training, for wartime planning, and for coordination of airborne operations. The transports and air force personnel required for any sizable operation would have to be provided from the other air forces and from the civil air fleet. Aggressor has carried out large-scale airborne operations in previous campaigns. However, most of their airborne missions were in support of partisans. It is known, however, that Aggressor has continued to exhibit strong interest in the potentialities of major airborne operations.

CHAPTER 11

NAVAL TACTICS

331. Past Naval Operations

Aggressor's past naval activity has been chiefly warfare against United States lines of communication, particularly convoy routes along the Atlantic coast. Early in the war, Aggressor used submarines to lay mine fields at the entrance to New York Bay, Delaware Capes, Boston Bay, and Hampton Roads. These mine fields have been replenished regularly. The amphibious operations undertaken have demonstrated that a balanced force of all required types is available for major amphibious operations up to corps size, including the ships required for screening, control gunfire support, and air support.

332. Submarine Tactics and Capabilities

a. Aggressor submarines normally operate individually in specified patrol areas, but occasionally assemble into wolf packs for operations against important surface naval forces and convoys. Their attacks are pressed home with skill and determination and with excellent coordination when operating as groups. Their evasive tactics are equally skillful.

b. Mine laying by submarines is common. It is coordinated with air and surface craft mine laying. Aggressor utilizes defensive mine fields for the protection of its bases and the homeland.

s. Aggressor is believed to have several troop-carrying submarines which were employed during the overrunning of the Vieques Puerto Rican area.

d. Submarine reconnaissance of United States ports is an Aggressor capability. Their submarines have been known to follow United States surface forces without attacking.

e. Aggressor midget submarine may be encountered in American waters but are not capable of crossing the Atlantic unassisted.

333. Naval Air Arm

The naval air arm has already damaged several United States fleet units. Their torpedo bombers are especially competent. Escort-type carriers have been used in support of amphibious operations, in anti-

submarine operations, and to protect shipping. A large part of the Aggressor naval air arm is intended for land, sea, and air action from on-shore bases (see also ch. 10, Air Tactics).

334. Naval Infantry

This force is not intended for land warfare but rather for the taking of shallow beachheads. Naval infantry provides the initial assault wave for all major landing operations. Naval infantry assault waves are responsible for the underwater demolition of underwater and offshore defensive systems. The usual attachment of naval infantry is one battalion to each army division in the assault. Aggressor naval infantry also takes part in reconnaissance and commando-type raids (see also ch. 9, Special Operations).

PART THREE
LOGISTICS, HISTORY, AND REFERENCE DATA
CHAPTER 12
LOGISTICS

Section I. GENERAL

335. Pressure From Above

Pressure from above is the most important element in Aggressor logistic achievement. But, as in other areas of Aggressor life, the pressure contributes to immediate success by sacrificing long-term efficiency. Previous Aggressor armies frequently wore out their equipment and men too rapidly. Success in one operation was often achieved at the expense of future operations in the same sector. Despite this questionable practice, Aggressor rear service activities are governed by sound principles and procedures.

336. Principles and Procedures

a. Priorities.

- (1) Always rigidly adhered to by the Aggressor, priorities tend to be absolute in tight situations. Ammunition and fuel priorities are not relaxed even though troops in the field are forced to forage for their rations. Supply priorities for sectors of main effort are maintained even though this may mean neglecting units in secondary sectors.
- (2) In wartime, priorities are applied to the entire life of the nation and to the life of countries under Aggressor control. When necessary, the entire population of an area is recruited to provide the labor for the digging of antitank ditches, for rebuilding rail lines, or even to shoulder rifles and defend the trenches they themselves have dug. The local population serves as an expendable defensive screen, while conventional military forces are concentrated for later decisive action.

b. Planning and Execution.

- (1) The logistical and industrial phases of mobilization are planned on a long-term basis. Specifications for civilian

goods are drawn up with military utility in view. Key civilian ministries, such as the Ministry of Transport and the Ministry of Communications, are organized along military lines and are adaptable to military control.

- (2) Logistic and supply matters at all levels down through the regiment are planned and executed by a single agency. The chief of rear services of a command takes part in the overall planning of an operation. He serves as an assistant commander and with his staff prepares the G4 portion of the plan. A substantial part of the supply and logistic resources of the command are directly controlled by the chief of rear services. He coordinates the actions of rear service elements organic to lower echelons and with the supply agencies belonging to the technical arms and services. This centralization of logistic responsibility facilitates the movement of vital supplies to the points of main effort.

c. Improvisation. Improvisation is a regular and important factor in Aggressor logistic activities. Local materials are used as much as possible for engineer works and military instruction. Troops are trained in the use of enemy weapons and equipment. During the California and Caribbean campaigns captured American weapons including artillery pieces were used extensively. Railroad construction engineers salvaged short sections of torn up and bent rails and pieced them together. Burnt-out box cars were cut down and salvaged as flat cars. Rail lines were operated at far beyond normal capacity by building numerous extra sidings and unloading points. Hundreds of thousands of semiskilled operating personnel were used to compensate for the regular signaling systems that were either lacking or out of order.

d. Supply Discipline. Aggressor supply discipline is strict and effective. At the outset of the Aggressor grab for power a special agency was set up to salvage, sort, repair, and evacuate Aggressor and captured materiel. A soldier had to be seriously wounded before he could hope to escape punishment for leaving his individual weapon on the field.

e. Weaknesses. Although Aggressor logistic capabilities are greater today than they were in the California Campaign, weaknesses still exist. The overburdened rail system is still the chief means of transportation. Rear installations, such as depots, dumps, and railheads are short of modern loading and unloading devices. Aggressor line divisions, although logistically far better off than during the California Campaign, do not approach United States divisions in

logistic endurance. The Aggressor Army lacks many of the technological skills and procedures which are taken for granted in the United States Army.

Section II. PROCUREMENT AND STORAGE

337. Procurement

a. Responsibility. The regime, probably in the Trinity, determines the amount of each year's production that is to be allocated to the Armed Forces for current consumption and the amount that is to be held in reserve. The details of this allocation plan are worked out by the appropriate governmental agencies.

b. Estimates. The Ministry of the Armed Forces submits preliminary estimates of its requirements. The estimate is prepared by the Main Administration of Rear Services, in conformity with the troop basis fixed by the General Staff. These estimates are modified by the State Planning Committee in the light of priorities assigned to other government activities and in terms of the resources available. The estimates then are approved by the Trinity as part of the annual budget. The General Staff of the Ministry of the Armed Forces works with the State Planning Committee to determine military requirements. The General Staff then directs the various headquarters of the Ministry in the preparation of a detailed procurement program. Specific procurement programs are developed by the various arms and services and by the Rear Services Headquarters.

c. Preparation and Placement of Orders. The next step, the preparation and placement of orders, requires close coordination between the Ministry of the Armed Forces, the State Planning Committee, and the economic ministries responsible for fulfilling Armed Forces requirements. Representatives of the major components of the Army, Air Forces, and of the separate main directorates actually perform this function for the Secretary of the Armed Forces. For example, the Chief of Rear Services is responsible for requisitioning and procuring such supplies as rations and fodder, fuel and lubricants, quartermaster supplies, trucks, and medical and veterinary supplies. In fulfilling this responsibility and in determining specifications, the Chief of Rear Services is assisted by the main directorates under his command. Likewise, the various arms and services work out specifications and make their own requisitions for materiel such as artillery, engineer, signal, and chemical warfare supplies. The procurement activities of the arms and services are coordinated and supervised by the Rear Services Headquarters.

d. Control of Procurement. Once the orders have been placed by the various economic ministries, procurement is controlled by the Ministry of State Control. Representatives of the appropriate branch of the Ministry of the Armed Forces are stationed at each factory to inspect the finished product. The military ministries themselves control a number of munitions plants, shipyards, and similar production facilities. Prominent arms designers often have military titles. Major weapons development centers and organizations are staffed by line and technical officers, civilian scientists, and production experts.

e. Accounting of Materiel. The Main Directorate for the Formation and Equipment of Units maintains an accounting of all acquired materiel, and the Main Directorate of Finance maintains fiscal control.

338. Storage

a. General. Since 1950 the Armed Forces have been stockpiling enormous reserves of materiel. At the same time substantial stores of strategic raw materials and machinery have been stockpiled by nonmilitary government agencies.

- (1) The high priority assigned to this program indicates that the regime is determined to make the Aggressor nation as completely prepared for war as possible, even at the risk of retarding the nation's economic development.
- (2) Two principal reasons appear to justify heavy emphasis on strategic stockpiling. The first is the weakness of the transportation system inside Aggressor. Aggressor apparently hopes to overcome this weakness by storing great quantities of materiel near potential theaters of operations. The second motive is probably to minimize the effect of strategic bombing on the Aggressor's short and mid-term war-making capabilities. Whatever the motive, it was decreed even before the California Campaign that peripheral Military Districts should maintain a 60-day combat stock of munitions and materiel in their depots.

b. Systems of Storage. Aggressor uses three separate systems of storage for war-preparedness stockpiling—the central depots of the Ministry of the Armed Forces, the strategic reserve warehouses of the Main Administrations for State Food and Materiel Reserves, and the reserve and storage facilities maintained under the system for industrial mobilization. The central storage depots of the Ministry of the Armed Forces are concerned directly with military storage. The other two systems are concerned with nonmilitary storage. In

the event of an emergency, the Aggressor Armed Forces would be able to draw directly from any one of the three storage systems.

c. Central Storage Depots. The central depots are used by the armed forces for large-scale storage of military supplies and equipment. Materiel to be stored reaches these depots following final acceptance of the materiel at the factories by the representatives of the Ministry of the Armed Forces. Central depots are located in each of the military districts and in occupied areas outside of the Aggressor Homeland. The number of central depots in a military district varies from 15 to 50. The depots are under the general supervision of the Chief of the Rear Services. They are administered by the main directorates of the combat branches, technical services, and rear services whose stores they contain.

- (1) Central depots are set up for specific types of supplies. Separate depots exist for rations and fodder, fuel and lubricants, weapons, ammunition, food, clothing, motor vehicles, engineer supplies, armored equipment, and signal and medical supplies and equipment. Several depots, each holding a single category of stores or materiel, often are located together in a major storage complex. Replacement supplies for the troop units and establishments of each military district or army group and the reserve supplies of each command come from these depots. Reserve stocks cannot be utilized except by authorization of top-level command. Older stocks are used first to avoid deterioration and spoilage.
- (2) Each central depot usually consists of a headquarters, numerous laboratories, workshops, warehouses, open storage areas, and vehicular parks. Protection for the entire installation is provided by guards from the Ministry of Internal Affairs.
- (3) The location of central supply depots follows a logical pattern based upon troop concentrations, road and rail centers and networks, and strategically important areas. These locations are prescribed by the General Staff in accordance with the staff's estimate of strategic and operational requirements.
- (4) Extensive storage installations are maintained in the Caribbean for Aggressor occupation troops. Numerous depots containing all types of military supplies are located throughout the Aggressor zones on the North American Continent. Many of these installations are located underground.

d. State Reserves. Other Aggressor government agencies that have important roles in the military storage and stockpiling program are

the Main Administration for State Food Reserves and the Main Administration for State Material Reserves.

- (1) The task of these agencies is to collect and store strategic materials and technical equipment to meet the requirements of whole economic or military regions in the event of a national emergency. These reserves may be used only upon authorization from the supreme command.
- (2) State reserves are put into five categories according to relative importance. The most common category is designated strategic. The other four categories are—especially strategic; short-supply; critically short-supply; and untouchable.
- (3) The Aggressor Homeland is divided into districts to provide a nationwide system of state reserves. Each district is under the control of a territorial directorate of the appropriate Main Administration. Each agency instructs its subordinate enterprises—state farms, factories, refineries, and mines—within each territory to transfer a certain quota of their production to the appropriate agency depot. The aim is to make the region self-sufficient for many months in the event of an emergency.
- (4) The amount of each type of material to be set aside as state reserve varies according to the anticipated need. During the difficult years after World War II, the average overall yearly quota was about 6 percent. At present the percentage is undoubtedly higher. Aggressor also is importing sizable quantities of materials for strategic stockpiling.
- (5) According to the best available information, the following items are being stored by the agencies: grain, meat and dairy products, petroleum products, coal and coke, metals, including alloys and rare metals, tools and instruments, chemicals, rubber, general industrial materials, heavy industrial equipment (production machinery), and transportation equipment, such as trucks and locomotives.
- (6) Food and raw-material reserves are stored in special warehouses under district management. Industrial reserves are stored either in district warehouses or, in the case of factories producing exclusively for the Main Administration for State Material Reserves, in special factory warehouses. The numerous depots and warehouses are dispersed throughout the district along railroad sidings, frequently near large towns. All state reserve storage installations are operated under the

same regulations as military installations and are protected by special security guards.

e. *Mobilization Reserves.* Mobilization reserves are stockpiled throughout Aggressor industry to facilitate the uninterrupted operation of the munitions industry during war and to speed the conversion of other industries toward production. Mobilization reserves differ from state reserves in that they are established at each factory in accordance with its mobilization plan. Taken together, mobilization and state reserves probably are large enough to keep the most vital segments of Aggressor industry in operation for periods of from 3 to 24 months. Industrial mobilization reserves include principally machine tools, raw materials, and semifinished goods.

- (1) The State Planning Committee cooperates with the Main Administration for State Reserves in drawing up and administering plans for industrial mobilization. The plans are made on the basis of control figures submitted by the General Staff. The plans are checked by the Ministry for the Armed Forces and approved by the Council of Secretaries. On the basis of these general plans, the various economic ministries draw up individual mobilization plans.
- (2) Mobilization branches are established at the factories themselves, but the manager of the factory has no jurisdiction over the materials controlled by the branch. The activities of the branch are secret, and its personnel must have special security clearance from the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The branch prepares detailed plans for converting the factory to a war footing. It specifies the instruments, equipment, technical staff, and manpower required, and it dictates the working materials that are to be kept in stock. Part of the factory in-place equipment and machinery apparently is kept in reserve and is at the disposal of the mobilization branch. Mobilization reserves are stored at each factory in specially designed and sealed warehouses.
- (3) Mobilization plans for plants producing military equipment include procedures for increasing production. Factories producing civilian consumer items have mobilization plans setting forth procedures for speedy conversion to specific military production. Plants producing military equipment must maintain sufficient stocks to carry out their mobilization plan and may not apply for state reserve supplies. Plants that are being converted to military production may apply to the appropriate agency of the Main Administration for State Material Reserves for necessary equipment and supplies.

- (4) Conversion to military production is not necessary in certain industries producing nonmilitary items. Many civilian products such as transport aircraft and tractors are manufactured according to military standards and specifications.
- (5) Special regulations govern the replenishment and turnover of supplies. Mobilization and reserve stocks are replaced so that the stocks on hand are always in a condition of readiness. The period of turnover varies according to the nature of the commodities stored. Most types of machinery and equipment must be replaced every 2 years; the average replacement period for chemicals is 6 months; technical instruments are replaced each year. Fuel reserves are constantly being used and replenished. Items that have been replaced by newer stocks are turned over for use by industry, agriculture, or for civilian use within the district where the items are stored.

Section III. SUPPLY

339. Responsibility

a. At Ministerial Level. At ministerial level, responsibility for supply is vested in the agencies responsible for procurement. The chief of rear services is responsible for the supply of rations and fodder, fuel and lubricants, quartermaster supplies, construction materials, and medical and veterinary supplies and equipment. The commander of artillery troops is responsible for the supply and issue of all weapons and ammunition except self-propelled guns. The commander of tank and mechanized troops has the responsibility for supplying tanks, self-propelled guns, combat vehicles, and prime movers. The commanders and chiefs of the technical arms and services (engineer, signal, and chemical warfare troops) are responsible for the supply of equipment and materiel pertaining to their own branches of the service. In addition the air forces chief of rear services is responsible for specialized supplies.

b. At Army Group and Army Levels. At army group and army levels supply is the general responsibility of the chief of rear services. In general practice, however, the same branches as the secretarial level are responsible for the supply of equipment and materiel. The chief of rear services coordinates the entire supply picture to fit in with the plans of the area commander. Actual procurement and issue of those supplies not handled by the rear services remain the functions of the supply sections of the technical services, the commander of tank and mechanized forces, and the chief of artillery.

c. Below Army Level. The corps normally has no supply functions except administrative control. At division and regimental

levels; the supply of combat and motor transport vehicles is handled by the chief of rear services. Engineer, signal, and chemical supply are consolidated under a single military-technical supply agency which is supervised by the chief of rear services. Thus, below army level all supply channels come under either the rear services or the artillery supply organization. The chief of rear service is responsible for the actual movement of all supplies except those moved by air or sea.

340. Impetus for Movement

a. During the California and Caribbean Campaigns movement of supplies was based for the most part on the principle of delivery forward. Higher echelons provided most of the transportation for the movement of supplies forward to lower echelons. The system operated on this basis all the way from army group down to troops in the line. The system was one manifestation of the centralization of control and of resources which characterized all Aggressor operations during war. Centralized control enables the Aggressor command to concentrate overwhelming forces at points of main effort and to keep these forces supplied despite limited transportation facilities. Troops in other sectors have to subsist marginally.

b. The principle of "delivery forward" is still followed, although less strictly than in the past. Down through army level, the impetus is from the rear. The same principle is probably applied below army, especially for ammunition and motor fuel. Subordinate units with increased T/E allotments of trucks, now are less dependent upon their parent organizations and probably share in the movement of their own supplies.

341. Supply Channels

a. Supplies are shipped from factories or central storage depots of the Ministry of the Armed Forces to army group depots in the field. All such long-distance military shipments are made by rail. Trucks are used in the field to move supplies from rail unloading points to unit control points and dumps. Army group depots are located on rail lines. These depots are large storage complexes, large enough to hold several days' supplies for all army group units.

b. Wherever possible, supplies are sent by rail from army group depots to army supply bases or field depots. The supply depots and field depots are located near railroad stations in the rear of the army area. If the tactical situation permits, forward depots are established between the army supply bases and the rear areas of divisions. Army reserves are increased before protracted offensive operations are undertaken.

c. Corps within armies have no rear areas or supply facilities except those for the supply of corps troops. Corps, however, exercise administrative control over supply requisitions from subordinate divisions. Separate corps handle their supply matters much the same as armies.

d. Supplies ordinarily are delivered from army depots to divisional distribution points by motor transportation organic to the army. In mobile situations division distribution points may be bypassed and delivery may be made directly from army depots to regiments in the line. This is done to avoid reloading of supplies.

e. At divisional distribution points supplies usually are stored in the open or in temporary buildings. Divisions generally have a reserve supply of about 5 rations, 2 refills of fuel, and 1½ units of fire for all subordinate and attached units.

f. In an active theater rail transportation usually terminates in the rear area of field armies. In a relatively static situation, military rail lines often are constructed to divisional distribution points.

342. Rear Services

a. The chief of rear services of a field command is also a deputy commander. He is responsible for the supply and logistical planning for the command and he participates in the planning of all operations. His organization supplies a substantial part of the materiel needed by the troops in operations, it provides transportation for the movement of all supplies and materiel, and it is responsible for the coordination of all supply matters. Because of his dual responsibility for planning and execution, the chief of rear services of a command is a particularly influential person. He is the third senior member of the command, ranked only by the commander and the chief of staff. All orders and directives applying to rear-area matters must be signed by the commander, the chief of staff, and the chief of rear services. The chief of rear services is the senior officer present at the rear CP. He directs the entire organization and the activity of the rear area of the command.

b. The position and influence of the chief of rear services emphasizes the intention of the Aggressor command to free the commander and the chief of staff from logistic planning and command responsibilities so that the commander and the chief of staff can concentrate their attention on operational matters. The command position of the chief of rear services charges him with the responsibility for taking the initiative in supply matters and for executing logistic plans already approved by the overall commander.

c. The commanders and chiefs of the technical arms and services must coordinate their supply activities with the chief of rear services and adapt their particular supply plans to fit into his overall plan. He tells them where to locate their depots and dumps, and they arrange with him for the transportation needed to move the supplies for which they are responsible.

d. A particularly important part of the rear services chief's responsibility is the control of traffic throughout his own rear area. The rear services chief of an army group or an army controls rail transportation through his staff chief of railroad planning who works with the civilian railroad administration in the area. Similarly, the rear services chief controls substantial motor transportation resources belonging directly to the army group. In critical situations where uninterrupted movement of supplies to points of main effort is essential, he can, with the permission of the overall commander, call upon the truck transportation resources of subordinate units.

343. Priorities

In the Aggressor system of priorities, ammunition is usually first. In the pursuit and exploitation phase, fuel may have equal or even higher priority, although usually it rates second. High priority is also given to various categories of specialized supplies and material, such as signal and engineer equipment.

344. Weapons and Ammunition Supply System

a. General.

(1) The artillery commander is responsible for the supply of small arms and artillery materiel, except for self-propelled guns. He is also responsible for the ammunition supply of both artillery and small arms. These responsibilities hold for the artillery deputy commanders of all field commands from army group down through regiment.

(2) Artillery supplies usually constitute the heaviest and most bulky category of supplies. Since these supplies usually have the highest priority for movement forward to the troops, particularly close coordination with rear services transportation elements is imperative.

b. *Ministerial Control.* The commander of artillery troops (subordinate to the headquarters of the ground troops within the ministry of the armed forces) procures and stores materiel and supplies and issues them to field commands. Each artillery staff, from the ministry down through the regiment, has a supply and ordnance element staffed by personnel of the artillery engineer service. The artillery

supply and ordnance element is the channel through which weapons and ammunition are requisitioned and supplied.

c. Army Group and Army Control. At army and army group levels artillery supply responsibilities follow the same basic pattern. In each case the artillery supply chief and his staff operate artillery depots and repair shops and supervise similar depots at the next lower echelon. In addition, the artillery supply chief and his staff consolidate requisitions from lower units and prepare shipments of ammunition and weapons. Actual transportation is supplied by the rear services. Artillery supply chiefs at army and army group levels also receive reports from subordinate units indicating the level of ammunition reserves.

d. Corps Control. The corps has a control agency headed by a chief of artillery supply. This chief is responsible for regulating the flow of artillery supplies to subordinate divisions. He receives copies of the reports and requisitions which subordinate divisions submit to the chief of artillery supply at army level.

e. Divisional Control. At divisional level the chief of artillery and his staff are responsible for the supply of ammunition and weapons to division units. This chief and his staff also are responsible for the storage and distribution of artillery supplies, the repair and maintenance of weapons and cartridge cases, the maintenance of daily records of ammunition expenditure and reserves, and the preparation of an estimate of future ammunition and weapons requirements.

f. Regimental Control. At regimental level the chief of artillery is responsible for the artillery supply dump; the issue of ammunition; and the issue, temporary storage, and repair of weapons. One or two armorers usually are available at the regimental dump to perform local repair work.

345. Fuel Supply

a. Divisions normally receive their fuel supplies by army transport from army depots. If the main fuel depots are more than 60 miles from the front, special forward fuel points are established.

b. Fuel is delivered by rail from central storage depots to army group bases, either in tank cars of 5,000-gallon capacity or in drums or barrels. Pipelines are rarely used, except in rear areas where the lines already exist. At army and army group supply bases, fuel is stored in tanks of from 15 to 50 tons. Oil and lubricants are stored in 40- to 132-gallon drums. Tank trucks carry fuel forward from army bases. Divisions use tank trucks and 53-gallon drums for supplying regiments.

346. Ration Supply

a. The exploitation of local resources to supply rations and fodder is a standard practice of the Aggressor army. This is especially true for perishable foods such as meat, vegetables, and butter. Within the zone of interior, grain is obtained from local collective farms. This grain sometimes is ground into flour or meal in division field mills. In 1953 some 50 mills or combination mills and field bakeries were operated by the rear services of the North Army Group. Although payment for appropriated food is not made, a receipt is given and the receipt can be applied against taxes due from the locality.

b. Thorough exploitation of local populations—friend or foe—was the rule during all Aggressor campaigns. Appropriated cattle not slaughtered or packed were driven on the hoof by armies and army groups. When the battlefield became stabilized, extensive vegetable gardens were laid out and the produce provided a substantial part of the ration requirements. By securing food supplies from local sources, other rations and transportation facilities are released for use in other areas.

c. The Aggressor Army uses both a summer and winter ration. The winter ration contains a greater percentage of fat than the summer ration. The Aggressor actually utilizes 13 different basic rations. The type of ration allotted for an individual depends upon his rank and type of duty. The maximum prescribed ration weighs about five pounds as compared to the seven-pound United States ration, standard for the European theater. Officer rations usually are the best, regardless of the type of duty. Prisoners of war and civilian laborers receive inferior rations.

347. Water Supply

a. The water supply in the field is organized according to plans prepared by engineer units in cooperation with the medical service. When time permits a water supply plan is drawn up to include a survey, a water-supply chart, and a work schedule. The location of existing water resources in the expected zone of operations is established by the survey. The water-supply chart indicates which water wells will be used, where new wells will be dug, and how water-supply stations will be deployed. The work schedule designates water points and the specific troops assigned thereto. The schedule also shows daily water requirements, indicates transportation requirements for the hauling of water, and provides for necessary equipment relative to water availability.

b. Engineers organize water-supply points in the rear of army groups and armies. Water-supply points for all lower echelons are organized by engineer units or the troops themselves under the direction of the local commander. The daily requirements for areas where water points are few or widely scattered are carefully computed to determine the amount of transportation needed.

348. Motor Transportation and Combat Vehicles

Motor transportation vehicles are supplied by the Main Administration of motor transport, a subordinate agency of the chief of rear services. Combat vehicles are furnished by the supply element of the headquarters of the tank and mechanized troops. At army and army group levels, analogous agencies are responsible for supplying vehicles. Prime movers are furnished by an element of the supply organization of the artillery chief of the army or army group command. At lower levels all vehicles are supplied through the motor transportation supply element of the rear services headquarters. Agencies that supply vehicles are also responsible for providing for their maintenance.

349. Specialized Equipment

a. Specialized equipment is furnished by the supply element of the arm or service most concerned with the use of the equipment. Signal equipment, for example, is furnished by the supply elements of the signal troops. Although specialized equipment constitutes only a small percentage by weight of the overall supplies and equipment needed by a field command, specialized equipment is often of great importance for the success of the operation. Therefore, the rear services transportation elements give high priority to the movement of any equipment furnished by the specialized arms and services. Below army level most of the specialized types of technical equipment are supplied by a unified military-technical section under the command of the chief of rear services.

b. Throughout the entire flow of supplies from factory to front-line regiment, elasticity is the fundamental characteristic of the Aggressor supply system. While definite procedures have been established to cover the movement of all types of supply, the methods actually employed depend upon the tactical situation at the moment.

Section IV. MOVEMENT

350. Rail

a. Within the homeland the Aggressor Army depends heavily upon the rail network. When the railroads are capable of meeting the supply needs of the army, no other means of transportation is considered. This does not mean that Aggressor underestimates the importance of motor transportation. It does mean, however, that even divisions normally supplied by motor transport from the army will be supplied by rail wherever possible.

b. All railroads within the Aggressor Homeland are controlled and operated by the Ministry of Transport. The military section of this ministry, headed by a general officer, works out plans for a rapid transfer of all rail facilities to military control in the event of war or national emergency. Upon mobilization, all railroads are converted to military status. Even in peacetime, the Ministry of Transport is a semimilitary organization. Railway personnel wear special uniforms and hold rank comparable to those in the Aggressor Army. In time of war the ministry is responsible for the technical operation and maintenance of the rail network. In combat areas where rail facilities have been damaged or destroyed, repairs and reconstruction is performed by railroad engineer construction brigades supplied by the army. Other railroad operating brigades operate reconstructed rail sectors until they can be turned over to the Ministry of Transport.

c. Railroads are used to move military supplies from factories to central depots and from there to army and army group depots. The chief of rear services at both army group and army level is assigned a chief of military communications who controls and plans rail movements. The chief of marshaling yards, under the army group chief of military communications, is responsible for the proper dispatch of trains to the armies.

d. The army supply base usually is located at the army regulating station near the rear boundary of the army rear area. The army base regulates the flow of supplies to the army and subordinate units. In addition to the supply base, the army usually has one or more advance supply depots located at railheads near the forward limit of the army rear area. This advance supply depot is usually the point of direct distribution to the divisions. Here, there are at least one unit of fire, 3 or 4 days' rations, and two fills of fuel and lubricants for units in the area. As a rule supplies are moved by rail from the army supply base to the advance supply depot.

e. In mobile operations if the rail lines extend to the rear area of a division, an unloading station is set up in the division rear instead of

at the army supply depot at the railhead. Normally, however, supplies from the army to division are moved by motor transport.

f. Aggressor military trains average 120 axles and the number of railroad cars varies from about 30 to 60. Aggressor doctrine calls for the loading of an entire battalion on one train. When this is impracticable, as in the case of motorized battalions, supplies and equipment of lesser importance are moved on a second train.

g. Aggressor rolling stock includes all the standard box cars, flat cars, gondolas, and tank cars. The capacity of Aggressor military trains averages about 1,300 short tons. Average train speed is from 12 to 15 miles per hour. Normal capacity of double-track lines varies from 30 to 40 trains daily. The daily capacity of single-track lines varies from 10 to 15 trains in each direction. Rail capacity can be increased substantially by organizing traffic in one direction only and by disregarding safety regulations to the extent of reducing the space between trains to visual distance.

351. Motor

a. As late as 1953, 50 percent of the entire Aggressor motor truck pool consisted of vehicles manufactured in the United States. The Aggressor Army was chronically short of trucks. Motor vehicles were not used for long-distance hauling if railroad transportation was at all available.

b. Since 1949 the Aggressor has stepped up his own production of efficient, modern trucks. Army transportation is now largely motorized. There is still, however, a shortage of motor transportation throughout the Aggressor Homeland. In the event of mobilization, some military units would have to depend on animal-drawn transportation. A shortage of trained drivers and skilled mechanics still exists.

c. The Aggressor Army has made good use of its opportunities for the study and use of road nets. Nearly all Aggressor troops in occupied areas are motorized or mechanized. Motor transport of supply and personnel has been a prominent feature of the annual maneuvers held in these areas. Both in maneuvers and in normal occupation activities, Aggressor has gained knowledge and experience in movement by motor. The total mileage of the road network within the Aggressor Homeland is less than one-fourth of that within the United States and includes only a few thousand miles of good paved roads.

d. Extensive use of motor transport by the Aggressor Army usually begins in the rear areas of armies, where rail transport terminates. In areas where rail lines run closer to the front, short trains are used to move supplies to the most advanced railheads, and divisions take

supplies directly from the railroads. In the past campaigns army groups frequently were forced to use vehicles to supply army bases. Army, division, and regimental columns often were combined for the purpose of moving supplies from any depot to critical frontline sectors.

e. Aggressor has shown that they are capable of improvising and adapting their supply mechanism to meet the changing demands of mobile warfare. Because of this the actual use of available motor transport frequently differs from theoretical supply procedure. In future combat operations Aggressor army groups and armies would have substantial motor pools organized into several truck brigades. The size of each pool would depend upon circumstances. Each division would have one organic motor transport battalion.

f. Army and divisional motor transport units are employed in two principal ways. The units may be used independently to move certain supplies within specified distances, or they may be concentrated to provide a continuous emergency-supply flow from distant army depots down to fighting units. The choice between these two methods depends upon the distance of the fighting troops from the army supply bases and upon the number of vehicles available.

g. Ammunition, rations, and fuel for rifle divisions are hauled forward to divisional relay points by army supply columns. Tank and mechanized divisions have organic transport for obtaining supplies from distances up to 60 miles. This difference in practice between rifle and mobile divisions is necessary because mobile divisions are employed at points of main effort and must carry with them the transport needed to meet their own supply crises.

h. Additional nonorganic motor transportation is provided for the movement of a rifle division only if the distance involved is over 45 miles. For lesser distances the division moves by shuttling its own vehicles back and forth; part of the distance is covered by truck and the remainder by marching. For moving regiments distances in excess of 35 miles, additional trucks are provided by the division or army. A battalion may be moved by the division's truck battalion if the distance is 15 miles or more.

i. At all levels of command the transportation of military supplies and equipment and the construction and maintenance of roads are responsibilities of the chiefs of rear services. During past campaigns Aggressor established road exploitation regiments which were assigned sectors of the rear-area road network. These regiments were responsible for maintenance, construction, traffic control, and security of all roads within their sector. This arrangement usually permitted full exploitation of motor transportation.

j. One-way traffic often is ordered on roads used for troop movement. Distance between vehicles is normally 25 to 50 yards; for blackout driving it is 20 to 30 yards. When motor columns come within range of enemy artillery fire or when roads are dusty, the distances are from 500 to 600 yards between rifle battalions and from 1,000 to 1,100 yards between rifle regiments, tank and mechanized battalions, and brigades. Although the distance intervals and load capabilities are standardized theoretically here as elsewhere, improvisation and adaptation to changing conditions is common. In past campaigns trucks allocated for moving food were sent to move ammunition one day and fuel the next. When mud hindered the employment of motor vehicles, horse and ox teams were collected from surrounding territory. The civilian population was ruthlessly forced to maintain roads.

352. Air

a. Aggressor has a sizable air transportation arm which consists of the 1,600 aircraft of the Civil Air Fleet and 1,200 transport aircraft of Aggressor Air Forces. The Civil Air Fleet, even in peacetime, is under the general supervision of the military. In wartime the greater part of its resources would be available for military tasks. Army air transportation resources are held under centralized control; headquarters below army group usually do not have regularly assigned air transport facilities.

b. During past campaigns Aggressor used air transportation to supply partisans behind enemy lines, to evacuate the critically wounded, and to supply mobile spearheads which had outrun their rear echelons. Past campaign experience is not, however, a reliable index of Aggressor views concerning the uses of air transportation.

c. In the future Aggressor undoubtedly will plan to use air supply on a far greater scale than they have in the past. They can be expected to use air supply in support of large airborne forces operating behind enemy lines and at points of main effort in mobile operations.

d. At present most of Aggressor's aircraft are of the C-47 type. Thus Aggressor capacity for moving large, heavy, and bulky objects is far inferior to that of the United States. But Aggressor has sufficient transport aircraft to move sizable numbers of men and large quantities of supplies and light equipment.

353. Water

a. Although river transportation carries 8 percent of all Aggressor freight, it is of little importance in Aggressor military picture. The Aggressor is now constructing a network of canals that will increase

the capacity and usefulness of inland waterways and will reduce the burden of the overworked railway system.

b. The Aggressor merchant fleet is small, totaling less than one-tenth of the tonnage of the United States merchant fleet. Most of the Aggressor merchant ships are small, slow cargo carriers, and only 32 are tankers. The present merchant marine of Aggressor has a limited capacity for providing sustained logistic support for long-range overwater operations.

c. Aggressor capacity for exploiting all available materials and methods make large-scale coastal operations a possibility. Small quantities of various types of landing craft were captured from the United States during previous campaigns and Aggressor also secured European amphibious craft. In addition Aggressor is developing his own landing craft and is increasing his capabilities for amphibious operations. With his genius for improvisation, Aggressor may be expected to undertake sizable short-range amphibious operations in a future conflict even though he lacks conventional amphibious craft.

Section V. REPAIR, MAINTENANCE, AND SALVAGE

354. Previous Experience

a. Although in past campaigns Aggressor had proportionately far less motor transportation and combat vehicle equipment than the United States Army, in absolute terms the Aggressor had an impressive number of trucks, tanks, and self-propelled guns. Aggressor had hundred of thousands of trucks. There were sufficient tanks to outfit 40 tank and mechanized divisions and many smaller independent tank regiments and brigades.

b. The task of supplying trained drivers for all this mechanized equipment proved insuperable. Although most of the mechanically trained inductees were assigned to tank and mechanized units, United States troops frequently commented on the overcaution, clumsiness, and poor training of Aggressor tank drivers. Because of the shortage of trained drivers, Aggressor was unable to use his large armored and mechanized forces to the best advantage during the late phases of the California campaign.

c. Aggressor was more adept at providing adequate maintenance for his motorized equipment. Severe handicaps had to be overcome. Vehicles operating in virtually roadless terrain wore out rapidly or required frequent repair. There was a chronic and extremely serious shortage of spare parts in forward maintenance and repair shops. The shortage was partly the fault of Aggressor industry, which produced too few spare parts in relation to the number of complete assem-

blies turned out. As a result a considerable amount of the total resources of army and lower echelon workshops was expended in the expensive and time-consuming process of machining and fabricating handmade replacement parts which, had the parts been in stock, could have been installed in a matter of minutes. This situation led to the wasteful practice of stripping one disabled vehicle to obtain a needed part for another. Nevertheless, Aggressor maintenance shops performed creditably considering the handicaps they faced. Tank maintenance, particularly, appears to have been competent and expeditious.

d. Maintenance and repair of roads and railroads were extremely important because lines of communication usually were taxed to capacity. Army construction engineers made immediate repairs and did rehabilitation work. More thorough repairs were carried out later by semicivilian engineering units and agencies under military control. The Aggressor Army was particularly adept in restoring the damaged transportation networks of newly occupied areas. Skillful improvisation, initial priority for replacement vehicles, and the large-scale employment of human labor under resourceful and experienced supervision were the main factors in Aggressor success in this type of repair and maintenance.

e. Another factor aided Aggressor in his solution of the repair and maintenance problem. This factor was the extremely strict supply discipline enforced in the field and in the rear. The discipline counteracted substantial Aggressor inexperience with machinery and lack of responsibility which otherwise would have added greatly to the problem.

355. Responsibility

a. The technical arms and services responsible for the supply of various categories of materiel are usually responsible for the maintenance (other than first-echelon or preventive maintenance) of the materiel which they supply.

b. In addition, armorers trained by and assigned to the artillery engineer service (except in echelons below rifle regiments) repair all weapons.

c. Collection, salvage, and evacuation of Aggressor and enemy materiel are the responsibility of salvage agencies subordinate to the rear services at division and above.

356. Maintenance and Repair of Motor Vehicles

a. Combat vehicles are maintained and repaired by elements of the tank engineer service of the tank and mechanized troops. Noncombat vehicles are serviced by motor transportation elements of the rear

services. In rifle divisions and rifle regiments, both functions are performed by small motor maintenance sections subordinate to the rear services. These sections operate mobile repair shops built into trucks. Repair trucks usually carry a lathe, tools, welding equipment, and spare parts; larger trucks also may carry a crane and a battery charger.

b. Special attention is given to the maintenance and evacuation of tanks; a complex system that emphasizes unit replacement and specialized repair has been developed. Mechanic teams service tank companies; workshop platoons service battalions; and larger units service regiments and divisions. In addition armies have mobile plants for more extensive repairs, such as electroplating and the reconstruction of motors, clutches, and transmission systems.

c. Aggressor preventive maintenance for armored vehicles roughly approximates United States practice. First-echelon maintenance is performed by regiments and battalions after a combat vehicle has been in operation for 9,000 miles. The maintenance includes cleaning of filters, motors, and other assemblies, testing of connections, lubrication of friction surfaces, and an overall check of the operating parts. Third-echelon maintenance is performed in regiments and divisions after operation for 18,000 miles. Typical third-echelon jobs include lubrication of transmission, adjustment of valves, and checking of the fuel-injection system.

d. Aggressor pays particular attention to the operation of armored vehicles in winter. Preheating devices for fuel injectors and motors are installed in tanks that are to operate in extremely cold areas. Coils carrying heated water are installed in crew compartments. Idlers and bogies are cleaned. Tracks are loosened for movement over ice and snow.

357. Maintenance of Weapons

a. The Chief of artillery at each level is responsible for weapons maintenance and repair. An echelon system similar to the automotive echelon repair system is used. Artillery weapons are repaired at all levels from battery to army group. At division level workshops perform light and partial medium repair of weapons and equipment. Mobile shops may make emergency repairs in combat areas, but normally division workshops located at division supply points are used. At army level mobile repair shops function under the weapons-repair group of the artillery supply section. Armorers in such a shop replace major parts and assemblies, dismantle damaged weapons, make parts, and do other similar repair work. Army groups have repair shops on railroad cars for medium repairs on infantry and artillery weapons. Major repairs are made in the zone of the interior.

b. The Aggressor army expects the individual soldier to maintain his clothing and other personnel equipment. The soldier is encouraged to do minor repairs himself and he is punished for irresponsible use of equipment. Repair of clothing is handled by laundries and workshops of the Intendance Service. A shoemaker and a tailor are assigned at regimental level; laundries and larger workshops are located at division level; similar services and work requiring large shops are performed at army level.

358. Maintenance and Repair of Railroads

a. Aggressor railroads in and near combat areas are maintained and repaired by the railroad engineer troops. Units of these troops are allocated by the chief of rear services to army groups and armies. An army might have four or five engineer reconstruction battalions as well as bridging, carpenter, and labor battalions, and tractor, truck, and railway-operating companies.

b. Aggressor railroad repair and reconstruction is aided by advance planning. Attempts are made to gain control of new areas before rails and rolling stock can be seriously damaged. Material and equipment for repairs are stockpiled in anticipation of needs. Railroad engineer troops follow hard on the heels of the advancing infantry.

c. In the actual repair work speedy resumption of traffic is achieved through short cuts and ruthless methods. No bridging of more than about 200 yards is done by railroad engineer troops. Torn and bent rails are salvaged, cut into 10- to 12-foot lengths, and used. Reconstruction material is dismantled from nearby sidings, industrial installation tracks, and secondary lines. Commanders of sectors under repair have control over areas up to three miles on both sides of tracks. As a general rule, 50 percent of the materials needed is expected to be found along the line. Railroad engineer troops are split into groups and assigned to sectors. The groups leap-frog along lines under repair. The local population, irrespective of sex, is pressed into service but is not provided with rations or quarters. Reconstructed sectors of track, in units of 6 to 18 miles, are transferred to the militarized Ministry of Transport. This organization reconstructs large bridges, signal communications, water tank installation, coaling bunkers, rail junctions, overpasses, and other major structures.

d. By using these methods in campaigns against United States Forces, the Aggressor is able to repair an average of about $3\frac{1}{4}$ miles of single-track line per day, including bridging. This rapid reconstruction and repair work assures almost continuous railway traffic.

e. The mission of the railroad engineer troops is to make only the repairs needed to keep the trains moving, even if only temporarily and over one track. The task of these troops is particularly important because of the shortage and slowness of nonrail transport.

359. Maintenance and Repair of Motor Roads

a. With the increasing motorization and mechanization of Aggressor troops, the functions of road repair units have become more important. The success of Aggressor future combat operations will be tied closely to the maintenance and repair of motor roads.

b. In past campaigns as in the case of railroads, motor-road maintenance and repair was done by engineer units that followed closely behind advancing troops. The engineer units made the minimum repairs necessary to keep vehicles moving uninterruptedly along the most important roads. Road construction units took over planned reconstruction and maintenance from the engineer units as soon as the situation permitted. To facilitate these operations, road networks in the rear area were subdivided into sectors. A road exploitation regiment was assigned the responsibility for reconstruction, maintenance, and traffic control of each sector.

c. Bridging is a particularly important problem in the work of road repair and maintenance. During past campaigns Aggressor divided bridging operations into three categories. Short-term reconstruction was intended to last from a few hours to a few days. Speed, the maximum use of local materials, and dependence on equipment at hand were emphasized. Engineer units supplied with organic bridging material performed this type of construction. Temporary bridge reconstruction had a planned life span of three to five years. This type of reconstruction was performed by road construction troops. Simple construction and speed were the chief considerations. Permanent bridge building was not considered a proper task for engineer units or road construction troops during wartime. Permanent bridges were built only when materials and labor were available and when the construction period did not exceed by much the time required for a temporary structure.

d. At the present time the road construction troops of the Aggressor Army serve in traffic control, road-construction, and bridge-building units. All are subordinate to the chief of rear services. The practice of dividing road networks into sectors, each sector under a single commandant, has been retained.

360. Salvage

Salvage is a particularly important matter to Aggressor war economy. The tremendous expenditures of military supplies requires that

both Aggressor and enemy equipment and materiel be salvaged. In the past the need for many of the items that could be salvaged was urgent. Hundreds of thousands of tons of burnt-out tanks and other forms of scrap steel were hauled back for the steel industry. Tens of thousands of captured trucks, weapons, and items of clothing (boots particularly) were used directly by the army. A special commission was created for the collection and evacuation of captured and Aggressor materiel. Salvaged materiel was transported in rear services organization trucks and trains that were returning to the rear. The commission had its own personnel for collecting, sorting, and loading the salvage. Thus rear-area service personnel were freed from the task and could devote their full energies to the support of the Aggressor combat troops moving forward on the offensive.

Section VI. MEDICAL AND VETERINARY EVACUATION SYSTEM

361. Evaluation

a. Despite the somewhat coldly materialistic Aggressor view concerning the value of the individual, the Aggressor Army Medical Service is well organized and efficient. In a state where the government operates all the social services, including medicine, the Army's Medical Service has first call on the resources of the Ministry of Health. At the top level of professional skill the Aggressor Army has the services of first-rate surgeons and therapists. Among medical corpsmen in the field, the Aggressor Army has the services of a corps of generally dedicated and selfless women stretcher bearers and nurses. In recovering the wounded from the field, getting them to aid stations, and providing front-line medical care, these medical assistants do their duty with great credit.

b. Two factors, however, reduce the efficiency, at least in terms of American standards, of the Aggressor Army Medical Service during previous campaigns. The first factor was an interest in wounded men chiefly as reparable human livestock rather than as individual persons. The second was the enormous burden that was laid upon the service—a burden which frequently far exceeded its capabilities. A combination of these two factors led an Aggressor military surgeon to say Aggressor was trying—in dealing with wounds of the extremities—to save hands rather than legs. "Hands," said the Aggressor surgeon, "will be economically valuable, whereas a man can do quite well in a factory if he has a peg leg."

c. The mission of the Aggressor Army Medical Service is to bring medical aid as far forward as possible and to expedite the evacuation of casualties. In addition, the service is responsible for epi-

demic control, for general preventive medicine, for the maintenance of sanitary conditions, and for the inspection of the food and water supply.

362. Responsibility

a. At ministerial level the Chief of Rear Services administers the medical activities of the Aggressor Army through the Main Directorate of Medical Service. In wartime, general and specialized hospitals are located within the zone of the interior and at army group and army levels. The Ministry of Health administers hospitals in the zone of the interior. In operational theaters large mobile field hospitals may be organized at division level. The evacuation chain extends from these hospitals forward through the various unit echelons as far as company level. Corps headquarters normally have no medical facilities. Each line division has a small medical battalion. Regiments supply medical platoons to the battalions. Men from the battalion medical platoon are made available to each company.

b. Casualties from lower medical points normally are picked up and evacuated by higher units. Any available rearward-moving transportation is used for this purpose.

363. Evacuation

a. Casualties are evacuated from the front to the battalion medical point by stretcher bearers. On the average four stretcher bearers are made available to each company. Wheeled stretchers, sleds, dog carts, ski stretchers, and horse and motor ambulances are used for battle evacuation. Trained dogs sometimes are used in mountainous terrain to locate casualties; once located, such casualties are evacuated by pack animals.

b. The medical company attached to each regimental headquarters evacuates battle casualties from the battalion to the regimental medical point. The company uses its own ambulances and any other available transportation. Regimental medical points usually are located within one to three miles of the frontlines. Treatment may be expected at this echelon within four hours of evacuation. The regimental medical point classifies and tags casualties, checks and changes bandages, provides emergency surgical treatment, and cares for patients who cannot be evacuated safely. Casualties are assigned priority tags to indicate the order in which they are to receive medical treatment and evacuation further to the rear.

c. The division medical battalion is established three to six miles from the frontlines. This unit is responsible for evacuating casual-

ties from the regimental medical points to the division medical points or to attached mobile surgical hospitals 15 to 20 miles behind the frontlines. Major surgery is performed at both the divisional medical point and at the mobile hospitals. When the casualties reach these points, they are divided into two categories—the casualties that must be evacuated further to the rear and those that can be returned to duty within a short time. Casualties expected to recover within two weeks are not evacuated further to the rear. The more seriously wounded or ill are sent to specialized hospitals at army level and above. These casualties are sent to army casualty clearing stations usually located near the railheads or main roads. From there they pass to army mobile surgical hospitals or to collecting hospitals in the army rear areas. At these installations casualties are again divided into two categories—those who should recover within 30 days are sifted out and retained; the remainder are sent further back, if possible, to specialized field hospitals.

d. Army group and army evacuation stations contain medical determining boards and ambulance units. Various types of specialized hospitals frequently are set up in army group and army rear areas. Chiefs of medical service at army group levels sometimes assign hospital trains to army group or army evacuation centers. These trains are sent to areas where large numbers of casualties are expected.

364. Medical Service Personnel

a. In wartime the Aggressor Army draws most of its medical professionals from civilian life. The Aggressor nation has a relative scarcity of doctors. Army standards generally are lower than those set by the United States Army.

b. In the first category of Aggressor medical professionals are doctors who have completed 5 years of specialized medical schooling in a medical university and have received diplomas. These doctors may be commissioned in the Aggressor Army with a rank as high as major.

c. The second category of Aggressor medical people includes those who have completed 4 years of study in a medical university but have not completed internship or residence requirements. These junior doctors may be accepted by the army for a short tour of duty and released in peacetime with the rank of senior lieutenants in the medical reserve.

d. Students who complete 3 to 4 years of simplified medical training may qualify as high-grade medical technicians. The urgent need

for medical personnel in the homeland has led to the training of great numbers of these technicians. Many of these have been inducted into the army as junior lieutenants.

e. In the past a large percentage of Aggressor Army medical personnel were women. Women served as some of the first-rate surgeons and doctors in the specialized hospitals and in some cases were used as aid personnel in line units.

f. The Aggressor Army accepts as nurses women who have completed a 2-year medical nursing course. Nurses are given a rank equivalent to warrant officers. Nursing orderlies are given a 6-month medical indoctrination course and hold the grade of sergeant.

g. In an effort to improve medical personnel standards, the army maintains a number of medical academies for training doctors and nurses. Aggressor medical corps personnel are kept abreast of the latest developments in medical science through refresher courses given in Aggressor Army medical academies and hospitals.

365. Veterinary Service

a. The treatment and evacuation of wounded horses proved to be a serious problem for the Aggressor during previous campaigns. The problem was acute because of the large number of animals used. The Aggressor Army depended to a large extent upon animal-drawn transportation and the total supply of horses had been so seriously depleted that enough replacements could not be found.

b. Aggressor has regimental and divisional veterinary aid stations in the rear areas of the respective echelons. They soon discovered that 4 to 6 hours were required for a wounded horse to reach the regimental veterinary hospital 5 to 6 miles from the battle line. This lapse of time proved to be a serious handicap.

c. Therefore, the army set up a new system which provided advance regimental veterinary stations well forward in combat areas. These stations are located on the lines of evacuation nearest the main concentrations of horses. Early treatment is further facilitated by locating sections of divisional veterinary hospitals at the boundaries of divisional and regimental rear areas.

d. Horses are evacuated from divisional veterinary hospitals to veterinary evacuation and field hospitals in army rear areas. If further treatment is considered practical, horses are evacuated to veterinary hospital bases in the army group rear areas. Unless incapacitated, wounded horses are not moved to rear areas.

Section VII. AIR FORCE SUPPLY, MAINTENANCE, AND EQUIPMENT

366. Supply and Maintenance

a. Unit Responsibility.

- (1) While it is a tenet of Aggressor Air Forces organization that matters such as supply, engineering, communications, and medical service be handled by units which are separate from the regular flying organization, no single headquarters is responsible for all these services.
- (2) The main burden of responsibility for supply service to flying units is borne by the aviation ground support troops and the aircraft service troops. These are separate organizations which carry out security, engineering, signal, supply, maintenance, medical, and transportation functions. Combat units do not have support and service troops in their organizations. Technical ground personnel of the flying units are responsible for the routine servicing of their aircraft. All other support and service requirements are met by the separate organizations mentioned above.

b. Aviation Ground Support Troops. Each command of aviation ground support troops is immediately subordinate to the deputy commander of the air army. This command is a headquarters unit; it merely controls the work done by subordinate units. General support, such as upkeep of fields and the furnishing of communications and antiaircraft defense is carried out by the airfield ground support troops which will service each divisional or army airfield.

c. Aviation Service Troops. The aviation service troops furnish the logistical support for the air army to which they are assigned and for the air corps and division to which they are attached. Minor and running repairs are grouped together under the heading "field repairs," and are accomplished by attached maintenance company and battalions. Damage and general repairs are considered "major repairs" and are accomplished by the maintenance companies.

367. Materiel

a. Aircraft. Aggressor aircraft compare favorably with current aircraft of the United States Air Force. Fighter units are almost entirely equipped with jet aircraft. Ground attack and bomber units are receiving jet equipment at a steadily growing rate.

b. Weapons, Ammunition, and Bombs. Aggressor is as eager as other countries to possess large caliber, high performance aircraft

weapons. Weapons, ammunition, and bombs at present compare favorably with those used by the United States.

c. Radio and Electronic Devices. Aggressor possesses the following radar equipment which compares favorably with that of the United States:

- (1) *Airborne equipment.*
 - (a) Airborne interception.
 - (b) Blind bombing and navigation.
 - (c) IFF.
- (2) *Ground equipment.*
 - (a) Early warning.
 - (b) IFF.
 - (c) Ground control interception.

CHAPTER 13

THE AGGRESSOR NATION

368. National History

a. At the close of World War II in 1945, the chaotic conditions resulting from fundamental disagreements between the victorious allied powers gave rise to a new nation—Aggressor. The surrender of the Axis Powers was followed by withdrawals of allied troops from Europe and immediate demobilization of Allied Armies. A small group of determined men, confirmed in their belief in the totalitarian state established an international organization called the Circle Trigon Party. This organization succeeded primarily because of the reluctance on the part of any nation or group of nations to accept responsibility for direct action to suppress this new group. By clever use of propaganda and slogans the Circle Trigonists soon consolidated their position and quickly extended their influence and control over many areas. Due to the chaotic economic conditions, they found a fertile field for the well-planned propaganda and the Aggressor Nation was established by late 1945. After all political opposition was silenced, a triumvirate of three men, popularly known as the Trinity, gained absolute control of the Circle Trigon Party and the Aggressor Nation.

b. Immediately upon its establishment, Aggressor entered upon a well-balanced and carefully-controlled period of intense development and organization of all resources and phases of national life, quickly attaining the immediate goal of national unity and relative self-sufficiency. In contrast to her neighbors, Aggressor was reasonably prosperous and her people contended with the new government as it started to fulfill its initial promises. One advantage enjoyed by the new nation was that the bulk of its lands had escaped the destruction of war which had so severely impaired the national economy of other nations. Aggressor was in a peculiar position in the world, as her able leaders had foreseen. Initially backed in secret by both the eastern and the western powers, Aggressor was alarmed at the closer and more friendly relations between the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States, and feared united action on the part of these powers. Engaged in a race against time, she was aware of the

necessity to become well-established before the dulled and war-weary former allies realized her true ambition and organized to put her down. Her leaders believed that she must strike before that day and that the blow must be against her most powerful opponent—the United States.

c. Turning her attention from the devastated areas of Europe to the prosperous and unscathed lands of North America, Aggressor began plans in early 1946 for an invasion of the United States. Although the United States had emerged from the war as a strong military nation, its hasty and ill-advised demobilization, together with widespread internal disturbance and general war-weariness, convinced the Aggressor High Command that such a plan offered a reasonable chance of success if aided by a well-organized branch of the Circle Trigon Party within the United States and by a skillful propaganda campaign. In late 1946 Aggressor, aided by agents and sympathizers, seized the Antilles chain of islands and the Panama Canal. Then in November an Aggressor expedition passed through the Panama Canal and landed on the coast of southern California. The Aggressor Navy was inadequate to protect the supply line and Aggressor troops were defeated. Quisling groups in the United States, however, assisted in arranging a peace in which Aggressor retained bases in the Caribbean area. Aggressor's determination to conquer the North American continent next resulted in a second campaign in the fall of 1947. The Aggressor Third Army overran portions of North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida in a large-scale amphibious assault on the southeastern coast of the United States. After suffering a serious defeat, this Aggressor force began an evacuation of troops while making a final stand in the Florida area. The Aggressor units which could not be evacuated were destroyed. However, individual soldiers, aided by Aggressor sympathizers, scattered over the entire United States and became members of and advisers to subversive groups. In the meantime Aggressor launched a combined amphibious air and airborne offensive across the North Atlantic Ocean. By the winter of 1947, Aggressor held all of New England and the St. Lawrence River area, and had driven a wedge southwest through New York State to the general line BUFFALO-SCRANTON-ALBANY-NEW HAVEN.

d. As the Aggressor forces continued to build up their military strength in the Caribbean, emphasis was placed on preparation and training for airborne operations. Meanwhile, subversive organizations of Aggressor sympathizers in the United States grew in size and number. The tempo of subversive incidents increased. The climax of the dissident movement was an open attack in the Tennessee-

Kentucky area by a military organization known as the Green Brigade. The attack began in April of 1948 as a series of raids on the supplies and arms stored at Fort Campbell, Ky. The Green Brigade then captured the airfield and laid siege to the camp. As the United States launched an attack against these guerilla forces, Aggressor forces from the Caribbean executed a successful airborne landing in Tennessee. The United States Air Force succeeded in preventing continued Aggressor air action and blocked the follow-up air lift. The Aggressor airborne forces were either killed or captured and members of the Green Brigade evaporated into the hills. The Circle Trigon Party again went underground.

e. Concerned over the stubborn Aggressor defense of New England, and over the critical United States shipping losses in the Atlantic, the United States decided upon a limited attack against Aggressor Caribbean installations in the early spring of 1949. On 2 March 1949 joint amphibious United States forces landed on the Island of Vieques, destroyed submarine pens there and at San Juan, Puerto Rico, and withdrew after the successful completion of their mission. Immediately following this attack, Aggressor propagandists made much of the limited objective and rapid withdrawal of United States forces. As if in retaliation for the assault against Puerto Rico, Aggressor Caribbean forces executed an airborne invasion of the United States early in May 1949. The initial attack, preceded by general unrest and industrial sabotage throughout Southeastern United States, resulted in Aggressor seizure of Pope Air Force Base and the Fort Bragg (North Carolina) area. The United States Air Force soon gained air superiority but not until Aggressor had air-landed an entire corps. Strongly reinforced United States defenders counter-attacked and by mid-June had destroyed the Aggressor force.

f. Late in May 1949, when the Aggressor High Command realized that the Carolina campaign was doomed to failure, part of a large convoy—ostensibly en route to the Caribbean—broke off in mid-Atlantic, rounded Cape Horn, and headed for the Hawaiian Islands. Secrecy was maintained by a screen of submarines and carrier-based planes which destroyed approaching ships and aircraft without a trace. The small United States garrison and hastily mobilized National Guard units put up stubborn resistance, chiefly on Oahu, but by 19 June Aggressor was in control of the entire archipelago. The United States immediately organized a joint amphibious task force which assaulted Oahu on 25 October and completely recaptured the island by mid-November. Only a few submarines and key command personnel escaped destruction in the attempted last-minute Aggressor evacuation. The Aggressor High Command had realized for a long

time that Alaska was one of the gateways to the United States and that while the Hawaiian Islands were in the possession of Aggressor a route was open to invade Alaska. Therefore, plans were made and appropriate supplies were stockpiled on the island of Hawaii for an amphibious operation against Alaska. No definite date had been set for the operation, but when the United States counterinvasion plans of Hawaii became known Aggressor decided that an Alaskan invasion would serve as a counterstroke that would render the northern flank of the United States vulnerable. On 4 October 1949, Aggressor Task Force "Schnee" departed from Hilo and made an amphibious landing in the vicinity of Anchorage, Alaska. By mid-February, Aggressor units had advanced beyond Northway. Subsequently, a combined operation of United States and allied forces pushed Aggressor from the Alaskan mainland to the Aleutian chain of islands.

g. Late in 1949 Aggressor appeared determined to carry out his master plan for the conquest of the United States. In accordance with this plan, Aggressor greatly increased his air and submarine attacks against United States shipping and coastal installations along the southeastern United States seaboard during January 1950. During 20 to 31 January 1950 Aggressor bombed major cities and United States military installations and airfields in Florida. On 1 February 1950 Aggressor made successful airborne and amphibious invasions of the Florida peninsula. At the same time the United States planned a major raid on the Island of Vieques, just east of the Aggressor stronghold of Puerto Rico to destroy the Aggressor naval installations in that area and to relieve the pressure being exerted against United States shipping. The United States intelligence agencies had persistently reported a strong concentration of Aggressor airborne and amphibious forces in the Caribbean. These concentrations indicated preparation for another attack against continental United States to relieve the pressure against Aggressor forces in Florida. On 15 March 1950 a joint United States Army-Navy task force with close air support landed on the Island of Vieques. This task force quickly overran the Aggressor defenders, destroyed glider assembly plans and the rebuilt submarine bases, and withdrew according to plan. In an effort to assist the Florida offensive, the Aggressor High Command decided to launch a second joint airborne and amphibious attack against the United States; using the airborne and amphibious troops previously reported concentrating in the Caribbean area. On 20 March 1950 Aggressor, with complete air superiority in southeastern United States, dropped an airborne force in the vicinity of Fort Bragg, N. C. This airborne force was reinforced by Aggressor air-trans-

ported troops shortly thereafter. These forces immediately occupied Fort Bragg, Pope Air Force Base, and nearby towns. Simultaneously, Aggressor landed a seaborne task force in the vicinity of Wilmington, N. C. This force immediately began pushing toward Fort Bragg in order to effect a link-up with the Aggressor airborne and air-transported forces in that area. By 28 April 1950 the United States Air Force regained air superiority over this sector. The United States ground force and its supporting arms immediately began counterattacks in order to drive the Aggressor forces out of North Carolina. Fort Bragg, Pope Air Force Base, and the towns located in their immediate vicinity were liberated by the United States forces 1 May 1950. By 31 May 1950 the remnants of the Aggressor forces which could not be evacuated were killed, captured, or scattered. The Aggressor invasion of Florida, in the meantime, had been stopped along the general line JACKSONVILLE-TALLAHASSEE-APPALACHICOLA.

h. The Aggressor High Command blamed the failure of the Hawaiian and Alaskan campaigns in 1949 and 1950 on the excessive length of the Aggressor supply lines which extended half-way around the world. The incorporation of a colonial empire into the Aggressor nation was the next step in Aggressor's master plan for world domination. Therefore, late in April 1950 Aggressor took over several of the former European Colonial areas in Asia. In May 1950 the Aggressor Tenth Army was sent to the Orient to occupy and control these areas.

i. In 1951 the Aggressor High Command again prepared a plan for an all-out attack against the United States. As a part of this plan, a reinforced armored corps made a successful amphibious landing in the Myrtle Beach-Charleston, S. C., area on 11 July 1951. The invaders pushed inland to the Fort Bragg, N. C., area where United States air and ground reinforcements from other sectors of the country established an impregnable defensive line. Subsequently, a United States airborne force dropped behind Aggressor lines and forced the Aggressor Commander to withdraw his units to the Myrtle Beach-Charleston beachhead line. Simultaneously with the Carolina operation, Aggressor forces in the New Brunswick-Nova Scotia-Labrador area started a major offensive west and southwest along the St. Lawrence Valley on 1 August 1951. With many United States units withdrawn to reinforce the beleaguered defenders in the Fort Bragg, N. C., area Aggressor captured Quebec in 15 days. After a temporary cessation in operations, Aggressor resumed the attack on 27 August 1951. By 15 February 1952 an elite mechanized force had reached the vicinity of Watertown, N. Y. United States and allied

forces counterattacked and by 28 February 1952 had pushed the Aggressor force back to the area it had previously occupied.

j. With the advent of the atomic age, Aggressor leaders intensified tactical training in the techniques of employment of chemical, biological, and radiological weapons. United States' suspicions that Aggressor was stockpiling atomic weapons in the Caribbean area were confirmed on 24 September 1951 when an Aggressor aircraft flying in the vicinity of Corpus Christi, Tex., atom-bombed a United States naval convoy. This action proved to be a prelude to the invasion of Texas. Two days later, Aggressor made an airborne and two amphibious landings in Texas. Fanning out from the beachheads and the airhead, Aggressor advanced inland as far as San Antonio by 15 November 1951 against sporadic United States resistance. On 5 April 1952 the Aggressor drive was finally stopped in the Fort Hood, Tex., area where after a battle in which both sides employed tactical atomic weapons, the United States forces routed the invaders. Strengthened United States ground forces and increased United States air power forced an Aggressor withdrawal to the Gulf Coast. This retrograde movement was a master stroke of planning and great credit is due the Aggressor staff officers who planned and supervised the execution of this movement. The bulk of the Aggressor forces were evacuated to Caribbean bases leaving a force believed to be three corps of doggedly determined combatants in the Corpus Christi, Tex., lodgment area.

k. In the spring of 1954 on the pretext that the national honor and the security of the southern frontier of the Aggressor Republic were being violated, elements of two army groups launched an attack on the nations south of the Homeland. This effort, the Southern Liberation Campaign, was a two-pronged offensive personally directed by the head of the Trinity, Emil Deutsch. Elements of Army Group West provided the right arm of the pincers and Army Group East furnished troops and field command of the left arm. After a masterful campaign, which lasted about three-quarters of a year, these underdeveloped, sparsely-populated, and dis-united countries were finally subjected. Circle Trigonist elements within their midsts rose to the top in the governments of the invaded states and requested annexation and incorporation into the Aggressor Republic. This the Trinity magnanimously granted. Aggressor Naval Forces played a very important role in the Southern Liberation Campaign, especially in the preparatory phases in early 1954. Naval intelligence agencies laid the foundation for both the military and the political aspects of the annexation. Amphibious units from the Naval Infantry (Aggressor Marines) and several regiments of Naval Aviation made valuable




Figure 60. Aggressor occupied areas in the United States and Canada.

contributions to the overall success of the operation. At the termination of the campaign, a new army group, Army Group South, was established to command the armed forces in the new territories and to conscript and train recruits from these areas. The establishment of military and naval districts has not been determined at this time, nor has the position of the Home Command and the Replacement Training Army been ascertained with any degree of certainty.

369. Social Structure

a. Population. When first established Aggressor had a population of 100,000,000. With the acquisition of additional territory during the years between 1949 and 1954, the number of Aggressor-controlled people was doubled, reaching approximately 200,000,000. Strong efforts were adopted to increase the population by raising the normal birth rate. Because scientists, soldiers, and professional men of all types were receiving preferential treatment, many migrated from adjacent countries to Aggressor.

b. Language and Religion. Esperanto has been adopted as the official language. Although it has not fully supplanted the native tongues of the local areas, it is expected to do so in the course of a few generations. Nearly complete religious freedom is enjoyed by all sects and denominations which support the Aggressor Nation. Aggressor agents have infiltrated various religious organizations abroad to further their own national propaganda.

c. Form of Government.

- (1) Control in government is centralized and vested in three key members of the Circle Trigon Party, commonly referred to as the "Trinity." Initially, the personalities comprising the "Trinity" were Martin Bormann, Tito Farruchi, and Pilar Cordoba, each having equal authority. Consistent reverses in campaigns against the United States, coupled with economic pressures, resulted in political and social unrest within the Homeland. In early 1953 it was apparent that the members of the "Trinity" were no longer content with the equal division of power previously established. A struggle for supremacy took place and by June 1953, the hitherto little known Circle Trigonist, Emil Deutsch, former Secretary of the Central Committee of the Circle Trigon Party had emerged as the supreme head of the Aggressor Nation and the "Trinity."
- (2) Deutsch leaned heavily upon the military to retain his newly won position and in carrying out a bloody purge of the Central Committee. The most significant aspect of this purge

was the elimination of Pilar Cordoba, the former police chief. His replacement in that position is Tito Farruchi. Cordoba's place in the "Trinity" was filled by Deutsch. The strong military influence in the government resulted further in the far-reaching reorganization of the armed forces that is discussed in appropriate subsequent chapters.

- (3) The "Trinity" coordinates the activities of the Circle Trigon Party in other countries with the political and military activities of the Aggressor Nation. This coordination is accomplished through a Central Committee of Circle Trigonists who are selected from the party because of their outstanding record of devotion and loyalty to the principle of world domination, as advocated by the Party's doctrine. The committee is dominated by members from the Homeland; however, party members from countries not under military or political control of Aggressor also may be members of the Central Committee.
- (4) The government, completely totalitarian in form, had demonstrated a tendency towards bureaucracy. It is subject to the advantages and disadvantages normally accompanying totalitarianism. All phases of national life are directed toward a common end—the execution of the plans of Emil Deutsch and the "Trinity." Through indoctrination and training the government seeks to encourage initiative and foster confidence in the principle of world domination. Conversely, the strict control and preferential treatment of party members in government tends to hamper initiative and instill distrust in the rank and file.
- (5) Functions of government are marked by impressive ritual and an air of mystery. Strict discipline and party loyalty is required for government service. These factors had had a strong appeal to many classes of people in the country.

d. Industry.

- (1) Emphasis has been placed upon the development of national industry. With previously existing factories as a nucleus, industry has been expanded and dispersed, according to a well-conceived plan of development, and integrated into a centralized system controlled by a bureau of the government.
- (2) The nation's war potential has been extensively strengthened. The research into and manufacture of atomic weapons and their subsequent utilization in the Texas campaign indicates progress in nuclear physics. Based on known facts, it is logical to assume that Aggressor has been able to manufac-

ture and stockpile a limited number of nuclear weapons. Continued development and improvement of atomic weapons is taking place and it is believed that Aggressor will have a substantial stockpile of these and related weapons in 1955.

- (3) All industrial activity is closely coordinated with the needs of the armed forces. The continued expansion of industry since World War II has raised the industrial potential of Aggressor almost to the level of the United States.

. *Aggressor Manpower.*

- (1) The nation's manpower, including women, has been registered and graded by mental and physical profiles. In selection for the Armed Forces the most intelligent recruits are assigned to the Armored Forces, the Air Force, the Navy, the Engineers and, to a lesser extent, to the Artillery. Infantry recruits are carefully selected for physical stamina and stolid temperament, fusilier units being favored with a strong percentage of the better men. Careful screening and selection of personnel to provide technical skills in industry is also accomplished by this system of registration. Those not qualified for professional or technical skills and who have been rejected by the Armed Forces generally are employed by the government as common labor in regimented labor organizations.
- (2) Women provide a high percentage of personnel throughout the Medical and Signal Corps. In time of war, they are assigned in large numbers to quartermaster and ordnance units, and as civilian labor details under the supervision of Engineer Labor Battalions.
- (3) Aggressor citizens whose loyalty to the state is questionable are not permitted to enter the Armed Forces. When such persons arrive at the age of induction into the service, they are sent to labor camps in which they serve without pay for twice the normal induction period.

CHAPTER 14

REFERENCE DATA

370. Weapons Tables

The following data on Aggressor weapons are included as a guide for general information and planning purposes. Included as information are the characteristics of individual weapons, such as hand guns and hand grenades, machineguns, mortars, rocket launchers, field artillery, antiaircraft weapons, and antitank weapons. There is also a comparative table of United States, Aggressor, and other foreign weapons.

Table XLVI. Aggressor Individual Weapons and Machineguns

Weapon	Cal in MM	MV in ft/sec	Eff range in yds	Length in in.	Wt in lbs	Rate of fire in rds/min	Mag cap in rds
Pistol.....	11	1,000	50	10 (overall) 5 (barrel)	2	7½ min	7
Submachinegun.....	11	1,500	200	30	9	100	30
Carbine.....	8	2,000	300	36 (overall) 18 (barrel)	5	150	30
Rifle.....	8	2,800	500	41 (overall) 24 (barrel)	9	20	8
Light machinegun.....	8	2,800	900	48	25	250	Belts of 125 or 250.
Heavy machinegun.....	8	2,800	1,500	48	90	400	Belt of 250.
Antiaircraft machinegun.....	12.5	2,800	3,000	60	350	400	Belts of 100 or 200.
Antipersonnel grenade.....	2-in. diam- eter.	-----	50	7.5	1.5		
Antitank grenade.....	3-in. diam- eter.	-----	20	12.5	3		

Table XLVII. Weight Classification of Aggressor Artillery-Type Weapons

Type	Light	Medium	Heavy	Super-heavy
Mortars.....	50-mm 80-mm	105-mm 120-mm	150-mm	
Howitzers.....	80-mm (pack)	120-mm (Div) 150-mm (Corps)	200-mm	
Gun-howitzers.....		150-mm		
Guns.....	80-mm	105-mm (Fld/AT) 120-mm	150-mm 200-mm 300-mm (12-tube)	800-mm
Rocket launchers.....		150-mm (16-tube)		
Antitank guns.....	¹ 80-mm RL ² 80-mm RR 80-mm gun	105-mm (Fld/AT)		
Antiaircraft guns.....	20-mm 40-mm 80-mm	80-mm	120-mm	
Self-propelled guns.....	80-mm	105-mm	150-mm (gun-how)	
Tank guns.....	³ 80-mm how	80-mm	120-mm	

¹ Rocket launcher.

² Recoilless rifle.

³ TA20/80H amphibious tank.

Table XLVIII. Aggressor Mortars and Artillery Rocket Launchers

Weapon	Cal in MM	M V in ft/sec	Eff range in yds	Length of tube in in.	Wt of weapon in lbs	Rate of fire in rds/min	Wt of proj in lbs
a. MORTARS							
Airborne mortar.....	50		100-900	24	35	30	3
Light mortar.....	80	700	100-3, 500	48	125	20	8
Mtn mortar.....	105	900	250-6, 500	60	375	15	20
Medium mortar.....	120	900	500-7, 000	60	600	10	35
Heavy mortar.....	150		500, 5, 500		2,000	5	75
b. ROCKET LAUNCHERS				No. of tubes	Mount	Time to reload	Wt of proj in lbs
Medium rocket.....	150		10, 000	16	3-ton truck	10 min	90
Heavy rocket.....	300		5, 000	12	3-ton truck	15 min	200

Table XLIX. Aggressor Conventional Artillery Pieces

Weapon	Cal in MM	MV in ft/sec	Max eff range in yds	Length of tube in in.	Wt in lbs	Rate of fire in rds/min	Wt of proj in lbs
Light howitzer.....	80	1,500	10,000	60	1,500	20.....	14
Light gun.....	80	2,200	14,800	115	2,500	25.....	14
Field/antitank gun.....	105	2,800	23,000	240	7,500	10.....	35
Div M howitzer.....	120	1,700	14,000	105	5,000	8.....	48
Medium gun.....	120	2,600	20,000	220	15,000	5.....	52
Corps M howitzer.....	150	1,700	14,000	150	7,500	6.....	100
Gun-howitzer.....	150	2,100	17,000	177	15,000	5.....	100
Heavy gun.....	150	2,800	25,000	-----	35,000	1.....	100
Heavy howitzer.....	200	2,000	19,000	-----	35,000	1 Rd/2 min..	200
Heavy gun.....	200	2,600	34,000	-----	95,000	1 Rd/3 min..	360
Super heavy gun.....	300	-----	46,000	-----	95,000	1 Rd/10 min..	750

Table L. Aggressor Antiaircraft Weapons

Weapon	Cal in MM	MV in ft/sec	Ver range in ft	Hor range in yds	Length of tube in in.	Wt in lbs	Rate of fire in rds/min	Proj wt in lbs
Antiaircraft machinegun.....	12.5	2,800	5,000	3,000	60 (overall)	350	400	¼
Acft mount.....	12.5	2,800	-----	1,000	60 (overall)	70	800	¼
Airborne antiaircraft gun.....	20	2,800	10,000	5,000	55	1,000	125	¼
Acft mount.....	20	2,800	-----	2,000	55	125	400	½
Light antiaircraft gun.....	40	3,000	20,000	9,000	95	4,500	30	3
Acft mount.....	40	3,000	-----	4,000	95	900	100	3
Medium antiaircraft gun.....	80	2,700	35,000	15,000	185	9,500	15	15
Heavy antiaircraft gun.....	120	2,600	50,000	20,000	220	-----	10	50

Table LI. Aggressor Antitank Weapons
(See Table LIII for Self-Propelled and Tank Guns)

Weapon	Cal in MM	MV in ft/sec	Max range in yds	Armor pene- tration at 90°	Length of tube in in.	Wt in lbs	Rate of fire in rds/min
Antiaircraft machinegun.....	12.5	2,800	3,000	1 in. at 500 yds.	60 (over- all).	350	400
Antitank rocket launcher.....	80	-----	500	10 in. at 500 yds.	60.....	15	
Recoilless antitank weapon.....	80	-----	7,500	4 in. at 1,000 yds.			
Light antitank gun.....	80	3,000	18,000	5 in. at 1,000 yds.	120.....	3,000	25
Medium antitank gun.....	105	2,800	23,000	10 in. at 1,000 yds.	235.....	7,500	10

Table L11. Comparison of Aggressor Weapons With Those of Other Military Powers

Weapon	USA	USSR	UK	Germany ¹	Italy ¹	Japan ¹	Aggressor
<i>a. Small Arms</i>							
Pistol.....	.45"	7.62-mm	.38"	9-mm	9-mm	8-mm	11-mm
SMG.....	.45"	7.62-mm	9-mm	9-mm	9-mm	8-mm	11-mm
Rifle and Carbine.....	.30"	7.62-mm	.303"	7.92-mm	6.5-mm ⁶	6.5-mm	8-mm
AR and LMG.....	.30"	7.62-mm	.303"	7.92-mm	6.5-mm ⁶	7.7-mm	8-mm
Medium and HMG.....	.30"	7.62-mm	7.92-mm	7.92-mm	8-mm ⁶	6.5-mm	8-mm
<i>b. Mortars</i>							
Co mort.....	60-mm	50-mm ¹	2"	50-mm	45-mm	50-mm ⁷	50-mm ^{5 8}
Bn mort.....	81-mm	82-mm	3"	81-mm	81-mm	81-mm ⁶	80-mm
Regl mort.....	4.2"	107-mm ⁸		120-mm			105-mm ^{8 8}
Div mort.....		120-mm	4.2"			90-mm ⁶	120-mm
Corps mort ⁶	4.2"	160-mm		105-mm		105-mm	150-mm
<i>c. Antitank Weapons</i>							
Co AT Wpns.....	3.5" RL ³	14.5-mm AT Rifle ¹	PIAT ⁴	7.92-mm AT Rifle			80-mm RL ²
Bn AT Wpns	57-mm RR ³	<i>Panzerfaust</i> ²		<i>Panzerfaust</i> ²			<i>Panzerfaust</i> ²
	57-mm AT ¹	57-mm AT Gun	40-mm AT Gun ¹	37- or 50-mm AT Gun		37-mm AT Gun	80-mm RR ³
	75- and 105-mm RR ³	82-mm RR	3" AT Gun				
Regl AT Wpns.....	90-mm AT Gun ³	57-mm AT Gun		50- or 75-mm AT Guns.	47-mm AT Gun		80-mm AT Gun
	90-mm Gun Tk	76.2-mm SP Gun					80-mm SP Gun
Div AT Wpns.....	90-mm AT Gun ⁵	85-mm AT Gun	3" AT Gun	75-mm AT Gun	75-mm SP Gun	75-mm Fld Gun	80-mm AT Gun
	90-mm Gun Tk	100-mm SP Gun	120-mm RR ³	75-mm SP Gun	75-mm Fld Gun		80-mm Gun Tk
		85-mm Gun Tk	88-mm Gun Tk				105-mm SP Gun
Corps AT Wpns ⁶	120-mm Gun Tk	100-mm AT Gun	3" AT Gun	88-mm Gun Tk	90-mm SP Gun	75-mm SP Gun	105-mm AT Gun
		152-mm SP Gun	120-mm Gun Tk	88-mm AT Gun			150-mm SP Gun
		122-mm Gun Tk		128-mm SP Gun			120-mm Gun Tk

d. Antiaircraft Weapons		e. Conventional Artillery		f. Artillery Rocket Launchers	
Bn AAA	50" MG	12.7-mm MG	20-mm MG	12.5-mm MG	12.5-mm MG
Regt AAA	50" MG	12.7-mm MG	20-mm MG	20-mm MG	20-mm MG
Div AAA	Quad 50" MG	12.7-mm MG	88-mm Gun	75-mm Gun	40-mm AW
	Dual 40-mm AW	37-mm AW	4.7" Gun	105-mm Gun	40-mm AW
Corps	75-mm Gun	37-mm AW		105-mm Gun	80-mm Gun
AAA	90-mm Gun	85-mm Gun			
	120-mm Gun				
Bn Art'y	105-mm How	76.2-mm Gun	75-mm How	70-mm How	80-mm Gun
Regt Art'y		76.2-mm How	105-mm How	75-mm How	80-mm How
Div L Art'y	75-mm How	76.2-mm Gun	105-mm G/H	75-mm Gun	80-mm Gun
	105-mm How			75-mm Gun	
Div M Art'y	155-mm	122-mm How		100-mm How	120-mm How
Corps Art'y	155-mm Gun	122-mm Gun	4.5" Gun	105-mm G/H	120-mm Gun
	8" How	150-mm How	8" How	149-mm How	130-mm How
	240-mm How	150-mm G/H			150-mm G/H
L Rkt L	82-mm, 48 Tube		75-mm, 28 Tube		150-mm, 18 Tube
M Rkt L	132-mm, 16 Tube		105-mm, 6 Tube		
	4.5"		110-m, 5 Tube		
Hv Rkt L	305-mm, 12 Tube		280-mm, 6 Tube		300-mm, 21 Tube
			320-mm, 6 Tube		

6 Airborne.

⁶ Extremely Variable.

? Grenade Discharger.

8 Mountain Units.

WWW II.

2 Rkt Launcher.

Recoilless Rifle.

Projector, Inf, A.T.

371. Vehicular Data

This paragraph consists of data on the performance and characteristics of Aggressor military vehicles, both wheeled and tracked, combat and administrative. It includes tanks, self-propelled guns, armored cars, amphibian vehicles, motor sleds, tractors, trucks, cars, and motorcycles.

Table LIII. Aggressor Armored Fighting Vehicles

Armored fighting vehicles	Main armament caliber type	Muzzle vel in ft/sec	Maxi- mum range in yards	Armor penetration at 90°	Total wt in tons	Cruising radius in miles	Armor thickness in inches
<i>a. Tanks</i>							
Amphibious Tank T A20/80 H.....	80 Howitzer.....	1,500	7,500	1 inch at 1,000 yds.....	20	150 (land)..... 100 (water).....	½ to 1 in.
Medium Tk T40/80.....	80 Gun.....	300	18,000	5 inches at 1,000 yds.....	40	175.....	1 to 4 in.
T40/Flamethrower.....	Turret Mtd Flth.....	n/a	50-150	n/a.....	40	175.....	1 to 4 in.
Heavy Tk T50/120.....	120 Gun.....	2,600	20,000	6 inches at 2,000 yds.....	50	150.....	2 to 6 in.
<i>b. Self-Propelled Guns</i>							
SP-80.....	80 Gun.....	2,200	14,000	3 inches at 1,000 yds.....	20	200.....	1 to 2 in.
SP-105.....	105 Gun.....	2,800	20,000	10 inches at 1,000 yds.....	35	175.....	1 to 4 in.
SP-150.....	150 Hv Gun.....	2,100	10,000	5 inches at 1,000 yds.....	50	150.....	1 to 4 in.
<i>c. Other Vehicles</i>							
Armored Motor Sled.....	12.5 Machinegun.....	2,800	3,000	1 inch at 500 yds.....	2	50.....	¼
KO-5-Armored Car.....	12.5 Machinegun.....	2,800	3,000	1 inch at 500 yds.....	5	250.....	¼ to ½

Modified Handling Authorized

Modified Handling Authorized

Table LIV. Aggressor Cargo and Passenger Vehicles

Type	Payload in tons	Gross wt in tons	Crew	Personnel capacity (less crew)	Suspension	Cruising range in miles
<i>a. Passenger Vehicles</i>						
Motorcycle, solo.....	1/8	1/4	1	---	2 x 1.....	250.
Motorcycle, dual.....	1/4	1/2	1	1	3 x 1.....	125.
Car, passenger.....	1/4	1 1/2	1	5	4 x 2.....	200.
Car, recon.....	1/4	1 1/2	1	4	4 x 4.....	175.
<i>b. Trucks</i>						
Light truck.....	1	4	1	9	4 x 4.....	200.
Medium truck.....	3	8	1	20	6 x 6.....	200.
Heavy truck.....	5	15	1	25	6 x 6.....	150.
<i>c. Tractors</i>						
Light tractor.....	5	10	1	15	Full track.....	150.
Medium tractor.....	10	20	1	20	Full track.....	150.
Heavy tractor.....	20	40	1	25	Full track.....	150.
<i>d. Special Vehicles</i>						
Amphibious tractor.....	5	15	2	20	Full track and floating.....	100 (water) 150 (land).
Motor sled.....	1	2	1	9	Skis.....	50.

Table LIV. Aggressor Cargo and Passenger Vehicles—Continued

Type	Payload in tons	Gross wt in tons	Crew	Personnel capacity (less crlwr)	Suspension	Cruising range in miles
<i>e. Trailers</i>						
Light trailer-----	1/2	3/4	-----	6	Prime mover-----	
Medium trailer-----	1	1 1/2	-----	10	Car, recon-----	
Heavy trailer-----	2	4	-----	16	Light truck-----	
Ammo trailer-----	4	6 1/2	-----	-----	Medium truck-----	
					Medium and heavy truck-----	
					Light, medium, and heavy trac- tor.	
Tracked trailer-----	6	9	-----	18	Light, medium, and heavy trac- tor.	

372. Aircraft Data

This paragraph contains information concerning assignment of aircraft to air units, comparison of Aggressor air units with United States air units, and Aggressor aircraft characteristics.

Table LV. Strength of Aggressor Air Units

Unit	Aircraft strength	Equivalent United States command	Unit	Aircraft strength	Equivalent United States command
Air Army-----	800-1, 500	Air Command	Artillery Spotter Regiment-----	70	Group
Fighter Corps-----	400	Air Force	Fighter Squadron-----	12	Squadron
Bomber Corps-----	290	Air Force	Bomber Squadron-----	9	Squadron
Ground Attack Corps-----	400	Air Force	Ground Attack Squadron-----	12	Squadron
Fighter Division-----	130	Wing	Reconnaissance Squadron-----	12	Squadron
Bomber Division-----	95	Wing	Artillery Spotter Squadron-----	17	Squadron
Ground Attack Division-----	130	Wing	Fighter Flight-----	4	Flight
Fighter Regiment-----	40	Group	Bomber Flight-----	3	Flight
Bomber Regiment-----	30	Group	Ground Attack Flight-----	4	Flight
Ground Attack Regiment-----	40	Group	Reconnaissance Flight-----	4	Flight
Reconnaissance Regiment-----	54	Group	Artillery Spotter Flight-----	4	Flight

Table LVI. Characteristics of Aggressor Aircraft

Type	Aircraft	Engines (No. and type)	Max speed	Max range	Max comb radius	Armament
Fighter	Bat-7	Single jet	582 knots/hr	935 nm ¹	315 nm	2 x 20-mm cannon 1 x 40-mm cannon
	Bat-6	Single piston	355 knots/hr	1,100 nm	440 nm	4 x 20-mm cannon
	Bat-6-E ²	Single piston	355 knots/hr	1,100 nm	440 nm	3 x 20-mm cannon
Ground attack	AT-2	Single piston	235 knots/hr	400 nm	160 nm	2 x 20-mm cannon 4 x 12.5-mm MG 2 x 500 lb bombs or 4 x 250 lb bombs
	AT-3	Single piston ³	235 knots/hr	400 nm	170 nm	2 x 20-mm cannon 4 x 12.5 MG ³ 8 x 150-mm rockets and 4 x 250 lb bombs
	Malbom-9	Twin piston	257 knots/hr	720 nm	320 nm	5 x 12.5-mm MG 6 x 250 lb bomb (Int) 4 x 250 lb bomb (Ex)
Light bomber	Malbom-10	Twin piston	257 knots/hr	940 nm	400 nm	5 x 20-mm cannon 16 x 250 lb bomb (Int) 4 x 1,000 lb bombs or 2 x 2,000 lb bombs (Ex)
	Malbom-11	Twin jet	455 knots/hr	1,520 nm	690 nm	4 x 20-mm cannon 4 x 2,000 lb bombs
Heavy bomber	Mez bom-2	Four piston	350 knots/hr	3,450 nm	1,700 nm	11 x 20-mm cannon 90 x 250 lb bomb or 22 x 1,000 lb bomb or 11 x 2,000 lb bomb or atomic bomb load
Transport	TP-27	Twin piston	234 knots/hr	1,470 nm	695 nm	7,500 lb payload

¹ Nautical miles. ² Recon version of Bat-6. ³ Capable of carrying combination of rockets and bombs up to 1,500 lbs.

373. Naval Vessel Data

This paragraph contains performance and descriptive data on Aggressor submarines.

Table LVII. Characteristics of Aggressor Submarines

Performance	Type of submarine		
	Standard	Streamlined	Midget
Tonnage.....	1,250.....	1,300.....	32
Length, feet.....	300.....	302.....	45
Draft, feet.....	22.....	22½.....	
Diving depth.....	300.....	300.....	150
Endurance, surfaced.....	18,000 mi at 11 knots.	18,000 mi at 11 knots.	1,000 miles at 4.5 knots.
Maximum surfaced speed.....	17 knots.....	22 knots.....	6.5 knots
Cruising surfaced speed.....	11 knots.....	17 knots.....	4.5 knots
Maximum submerged speed.....	8 knots.....	15 knots.....	6 knots
Cruising submerged speed.....	2.5 knots.....	4.5 knots.....	3 knots
Sea endurance.....	45 days.....	60 days.....	
Turning circle.....	275 yds.....	275 yds.....	
Diving time.....	48 sec.....	48 sec.....	
Torpedoes.....	20.....	20.....	2

374. Logistical Data

This paragraph consists of logistical information for planning and general use.

Table LVIII. Types of Aggressor Supplies and the Agencies Responsible for Their Procurement and Issue

Responsible individual or agency	Type of supplies
<i>Rear services</i>	
Chief of Rear Services.....	General supplies.
Main Directorate of Rations and Fodder.	Food, rations, and fodder.
Main Directorate of Fuels and Lubricants.	Fuels and lubricants (POL).
Main Intendance Directorate...	Indiv clothing and equipment.
Main Directorate of Motor Transport.	Transport vehicles.
Main Directorate of Construction.	Military construction material.
Main Directorate of Medical Service.	Med supplies and equipment.
Directorate of Veterinary Service.	Vet supplies and equipment.
<i>Arms and services</i>	
Commander of Artillery.....	Weapons and ammunition.
Commander of Tank and Mechanized Troops.	Tank and armored forces equipment, including self-propelled guns.
Chief of Engineer Troops.....	Engineer tools and equipment.
Chief of Signal Troops.....	Signal and communications equipment.
Chief of Chemical Warfare Troops.	Chemical warfare supplies, including pyrotechnics.

375. Time and Space Factors

a. Calculations. Tables LIX, LX, and LXI give time and space factors for units of the rifle, mechanized, and tank divisions respectively. If the strength in personnel and vehicles of units other than those shown in the tables is known, time and space factors for those units may be readily determined through use of basic road spaces.

b. Explanation of Factors. Factors given herein are based on a sound analysis of Aggressor marching capabilities under the following conditions:

- (1) Favorable weather and terrain.
- (2) Troops physically fit and trained in the type of march which is under consideration.
- (3) Road marches made on average improved roads.

(4) No interference with march as a result of hostile air or mechanized threat or action.

c. Foot Troops. The following factors for foot troops are based on an average distance of 2 yards between men for route marches and 5 yards for tactical marches.

Formation	Yards per man	
	Route march	Tactical march
Single file.....	3.0	6.0
Column of two's.....	1.5	3.0
Column of three's.....	1.2	2.0
Column of four's.....	1.0	1.5

d. Vehicles. The following road spaces are the lengths to the nearest yard of individual vehicles commonly employed by Aggressor.

Vehicle	Road space, yards
Car, armored.....	5
Car, passenger.....	4
Motorecycle.....	3
Tanks and self-propelled guns:	
Heavy.....	11
Heavy, with towed load.....	15
Medium.....	10
Medium, with towed load.....	14
Light.....	9
Light, with towed load.....	13
Tractor, heavy, with towed load.....	10
Tractor, medium, with towed load.....	9
Tractor, light, with towed load.....	8
Car, reconnaissance.....	4
Car, reconnaissance, with towed load.....	7
Light truck.....	5
Light truck, with towed load.....	9
Medium and heavy truck, with towed load.....	11
Average per vehicle in mixed column.....	8

e. Use of Basic Road Space Tables.

- (1) A battalion of 603 men marching under tactical conditions in a column of two's will occupy a road space of 603×3.0 (*c* above) = 1,809 yards.
- (2) To determine the road space of a column of vehicles—
 - (a) Multiply the number of each type of vehicle by the road space (*d* above) of each vehicle of that type.
 - (b) Add the products thus obtained.
 - (c) Multiply the distance in yards between vehicles by the total number of vehicles less one.
 - (d) Add (*a*) and (*b*).

- (e) An alternative and more rapid solution is to substitute for steps (a) and (b) above the multiplication of the average length per vehicle in a mixed column (8 yd), by the total number of vehicles and add the resultant product to the total distance in yards between vehicles (step (c) above).
- (3) Normally the distance in yards between vehicles will equal the speedometer reading (miles per hour) multiplied by a speedometer multiplier (SM) of 2 for night marches and an SM of 4 for daylight marches.

Column....	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Line	Type unit	Rate of march mph ¹				Lengths of march on road (daily average) ²	Forced march ³
		On roads		Cross country			
		Day	Night	Day	Night		
1	Foot troops ⁴ -----	3	2½	2	1½	30	45
2	Cavalry and pack ⁵ -----	4	3½	3	2	40	60
3	Artillery, towed-----	20	15	10	6	200	300
4	Mortorized ⁶ -----	20	15	10	6	200	300
5	Tanks and SP Guns ⁷ -----	12	8	6	4	120	180
6	Armored car-----	25	15	10	6	250	375
7	Ambulances-----	25	15	10	6	190-220	300-350

¹ Rate of march is average speed over a period of time including halts.

² Average day's march is 10 hours.

³ Forced march is calculated at average rates for 15 hours' marching time.

⁴ For movement over mountainous terrain, add 1 hour for each 1,000 feet of climb or 1,500 feet for descent.

⁵ Includes cavalry divisions.

⁶ Includes infantry divisions (motorized).

⁷ Includes tank and mechanized divisions.

g. Fixed Time-Distance Schedule. Motor or foot movements are employed in accordance with fixed time-distance schedules as follows: for distance of 20 miles or over, rifle battalions and regiments normally move by motor; and 40 miles or over, rifle divisions move by motor. If distances to be traveled by the unit are less than the foregoing, shuttling is employed. However, rifle battalions and companies without vehicles may be given transportation over shorter distances.

h. Marches in Snow. Foot troops marching in snow will have their rate of march decreased for a degree dependent on the varying nature and depth of the snow. Normally, snow of 2 feet or more in depth will prevent foot marches unless skis or snowshoes are used.

For troops equipped with skis or snowshoes and adequately trained in their use, the following rates of march are applicable:

- Snowshoes----- 2½ miles per hour.
- Skis----- 3½ miles per hour.

(Small bodies of well-trained troops are capable of moving 40 miles a day on skis under favorable conditions.)

- (1) Average dog teams of seven dogs hauling a 500-pound load are capable of moving at a rate of from 5 to 7 miles per hour for from 6 to 7 hours daily, the average day's march being approximately 39 miles.
- (2) Cavalry and pack units' rates of march are decreased in the same manner as those of foot troops. Normally, a depth of 3 feet or more of snow will prevent movement of this type of unit for any considerable time.
- (3) Wheeled motor movements can be made on roads and, to a restricted degree, across country, depending on the terrain. However, special measure to permit movement must be adopted.

<i>Snow depth, inches</i>	<i>Measures required for movement</i>
3-----	None.
6-----	Chains on rear wheels.
6-18-----	Chains all-round; special traction grouzers on trail-breaking vehicles.
18 and over-----	Snowplow.

- (4) Tracked vehicles are not impeded to any appreciable degree by new fallen snow up to 2 feet in depth. Icing conditions or layers of crusted snow may require the use of tank dozers or snowplows.

i. Rules for Calculating Aggressor Capabilities. Following are rules for calculating Aggressor capabilities:

- (1) Starting time and place are time and place unit was last reported.
- (2) Select logical point unit must reach to start a particular course of action.
- (3) March distance is distance from (1) to (2) above.
- (4) Arrival time is starting time plus march time plus closing time. This total time is rounded off to the nearest five minutes. In case of a withdrawal, closing time is not computed. In case of a piecemeal action, compute the arrival time of the nearest Aggressor unit that can *initiate* the action; closing time is not computed.
- (5) Compute foot marching time for reinforcements for all distances; compute motor marching time as indicated in *g*

above. If a unit is observed in trucks, compute only the motor marching time.

- (6) Consider a foot march of over 30 miles as a forced march; use forced march rates in *f* above.
- (7) Consider motor march of over 200 miles as a forced march for motorized rifle units and over 120 miles as a forced march for tank and mechanized units. This *cannot* be continued indefinitely but must be adjusted to actual conditions.
- (8) At the beginning of morning nautical twilight (BMNT) (FM 101-10), if the column is not closing, change the rate of march from night to day. If the column is in the process of closing at BMNT, continue to close the column at the night rate of march.
- (9) At the end of evening nautical twilight (EENT) (FM 101-10), if the column is not closing, change the rate of march from day to night. If the column is in the process of closing at EENT, continue to close the column at the day rate of march.
- (10) To move an Aggressor rifle or mechanized rifle battalion, move and close entire unit.
- (11) To move an Aggressor rifle or mechanized rifle regiment, move and close two battalions (except when part of a division movement (12) and (14) below).
- (12) To move an Aggressor rifle division, move and *close two entire rifle regiments*.
- (13) To move an Aggressor tank regiment, move and close entire unit.
- (14) To move an Aggressor tank or mechanized division, move and close *two-thirds of divisions time length*.
- (15) When a unit is less than full strength, close it as though full strength—irrespective of the amount of shortage.
- (16) In determining the *when* of an Aggressor capability, consider that the unit is ready for coordinated action when the rules listed in (10) through (15) above have been complied with.

Table LIX. Aggressor Rifle Division, Time and Space Factors

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17
Units	Personnel	Organic motor vehicles (includes all vehicles)	Men on foot	Road space (mi) (route march)			Time length (min)						Additional vehicles when troops to carry foot moves by truck	Time length (min)		
				Men on foot (column of two's)	Vehicles in march column		Vehicles in march column							Close column 45 vpm ¹ (15 mph)	Open column 20 vpm ¹ (20 mph)	
					Close column 45 vpm ¹ (15 mph)	Open column 20 vpm ¹ (20 mph)										
																1 mph
2 Rifle Division.....	11,957	1,859	3,780	3.2	41.3	93.0	192	128	96	77	165.2	279.0	189	2,048	182	308
3 Rifle Regt (each).....	2,273	220	1,260	1.1	4.9	11.0	66	44	33	27	19.6	33.0	63	283	25	43
4 Rifle Bn (each).....	603	37	420	0.4	0.8	1.9	24	16	12	10	3.2	5.7	21	58	5	9
5 Divisional Arty.....	2,435	429			9.5	21.5					38.0	64.5		429	38	64
6 Light Gun Regt.....	609	114			2.5	5.7					10.0	17.1		114	10	17
7 Medium How Regt.....	856	141			3.1	7.1					12.4	21.3		141	12	21
8 Heavy Mortar Bn.....	292	43			0.9	2.2					3.6	6.6		43	3	6
9 Light AA Bn.....	315	43			0.9	2.2					3.6	6.6		43	3	6
10 Light AT Bn.....	248	43			0.9	2.2					3.6	6.6		43	3	6
11 Motorcycle Bn.....	354	109			2.4	5.5					9.6	16.5		109	9	16
12 Medium Tank Regt.....	698	196			4.4	9.8					17.6	29.4		196	17	29
13 Engineer Bn.....	368	58			1.3	2.9					5.2	8.7		58	5	8
14 Signal Bn.....	297	61			1.4	3.1					5.6	9.3		61	5	9
15 Other.....	986	341			7.6	17.1					36.0	51.3		341	36	51

¹ Vpm—vehicles per mile.

Modified Handling Authorized

Modified Handling Authorized

Table LX. Aggressor Mechanized Division, Time and Space Factors

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Units	Personnel	Organic motor vehicles (includes all vehicles)	Road space (mi)		Time length (min)	
			Vehicles in march column		Vehicles in march column	
			Close column 45 vpm. ¹ (15 mph)	Open column 20 vpm. ¹ (20 mph)	Close column 45 vpm. ¹ (15 mph)	Open column 20 vpm. ¹ (20 mph)
1 Mecz Div.....	13,948	2,657	59.0	132.9	236	399
2 Mecz Rifle Regt (each).....	2,387	357	8.0	17.9	32	54
3 Mtz Rifle Bn (each).....	492	54	1.2	2.7	5	8
4 M Tk Bn.....	242	54	1.2	2.7	5	8
5 M Tk Regt.....	1,484	323	7.2	16.2	29	48
6 M Tk Bn (each).....	162	41	0.9	2.1	4	6
7 Mtz Rifle Bn.....	492	54	1.2	2.7	5	8
8 Hv SP Gun Bn.....	174	45	1.0	2.3	4	7
9 Hv Tk & SP Gun Regt.....	1,243	265	5.9	13.3	24	40
10 L SP Gun Bn.....	174	44	1.0	2.2	4	7
11 Hv Tk Bn (each).....	174	44	1.0	2.2	4	7
12 SMG Bn.....	316	18	0.4	0.9	2	4
13 Divisional Arty.....	1,919	392	8.7	19.6	35	59
14 M How Regt.....	609	114	2.5	5.7	10	17
15 M Mort Regt.....	609	126	2.8	6.3	11	19
16 M Rkt Bn.....	199	56	1.2	2.8	5	8
17 L AA Regt.....	377	51	1.1	2.6	5	8
18 Motorcycle Bn.....	455	130	2.9	6.5	12	20
19 Engr Bn.....	368	55	1.2	2.8	5	8
20 Sig Bn.....	277	65	1.4	3.3	6	10
21 Others.....	1,041	356	8.0	17.8	32	53

¹ Vpm—vehicles per mile.

Table LXI. Aggressor Tank Division, Time and Space Factors

1	Unit	2	3	4		5	6	7
				Road space (mi)		Time length (min)		
				Vehicles in march column		Vehicles in march column		
				Close column 45 vpm ¹ 15 mph	Open column 20 vpm ¹ 20 mph	Close column 45 vpm ¹ 15 mph	Open column 20 vpm ¹ 20 mph	
1	Tk Div	11, 552	2, 466	54.8	123.3	219	370	
2	M Tk Regt (each)	1, 484	323	7.2	16.2	29	48	
3	Hv Tk and Sp Gun Regt	1, 243	265	5.9	13.3	24	40	
4	Mtz Rifle Regt	2, 136	303	6.7	15.2	27	45	
5	Divisional Arty	1, 518	323	7.2	16.2	29	48	
6	M How Bn	270	45	1.0	2.3	4	7	
7	L AA Regt	377	51	1.1	2.6	5	8	
8	M Mort Regt	609	126	2.8	6.3	11	19	
9	M Rkt Bn	199	56	3.5	7.8	14	23	
10	Mtrl Bn	455	130	2.9	6.5	12	20	
11	Engr Bn	368	55	1.2	2.8	5	8	
12	Sig Bn	277	65	1.4	3.3	6	10	
13	Other	1, 041	356	8.0	17.8	32	53	

¹ Vpm—vehicles per mile.

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